Dharma and the enjoined subject: Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras and the study of ritual by Ngaihte, Samuel
 
 
 
‘Dharma and the Enjoined Subject:  
Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras and the Study of Ritual’ 
OCMS, Ph.D 
July 2018 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an enquiry into the conception of dharma by Jaimini in his 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras with the aim of arguing for its contemporary relevance, particularly for 
the scholarship on ritual. It seeks to do this by offering a hermeneutical re-reading of the 
text, primarily by investigating the theme of the relationship between subjectivity and 
tradition in the discussion about dharma, and bringing it into conversation with 
contemporary discourses on ritual.  
The central argument that is proposed in this thesis, based on this re-reading, is that 
Jaimini’s conception of dharma can be read as a philosophy of Vedic practice that is 
centred on the enjoinment of the subject, whose stages of transformation can be seen to 
possess the structure of a hermeneutic tradition. This argument, which places 
subjectivity and tradition at the heart of the explanation of Vedic practice, is then 
discussed with the scholarship on ritual in order to indicate its contemporary relevance. 
Therefore, the explication of the central argument, which is based upon the insights 
gleaned from this hermeneutical re-reading of Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras, will be broken 
down into two main aims. The first aim will attempt to demonstrate that the significance 
of Jaiminian enquiry lies in its conception of dharma as an embodied traditionary 
practice that possesses the structure of a hermeneutic tradition. The second aim will 
attempt to demonstrate that this re-reading of Jaimini’s enquiry can offer both 
substantive and methodological insights to the contentions within the contemporary 
study of ritual. Jaimini’s conception of dharma enables me to introduce the notion of 
subjectivity at the heart of the explanation of ritual and allows the possibility of re-
imagining a way beyond the reductionist explanations of ritual in contemporary 
scholarship. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
MAPPING THE JOURNEY 
PRELIMINARY BACKGROUND 
The Pūrvamīmāṃsā, 1  which is based on Jaimini’s seminal text known as the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras, is a school of thought in Indian philosophy whose stature and nature of 
enquiry, particularly in light of its close connection with the elaborate practice of 
sacrifice in late Vedic times, has been a point of contention. The Mīmāṃsā has been 
generally observed in modern scholarship as a system of thought or a body of doctrines 
that is a ‘reasoned investigation of the earliest portions of the Veda’,2 a ‘science of 
interpreting sentences’3 and a ‘scholastic tradition’ that is ‘dedicated to the study of the 
language of the veda’4 ; however, it has also been simultaneously dismissed as an 
‘orthodox’ tradition that is contemporarily irrelevant,5 and its credibility as one of the 
ṣaḍ-darśanas6 in Indian philosophy has often been treated with suspicion. As Biderman 
poignantly noted: 
Mīmāṃsā has suffered many contemptuous attacks both in India and the West. It has been 
condemned by “spiritualists” as a sterile, mechanistic, dogmatic ritualism. It has often been 
                                                 
1
 The Pūrvamīmāṃsā is known as ‘prior enquiry’ as opposed to Uttaramīmāṃsā which is known as 
‘posterior enquiry’. The general term commonly used by scholars for the former is Mīmāṃsā and the 
latter is Vedānta. See G Jha, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, ed. S Radhakrishnan, Banaras Hindu 
University Press, Varanasi, 1942, pp. 4-5. Henceforth in this thesis, the term Mīmāṃsā will be used to 
refer to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā. However, one must take note that the nature of the relation between the two 
is still a point of contention. The nature of this contention is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five of 
this thesis. 
2
 GP Bhatt, ‘Mīmāṃsā as a Philosophical System: A Survey’, in RC Dwivedi (ed.), Studies in Mīmāṃsā, 
Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1994, p. 3. 
3
 See GV Devasthali, Mīmāṃsā: The Vakya-śāstra of Ancient India, Bookseller’s Publishing, Bombay, 
1959. See also U Panse, A Reconstruction of the Third School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Sri Satguru, Delhi, 
1989, p. 4. 
4
 J Benson, ‘Introduction’, in Mahādeva Vedāntin, Mīmāṃsānyāyasaṃgraha: A Compendium of the 
Principles of Mīmāṃsā, trans. J Benson, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 2010, p. 11. 
5
 See S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol 2, G Allen & Unwin, London, 1931, pp. 428-429. 
6
 Ṣaḍ-darśana is generally known as the six-systems or six-schools of Indian philosophy namely 
Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. These six-systems are generally known as the 
āstika schools that regard the Veda as authoritative as opposed to the nāstika schools that disregard this 
claim, such as the Buddhists, Ājīvikas and Jains.  
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condemned by philosophers, both Western and Indian, as a rigid, narrow-minded school, whose 
contribution to Indian thought is at best marginal.
7  
The ‘marginal’ interests that have shaped the works of modern scholars, both Eastern 
and Western, which I classify here into two general groups, are particularly noteworthy 
for their lack of clarity about the purpose of Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras and the paucity 
of investigation on the understanding and intelligibility of the Vedic world of sacrifice 
propounded by him. On the one hand, there are those who accept the Mīmāṃsā as a 
philosophical tradition even as they advance an anti-intellectual reading of its main 
theme of ‘ritual’,8 and on the other hand, there are those who take the Mīmāṃsā as an 
exegetical tradition that advances a science of language whose principles can be 
interposed across contexts.  
As a school of Indian philosophy, the Mīmāṃsā system has attracted very little attention 
in comparison to the other schools of thought. Garge argues that modern scholars on 
Indian philosophy have largely neglected the Mīmāṃsā system, and maintains that the 
number of scholars engaged in the field indicates that the Mīmāṃsā is one of the ‘less 
favoured darśanas’ within Indian philosophy.9 According to him, those who do study 
the Mīmāṃsā system seek to introduce new themes while disregarding the ritual 
concerns as orthodox and redundant.
10
  Keith writes:  
                                                 
7
 See S Biderman, Scripture and Knowledge: An Essay on Religious Epistemology, Brill, Leiden, 1995, p. 
183. Wilhelm Halbfass, Karl Potter, Surendranath Dasgupta and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan are scholars 
whose works are typical of the general philosophical attitude towards Mīmāṃsā i.e. an attitude that takes 
the doctrine to be predominantly mechanistic and ritualistic and therefore unworthy of serious 
philosophical discussion. 
8
 Arnold suggests that the Mīmāṃsā is discussed under the rubric of Indian ‘philosophy’ only because it 
is generally taken as ‘one of the six “orthodox” schools’ of Indian thought, but it has never been taken as 
a system of thought that has seriously contributed any ‘philosophical’ relevance. See D Arnold, ‘Of 
Intrinsic Validity: A Study on the Relevance of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā’, Philosophy East and West, vol. 51, no. 
1, 2001, p. 26. 
9
 DV Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute, 
Poona, 1952, p. v.  
10
 Garge argues that this is a tendency that is recognizable even amongst early commentators such as 
Kumārila and Prabhākara, who in their engagements with Śabara’s Bhāṣya, dwelled at great lengths on 
topics such as the idea of ‘god’, the ‘reality of the external world’, ‘mokṣa’, even as they sought to 
establish the Mīmāṃsā as a darśana in light of the new Nyāya and Vedāntic insights, which often 
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The details of the discussions have necessarily little value; they deal with incidents of sacrifices, 
which flourished only in the early days of the history of Mīmāṃsā, and in many cases the labor 
devoted to their investigation cannot but seem to us mis-spent.
11
 
Kane best captures the sense of this prevailing general attitude towards the Mīmāṃsā: 
The doctrines of the early and principal writers on Pūrva Mīmāṃsā are rather quaint and 
startling. Their arguments about the eternality and self-existence of the Veda are fallacious and 
were not accepted even by other ancient Indian systems. Both Prabhākara and Kumārila have in 
their scheme no place for God as the dispenser of rewards or as the ruler of man’s destiny as 
being pleased with men’s prayers. They do not expressly deny the existence of God, but they 
assign to god or the deities mentioned in the Vedic texts a secondary role or rather practically no 
role at all. They raise yajña to the position of God and their dogmas about yajña seem to be 
based upon a sort of commercial or business-like system, viz. one should do so many acts, 
dispense gifts to priests, offer certain offerings, observe certain ethical rules and other rules of 
conduct (such as not eating flesh, subsisting on milk) and then the reward would follow without 
the intervention of God. There is hardly any appeal to religious emotions, there is no omniscient 
being, no Creator and no creation of the world.
12
  
The little that has been written about Mīmāṃsā in Radhakrishnan’s Indian Philosophy 
(Vol 2) deals chiefly with the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the system, 
without any discussion about Jaimini’s reflection on Vedic practice: 
It is unnecessary to say much about the unsatisfactory character of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā as a 
system of philosophy. As a philosophical view of the universe it is strikingly incomplete. It did 
not concern itself with the problems of ultimate reality and its relation to the world of souls and 
matter. Its ethics was purely mechanical and its religion was unsound.
13
  
Dasgupta mentions that the Mīmāṃsā cannot be properly spoken of as a system of 
philosophy and only gave it cursory attention in his History of Indian Philosophy,
14
 and 
D’Sa argues that ‘the Mīmāṃsā is no more a living system and its name does not 
command much respect even among scholars, some of whom have gone to the extent of 
making it a sort of ancilla of the Uttarā Mīmāṃsā.’15 Dasgupta has stated that the 
Mīmāṃsā school no longer holds any interest even for the student of Indian 
                                                                                                                                               
resulted in the divergence from the main theme of dharma. See Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A 
Study, p. 68. 
11
 AB Keith, The Karma-Mīmāṃsā, 2nd edn, The Heritage of India Series, Delhi, 1978, p. 79. 
12
 PV Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, 2nd edn, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1968, p. 
1217. 
13
 Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol 2, pp. 428-429. 
14
 The Mīmāṃsā receives a much shorter discussion (about one-third) as compared to the discussions 
accorded to the other philosophical schools such as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta. See S Dasgupta, A 
History of Indian Philosophy, vol 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1922, pp. 68-69.  
15
 FX D’Sa, R Mesquita & G Oberhammer, Hermeneutics of Encounter, vol XX, De Nobili Research 
Library, Vienna, 1994, p. 75. 
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philosophy,
16
 and while the accusation might be far-fetched, the Mīmāṃsā school, 
particularly in contrast to the ‘more popular and influential Vedānta school’,17 continues 
to remain a school that is under-studied and under-appreciated, especially as ancient 
‘Vedic sacrifices began to fall into disuse’. 18  Ninian Smart’s assertion promptly 
captures the sense in which the Mīmāṃsā is often dismissed when he states that it is 
‘the most archaic of the orthodoxies of India’.19  
As an exegetical tradition, the Mīmāṃsā discussions concerning the theory of sound and 
language, in light of the resurgence of the problem of hermeneutics and language have 
been explored to a considerable extent. These scholars turned to Śabara’s Bhāṣya 
(commentary) and the works of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on the tarka-pāda (sections on 
reasoning/philosophy) in particular, and sought to uncover a theory of language to 
establish the Mīmāṃsā as an exegetical system. The works of Gachter, Bhat, and Taber 
are a few examples.
20
 These topics then become the central focus of study, which while 
significant in their own terms, have largely taken the theme of ‘language’ and the 
‘principles of interpretation’ out from their sacrificial context, and developed them 
independently as the major contributions of the system. McCrea observes that the 
‘standard practice in general surverys of Mīmāṃsā…has been to draw a sharp 
distinction between “philosophical topics” (i.e. topics dealt with in the tarka-pāda) and  
“Mīmāṃsā topics proper” (i.e. the interpretative questions dealt with in the fifty-nine 
pādas of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra)’ where the latter topics are taken as having ‘minor 
                                                 
16
 Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol 1, p. 406.  
17
 G Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 236.  
18
 G Jha, The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Motilal Banarsidass, Allahabad, 1911, p. 8.  
19
 N Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, Brill, Leiden, 1992 (1966). Quoted in RD 
Sherma & A Sharma (eds), Hermeneutics and Hindu Thought: Towards a Fusion of Horizons, Springer, 
New York, 2008, p. 46. 
20
 Refer J Taber, A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology, Routledge Curzon, London, 2005; O 
Gachter, Hermeneutics and Language in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā: A Study in Śabara Bhāṣya, Motilal 
Banarsidass, Delhi, 1983; S Bhat, Mīmāṃsā in Controversy, New Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi, 
2011. 
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importance’ or are being ignored altogether as unconnected from the rest of the sūtras.21 
The rules and principles found in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras have been emphasized at the 
expense of the study of the system as a whole, and the ritual context within which these 
rules are made intelligible and effective have been sidelined. Within contemporary 
Mīmāṃsā scholarship, the contribution of the Mīmāṃsā understanding on ‘sound’, 
‘word’, ‘grammar’, ‘semiology’, ‘linguistic analysis’ and ‘law’ have each become a 
central focus of study on their own. For example, the 25 essays collected in the 
momentous volume Studies in Mīmāṃsā edited by Dwivedi, have sought to take the 
Mīmāṃsā out of its ritualistic interpretations to make it a part of the ‘global’ philosophy 
of language and religion by classifying it under topics such as ‘epistemology’, 
‘philosophy’, ‘grammar’, ‘meaning’ and ‘language’.22  
The concerns of these two ways of representing the Mīmāṃsā enquiry differ, in that the 
former consigns the Mīmāṃsā as a redundant system because of its perceived 
‘orthodoxy’ and ‘ritualism’, and the latter tries to make the system relevant to the 
contemporary resurgence of interest in the problem of the philosophy of language. 
However, the nature of investigation that prevails in these groups reveal that the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras have largely been taken as a corpus that is already constituted and 
closed, and ostensibly dead. This ‘objectivist’ reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras combined 
with the discarding of the structures of understanding that constituted the enactment of 
Vedic practice, remained distant to the ritualistic conception of dharma that was central 
for Jaimini’s constitution of the Mīmāṃsā. In both these accounts, there seems to be an 
underlying assumption that the nature of Mīmāṃsā enquiry can be discussed apart from 
Jaimini’s central concern of dharma and its ritual context, and that it is only by 
                                                 
21
 L McCrea, ‘The Hierarchical Organization of Language in Mīmāṃsā Interpretative Theory’, Journal of 
Indian Philosophy, vol. 28, no. 5, 2000, p. 429. 
22
 RC Dwivedi, ‘Introduction’, in RC Dwivedi (ed.), Studies in Mīmāṃsā, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 
1994, p. xi. 
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distancing the discussion from the context of Vedic Brahmanical ritual that the 
Mīmāṃsā can be productively developed as a darśana. 
Therefore, despite the importance and vitality of their work in light of the topics they 
had chosen to study, the selected interests that have contributed to the development of 
modern scholarship on Mīmāṃsā have not been able to provide insights about the 
nature of Jaimini’s enquiry. His reflections on the challenges of the Vedic world that 
confronted him and his defence of the practice of sacrifice as a tradition that demanded 
continued enactment was entirely disregarded. Despite their importance, these studies 
have also resulted in fragmenting the foundational text of the Mīmāṃsā tradition, 
thereby relegating it to a collection of topics that are not discerned to have a common 
concern or purpose. Clooney, who has written an insightful monograph on the 
Pūrvamīmāṃsā of Jaimini, goes to the extent of claiming that the Mīmāṃsāsūtras have 
not been understood in the ‘spirit’ in which they were written, neither by the 
commentators, nor by modern scholarship on Mīmāṃsā. He maintains that the text of 
Jaimini has remained unexplored as a whole, and thus makes his task a ‘rediscovering’ 
of and a ‘return’ to the Sūtras themselves. 23  Although a few translations of the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras in English by a handful of scholars can be found, namely by Jha, 
Sandal and Thadani,
24
 no comprehensive research has been done on the foundational 
text of the Mīmāṃsā beyond these few translations, especially not in light of Jaimini’s 
central theme of ritual and dharma.  
The aforementioned selective studies, while momentous and significant in their own 
right, have not sought to raise the question of ritual and tradition and, therefore, have 
                                                 
23
 FX Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, De Nobili Research 
Library, Vienna, 1990, pp. 33-40. 
24
 See Jaimini, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras of Jaimini, trans. G Jha, Panini Office, Allahabad, 1916; Jaimini, 
Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini, trans. ML Sandal, AMS Press, New York, 1974; Jaimini, Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of 
Jaimini, trans. NV Thadani, Bharatiya Kala Prakashan, Delhi, 2007. 
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not been able to offer much with regard to the central theme that is propounded in the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras - the enquiry into the nature of dharma. The rationale for the 
intelligibility of Vedic practice that Jaimini sets out to argue and develop in his Sūtras is 
consequently missed out. These studies contain certain presuppositions of their own 
which must be interrogated if one is to consider the Mīmāṃsā system more seriously, 
and its contribution as a philosophy of Vedic practice (ritual action) is to be recognized 
and put forward.  
In providing this critical overview of Mīmāṃsā scholarship as an introductory 
background to the thesis, I highlight my interest in seeking to investigate the question of 
ritual and tradition in light of the central theme of dharma in Jaimini’s enquiry in the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras. The overarching claim that I wish to propose and develop is that the 
Mīmāṃsā tradition, when read primarily through Jaimini’s concern for ritual and 
dharma in his Mīmāṃsāsūtras, is best understood as a hermeneutical tradition that 
offers a philosophy of Vedic practice. It is a school of reflection in which practice is 
taken as the fundamental reality and, therefore, central in shaping and organizing the 
Vedic world. While the Vedic experience can be taken to be mediated significantly 
through language, the world, including the highest good in the Mīmāṃsā, is revealed 
and understood only through correct and responsible activity. Furthermore, 
understanding the Vedic world as ordered and organized around the practice of 
sacrificial ritual also allows me to account for the emergence of a ritual subjectivity, 
which in this thesis, is discussed as the mode through which the relevance of ritual as a 
traditionary practice is responsibly maintained and continued. Therefore, I wish to show 
that the type of intelligibility that is expressed in Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras through a 
study of his unique conception of dharma also calls for a revision of our very 
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understanding of what the Sūtras, as well as the Mīmāṃsā as a darśana, are primarily 
about. 
CENTRAL ARGUMENT AND TWO AIMS 
This thesis, then, is an enquiry into the conception of dharma by Jaimini in his 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras with the aim of arguing for its contemporary relevance, particularly for 
the scholarship on ritual. It seeks to do this by offering a hermeneutical re-reading of the 
text, primarily by investigating the theme of the relationship between subjectivity and 
tradition in the discussion about dharma, and bringing it into conversation with 
contemporary discourses on ritual.  
The central argument that is proposed in this thesis, based on this re-reading, is that 
Jaimini’s conception of dharma can be read as a philosophy of Vedic practice centred 
on the enjoinment of the subject, whose stages of transformation can be seen to possess 
the structure of a hermeneutic tradition. This argument, which places subjectivity and 
tradition at the heart of the explanation of Vedic practice, is then brought into 
conversation with the scholarship on ritual in order to indicate its contemporary 
relevance. 
The explication of the central argument, which is based upon the insights gleaned from 
this hermeneutical re-reading of Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras, will be broken down into 
two main aims. The first aim will seek to demonstrate that the significance of Jaiminian 
enquiry lies in its conception of dharma as an enjoined traditionary practice that 
possesses the structure of a hermeneutic tradition.  
The specificity of this claim is that Jaimini’s conception of dharma, read through the 
theme of the enjoinment of the subject, enables me to account for the emergence and 
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transformation of a particular mode of being in the Vedic sacrificial world. The 
enjoinment of the subject is taken here as the responsible appropriation and enactment 
of a tradition’s practical rationality by the ritual subject. More precisely, the structure of 
transformation - which includes the three stages of desiring, appropriating and enacting 
- that gave rise to the subject of ritual injunction can be seen to be akin to the three-fold 
structure that constitutes a hermeneutic tradition.  
Therefore, to give an account of Jaimini’s conception of dharma in light of the 
enjoinment and transformation of the subject is also to give an account of the nature of 
Jaiminian enquiry and his understanding of tradition. The explication of the structure 
through which this ritual subjectivity emerges in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, thereby enables 
me to explicate the traditionary hermeneutical structure of Jaimini’s enquiry. 
The second aim will seek to demonstrate that this re-reading can offer insights to the 
debates within the contemporary study of ritual. Jaimini’s conception of dharma 
enables me to introduce the notion of subjectivity at the heart of the explanation of 
ritual. Therefore, the insights gleaned from the discussion of the enjoinment of the 
subject i.e. the subject of ritual injunction who embodies and enacts the practical 
rationality of a tradition, allows the possibility of re-imagining a way beyond the 
symbolic and formalist reductionist explanations of ritual in contemporary scholarship. 
This, I argue, is a hermeneutical re-reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras. 
DIALOGUING TRADITIONS OF ENQUIRY: MĪMĀṂSĀ AND RITUAL 
As mentioned above, the main concern of the thesis is to explicate the unique ritualistic 
conception of dharma by Jaimini and critically engage that with contemporary 
discussions on the problematic of ‘ritual’ within the study of ritual. The rationale for 
choosing to dialogue these two traditions of enquiry is based on the following: 
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First, though the main project of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras is concerned with the intelligibility 
of elaborate Vedic ritual in light of the over-arching theme of dharma, the Sūtras have 
been scantily studied as a source for understanding ritual either by the scholarship on 
Mīmāṃsā or the scholarship on ritual. The credibility of the Mīmāṃsā tradition has 
largely been treated with suspicion particularly because of its perceived ‘orthodoxy’ 
whose vast material on elaborate ritual details are claimed to be a redundant discussion 
that is irrelevant for contemporary discourse. This thesis may be seen as a fresh reading 
in that, it seeks to understand the nature of Jaimini’s enquiry by focussing primarily on 
the theme of dharma in the ‘historical and doctrinal’ context of Vedic ritual and 
tradition even as it seeks to present a ‘constructive reading’ of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras.25   
Second, the choice to study the Mīmāṃsāsūtras through the parameters set by the 
scholarship on ritual will gain further relevancy due to correlations that can be argued to 
exist between Jaimini’s work and the issues raised by contemporary discussions on 
ritual. Jaimini’s conception of dharma as an enjoined traditionary Vedic practice 
therefore, will be able to critically engage with the contemporary understanding of ritual 
and contribute new insights to the contentions that exist within the study of ritual.  
Third, the academic study of ritual, which is growing in its efforts to be an independent 
field of study known as ritual studies, is largely resourced and governed by the 
discourse predominant within the Western intellectual tradition. This thesis will seek to 
contribute critically to the understanding of ritual by introducing the discussions taken 
from an Indian intellectual tradition as its main resource, even as it seeks to dialogically 
participate in the debates within the Western academia.
26
  
                                                 
25
 G Flood, The Tantric Body: The Secret Tradition of Hindu Religion, IB Tauris, London, 2006, pp. 1-2. 
26
 While it would be presumptious to assume that the study of ritual in the Western academia has not 
engaged with Indian materials, as the works of Staal, Heesterman, Humphrey and Laidlaw, to name a 
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Therefore, the two themes around which the investigation into Jaimini’s 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras and his conception of dharma is pursued can be stated as: (a) the nature 
of Jaimini’s enquiry into dharma and ritual, (b) and its contemporary relevance, 
particularly for the scholarship on ritual. Thus, this reading of Jaimini’s text brings 
together two traditions of thought - Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā tradition represented by his text, 
and the study of ritual represented by the Western scholarship on ritual. In other words, 
the reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras and the attempt to establish its contemporary 
relevance is conditioned by the contentions that arise from the study of ritual. 
I have mentioned that the first main aim of this thesis is to argue that Jaimini’s 
conception of dharma can be read as a philosophy of Vedic practice centred on the 
enjoinment of the subject, whose stages of transformation can be seen to possess the 
structures of a hermeneutic tradition, and the second inter-related aim is to investigate 
the substantive and methodological contributions that may be explicated from Jaimini’s 
enquiry in an attempt to offer insights for discussion in the scholarship on ritual. While 
Jaimini’s enquiry and the scholarship on ritual are two distant traditions of discourse, in 
that the former is more closely associated with Indology and the latter with the 
emerging multi-disciplinary ritual studies, the aim of this thesis is to bring them 
together in a form of dialogue. Therefore, the re-reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras in this 
thesis is both constrained and guided by the specific questions that I bring to it - 
                                                                                                                                               
few, have all gathered their substantive insights from Indian materials, these studies have often treated 
these materials as primarily ‘data’ against which they engage their theories. The contributions of 
traditionary reflexive discourses on rituals by practitioners such as Jaimini have not been engaged 
seriously as dialogue-partners in their enquiries. Michaels’s Homo Ritualis (2016) based on extensive 
textual studies and field-work in Nepal and India, is an exception in that it has attempted to present a 
‘Hindu’ theory of ritual by drawing particularly on the Mīmāṃsā literature. The works of the authors 
mentioned above are the following: F Staal, Rules Without Meaning: Ritual, Mantras and the Human 
Sciences, Peter Lang, New York, 1989; JC Heesterman, The Broken World of Sacrifice: An Essay in 
Ancient Indian Ritual, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993; C Humphrey & JA Laidlaw, The 
Archetypal Actions of Ritual: A Theory of Ritual Illustrated by the Jain Rite of Worship, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1994; A Michaels, Homo Ritualis: Hindu Rituals and Its Significance to Ritual Theory, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2016. 
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questions drawn particularly from the contentions within the contemporary scholarship 
on ritual.  
According to Bakhtin, ‘even past meanings, that is, those born in the dialogue of past 
centuries, can never be stable (finalized, ended once and for all), they will always 
change (be renewed) in the process of subsequent development of the dialogue.’27 Flood 
develops this sense of ‘renewal of past meanings’ into a method of dialogical enquiry 
which shifts from a ‘plain sense’ of reading to one that goes beyond it to establish the 
‘interpreted sense’ to seek for its contemporary relevance. He argues that while ‘the 
plain sense is the foundation upon which the interpreted sense is built’, the ‘plain sense 
is never enough for a particular situation’ and maintains that the ‘interpreted senses are 
always necessary to bring some meaning to life for some particular community of 
readers’.28 Therefore, for Flood, ‘a dialogical reading’ is one ‘that stands outside of the 
texts while partially entering into them in an act of imagination’ and allowing their 
‘reconstruction and reconfiguring in a new mode’.29  
Following Flood, I argue that as important as it is ‘to maintain discourses within the 
boundaries of tradition in order for them to retain meaning and relevance for particular 
communities of readers’, it is equally ‘germane, enriching and challenging to engage 
theologically and philosophically with thought systems outside of those discourses’.30 
This renewal of past meanings is enabled by hermeneutical traditions of enquiry, where 
such an enquiry entails not ‘a discovery of the past’ but a ‘construction of the past’ from 
‘a particular perspective or standpoint’.31 Therefore, in line with Flood’s argument, the 
nature of enquiry that this research seeks to propose and develop is not ‘neutral’, in the 
                                                 
27
 MM Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. C Emerson & M Holquist, trans. VW McGee, 
University of Texas Press, Austin, 1986, p. 170. 
28
 Flood, The Tantric Body: The Secret Tradition of Hindu Religion, p. 16. 
29
 Ibid., p. 17. 
30
 Ibid., p. 6.  
31
 Ibid., p. 15. 
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sense of the ‘encyclopaedist’ or universalist understanding of neutrality as a singular 
and unbiased claim to truth and knowledge,
32
 but rather seeks to be dialogical. 
Following MacIntyre’s thesis on tradition and enquiry, I will argue for the importance 
of recovering the ‘conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition’,33 which 
enables the past to be continually reconfigured in light of new readings, beyond just 
discovery and description.
34
  
Building upon the works of post-Heideggerian hermeneutics, this thesis is informed by 
‘phenomenological hermeneutics’35 and will build on the dialogical method of research 
as espoused by Flood in his major works
36
 as the conceptual lens and framework. 
Phenomenological hermeneutics is succinctly described by Flood as the turn from the 
‘philosophy of consciousness (that developed from Descartes through Kant upto 
Husserl) to the philosophy of the signs and languages’ where the subject of knowledge, 
instead of being a detached observer, is situated in a particular historical and social 
context, in which ‘understanding’ is negotiated in a dialogical relationship of inter-
subjectivity.
37
 The enquiry is phenomenological in that it allows the structures of 
tradition to show themselves through the interplay of the text and the subject in the 
stages of enjoinment, and it is hermeneutical in that it recognizes the historical nature of 
                                                 
32
 A MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1990, pp. 149-151.  
33
 A MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1988, 
pp. 7-9.  
34
 Flood, The Tantric Body: The Secret Tradition of Hindu Religion, p. 15. 
35
 The term ‘phenomenological hermeneutics’, which I have borrowed from Paul Ricoeur, is used here to 
acknowledge that this thesis accepts the Ricoeurian critique of the Husserlian phenomenology. For 
Ricoeur’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenology, see P Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in 
Hermeneutics II, trans. K Blamey & JB Thompson, Continuum, London, 2008, pp. 23-50. 
36
 I will draw insights specifically from some of the major works which include Beyond Phenomenology: 
Rethinking the Study of Religion (1999), The Ascetic Self: Subjectivity, Memory and Tradition (2004), The 
Tantric Body: The Secret Tradition of Hindu Religion (2006), The Importance of Religion: Meaning and 
Action in our Strange World (2012), and The Truth Within: A History of Inwardness in Christianity, 
Hinduism and Buddhism (2015). 
37
 For an extensive discussion of Flood’s dialogical method as it relates to the study of religion, refer G 
Flood, Beyond Phenomenology: Rethinking the Study of Religion, Continuum, London, 1999. For an 
example of the strategy of dialogical reading that he applies in his works, particularly between 
phenomenology and Indology, see for instance, Flood, The Tantric Body: The Secret Tradition of Hindu 
Religion, pp. 15-27. 
 19 
 
enquiry and the importance of the situatedness of an understanding of ritual as located 
within a tradition. 
THE PATH AHEAD 
The central argument will be developed through the following four main chapters with 
each chapter contributing to the elaboration of the two aims that guide the thesis. The 
hermeneutical re-reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras is constrained by the questions that I 
bring to the text, particularly through a detour of the problematic on ritual, and the 
insights that it offers dialogically.  
Chapter Two offers an introduction to the three strands of enquiry that make up the 
conceptual framework guiding the development and explication of the central argument 
in the following chapters. I will begin with a brief introduction on Jaimini and his text – 
the Mīmāṃsāsūtras. I will then explicate the tripartite conditions of understanding 
which constitute the structure of a hermeneutical tradition of enquiry as: (a) the notion 
of a shared telos, (b) the authority of an internal rationality, and (c) the institution of an 
answerable practising community. Each of these themes will form the conceptual lens 
through which I re-read the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, and will also inversely enable me to argue 
that Jaimini’s vision and approach in his conception of dharma and explication of the 
enjoinment of the subject can be seen to possess the structure of a hermeneutic tradition. 
I will also map the debates in the contemporary discourses on ritual with an attempt to 
highlight that it is constituted by three interrelated contentions about representation, 
rationality and articulation, each of which is concerned with the larger problem of a 
reductionist form of enquiry. My reading of Jaimini’s text and the explication of the 
stages of enjoinment of the subject in his conception of dharma in the following 
chapters will enable me to seek insights to address these debates stemming from 
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contemporary discourses on ritual. Finally, I will end the chapter with a brief overview 
of how the notion of ritual and tradition can be conceptually related to one another to 
claim that an investigation of these two themes is not so distant as to inhibit 
conversation. 
In Chapter Three, I will investigate Jaimini’s introduction of dharma as the pursuit of 
his enquiry primarily by looking at the theme of sacrifice and subjectivity. I focus on 
the invisibility of dharma and the emergence of the Mīmāṃsā subject in light of the 
problem of meaning within the study of ritual. I claim that the debate concerning the 
question of meaning in the scholarship on ritual is limited because the ritual actant and 
his impulse towards meaning in the practice of sacrifice is not taken into consideration. 
I use this claim to argue, through a detour on the problem of the invisible and 
Heidegger’s phenomenology of religion, that the tradition-constituted subjectivity 
becomes the mode through which the invisible - the invisibility of meaning and the telos 
of tradition - is revealed. With regard to the first aim of the thesis, I seek to argue that 
Jaimini’s engagement with the notion of the invisible dharma within the context of the 
phala-governed Vedic sacrifice, introduces the birth of the Mīmāṃsā subject who 
desires the telos of tradition. The nature of this desire, in turn allows me to account for 
the interplay between Jaimini’s concern for the unbroken tradition of Vedic sacrifice 
and the pursuit of dharma. With regard to the second aim of the thesis, the 
understanding of the invisible as a human ‘existentiale’38 allows me to account for the 
notion of sacrifice as a traditionary practice that is intrinsically meaningful, and which is 
                                                 
38
 To discuss the noun ‘Existence’ (‘that something is’), Heidegger uses two related words, Existentiell 
and Existentiale, as descriptive characteristics of Dasein’s being. An ‘existentiell’ is a categorical or 
ontical characteristic (an understanding of all that which relates to one’s existence) while an ‘Existentiale’ 
is an ontological characteristic (the structure of existence). While ‘existentiell’ is taken to pertain to 
Dasein as an entity, ‘Existentiale’ is taken to pertain to the essential feature of Dasien, i.e., an element of 
the being of Dasein. For a detailed elaboration and analysis of these terminologies, see S Mulhall, 
Heidegger and Being and Time, Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 16, 32, 37-38, 70-74, 116-117. 
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accessible primarily through the ritual subjectivity (desiring subject) upon which it is 
ultimately grounded.  
In Chapter Four, I will develop Jaimini’s explication of the authority of the Veda in 
light of the discussion on ritual and rationality, particularly by looking at the limitations 
of reductionist approaches within the study of ritual. I claim that a reductionist enquiry 
in the human sciences, which includes the modern invention of ‘ritual’, is propelled by a 
Western universal rationality whose presuppositions are often uncritically borrowed 
from the scientific methods of enquiry. I use this claim to argue the importance of 
identifying tradition-constituted rationalities. With regard to the first aim of the thesis, I 
seek to demonstrate that Jaimini’s development of an intelligible internal rationality, 
through his unique conception of the authority of the Veda as an infallible injunction 
oriented towards enactment, allows me to identify the structure of a revelation-
appropriation mechanism which constitutes the sacredness of the text and tradition. This 
demonstration of the authority of the Veda can then be seen as both an example of a 
tradition-constituted rationality and also a rejection of any notions of a universal 
rationality. With regard to the second aim of the thesis, Jaimini’s development of an 
internal rationality and his dialogical constitution of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras and critique of 
foundationalist epistemologies will be offered as an example of a way forward beyond 
reductionism to an appreciation of the complexity of an internal rationality governing a 
particular tradition.  
In Chapter Five, I will explicate Jaimini’s development of the realization of dharma in 
light of the discussion on the question of praxis and the articulation of ritual, primarily 
by looking at his elaboration of the nature of Vedic practice and its intrinsic relationship 
with dharma. With regard to the first aim of the thesis, I argue that Jaimini’s discussion 
of the event of sacrifice through the lens of ‘enjoinment’ and ‘answerability’ allows the 
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reconceptualization of ritual as a narratively structured traditionary practice that is both 
answerable and repeatable. This reconceptualization of ritual showcases both the 
textuality of Vedic practice and the agency of the enjoined subject and discloses 
Jaimini’s unique ritualistic conception of dharma. With regard to the second aim of the 
thesis, I provide a brief genealogical sketch of the larger action-theory dichotomy that 
pervades the enquiry into ritual to highlight that the articulation of ritual through the 
lens of this dichotomy is problematic because the answerability of an embodied 
inhabitation or ‘the life of practice’ is not given due consideration. I claim that Jaimini’s 
notion of practice is able to contribute an understanding of ritual that is not entangled in 
the theory-action dichotomy but one that is historically situated and answerably 
appropriated and maintained.  
Finally, in Chapter Six, I will draw my conclusions together particularly in light of the 
central argument of the thesis and its two main aims that have been introduced. I will 
bring the contributions of each of the chapters together in light of the significance of 
Jaimini’s enquiry and his conception of dharma, and the implications of this study for 
the contemporary discourse on ritual. The conclusion of the thesis will be followed by 
an Appendix, which lists all the cited Sanskrit transliterated sūtras from Jaimini’s 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras. 
SUMMARY 
I began this introductory chapter with a brief overview of the nature of scholarship 
concerning the Mīmāṃsā tradition, particularly in light of the negligence with which the 
central theme of dharma in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras has been received both in India and the 
West. I highlighted that the marginal scholarship that studied the tradition generally 
sought to distance itself from what it perceives as the ‘orthodoxy’ of Vedic Brahmanical 
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‘ritualism’ that Jaimini discussed in elaborate detail in his text. I claimed that this 
sidelining of the ritual concerns, which makes up the majority of the discussions in the 
Sūtras, limited the significance of their studies primarily in that they were unable to 
explore the central concern of Jaimini’s enquiry – the conception of dharma that sought 
to validate the intelligibility of the Vedic practice of sacrifice. 
It is within the context of this background that I then proposed a hermeneutical re-
reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras as the primary investigation of this thesis, whose two 
overarching aims include: (a) to demonstrate the significance of Jaiminian enquiry by 
explicating the unique conception of dharma in light of the internal concern of ritual 
and tradition, and (b) to offer insights to the scholarship on ritual by introducing the 
theme of ritual subjectivity at the heart of the discussion, as a way of indicating the 
contemporary relevance of Jaimini’s enquiry. 
I then introduced the manner in which I seek to discuss the two traditions of enquiry by 
highlighting the dialogical method that builds upon the works of post-Heideggerian 
hermeneutics, and I concluded the chapter by providing a brief outline of how each of 
the following main chapters will be discussed, especially in light of the two aims of the 
thesis.
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CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
JAIMINI, HERMENEUTICS AND RITUAL 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I seek to lay out the conceptual framework necessary for this thesis. As 
highlighted in the introductory chapter, the central argument advanced is that Jaimini’s 
conception of dharma can be read as a philosophy of Vedic practice centred on the 
enjoinment of the subject, whose stages of transformation can be seen to possess the 
structure of a hermeneutic tradition. The explication of the enjoined subject in light of 
Jaimini’s concern for dharma then allows me to develop an account of a ritual 
subjectivity which becomes the embodiment of an unbroken tradition. It is this notion of 
subjectivity which is excavated from Jaimini’s enquiry that allows me to propose the re-
imagining of ritual as a traditionary practice. 
The discussion of this central argument is broken down into two aims that seek to 
demonstrate firstly, that the significance of Jaiminian enquiry lies in its conception of 
dharma as an enjoined traditionary practice that possesses the structure of a hermeneutic 
tradition, and secondly, that this can offer both substantive and methodological insights 
to the contentions within the contemporary scholarship on ritual, particularly through 
the introduction of the idea of the enjoined subject as an explanation of ritual 
subjectivity. 
With regard to the first aim, I will read key themes concerning subjectivity, text, and 
action from Jaimini’s discussion of dharma in his Mīmāṃsāsūtras, with the aim of 
arguing that the interconnectedness and interplay between them in the stages of 
enjoinment can be seen to disclose the structures of a hermeneutic tradition. However, 
before I delve into the enquiry into dharma, I have to develop a preliminary background 
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understanding of Jaimini and his text. This preliminary discussion will not be an attempt 
to provide a historical or intellectual biography of Jaimini, although a brief sketch is 
included, but rather, to locate the Mīmāṃsāsūtras by sketching the background of the 
text to help inform my mapping of Jaimini’s epistemological position, and to argue that 
his approach towards an understanding of dharma is already implicitly hermeneutic in 
orientation. 
I will begin with a brief description of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, followed by an overview of 
the Mīmāṃsā corpus. I will briefly highlight the readings of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras by the 
commentarial tradition, with the intention of highlighting the argument that the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras have generally been studied apart from the context of their ritualistic 
concern, and that Jaimini’s concern for the sanctity of Vedic practice, the performance 
and transmission of which is seen as vital for the maintenance of tradition and the 
actualization of dharma, have largely been sidelined.  
In order to argue that Jaimini’s vision and approach in his conception of dharma can be 
seen to possess the structure of a hermeneutic tradition, I will need to highlight the 
tradition from where this understanding of ‘hermeneutic’ is borrowed and, therefore, I 
will briefly introduce Western hermeneutical traditions of enquiry, particularly post-
Heideggerian phenomenological hermeneutics.
1
 This introduction will lay out the 
structure of a hermeneutic tradition of enquiry, which will also serve as the conceptual 
lens through which I re-read the Mīmāṃsāsūtras. This hermeneutic lens will not only 
enable me to argue that Jaimini’s enquiry and conception of dharma possessess the 
structure of a hermeneutic tradition, but also enable me to discuss the disclosing of this 
                                                 
1
 By ‘post-Heideggerian phenomenological hermeneutics’ I am referring here specifically to the works of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Alasdair MacIntyre and Mikhail Bakhtin, and particularly their 
discussions on the theme of text, action and tradition respectively. 
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structure in the enjoined subject as providing substantive and methodological insights to 
the contentions that are raised in the contemporary scholarship on ritual. 
With regard to the second concern, I will seek to draw insights from Jaimini’s 
conception of dharma that can offer contributions to the ongoing discussions within the 
academic study of ritual. I will primarily discuss the problematic with regard to the 
study of ritual by mapping the contemporary debates on ritual with a view to show that 
it is constitutive of three contentious discussions about representation, rationality and 
articulation. Each of these contentions is briefly presented in each of the three core 
chapters as a way of setting the parameters for the questions that are pursued in the 
respective chapters. Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras are read with a view to seek for ‘insights’ 
to the ‘queries’ that arise from the contemporary study on ritual. Jaimini’s account of 
the centrality of practice and the importance of the ritual actant in his enquiry into the 
nature of dharma offers an explanation of ritual subjectivity in a way that contemporary 
scholarship on ritual has yet to seriously consider. 
It is here that the hermeneutic tradition, and particularly the dialogical approach that 
stems from it,
2
 will be used to serve as a guide towards effectively engaging both the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras as well as the theories of ritual in conversation to provide an attempt at 
the possibility of developing ‘mutual answerability’. 3  The intention is to see if a 
hermeneutical re-reading of Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras is able to offer insights and 
contribute to each of these contentions discussed within the academic study of ritual. 
                                                 
2
 Using the lens of post-Heideggerian phenomenological hermeneutics, I will primarily build on the 
dialogical method as espoused by Gavin Flood in the field of religious studies for the conceptual tools 
necessary to dialogue a traditionary reflexive discourse on ancient Vedic practice with contemporary 
scholarship on ritual. 
3
 Bakhtin develops the notion of ‘mutual answerability’ in the sense of an ‘inner interpenetration’ 
between ‘life’ and ‘art’, and it is the possibility of this sense of interpenetration that I wish to explore for 
bringing Jaimini’s enquiry and the academic study of ritual into conversation. See MM Bakhtin, Art and 
Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays, M Holquist & V Laipunov (eds), trans. and notes V 
Liapunov, Texas University Press, Austin, 1990, p. 1. 
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Therefore, the tasks for this framework are: (a) to locate the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, (b) to 
present a brief overview of the Mīmāṃsā corpus with the intention of highlighting the 
paucity of discussions concerning ritual and tradition within Mīmāṃsā scholarship, (c) 
to give an overview of the hermeneutic tradition with the intention of highlighting its 
conceptual structure, (d) to identify the key components of the contemporary 
discussions on ritual, and (e) to establish the conceptual ties between ritual, tradition 
and subjectivity. 
LOCATING THE MĪMĀṂSĀSŪTRAS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Both the Mīmāṃsākas4 and Mīmāṃsā scholars took the Mīmāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini as 
the foundational text upon which the Pūrvamīmāṃsā5 as a darśana6 was formulated. 
The text consists of twelve adhyāyas (chapters), which are divided into sixty pādas 
(sections),
7
 and which are further divided into several adhikaraṇas (topics). 8  They 
comprise approximately 2745 short statements or aphorisms,
9
 referred to individually as 
a sūtra. The term sūtra, which literally means ‘thread’, and is often translated as 
                                                 
4
 Mīmāṃsākas are the adherents of the Mīmāṃsā school of thought. 
5
 The Pūrvamīmāṃsā, which is taken to be one of the six darśanas in Hindu philosophy within the āstika 
tradition, is taken by some scholars to be concerned primarily with the investigation of the ‘antecedent 
[portions of the Veda]’. The tradition of the Mīmāṃsā darśana in ancient India is believed to be the ‘first’ 
and ‘only rigorous philosophical interpretation of the Vedic sacrificial ritual’. See Bhatt, ‘Mīmāṃsā as a 
Philosophical System: A Survey’, in RC Dwivedi (ed.), Studies in Mīmāṃsā, p. 3. Keith also mentions 
that the Mīmāṃsāsūtras are most possibly the earliest of the six darśanas preserved today. See Keith, The 
Karma-Mīmāṃsā, p. 5.   
6
 According to Halbfass, in classical Indian philosophical literature darśana means simply ‘philosophical 
view’ or ‘opinion’ or ‘belief system’. He proposes this against the interpretation of the word taken to 
mean ‘insight’, ‘intuition’, or ‘vision’ which is employed by modern Indian thinkers, and particulary Neo-
Hinduism, to suggest that Indian philosophy (darśana) is grounded in experience in a way that Western 
philosophy is not. Halbfass reminds us to be cautious against the employment of the word which is used 
as a vehicle for cultural self-assertion. For a detailed discussion on the concept of darśana, see W 
Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding, State University of New York Press, Albany, 
1988, pp. 263-286. According to Renou, the word translated literally means ‘view’ and is used to suggest 
the different points of view assumed by philosophical schools. See Renou, Indian Literature, p. 39.  
7
 While each adhyāya of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras generally consist of four pādas each, the third, the sixth and 
the tenth adhyāyas have eight pādas each as opposed to the normal four. 
8
 Each of these topics takes up one doubtful point, and by a series of reasoning and discussion, arrives at 
what can be considered as the best (most acceptable) conclusion. See Jaimini, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras of 
Jaimini: Chapter I-III, trans. G Jha, Panini Office, Allahabad, 1916, p. i. 
9
 As Garge has highlighted, ‘In Mādhava’s reckoning there are 2745 sūtras grouped into 915 
adhikaraṇas.’ See Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, p. 5. 
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‘aphorism’, is applicable to describe both the whole work, in which case an ‘s’ is added 
at the end (viz. sūtras), or to its individual sentences or paragraphs, in which case the 
addition of an ‘s’ is not required. It is taken from the image of weaving and of woven 
material made out of threads. Sūtra works10 are intended to present the essence of a 
doctrine systematically in compact form, and they are generally precise and succint.
11
  
While the nature of Sūtra works is such that it is difficult to read them without a 
commentary, scholars such as Modi and Clooney have pointed out that they can also be 
read on their own. Modi, who has worked extensively on the Brahmasūtras, sets forth 
eleven principles as guidelines for approaching the Sūtras independently, and has 
stressed the importance of reading the texts ‘intensively’ and ‘internally’ to get the 
sense of the Sūtras from its context, before consulting the commentary and other texts.12 
Clooney sought to ‘fix the sense of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras as a whole’ through a reading 
of ‘the Sūtras as distinguishable from the Bhāṣya’ and elaborated the importance of 
‘working from a knowledge of parts of the texts to a sense of the whole’.13 Garge lays 
out a critical evaluation of the ‘principles of textual interpretation’ that he argues are 
employed by both Jaimini and Śabara in their respective works. 14  As Clooney has 
pointed out, any given sūtra generally resolves into three component parts which 
consists of a statement (usually represented by the nominative), made in reference to a 
certain situation (represented by the locative), for a certain reason (represented by the 
ablative).
15
 These kārakas (case-relationships) are particularly important in that they 
indicate the structure of a particular sūtra statement (argument). For instance, while the 
                                                 
10
 For a detailed discussion of the emergence and development of sūtra works in general, refer L Renou, 
‘Sur le Genre du Sūtra dans la Littérature Sanskrite’, Journal Asiatique, vol. 251, 1963, pp. 163-211. 
11
 See H Scharfe, Grammatical Literature, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1977, p. 87. 
12
 PM Modi, A Critique of the Brahmasūtra (III.2.11-IV): With Special Reference to Śaṅkarācārya’s 
Commentary, Modi, Bhavnagar, 1943, pp. 294-312. See also H Nakamura, A History of Early Vedānta 
Philosophy, trans. T Legett, ed. S Mayeda, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1983, p. 443. 
13
 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, pp. 19-20, 40-41. 
14
 Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, pp. 252-265. 
15
 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 43. 
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ablative allows one to understand the reason for which a statement is made (which may 
be a positive or a negative reason), the locative indicates the context or situation to 
which the statement refers, or in which an argument is based. Clooney points out that 
‘locative references are usually of two kinds’: (a) those that ‘offer a general or 
conceptual condition which can be understood on an abstract basis without reference to 
a particular ritual place or text’ and (b) those that refer to ‘a particular text or ritual 
situation’.16 The presence of particles such as ca, vā, tu, iti cet, na which occur regularly 
in the Sūtras are also helpful indicators of the general arrangement and ordering of the 
skeletal structures of the sūtras. They allow one to see what can be placed as primary 
and what as secondary, which is a helpful guide when one attempts to excavate the 
meaning (or main line of argument) of the sūtras.17  
In this thesis, while I acknowledge the importance of seeking to ‘attain a more specific 
and accurate understanding of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras on its own terms’, I remain 
committed to the position that Sūtras cannot be read without a commentary. This is 
particularly pertinent in the case of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras because not only is the Bhāṣya 
of Śabara-svāmin (c. 400 CE) the earliest extant commentary available on the Sūtras but 
more importantly, it is one that is accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas as the most 
authoritative.
18
 Therefore, even as I remain cautious of the probability that there may be 
possible divergences or distinctions in the interpretation of individual sūtras in Śabara’s 
commentary,
19
 in this thesis I nonetheless rely on Śabara’s Bhāṣya to help me 
                                                 
16
  Ibid. 
17
 Ibid., p. 44. 
18
 This is unlinke the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa which has two Bhāṣyas, with each Bhāṣya claiming to 
represent correctly the meaning of the Sūtras. 
19
 It is my understanding that Śabara has sought to stay as close to Jaimini’s concern for the intelligibility 
of the Vedic sacrificial tradition as possible and have not intentionally brought in assumptions or 
attributed meanings from outside Jaimini’s concern and context. Even Clooney, who has claimed that 
Śabara has on occasion attempted a shift in perspective (particularly concerning the theme of apūrva), 
nonetheless states categorically that ‘there is no point in ignoring Śabara’ and that there is no doubt on the 
‘general accuracy’ of the Bhāṣya. Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of 
Jaimini, p. 46. 
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understand the context more comprehensively. I seek to acquire an intelligible sense of 
the Sūtras by employing: (a) a close and intensive reading of the text ‘for its own sake’ 
with the intention of seeking to develop an intelligible translation, which is followed by 
(b) a re-reading (and re-translating) that is assisted by Śabara’s commentary, and which 
is then (c) critically interrogated (compared and re-evaluated) in light of the available 
[English] translations of the Sūtras, particularly of Jha, Sandal, Thadani, and more 
recently Clooney.
20
 Therefore, the final translations of each of the sūtras mentioned in 
this thesis are a result of this hermeneutical circle where, more than a direct translation 
of each of the specific sūtras, I have sought to present the overall sense of the sūtras 
and have often resorted to presenting a gloss, which is assisted by the commentary and 
the translations already available. 
The primary concern of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras as a whole, as declared in the introductory 
first sūtra, is to enquire into the nature of dharma. While Jaimini elaborates his notion 
of dharma and the means of knowledge that enable its pursuit in the first adhyāya, from 
the second to the twelfth adhyāya he enters into an elaborate discussion of the world of 
sacrifice which centers around his concern for its enactment. It is these discussions, 
which deal extensively with the corpus of sacrifices and its complicated details of 
performance, that often obstruct scholars from seeking to investigate the nature of 
Jaimini’s enquiry beyond his introduction of dharma and his discussion about the nature 
of śabda. As laborious and tedious as the task of surveying these details is, Jaimini’s 
discussions can be tied together under several themes that disclose the nature of his 
concern for the practice of sacrifice and the structure and method which entails 
enjoinment and enactment. Jaimini introduces his notion of action and the principles 
                                                 
20
 See Jaimini, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras of Jaimini, trans. G Jha, Panini Office, Allahabad, 1916; Jaimini, 
Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini, trans. ML Sandal, AMS Press, New York, 1974; Jaimini, Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of 
Jaimini, trans. NV Thadani, Bharatiya Kala Prakashan, Delhi, 2007. Clooney’s translations are available 
in KH Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Philosophy of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, vol. 16, Motilal 
Banarsidass, Delhi, 2014. 
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which lay down the nature of different actions in the second and third adhyāya 
respectively. In his fourth and fifth adhyāya, he talks about the motives that direct these 
actions along with the order in which they are then organized, and in the sixth adhyāya, 
he takes up the theme of the one who is entitled to the sacrificial enactment. From the 
seventh to the twelfth adhyāya, Jaimini discusses the nature of the enacted sacrifice, and 
the way in which the details of the sacrificial components (accessories) are negotiated 
through a structure that allows modification, transference and repetition even as the 
originality of each enactment is sought to be maintained.  
In the process of seeking to resolve complications pertaining to the interpretation and 
enactment of enjoined sacrifices, Jaimini engaged in lengthy discussions and 
negotiations with interlocutors, presumably both from within and outside the Mīmāṃsā 
tradition.
21
 These discussions were often followed by a reflection about the 
presuppositions and overall purpose of enacting sacrifices, many of which were stated 
in response to objections (pūrvapakṣas) from their interlocutors (pūrvapakṣins – holders 
of the pūrvapakṣa positions). While concern for rules governing the sacrificial world to 
ensure its enactment was an important focus of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras from the outset, its 
underlying concern had to do with the why of sacrifice – a why that entails the question 
of its intelligibility and significance for the Vedic world.  
The personal history, date and place of birth of Jaimini is uncertain, which is usually the 
case with ancient sūtrakāras. Regarding the period to which he belongs, there is little 
information apart from contested speculation amongst scholars who place him as far 
apart as the seventh, fourth and second century BCE. Shastri has noted that while 
Radhakrishnan assigns the fourth century BCE and Dasgupta the second century BCE 
                                                 
21
 The nature and form of these ‘discussions’ and ‘negotiations’ will be elaborated in detail in the fourth 
chapter of this thesis where I present the dialogical constitution of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras. 
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as the period in which Jaimini flourished, the structure of the Sūtras and the style of 
composition imply that the Mīmāṃsāsūtras belong to a period which saw the growth of 
sūtra literatures, i.e. from the seventh century to the second century BCE. Other 
scholars like Jacobi are of the opinion that the Sūtras date no later than second century 
BCE while Keith has assigned the period not later or earlier than 200 BCE as a 
plausible conclusion.
22
 Clooney claims that the Mīmāṃsā appears ‘as a definite school 
of thought, with its own texts…some time after the time of the Buddha (500 BCE).’23   
The Mīmāṃsāsūtras are a text from a cultural setting that is unfamiliar to our own and, 
therefore, it is important to investigate in more detail how it contributes to Jaimini’s 
immediate society. To do this, I will attempt to place the text as close to its social and 
intellectual context as possible and remain ‘sensitive to the wider textual field’24 within 
which it may be located. 
The Beginnings of Mīmāṃsā: Between Codification and Speculation 
The primary designation of the term mīmāṃsā or mīmāṃsāte can be traced back to 
usages in the Veda, and particularly the Brāhmaṇas, where the term is used to denote a 
form of enquiry which allows a discussion of doubts and problems with regard to 
contentions over ritual details.
25
 According to Clooney, the oldest use of the derivative 
verb-form mīmāṃsānte which is translated as ‘investigating a doubtful point and 
arriving at a conclusion thereon’, occurs in the Yajurveda Saṃhitās and the Brāhmaṇas 
                                                 
22
 For more details, see Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, pp. 13-17.  
23
 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 19. 
24
 Flood argues that while a ‘philological’ reading of a text, which he points out is ‘indispensable in 
establishing the plain sense of the texts’ is necessary, one must move from a plain reading to a 
‘dialogical’ reading of a text, which goes ‘beyond philology to establish interpreted senses.’ See Flood, 
The Tantric Body: The Secret Tradition of Hindu Religion, IB Tauris, London, 2006, p. 16. 
25
 See J-M Verpoorten, Mīmāṃsā Literature, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1987, p. 4. Also see 
Bhāskara, The Arthasaṁgraha: An Elementary Treatise on Mīmāṃsā, p. ii. 
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in the discussion on rituals.
26
 Garge claims that the earliest ‘traces or rudiments’ of the 
Mīmāṃsā can be traced as far back as the ṚgVeda where ‘doubts are raised and 
inquiries started regarding the ultimate truth on a religious as well as philosophical 
plane.’27 
While it is difficult to trace the chronology of ancient texts in terms of dates,
28
 it is often 
possible to trace them in terms of the development of their linguistic usage and, based 
on that argument, the Mīmāṃsāsūtras may be located as a text which was composed 
‘towards the close of the Vedic age’ when the ‘new literary genre’ called the ‘sūtra 
literature’ came into prominence.29 The sūtra period was a period that witnessed the 
beginning of the development of the ṣaḍ-darśanas,30 and the foundational texts of each 
of these schools were all written in the sūtra form.31 Garge has mentioned that Jaimini’s 
work, on account of its form and nature deserves to be compared with the Śrauta-
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 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 21.  
27
 Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, p. 1. 
28
 The texts themselves do not give chronological indications. Gonda has remarked that many of the 
‘definite dates’ suggested in modern scholarship are little more than guesses unsupported by cogent 
arguments but based on ‘disputable deductions or unconvincing considerations.’ J Gonda, The Ritual 
Sūtras, Otto Harrasowitz, Wiesbaden, 1977, p. 476. 
29
 The rise of this style of literature was largely a consequence of the need to reduce the growing mass of 
details preserved by specialists in different branches of knowledge. It is not disconnected from a method 
of teaching designed to enable the student to memorize vast and varied amounts of rules, facts and other 
relevant information. Ibid., pp. 465-466.  
30
 According to Renou, ‘The darshanas appeared in the early centuries of the Christian Era, in the form of 
Sūtras, “aphorisms”: these aphorisms immediately became the subject of commentaries, oral at first, later 
written down, which were sometimes developed into semi-independent works or, as more frequently 
happened, gave rise to further commentaries; and so the process has gone on, even into contemporary 
times.’ See Renou, Indian Literature, pp. 39-40. Flood mentions that the classification of these six 
specific schools comes only post-twelfth century and warns that the loose classification is problematic not 
only in that it excludes important traditions such as the ‘Śaiva systems’ but also more importantly in that 
it does not account for ‘dynamic exchange’ and ‘common style of discourse’ that was shared amongst all 
of these traditions. He also pointed out that a Jain author named Haribhadra Sūri (eighth century) seems 
to have been the earliest to use these six systems, although the six were quite different from what was 
later consolidated as the six darśanas. See G Flood, The Truth Within: A History of Inwardness in 
Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism, p. 140. See also KS Murty, Ṣaḍ-darśana Samuccya: A 
Compendium of Six Philosophies, 2
nd
 edn, Eastern Book Linkers, Delhi, 1986, pp. 98-100. Jha also 
mentions that ‘till so late as the fourteenth century the name “Ṣaḍ-darshana”, “six systems of philosophy” 
had not become stereotyped as standing definitely and specifically for the six systems now known as 
Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. The old division was into the two broad lines 
mentioned by Yājñavalkya in his Smṛti, under the names Nyāya (Reasoning, argumentation) and 
Mīmāṃsā (Investigation, Deliberation). It is not easy to find proper justification for the later division into 
the “Six Systems”.’ See G Jha, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, ed. S Radhakrishnan, Banaras Hindu 
University Press, Varanasi, 1942, pp. 2-3.  
31
 See SC Chakrabarti, ‘Śrautasūtras and the Purvamīmāṃsāsūtras’, in Pandurangi (ed.), Pūrvamīmāṃsā 
from an Interdisciplinary Point of View, p. 40.  
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sūtras,32 and it is this close comparability that in turn discloses the uniqueness of the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras. 
The Śrauta-sūtras are manuals, also known as ‘rules of sacrifice’, compiled for the 
purpose of giving directions for the performance of several solemn sacrificial rites in 
Vedic times. Sharma notes that the ‘Śrauta-sūtras were formulated to describe the 
procedure of the performance of sacrifice[s]’, and along with the Gṛhya-sūtras and the 
Dharma-sūtras they form an important link between the Vedic literature and the 
classical literature.
33
 According to Gonda, these works are closely connected with the 
older Vedic literature and are also related to and based on the Brāhmaṇas, which they 
often quote or refer to in their ‘vocabulary’ and ‘phraseology’.34 These treatises i.e. the 
Śrauta, Gṛhya and Dharma sūtras are together commonly known as the Kalpa-sūtras.35 
According to Ramgopal: 
There is a fundamental difference between the Brāhmaṇas and the Kalpasūtras in regard to their 
aim and scope. The principal aim of the Brāhmaṇas is to explain the significance of various acts 
in Vedic sacrifices and to settle ritualistic doctrines, while the Kalpasūtras are chiefly connected 
with a succinct and systematic account of all the Vedic sacrifices and customs prevalent at the 
time of their composition. The Kalpasūtras simply record the rituals and traditions current in 
their respective schools and do not concern themselves with their explanation and rationale.
36
  
They were understood to be the outcome of the efforts of the Aryans’ attempt to 
preserve and systematize the religious practices that were gradually multiplying. They 
aim at the systematic description of the Śrauta rituals in their respective schools and 
seldom make any attempt to interpret them.
37
 The Śrauta-sūtras therefore, present a 
detailed and systematic treatment of the Vedic sacrifices, and they were composed 
mainly to deal with the Vedic sacrifices in a nutshell. They are commonly known for 
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 Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, p. 50. 
33
 RN Sharma, Culture and Civilization as Revealed in the Śrauta-sūtras, Nag, Delhi, 1977, p. 1. 
34
 Gonda, Ritual Sūtras, p. 489.  
35
 The word ‘Kalpa’ is often translated as ‘ritual’ and the word ‘sūtra’, as mentioned already, is 
commonly understood to mean an ‘aphorism’. 
36
 R Gopal, India of Vedic Kalpasūtras, PhD. Thesis, University of Delhi, Delhi, 1959, pp. 1-2. Quoted in 
Sharma, Culture and Civilization as Revealed in the Śrauta-sūtras, pp. 1-2. 
37
 Ibid., p. 4. 
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the preservation of the codification of ritual practices in a completely systematized 
form.
38
 
Clooney, while following the same observation that the Mīmāṃsāsūtras and the Śrauta-
sūtras are comparable, locates the Mīmāṃsāsūtras particularly midway between the 
‘sacrificial’ Śrauta-sūtras and the ‘philosophical’ Darśana-sūtras on account of its 
nature of enquiry. According to him, while Jaimini’s text is more speculative in its 
reflection on the nature of the Vedic practice than the Śrauta-sūtras (ritual-manuals) and 
therefore, is closer to the Darśana-sūtras, it is a speculative reflection that is grounded 
primarily on the intelligibility of the sacrificial ritual.
39
 While one finds, in both the 
works of the Śrauta-sūtras and the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, a very systematic treatment of a 
large number of Vedic passages with an attempt to arrive at definite conclusions 
regarding the details of Vedic rituals, the Mīmāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini and the Śrauta-
sūtras undertake their approach in very distinct ways. Pandurangi lays out the distinct 
approaches of both the Sūtras:  
The śrauta sūtras’ approach is descriptive. These describe the details of the sacrifice step by step 
following the procedure of the performance. However, these do not discuss the rationale 
underlying the introduction of certain items or procedures. These are just a diary of 
performance…However, a full discussion and the interpretation of the statements in the 
Brāhmaṇas connected with sacrifice is not found in śrauta sūtras. The Jaimini sūtras of 
Pūrvamīmāṃsā are formulated to play this role.40  
He continues:  
A large number of sacrifices and rituals and their auxiliaries are stated in Brāhmaṇa literature. 
These are codified in Śrauta Sūtras. However the rationale behind the arrangement of these is 
not stated in these works. This is worked out by Jaimini in Pūrvamīmāṃsā sūtras.41  
According to Garge, ‘the Śrauta-sūtras deal with the complicated procedure of the 
sacrificial rites while the Mīmāṃsāsūtras attempts at a judicial interpretation of the texts 
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 Ibid., p. 8. 
39
 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 82.  
40
 Pandurangi (ed.), Pūrvamīmāṃsā from an Interdisciplinary Point osf View, p. 176. 
41
 Ibid., p. 17. 
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bearing on the sacrificial performances’.42 Clooney claims that the Śrauta-sūtras came 
to be juxtaposed with and eventually replaced by the assertion that ‘ritual is itself its 
own meaning’ whose arrangements constitute the significance of its components, and is 
supplanted by the appeal to the coherence of logic and language which is understood to 
have a life of its own.
43
 While the Mīmāṃsāsūtras are also developed in the context of 
‘repetitive’ performance of the sacrificial prescriptions, they are concerned with the why 
of sacrifice that enables one to reimagine the how of responsible performance and to 
enquire into the nature of the reference of Vedic practice i.e. dharma. Das asserts that 
the Mīmāṃsāsūtras can be taken as ‘the first intellectualized interpretation of sacrifice’ 
and suggests that this system is a ‘partner’ in our attempt to understand sacrifice 
rationally, and not merely as a pre-reflective portion of the data we study.
44
  
In line with Clooney, I wish to highlight that Jaimini’s defence of the intelligibility and 
sanctity of Vedic practice in a period which saw, on the one hand, the rigorous 
production of methodical codification of systematic ritual manuals and, on the other, a 
growing intrusion and influence of Buddhist idealism and abstract speculation,
45
 places 
him in a ‘hermeneutical’ position where he seeks to move beyond the rigid systems and 
structures of the Śrauta-sūtras without tending towards the ‘idealist’ and ‘spiritualist’ 
positions that were emerging, and grounding his enquiry firmly in the notion of the 
‘truth’ and authority of the Veda. It is this ‘hermeneutical’ orientation that enables him 
to seek out a rationale and a vision for Vedic practice by establishing its 
interconnectedness with dharma that is both ‘realist’and ‘immanent’46 and is, therefore, 
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 Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, p. 50. 
43
 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 82. 
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 V Das, ‘Language of Sacrifice’, Man, New Series, vol. 18, no. 3, 1983, pp. 445-462. 
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 See Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, p.12. 
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 The Mīmāṃsā’s ‘realist’ position can be taken to be the outcome of its conception of dharma. The 
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able to reflect a harmonizing view of dharma while reflexively locating his project 
firmly within the Vedic sacrificial world. To reiterate, Jaimini’s primary concern in the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras can be argued to be the sanctity and intelligibility of Vedic practice, the 
performance and transmission of which is seen as vital for the maintenance and 
continuation of tradition and the actualization of dharma.  
The Mīmāṃsā Corpus 
The Mīmāṃsā tradition, throughout its long history, has continued to be a commentarial 
tradition, with each Mīmāṃsāka developing their own contributions based upon earlier 
commentators, all of which are eventually related to Śabara’s Bhāṣya (commentary) on 
the Mīmāṃsāsūtras. Though Jaimini in his Sūtras refers to a few predecessors,47 he is 
generally taken as the founding teacher and inspiration behind the development of the 
Mīmāṃsā darśana in so far as clear ‘literary evidence of such development’ 48  is 
available, and more importantly in light of the fact that his Sūtras are the only extant 
work available today.
49
 As Garge notes, after Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras, no other 
‘independent work’ was written on the system, and all the great scholars of Mīmāṃsā 
after him have all based their contributions on Jaimini’s Sūtras through a commentarial 
form of scholarship.
50
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Although Jha mentions that the Sūtras of Jaimini have had several commentators such 
as Upavarṣa and Bhartṛmitra, who are ‘known to us only in name’,51 the Bhāṣya of 
Śabara-svāmin is the earliest extant commentary available on the Sūtras and is, 
therefore, taken as the most authoritative. Śabara’s Bhāṣya was followed by two 
important commentaries that laid the groundwork for the development of the Mīmāṃsā 
tradition which was led, on the one hand, by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (c. 620-680 CE) who 
commented on the Bhāṣya in three parts namely – Ślokavārttika, Tantravārttika, and 
Ṭupṭīkā, and on the other, by Prabhākara Miśra (c. 700 CE) who wrote his commentary 
on the Bhāṣya known as the Bṛhatī.52 Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika, which is his ‘main 
philosophical work’, was commented on by several of his disciples, of which the 
earliest was Umbeka’s Tātparyattīkā. Bhatt, drawing from Vidyāraṇya, argues that 
‘Umbeka was a popular name of Maṇḍana Miśra’, the author of the Vidhiviveka, who 
was a contemporary of Śaṇkara and engaged in debates with him. Umbeka’s 
commentary was followed by Sucarita Miśra’s Kāśikā and Pārthasārathi Miśra’s 
Nyāyaratnākara. Pārthasārathi also wrote an independent commentary on the Bhāṣya of 
Śabara entitled Śāstradīpikā. Prabhākara’s Bṛhatī, which was believed to be ‘discovered 
and published in an incomplete form’, was also commented on by his disciples, of 
which the most important was Sālikanātha’s Ṛjuvimalāpañcikā. Bhavanātha Miśra was 
another important follower of Prabhākara who wrote an independent commentary on 
Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras entitled Nayaviveka.53 
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While there were elaborated agreements on the style and methods of interpretation 
prevalent in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, there emerged against this background, a set of 
disputed and contentious issues, in which problems of disagreement within the text 
commented upon multiplied between different commentators in the continuing 
commentarial-tradition after Śabara-svāmin. The Mīmāṃsā as a school persisted over 
the centuries precisely through these intra-Mīmāṃsā disagreements and debates. The 
formation of the three schools of Mīmāṃsā, namely the Bhaṭṭa, Prabhākara and 
Murāri54 schools, were a consequence of these disagreements and debates.  
A survey of the intellectual history of the Mīmāṃsā, including the important 
introductory treatises on the system, highlights that most commentators and interpreters 
differ on what they introduce and consider the main thematic of the system. For 
example, the three relatively well-known treatises on Mīmāṃsā that have been 
published, all with accompanying English translations, are Laugākṣi Bhāskara’s 
Arthasaṁgraha, Āpadeva’s Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa, and Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa and 
Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitā’s Mānameyodaya. While they were all written as introductory texts to 
the Mīmāṃsā system, they do not discuss the same set of topics. The first two deal 
directly with the analytic principles of Vedic exegesis, and the third deals exclusively 
with the philosophical positions, particularly as developed in the works of Kumārila, 
without any discussion on exegesis.
55
  
While we are fortunate to have a single Bhāṣya on the text which is considered to be 
authoritative,
56
 the very nature of Jaiminian enquiry and what he enquires into and why, 
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viz., what the Sūtras as a text are primarily about, is often only discussed and 
understood fragmentarily. Similar to other branches of Sanskrit literature, a large 
number of the Mīmāṃsā works were written between the sixteenth and the eighteenth 
century.
57
 These range from introductory treatises, which presupposed no prior study of 
the subject, to commentaries on the major works of earlier writers, to the development 
of the ‘New School’ of Mīmāṃsā in the texts by Khaṇḍadeva (c. 1575-1665 CE) based 
on the ‘New Logic (Navya-Nyāya)’.58 Although there have been a few studies on the 
commentary of Śabara-svāmin, and the study of two of the schools of Mīmāṃsā, 
namely the Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara schools, have continued at least till the eighteenth 
century, not unlike the modern scholarship on Mīmāṃsā, these studies have been 
largely thematic, with scholars looking to elaborate particular pādas (sections) and 
therefore confining themselves to limited themes.
59
  
However, as disparate as these disagreements were, they all shared the same telos in that 
they were Mīmāṃsākas trying to establish the Mīmāṃsā as a darśana and argue for its 
credibility and significance in light of the criticisms of its central tenets from other 
systems of thought, particularly the Buddhist system, which was understood to be 
dominant in the early periods of the formation and development of the Mīmāṃsā 
tradition.
60
 
My intention in briefly mapping the Mīmāṃsā corpus is to highlight that even as 
scholarship-through-commentary proliferated and continued up to the eighteenth 
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century, these commentaries often distanced themselves from the main concern of the 
the Mīmāṃsāsūtras; as a consequence, have only served to sideline the particularity of 
the Vedic ritual context that Jaimini sought to vehemently defend. They have been 
unable to contribute to the discussions on the understanding of the nature of Vedic 
practice, which is the central concern for Jaimini in his investigation into dharma and 
his constitution of the Mīmāṃsā tradition. 
THE HERMENEUTIC TRADITION 
One of the most prominent and extensive debates within the humanistic enquiry is the 
debate on the nature of human rationality, and the terms on which this debate was 
conducted was in the standard opposition between ‘objectivism’ and ‘relativism’. This 
opposition continued to pervade the study of culture, religion and society, and within 
the study of religion, in light of the growing recognition of the plurality of religious 
traditions and the multiplicity of their voices, the question of rationality became a 
central contention.
61
  
On the one hand, as MacIntyre has pointed out, according to post-Kantian 
Enlightenment thought, there ‘was an unargued belief that in all enquiry; religious, 
moral or otherwise, the adequate identification, characterization, and classification of 
the relevant data does not require, and indeed may preclude any prior commitment to 
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some particular theoretical or doctrinal standpoint’. 62  This encyclopaedist mind-set 
inspired an ‘objectivist’ enquiry which claims that ‘the data, so to speak, present 
themselves and speak for themselves’, and whose approach involves a detached and 
‘neutral’ observer who does not acknowledge but seeks to ‘bracket’ his prejudice, and 
who overlooks cultural and historical particularity in his quest for universal and accurate 
representation of data. MacIntyre argues that these theorists held a ‘unitary conception 
of rationality and of the rational mind’ by which ‘they took for granted not only that all 
rational persons conceptualize data in one and the same way’ but also that the ‘attentive 
and honest observer, unblinded and undistracted by the prejudices of prior commitment 
to belief’ will ‘report the same data, the same facts’. 63  This was understood to be 
applicable for all forms of enquiry. On the other hand, the reaction to the encyclopaedic 
position in the works of post-critical scholars, influenced by Nietzsche’s genealogical 
approach and perspectivalism argues for the importance of promoting the ‘multiplicity 
of perspectives’ from which they believed ‘reality’ could be viewed, to the extent that 
these multiple perspectives have no commonalities or shared conceptions of ‘truth’. 
Nietzsche, in his ‘psychological, epistemological, historical and literary’ explorations of 
the question of ‘truth’, argues, according to MacIntyre, ‘that all claims to truth are and 
can only be made from the standpoint afforded by some particular perspective. There is 
then no such thing as truth-as-such, but only truth-from-one-or-other-point-of-view’.64 
Therefore, the ‘encyclopaedists’ and ‘genealogists’ can be seen to hold two divergent 
and even antagonistic rival viewpoints. While the post-Kantian Enlightenment position 
proposed the notion of a standard and fixed rationality that is universal in its adoption, 
the Nietzscheian-influenced counter-Enlightenment position challenged that privilege 
and sought to deconstruct its fixed foundations. 
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The search for a coherent alternative that is able to engage these two untenable positions 
seriously while seeking to surpass it, has been emerging from different perspectives 
associated with different philosophers across disciplines such as Kuhn and Feyerabend 
in the philosophy of science, Winch and Geertz in the social science, and Habermas in 
critical theory and pragmatism. It is within the same concern for identifying and 
formulating a coherent alternative beyond these extreme binaries that the task of 
hermeneutics was proposed as a way forward. Bernstein, having extensively examined 
the nature of this debate in his book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, sought to 
interrogate this standard opposition and move beyond incommensurability by 
introducing a new conception of rationality that is grounded on the practical task of 
hermeneutical discourse as founded in ‘dialogical communities’.65 He argued that it is 
the incommensurability of theories, traditions and practices that makes hermeneutics 
necessary for understanding. He also pointed out that while we, in the modern world, 
can no longer assume that there is shared acceptance of norms and principles and the 
preconditions for phronesis no longer necessarily exist, it does not mean that the 
preconditions for hermeneutics are absent. Bernstein argues that it is precisely when 
shared preunderstandings are absent that hermeneutics and the practical possibility of 
dialogue becomes crucial.
66
 Bernstein picks up on Gadamer’s discussion of 
hermeneutics, which he claimed is not only concerned with the interpretation of texts, 
but whose insights are extended to ‘all that no longer expresses itself in and through its 
own world’ and argues that ‘philosophical hermeneutics contributes to the movement 
beyond objectivism and relativism’. 67  Henceforth, the hermeneutic approach, 
particularly the post-Heideggerian philosophical hermeneutics, has been developed as a 
way forward from what was commonly known as ‘objectivism’ and ‘relativism’. 
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Overview of the Tasks of Philosophical Hermeneutics 
Ricoeur argued that the recent history of hermeneutics has generally been dominated by 
a preoccupation to enlarge the aim of hermeneutics in terms of a ‘mode of knowing’.68 
The interpretation of texts, particularly in the works of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, 
sought to establish hermeneutics as a viable method for the human sciences. The use of 
the term ‘hermeneutics’ as ‘a science of understanding that can offer a hermeneutical 
methodology for the human sciences’ was first developed in the nineteenth century 
through the works of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, primarily for the interpretation of 
texts.
69
 For Schleiermacher, the development of a ‘general hermeneutics’ is primarily 
dependent on the challenge of grasping the author’s intention, and along with the 
hermeneutic task of ‘grammatical interpretation’, a ‘fuller grasp of the author’s 
intention’ is acquired through ‘a psychological immersion’ in the period in which the 
text was written.
70
 Ricoeur notes that for Schleiermacher, while ‘the first interpretation 
is called “objective”,’ in that ‘it is concerned with linguistic characteristics distinct from 
the author’, it is also ‘negative’ in that ‘it merely indicates the limits of understanding.’ 
Therefore, it is only in the second interpretation that the proper task of hermeneutics is 
fulfilled, where the subjectivity of the one who speaks is reached.
71
 Dilthey expands 
Schleiermacher’s analysis of hermeneutical methodology to the ‘problem of the 
intelligibility of the historical’ where the text to be interpreted is reality itself and its 
historical interconnection.
72
 Dilthey, writing in an epoch characterized by a ‘total 
rejection of Hegelianism and an apology for experimental knowledge’, sought to 
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respond to the positivism predominant in that period by claiming the scientificity of 
historical knowledge as comparable to the natural sciences. To do this, he maintained a 
strict ‘opposition between the explanation of nature’ and the ‘understanding of history’, 
where understanding presupposes the ‘primordial capacity to transpose oneself into the 
mental life of others.’73 For Dilthey, understanding is ‘foundational to the interpretative 
process at the heart of the human sciences’, and while the ‘natural sciences are based on 
the experience of externalities, the human sciences relate to inner experience’.74  
After Dilthey, Heidegger took hermeneutics through what Ricoeur termed a 
‘Copernican inversion’ by subsuming the question of ‘method’ to the reign of 
‘primordial ontology’. 75  For Heidegger, verstehen (understanding) is no longer an 
entering into the minds of authors or an immersion into the context of the author 
through intuition or empathy (Schleiermacher) or by historicality (Dilthey), and the 
decisive step in hermeneutics was not an attempt ‘to perfect the epistemology of the 
human sciences’, but rather to question the ‘fundamental postulate’ itself i.e. the very 
presupposition of hermeneutics construed as an epistemology.
76
 For Heidegger, 
understanding is ‘essential to our being’ and is more than just a ‘cognitive process’. As 
Sherma and Sharma point out, ‘it is less a theoretical comprehension than a practical 
knowledge that relates to our being-in-the-world or existence (Dasein).’77 His important 
categories for understanding in his magnum opus Being and Time include ‘Dasein’, 
‘facticity’ and ‘thrownness’, which refers to our arbitrary givenness and ‘care’ and 
‘being-towards-death’ that touches the acceptance of our finitude and the striving 
towards genuineness and responsibility. Therefore, for Heidegger, understanding is 
necessarily interpretative. Thereafter, there was a significant shift from a ‘mode of 
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knowing’ to a ‘way of being’, 78  which is seen as ‘an attempt to dig beneath the 
epistemological enterprise itself, in order to uncover its properly ontological 
conditions’.79 The question of ‘how do we know?’ was replaced by the question of 
‘what is the mode of being of that being who exists only in understanding?’ With 
Heidegger, the ‘forgotten question of being’ and ‘the question of the meaning of being’ 
were now central to the enquiry.
80
  
It is precisely in light of this shift that Gadamer takes up the debate about the human 
sciences in terms of Heideggerian ontology, and introduces the concepts of ‘prejudice’, 
‘authority’ and ‘tradition’ by claiming that ‘we are always situated in history’81 and 
communicating at a distance is made possible only by means of a ‘fusion of horizons’.82 
Gadamer takes Heidegger’s perception of understanding as his point of departure and, 
borrowing his analysis of ‘fore-structures’ as foundational to understanding, argues that 
‘prejudice’ is inevitable and that all understanding is both limited and constrained by 
history and ‘tradition’. While the works initiated by Heidegger and Gadamer were 
developed for a discussion of human understanding in a more general sense, it is in the 
works of Ricoeur that hermeneutics was primarily applied to the study of human action. 
Ricoeur focussed on Gadamer’s ‘communication at a distance’ by drawing on the 
‘universal linguality of human experience’ that enables our belonging to a tradition, and 
sought to interpret it in light of the problematic of the ‘matter of the text’.83 Therefore, 
for Ricoeur, hermeneutics is ‘the theory of the operations of understanding in their 
relation to the interpretation of texts’. Ricoeur argues that ‘hermeneutics is not a 
reflection on the human sciences, but an explication of the ontological ground upon 
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which these sciences can be constructed’, and sought to shift the function of 
‘understanding’ from the concern of grasping a fact to the apprehension of a possibility 
of being.
84
 He further claims: ‘To understand a text, we shall say, is not to find a lifeless 
sense that is contained therein, but to unfold the possibility of being indicated by the 
text.’85 Ricoeur states at this point that while philosophical hermeneutics move with 
assurance along the ascending pathway from epistemology to ontology, it is along the 
descending pathway that the most significant question for hermeneutics is 
encountered.
86
 Hermeneutics in this sense is an ontological hermeneutics, a projection 
within a prior being-thrown, a way of being in the world that touches upon the 
acceptance of our historicality and finitude and our effort towards authenticity and 
responsibility. It is a way of abiding and living reflexively in the world, where one 
understands one’s particularity and location in history and temporality, and how the 
dialectic of ‘belonging’ and ‘distancing’ informs both our knowing and our acting in the 
world - our being.  
Building on ‘Heideggerian ontology’, Gadamer revisited the concept of tradition and 
introduced it as the site (historical location) where the ‘alienating distanciation and the 
experience of belonging’ for Dasein is negotiated.87 It is this historical location, which 
is not ‘historically neutral’ in the ‘Encyclopaedist’ sense,88 that allows me to seek if 
rational enquiries are indeed enquiries that can only be enabled by traditions of enquiry. 
Within the scholarship in the human sciences, in the last few decades, the concept of 
tradition has seen a resurgence of interest both as a ‘category’ as well as a ‘method of 
research’ particularly concerning the question of ‘whether and to what extent’ one can 
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accept the ‘tradition-bound nature of rationality’ and enquiry without conceding to the 
relativistic thesis that disagreements between varied and competing traditions are 
rationally unresolvable.
89
 
Tradition as a Hermeneutic Form of Enquiry 
The word ‘tradition’ is taken to have come from the ‘Latin noun traditio (“handing 
over”) which derives from the verb tradere (“hand over”, “deliver”)’. This sense of 
‘handing over’ (traditio) is closely related to ‘the Greek paradosis, which also comes 
from a verb meaning “hand over”,’ but with a focus on the ‘content’ on what is being 
handed over. Both terms (traditio and paradosis) are often used in a literal and 
figurative sense, and when used in the latter sense, can also be taken to suggest a sense 
of ‘teaching’ and ‘instruction’. It is primarily in this sense that both terms were used and 
developed by the ‘Latin and Greek Christian theologians’ to designate ‘the body of 
teachings preserved and handed down by the church as the “Catholic faith”.’90 The 
English usage of the word tradition with the meaning of ‘hand over’ is argued to have 
been derived from both the ‘Latin verb tradere’ and the ‘French tradicion’ around the 
fourteenth century, referring to the process of ‘passing on’ and carrying the same sense 
of ‘handing over’ or transmitting ‘something’ from the past.91 As Morris would put it, 
‘each generation has handed on something to the next and that something is – 
Tradition.’92 Flood threads together various conceptions of tradition to argue that while 
there are different ways of approaching the complex nature of tradition, the central 
concept of any tradition is primarily the notion of ‘memory’, and tradition is closely 
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associated with the passing down of ‘collective memory’ ‘through the generations’.93 
He presents the performance of asceticism by the religious self as an example of the 
form that a transmission of the memory of a tradition can take, and he argues that the 
‘past’ is not an object that is ‘simply waiting to be discovered’ but is a ‘memory’ that 
has to be ‘continually reconfigured in light of new evidences and new readings’.94 
Therefore, for Flood, the notion of tradition is not something that is ‘passively received’ 
but instead it is ‘actively reconstructed in a shared imagination and reconstituted in the 
present as memory’.95 Following this understanding of tradition as a ‘content’ from the 
past that is reconstructed and handed down to succeeding generations in this thesis, I 
would later argue that it is the internal rationality of a particular tradition that is 
transmitted and passed on by each generation, primarily through their texts and 
practices. It is particularly within the hermeneutical tradition that the concept of 
tradition has been developed and proposed, both as a method of enquiry and a mode of 
understanding, particularly through the works of Gadamer, Ricoeur and MacIntyre in 
the twentieth century, and it is primarily based on their insights that I highlight the 
structure of a [hermeneutic] tradition below. In the following chapters, I will argue that 
this same structure can be uncovered from Jaimini’s enquiry. 
Structure of a Hermeneutic Tradition 
One of the charges that Gadamer makes against the Enlightenment tradition in his Truth 
and Method is their confusion and failure to perceive the three interrelated conditions of 
understanding: ‘prejudice’, ‘authority’ and ‘tradition’. He claims: ‘there is one prejudice 
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of the Enlightenment that defines its essence: the fundamental prejudice of the 
Enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its 
power’,96 arguing that they have succeeded in distorting prejudice to mean ‘unfounded 
judgement’ that has ‘no foundation in the things themselves’;97 authority is taken to be 
‘blind obedience’, and tradition is taken to be ‘something that is historically given’ that 
is the ‘abstract opposite of free self-determination.’ 98  Gadamer differentiates his 
understanding of tradition from this misunderstanding that he calls ‘traditionalism’ and 
shows that not only are prejudice, authority and tradition inescapable, but they are also 
necessary and positive conditions for understanding. For Gadamer, we, as essentially 
historical beings, are always situated within specific traditions, which enable us to 
understand one another. Therefore, according to him, tradition is not ‘the inertia of what 
once existed’ but is something that is continually ‘affirmed, embraced, and cultivated’ 
as an act of reason and a freely chosen action.
99
 We are ‘always already affected by 
history. It determines in advance both what seems to us worth inquiring about and what 
will appear as an object of investigation’. 100  ‘Understanding’, therefore, is ‘to be 
thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition, a process 
of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated’.101 
Ricoeur, in his third volume of Time and Narrative, discusses the possibility of 
understanding tradition as a multi-faceted concept and claims that contemporary 
thinking about tradition has become entangled in unnecessary confusions because 
contemporary philosophy has viewed tradition as a monolithic concept. For Ricoeur, the 
term ‘tradition’ does not denote a single phenomenon, but a cluster of interrelated ones. 
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He argues that the notion of tradition can be best understood under three inter-related 
themes which include the discussion about: (a) how we are connected to the past, (b) 
what we are connected to when we stand in relation to the past, and (c) the legitimacy of 
the past’s hold on us today. Ricoeur categorizes these three themes using the concept of 
‘traditionality’, ‘traditions’ and ‘tradition’.102 
It is this explication of the vitality of tradition and historical consciousness and 
situatedness by Gadamer and Ricoeur that MacIntyre picks up and develops in his own 
work. In his three major works, there is a sustained development of the validity and 
significance of tradition as an enquiry, and as an alternative to both Enlightenment 
universalism and post-modern perspectivalism,
103
 where he stressed and illustrated the 
importance of recovering the conception of rational enquiry as bounded within a 
tradition, and proposed the significance of tradition as a mode of understanding and a 
method of enquiry.
104
 
The three senses with which Ricoeur unpacks the complexity of the notion of tradition 
are significant in that they enable a further explication of the three important conditions 
of understanding that can be taken as constituting the three inter-related structures of a 
hermeneutic tradition, which includes: (a) the condition that locates and connects us to 
our past - a sense of shared telos, (b) the condition that allows us to identify what we are 
connected to when we stand in relation to the past - the authority of an internal 
rationality that is unique to that tradition, and (c) the condition that legitimizes the past’s 
claim on us today - the institution of the answerable practising community.  
                                                 
102
 P Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol 3, trans. K Mclaughlin & D Pellauer, University of Chicago Press, 
London, 1988, p. 219. 
103
 The three works mentioned here are Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988), Three Rival Versions 
of Moral Enquiry (1990) and After Virtue:A Study in Moral Theory (2007). 
104
 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, pp. 7-9. 
 53 
 
Therefore, to say that enquiry is bound to tradition necessitates the explication of these 
three conditions, and it is in the post-Heideggerian hermeneutical tradition, and 
particularly in the works of Gadamer, Ricoeur and MacIntyre, that I find contributions 
to the development of these various aspects of tradition as a form of enquiry. The three 
constitutive structures of telos, internal rationality and practising community are 
discussed most comprehensively by Ricoeur and MacIntyre, as highlighted below. 
Telos 
In discussing ‘the unity of a human life and the concept of a tradition’ in his After 
Virtue, MacIntyre points out that ‘any contemporary attempt to envisage each human 
life as a whole, as a unity, whose character provides the virtues with an adequate telos’ 
is faced with ‘social obstacles’ whereby ‘modernity partitions each human life into a 
variety of segments, each with its own norms and modes of behaviour’. He argues that 
‘these separations’ have led to the privileging of ‘the distinctiveness of each’ as opposed 
to ‘the unity of the life of the individual’ as a whole. These ‘social obstacles’ are then 
followed by what MacIntyre calls ‘philosophical obstacles’ which are characterized by 
‘the tendency to think atomistically about human action and to analyze complex actions 
and transactions in terms of simple components.’ This has led to the dominant 
orientation that ‘particular actions’ no longer ‘derive their character as parts of larger 
wholes’,105  and ‘life comes to appear as nothing but a series of unconnected episodes – 
a liquidation of the self’ where the self is fragmented ‘into a set of demarcated areas of 
role-playing’. All of these developments have in turn contributed to the invisibility of 
‘the unity of a human life’.106 MacIntyre attributes this growth of modern individualism 
and ‘individualist conceptions’ to the reality that modern society today is constituted by 
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‘a collection of strangers, each pursuing his or her own interests under minimal 
constraints.’107 He adds that such modern individualistic societies where there are no 
institutions that ‘express or represent the moral community of the citizens’ become 
governed by ‘a set of institutional arrangements’ that seek to impose a ‘bureaucratized 
unity which lacks genuine moral consensus.’108 MacIntyre claims that this lack of moral 
consensus or common goal is a consequence of the denial or neglect of its own narrative 
history by society and the fragmentation of individuals from their historical location and 
narrative due to the influential modern notion of individualism.  
It is in light of this that MacIntyre explicates the impossibility of giving an account of 
human action that is individuated and intelligible outside the framework of a particular 
narrative. In the absence of ‘an overriding conception of the telos of a whole human life, 
conceived as a unity’, any conception of virtues ‘remain[s] partial and incomplete’, and 
any conception of justice within this ‘collection of strangers’ remains untenable as there 
are no common goals or grounds upon which rival versions of what is considered good 
can be negotiated.
109
 He notes that there can be no independent or objective study of an 
‘agent’s intentions’ apart from the ‘causal and temporal order’ within which they are 
historically situated and the ‘history of the setting to which they belong’ and concludes 
by arguing that ‘narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and essential 
genre for the characterization of human actions.’ 110  The narrative form, MacIntyre 
argues, is not a method of understanding that is then imposed onto the enquiry into the 
nature of action but it is a form that is intrinsic to the very nature of human action. 
Further, the notion of being connected and located firmly in history is important for 
understanding actions, for every action is deemed intelligible only within a particular 
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history. According to him, ‘an action is a moment in a possible or actual history or in a 
number of such histories. The notion of a history is as fundamental a notion as the 
notion of an action. Each requires the other.’111 
MacIntyre points out that modernity fails to appreciate this interrelation between the 
concept of history and action and points to Sartre who, in his ‘whole theory of the self’ 
in particular, argued that ‘human life is composed of discrete actions which lead 
nowhere, which have no order; the story-teller imposes on human events retrospectively 
an order which they did not have while they were lived’ so that ‘to present human life in 
the form of a narrative is always to falsify it.’112 Stating that Sartre never sought to 
provide the answer to ‘what human actions deprived of any falsifying narrative order’ 
would look like, and claiming also that Sartre himself had to write a narrative to ‘show 
that there are no true narratives’, MacIntyre argues that ‘all lived narratives’ are 
characterized by ‘a certain teleological character’ where ‘we live out our lives, both 
individually and in our relationships with each other, in the light of certain conceptions 
of a possible shared future.’113 
Within MacIntyre’s argument, one of the key aspects of the narrative form or 
teleological nature of human life is that they are guided by a goal - an end or a telos - 
towards which the actions are oriented. He states: ‘There is no present which is not 
informed by some image of some future and an image of the future which always 
presents itself in the form of a telos – or of a variety of ends or goals – towards which 
we are either moving or failing to move in the present.’114 It is in this sense that ‘man is 
in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal. 
He is not essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to 
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truth.’115 MacIntyre proposes the Aristotelian tradition as one such tradition in which 
the goods (virtue in this case) that a tradition offers are available only within ‘the 
narrative unity of a human life’, particularly in practices that derive from ‘shared 
activity’ with a community whose members find their purpose in the unity fostered by a 
shared vision of the good.
116
 Therefore, for MacIntyre, it is the teleological unity of a 
tradition, and for him the Aristotelian tradition, that can provide the necessary 
alternative to liberal individualism. In other words, it is the notion of a shared telos that 
allows the conglomeration of actions to be narratively structured and the idea of a 
tradition cultivated, actualized and validated.  
Telos, for MacIntyre, can be understood in light of the notion of ‘practice’ in reference 
to teleological virtue. Virtue requires embodiment in practice, and MacIntyre defines a 
virtue as ‘an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to 
enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which 
effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.’ Every practice, for MacIntyre, 
embodies ‘goods internal to the practice’ whose realization ‘requires a certain kind of 
relationship between those who participate in it’ according to the shared telos of the 
community.
117
 Therefore, practice is carried out in reference to one’s relationship with 
other practitioners according to shared common standards. In this sense, living out 
shared virtues in relationship within a community is a dynamic process that is ongoing 
and never fully completed. 
Internal Rationality 
                                                 
115
 Ibid., p. 216. 
116
 Ibid., p. 258. 
117
 Ibid., p. 191. 
 57 
 
In his book Whose Justice? Which Rationality? MacIntyre provides a sustained 
development of the notion of rationality as bound within a particular tradition. 
MacIntyre was seeking to find an alternative to the two predominant views on 
rationality which was characterized by the Enlightenment view of a universal and 
standard rationality, as proposed by Kant and Bentham on the one hand, and the post-
Enlightenment perspectival view of a multiplicity of rationalities developed from the 
works of Nietzsche on the other hand.  
MacIntyre claims the indispensibility of tradition in any form of enquiry by asserting 
that ‘all reasoning takes place within the context of some traditional mode of thought, 
transcending through criticism and invention the limitations of what had hitherto been 
reasoned in that tradition’.118 He further writes: ‘What I am therefore, is in key part 
what I inherit, a specific past that is present to some degree in my present. I find myself 
part of a history and that is generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I recognize 
it or not, one of the bearers of a tradition.’119 For him, a tradition is:  
an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined and 
redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics and enemies external to the 
tradition who reject all or at least key parts of those fundamental agreements, and those internal, 
interpretative debates through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements 
come to be expressed and by whose progress a tradition is constituted.
120
  
MacIntyre stresses that these internal discussions within a living tradition are 
‘historically extended, socially embodied argument[s]…about the goods which 
constitute that tradition’121 and it is these internal dynamics which ushers one to the 
specific sense in which MacIntyre takes the notion of ‘tradition-constituted enquiry’. He 
states:  
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There is no other way to engage in the formulation, elaboration, rational justification, and 
criticism of accounts of practical rationality and justice except from within some particular 
tradition in conversation, cooperation, and conflict with those who inhabit the same tradition. 
There is no standing ground, no place for enquiry, no way to engage in the practices of 
advancing, evaluating, accepting, and rejecting reasoned argument apart from that which is 
provided by some particular tradition or other.
122
 
Ricoeur uses the term ‘traditionality’ to talk about the way in which we are connected to 
the past. He argues that we are always embedded and located within the ‘chain of 
interpretations and reinterpretations’ transmitted to us from the past.123 Regardless of 
what traditions we inhabit, regardless of what is transmitted to us from the past, we 
always think in the mode of tradition. To say that enquiry is bound to tradition is to 
begin enquiry by taking up problems and preoccupations from the past. The importance 
of tradition is not only what is handed down to us in particular contexts, but also the 
sense that there is some particular tradition, to which we must belong if we are to 
engage in a discussion, an activity, a deliberation.  
Practising Community 
It is in light of the necessity of these ‘exemplifications’ as discussed above that one can 
argue, following Ricoeur, that tradition is not just a set of transmitted contents that 
governs our thought and practices but one that legitimately does so. This is to claim that 
not only are we connected to our particular past because of ‘the unavoidable finitude of 
all understanding’, but also because the transmitted contents from the past are endorsed 
and accepted as legitimate by us today. For Ricoeur, the question of the legitimacy of 
our situatedness and location within traditions is an important one because traditions are 
‘proposals of meaning’124 which are at the same time ‘a claim to truth’.125 Each tradition 
presents itself to us not as one tradition amongst many others, but as the tradition.  
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According to MacIntyre, a ‘living tradition’ is a ‘historicaly extended, socially 
embodied argument’ which not only manifests in a grasp of those ‘future possibilities 
which the past has made available to the present’ but also ‘continue a not-yet-completed 
narrative’ and ‘confront a future whose determinate and determinable 
character…derives from the past.’ 126  It is this continuation of the narrative, which 
according to Ricoeur, is to ‘enlarge the sphere of communication’127 that necessitates 
the practising community, where the enquiry is continued and the tradition embodied. 
He writes:  
Tradition means transmission, transmission of things said, of beliefs professed, of norms accepted, 
etc. Now such a transmission is a living one only if tradition continues to form a partnership with 
innovation. Tradition represents the aspect of debt which concerns the past and reminds us that 
nothing comes from nothing. A tradition remains living, however, only if it continues to be held in an 
unbroken process of reinterpretation.
128
 
It is one of Ricoeur’s central claims that tradition is something that happens; it is an 
activity of transmission - a normatively structured activity.  
PROBLEMATIC IN THE STUDY OF RITUAL 
In a previous section, I have stated that Jaimini’s conception of dharma in his 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras can be re-read as a hermeneutical enquiry into Vedic practice which 
can offer insights into the discussions within the contemporary scholarship on ritual. In 
this section, I will primarily discuss the problematic with regard to the study of ritual by 
mapping the contemporary debates on ritual with a view to show that it is constitutive of 
three contentious discussions about representation, rationality and articulation. These 
debates are highlighted with the intention of showing that they will be brought together 
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in conversation with a re-reading of Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras in an attempt to develop 
‘mutual answerability’ in the succeeding core chapters.  
While there is a multiplicity of interdisciplinary theories and perspectives adopted in the 
study and interpretation of rituals, the contemporary debate within the study of ritual is 
identified in this thesis by two main fundamental attitudes that are adopted with regard 
to ritual. These two attitudes are summed up here by two phrases viz., ‘ritual as 
representation’ (thought-centered) and ‘ritual as phenomenon’ (act-centered), adopted 
by two theoretical tendencies that may be categorized as the semiotic-symbolists and the 
formalist-structuralists. The origins of this debate, however, can be traced back to the 
classical theorists of the late nineteenth century. 
Historical Beginnings of the Thought-Action Dichotomy 
Bell argues that the formal study of ritual began after a drawn-out debate by classical 
theorists on the question of the ‘origins of religion’ from the late nineteenth century 
onwards, at the heart of which was the controversy over whether the roots of religion 
were to be found in the rites and practices or in the myths and beliefs of a 
community.
129
 On the one hand, beginning with the work of Smith, who was closely 
following the evolutionary schema of the anthropologist Tylor,
130
 religion was taken as 
constituted by ‘a series of acts and observances’ that existed primarily ‘for the 
preservation and welfare of society’,131 shifting the focus away from speculative myths 
about the nature of things to the series of acts performed by the community. He believed 
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that religion originated in activities that cemented the bonds of the community. His 
student Frazer, who followed this line of thinking, was equally interested in 
propounding the activities of communities and their collective experiences as the site 
from which religions originate.
132
 Bell mentions that Frazer’s most famous work, The 
Golden Bough, developed the argument that in order to understand myth, one must first 
understand ritual activity, as ritual is the most expressive form of cultural life.
133
 
Therefore, the importance of ‘ritual’ as acts that precede myths and beliefs was stressed. 
Smith and Frazer became important figures for the school known as The Myth and 
Ritual Schools, which maintained the primacy of ritual as acts in their enquiry into the 
roots of religion.
134
  
On the other hand, following the early influential pioneering work of Müller on the 
presumed Indo-European roots of Greek mythology,
135
 the phenomenologists of 
religion
136
 who had aligned themselves with Müller’s emphasis on myths, accorded a 
greater primacy to cultural myths, beliefs and symbols as opposed to ritual, which was 
understood as the practical reworking or performance of those myths. ‘Ritual’, as the 
phenomenologist of religion Eliade noted, is completely distinguishable from symbols 
and myths: ‘A symbol and a rite…are on such different levels that the rite can never 
reveal what the symbol reveals.’ 137  Eliade’s approach, while not strictly separating 
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‘living’ myths from rituals, still tended ‘to place ritual on a secondary level, reserving a 
primary place for myth by virtue of its closer relationship to the underlying structures of 
all religious experience’.138  
While the ritualists of The Myth and Ritual Schools were theorizing in terms of a 
universal evolutionary pattern that they argue had historically ‘diffused to become the 
underlying basis for all ritual[s]’ everywhere, the mythologists and phenomenologists of 
religion on the other hand, were seeking to locate ahistorical universals and identify 
trans-historical similarities and commonalities across cultures through their applications 
of the methods of ‘systematic comparison’. This enabled them to move away from the 
evolutionary framework adopted by The Myth and Ritual Schools, but at the cost of a 
meticulous historical framework.
139
  
However, in spite of their seemingly divergent methodological approaches, both schools 
were working under an Enlightenment ‘universalist’ rationality140 that was inclined to 
argue for ‘a coherent and meaningful unity to the diversity of religions, cultures and 
histories’ 141  across continents. Therefore, underlying the emergence of ‘ritual’ as a 
formal category separated distinctly from myths and beliefs was an attempt to 
understand and negotiate cross-cultural diversities and similarities and to locate 
difference primarily according to the positions of the scholars of that period who were 
convinced that the ‘scientific’ pursuit of knowledge accorded them a more privileged 
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position. Therefore, as Bell noted, ritual ‘as a constructed category’ was a ‘rather liberal 
and enlightened one’.142 
While there was no dearth of critics to challenge these early theories and call attention 
to their inconsistencies,
143
 nonetheless these classical theoretical models and debates 
were significant in that they were influential in positing an essential dichotomy between 
myth and ritual. Segal has pointed out that this dichotomy resulted in growing 
contentions between notions of practice and belief, phenomenon and representation, and 
ritual began to be ‘readily cast as action in opposition to thought and theory’, 144 
stimulating a clear distinction between behaviour and beliefs, action and thoughts, and 
practice and text in the enquiry into the nature of religion. As a result, ‘ritual’ as a 
category, was not only distinguished and disconnected from the notion of religion, but 
also came to be understood as particularly thoughtless action in itself - habitual, 
routinized, prescriptive, traditional, and unreflective - which are the ‘purely formal, 
secondary, and mere physical expression of logical ideas’.145 Smith, in his book The 
Meaning and End of Religion, argues that the understanding of the category ‘religion’ 
shifted, as a result of the gradual process of reification of the term religio from an 
adjective to a noun, from denoting an ‘attribute of persons’ to a ‘separate thing in itself’. 
He claims that this process accelerated particularly during the Protestant Reformation 
and the Enlightenment period, as the doctrinal content of religion slowly came to be 
regarded as more central than religious practices, until finally religion was conceived as 
a set of beliefs that can and should be evaluated in terms of their internal consistency.
146
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Following this separation of religious beliefs and practices, the tendency to interpret 
ritual either in terms of what it ‘symbolizes’ or in terms of its underlying structure was 
further strengthened. The outcome of these processes is the modern representational 
theory
147
 of ritual, which tended to present external accounts of ritual that are often 
distanced from the complexity of the ‘act’ and the ends towards which it conduces - 
ends as conceived by the practitioners.  
The Debate in the Contemporary Study of Ritual 
While Buc traces the history of the development of the study of rituals, which he claims 
is specific to ‘Western societies’, back to the sixteenth century,148 Bell argues that the 
‘formal’ study of ritual as a distinct category in academia, which sought to be 
differentiated from the study of religion, is a relatively recent phenomenon that first 
emerged as a formal term of analysis in the nineteenth century.
149
 Grimes, highlighting 
that the phrase ‘ritual studies’150 was not in use until 1977, inaugurated the Journal of 
Ritual Studies ten years later, and claimed that this journal can be taken as supporting 
evidence that the distinctiveness of the study of ritual has come of age.
151
 The concern 
for the distinctiveness of ritual, particularly with the perceived demise of religion as an 
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analytical category,
152
 led to a re-exploration of the checkered conceptual relationship 
between ritual and religion, and the emergence of ‘ritual studies’ came to be linked with 
the earlier dichotomy of myths and ritual in relation to the study of religion.
153
 As 
contemporary theories on ritual continue to draw from this un-problematized 
dichotomy, the effects of this assumption has led to the continuing study of ritual as an 
‘object’ or a ‘datum’ investigated through a method that already presupposes the notion 
of ritual as action opposed to beliefs and symbols, which are more closely associated 
with the notion of religion.  
This distinction between beliefs and ritual, then in turn, influenced the way 
contemporary discourses on ritual diverged, and they tended to diverge in two main 
directions, with both sides uncritically assuming ritual as a kind of action alone. The 
contemporary debate, as already mentioned, can be identified by two main fundamental 
attitudes adopted with regard to the study of ritual.  
The first group, which I categorize here as the semiotic-symbolists, were those group of 
theorists who focussed on the meaning(s) of religious symbols as their frame of 
reference in their approach to the study of rituals and, therefore, emphasized ritual as a 
symbolic site of meaning and as a universal medium of symbolic expressions. Durkheim 
was one of the most important pioneers in arguing the instrumentality of ritual as 
serving a social function in society. Durkheim in his The Elementary Forms of the 
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Religious Life analysed religion pragmatically as comprising both primary beliefs and 
secondary rites, and argued that the ‘collective consciousness’ of individuals was 
fostered through the medium of these rites and rituals, thus providing cohesion and 
integration in society.
154
 Following this Durkheimian reading of ritual as serving a 
social function or as communicating a larger meaning for society,
155
 later theorists 
became primarily interested in how ritual as a medium of religious expression facilitates 
the surrounding social and cultural life.
156
 This was a period in which theories 
concerning the effect of ritual on social cohesion and equilibrium coincided with the 
introduction of ‘culture as a category’ of investigation. Therefore, ritual came to be 
interpreted in terms such as ‘symbolization’ and ‘social communication’. It was a model 
of ritual theory that was still in search of a way to represent the universal essence of 
religious experience and was accompanied by cross-cultural methods of comparison 
premised upon a universal rationality.
157
 This approach then resulted in the elucidation 
of ritual as a tool for understanding and substantiating larger entities such as religious 
symbols and beliefs and society and culture. Thus, ritual was understood to be a 
storehouse of religion, culture and society that was taken to represent the same. 
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On the other hand, influenced by the works of Lévi-Strauss and particularly his 
assertion that rituals are completely distinct from myths,
158
 by the late twentieth 
century, there were scholars who emphasized the necessity for the study of ritual ‘in 
itself and for itself…to determine its specific characteristics’159 and emphasized the 
need to study ‘ritual in its own right’.160 They were interested exclusively in how the 
phenomenon of ritual works on its own, without signifying any meaning with regard to 
religion or society. For them, ‘religious symbols and the symbolic activity of ritual’ are 
too complicated in themselves to be taken as ‘mere reflections of the social order’.161 
The  study of ritual as representation is crucially missing the importance of the act and 
its ‘interior organization’ and ‘self-referentiality’ in their approach. 162  Seeking to 
navigate these ‘unchartered waters’ by focussing particularly on the syntactical elements 
of ritual, they proposed a new approach called ‘Ritology’ or the ‘science of ritual’163 that 
would become the study of the phenomenon of ritual in and for itself and to promote the 
development of a computer-based research platform for the analysis of ritual by means 
of an ‘ontology of rituals’.164 This, they argued, would introduce ritual studies as a 
distinct ‘science’ of study that can stand in its own right. To study rituals in this manner 
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would then mean, to study them as particular and singular events, independent of their 
contexts and socio-surround and of any underlying meanings that may be attributed to 
them.
165
 Therefore, they are primarily interested in looking at rituals parsimoniously as 
an independent and autonomous locus of enquiry. Rituals are seen as mechanical and 
rule-governed activities not necessarily concerned with thinking or meaning-making
166
 
and hence, they attended primarily to the formal and practical elements in their study. 
Smith talked about the importance of seeing ritual as work as opposed to seeing ritual in 
terms of symbolic and idealized expressions.
167
 Staal vehemently argued that rituals 
must be investigated and understood for their own sakes, as they are meaningless and 
pure activities where the performers’ only concern is the proper execution of the 
rules.
168
 Bateson also emphasized the importance of situating the locus of enquiry on 
rituals themselves by taking them as autonomous from the larger social order.
169
 This 
has resulted in the implication that ritual, rather than being subsumed under the study of 
religion, or even society or culture, is a distinct field that can be studied on its own 
terms and not as a continuation of the study of these larger fields.
170
 
The first position, which can be claimed to be a continuation of the Enlightenment 
approach adopted by the classical theorists, in their attempt to identify what they 
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believed to be a universal category of human behaviour, worked with essentialist and 
realist pre-suppositions that were derived from their own rationalities. They sought to 
‘discover’ ritual by finding some ‘deep-structure’ social sense and function often only 
known to the researcher and not the participants whose own traditionary constitutions 
they were not interested in investigating.
171
 Ritual, for them, was a ‘treasure house of 
culture and society, epiphenomenally shaped…to reflect or radiate how values, ideals, 
and relationships should be shaped and resolved, symbolically and functionally.’172  
The second position criticised the former for their ‘claims to the value of any universal, 
overarching definition or conception of ritual’, and thereby, sought to recover the 
phenomenality of ritual through attempts to exhaust the significance of its formation by 
adopting a ‘grammar’ and a ‘science of ritual’ approach.173 In their attempts to stress the 
autonomous and complicated nature of ritual as a distinct phenomenon, they tended to 
cast ritual as an independent autonomous entity in itself with no connection with 
religion and society, and as an activity whose primary concern is the execution of a 
system of rules. Ritual, for them, is a self-organizing and self-referential phenomenon 
without any credal core or symbolic content and whose forms are characterized by an 
interior complexity and irreducibility to either its agent(s) or its environment. Their 
position resulted in the widening of the belief-practice dichotomy to its extreme, and 
subsequently to the widening of the relationship between religion and ritual. 
In their efforts to propose ritual as a phenomenon that can be distinguished from other 
encompassing categories such as religion and society, the formalist-structuralist ritual 
theorists have a tendency to under-determine the role of meaning, beliefs and texts as 
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they sought to foreground ritual as an act in and for itself without any symbolic content. 
The semiotic-symbolist ritual theories showed a tendency to over-determine the role of 
meaning, beliefs and texts as they sidelined the enactment aspect of ritual. These two 
prevalent attitudes in contemporary debates were influenced by the unchallenged 
dichotomy between myth and ritual in classical scholarship. This dichotomy was 
founded upon a particular notion of ‘myth as beliefs’ and ‘ritual as action’, where 
beliefs and action were understood to correspond to activities of the mind (thought-
centred) and the body (behaviour-centred) respectively.
174
 This ‘objectivist’ 
representation of ritual as an epiphenomenon and the ‘formalist’ abstraction of ritual in 
terms exclusively of its forms and structure, only seek to support the supposition that 
ritual is an unreflective and thoughtless action.
175  
The notion of ritual-as-action (as 
opposed to religion-as-beliefs), and thereby, empty action was not problematized by 
contemporary debates on ritual. Therefore, they reduced ritual to either a secondary re-
presentation of larger religious, social or cultural entities, or to an event that is 
abstracted from its concrete enactment in material reality. Ritual as a way of acting 
which expresses the construction and negotiation of human meaning within a particular 
cosmology, and therefore, as a form of praxis taken to be a mode of thinking and 
reflection, was completely left out of their imaginaire.  
Although much is known from these interdisciplinary studies about various kinds of 
ritual in light of the roles they play in social and cultural processes, the question of what 
‘ritual’ is, what it is constitutive of, and how it can be comprehensively understood, has 
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not yet been posed in a helpful manner. Schilbrack argued that the reason for this is the 
lack of philosophical interest in ritual. He highlighted that while the study of rituals is 
an interdisciplinary investigation and includes varied disciplines ranging from sociology 
and anthropology to performance studies and gender studies, philosophical interest in 
ritual is lacking and ‘philosophy has so far contributed almost not at all to the study of 
rituals’. 176  Guided by this over-arching problematic of seeking to understand what 
‘ritual’ is at the heart of my questioning, and following from the opposing positions 
highlighted above, I seek to elucidate the contentions in contemporary debates in the 
form of three main problematic about ritual. Therefore, I will reformulate the debate on 
ritual as a contention about (a) the articulation of the thematic of ‘ritual’ and its 
representation, in order (b) to explore its rationality and the historical conditions that 
gave rise to its study, with a view (c) to reclaim the importance of the agency of the 
subject in ritual practice and the tradition within which the practice is made intelligible. 
It is in view of these three main contentions within the contemporary debates in ritual 
that this research seeks to draw insights from Jaimini’s conception of dharma as an 
explanation of ritual subjectivity, and develop and argue that this hermeneutical re-
reading and reclaiming of the ritual actant is vital for understanding and paving a way 
forward from the imbalance that is presented in this section. Therefore, this thesis will 
seek to contribute a traditionary perspective to a general analysis of the phenomenon of 
ritual. In light of the contentions highlighted above, I will discuss ritual primarily as a 
traditionary practice viz. a culture-specific techné
177
 that entails the enjoinment and 
formation of subjectivities and results in an embodiment of the rationality of a tradition. 
This definition assumes the body as the locus of experience and transformation and the 
‘text’ as the authority that stipulates enjoinment. It is this enjoinment which may be 
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characterized as ‘the expression of a certain kind of textuality’ 178  and allows an 
identification of the self-expression of a particular tradition.   
There are two interrelated things that are important in my attempt to reimagine ritual 
primarily as traditionary practice, and particularly through the lens of ritual subjectivity: 
first, it must be noted that while ritual is a term also utilized to categorize actions often 
termed ‘secular’ and its study has ventured into other disciplines (particularly 
anthropology and sociology) aside from its beginnings in the study of religion, my 
conception of ritual as a traditionary practice is one that is set within scriptural 
traditions where the notion of ‘cosmology’ and the authority of a ‘sacred’ text are not 
yet lost. To suggest this is to see ritual primarily as a religious act. There are analogues 
of ritual in the ‘contemporary, secularised world’ but these are not discussed as rituals 
in my usage because they are not obligations enjoined by a ‘sacred’ text that seek to 
enact the ‘memory of a tradition’. The interrelation between religion, understood 
primarily in terms of socially sanctioned praxis and training of the body,
179
 and ritual, 
understood as a way of acting in the world that expresses imagination rather than 
propositions,
180
 allows me to claim the centrality of practice without making it an 
autonomous and meaningless activity. Ritual practices can be taken as ‘somatic 
responses to human need in real space and time’,181 and far from being irrational or self-
sufficient, serves as the locus within which the construction and negotiation of human 
meaning within a particular cosmology is fully realized. Second, while these practices 
function on a broader scale of collective representations of values and narratives of a 
community, resulting in the preservation, continuation and transformation of histories, 
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they impact upon individual lives and are appropriated primarily through desire, 
language and enactment within individual subjectivities. 
RITUAL, TRADITION AND SUBJECTIVITY 
Stausberg mentioned that the ‘term “ritual” and the related term “rite” go back to Latin, 
which has the noun ritus and the adjective ritualis (“relating to rites”)’. While he points 
out that this ‘does not imply semantic and pragmatic continuity’ in that the ‘meaning of 
these Latin terms does not correspond to the modern way of employing them’, he also 
notes that once ‘ritual’ became an important and useful term in the humanities, it came 
to replace ‘alternative (and partly synonymous) terms such as “ceremony”, 
“observance”, “celebration”, “custom”, “service” and “tradition” gradually’.182 Scheid, 
in his An Introduction to Roman Religion, mentions that the term ritus, whose Greek 
equivalent is nomos, is taken to designate a particular mode of action adopted in a 
specific form of practice, such as the celebration of religious festivals, as opposed to the 
content of those festivals. The term employed by the Romans to designate those 
contents, which are known more generally today as ‘rites’, is the term sacra or 
caerimoniae.
183
 According to Ernout and Meillet, ‘the term ritus depends on the root 
*er- (ar-), enlarged by *-ei- and the suffix –tu-.’ They claim that the word is ‘an 
example of the concordances between the Indo-Iranian and the Italo-Celtic religious 
vocabulary’, and further argue that ‘ritus’ corresponds to the ‘Vedic ṛtam’, which is 
generally taken to designate ‘correct order.’184 The word is also related to the Indo-
European root *re(i)- which is taken to mean ‘to reason’, ‘to count’.185  
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Quoting the ‘first edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, published in Edinburgh 
1771’, Asad points out that ritual was defined as ‘a book directing the order and manner 
to be observed in celebrating religious ceremonies, and performing divine service in a 
particular church, diocese, order, or the like.’ He goes on to claim that by 1910 (in the 
eleventh edition of the book) the notion of ritual as ‘a script for regulating practice’ was 
shifted to ‘a type of practice that is interpretable as standing for some further verbally 
definable, but tacit, event’.186 He claims that this modern understanding of ritual was 
disinterested in taking this shift from the sense of ‘a script (a text to be read and 
performed) to an action (an apt performance of what is prescribed)’ into account, and 
therefore, is unable to appreciate the intellectual and practical disciplines acquired for 
the full development of the self, such as the constitution of the ‘monastic self’.187 While 
the distinction of ritual either as a ‘script’ or an ‘action’ exclusively is limiting, this 
distinction, when pursued to explore their interrelation, serves to introduce the 
possibility of understanding ritual as a particular way of acting, and a specific form or 
method of practice and skill in action, which is oriented towards the realization of the 
telos of what is considered to be the good. This understanding of ritual action is very 
similar in its structure to MacIntyre’s envisioning of traditionary enquiry as a techné.  
In discussing philosophical enquiry, and particularly the enquiry into the knowledge 
about the truth of the good for the enquirer and the human good, MacIntyre talks about 
conceiving such enquiry as a craft, a techné, which he conflates with a skill that 
possesses practical rationality. He draws from Aristotle’s statement - ‘every good is the 
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ergon of a techné’188 - and connects it to the journey of transformation for the enquirer. 
For MacIntyre, to be an enquirer into the nature of the good is to learn to make himself 
or herself become a particular kind of person, ‘making oneself into an apprentice to a 
craft’.189 He then goes on to discuss some salient characteristics which the structure of a 
techné (here philosophical enquiry) shares with other crafts: firstly, he talks about the 
significance of the apprentice learning from his teacher for two purposes – one, to 
identify mistakes in the process of his recognition of the best available standards and 
two, to learn to distinguish his own ‘excellence here and now’ and the ‘ultimate 
excellence’ which furnishes him and his master with their telos. Secondly, he talks 
about the practical embodiment of virtues along with a ‘desire guided by reason’ to 
realize and actualize the ‘potentiality’ which, along with the authority and guidance of 
the teacher, will enable the enquirer to move towards the shared telos of a fully 
perfected craft. Thirdly, he talks about the ‘rationality of a craft’ that the enquirer can 
share in, by understanding and participating in the tradition through which it was 
achieved, and thereby, learning how to go further as well as learning how to direct 
others towards that shared telos of fully perfected work.
190
 Therefore, for MacIntyre, if 
one seeks to enquire into the nature of virtue, one has to submit to a disciplined 
apprenticeship where the lack of important ‘qualities of mind, body and character’ 
required for the ‘excellent performance’ and an ‘informed and accurate judgement about 
excellence in performance’ can be acquired and learned from ‘those competent to 
transform us into the kind of people who will be able both to perform well and to judge 
well.’ 191  Thus, the relationship of master-apprentice can be seen as providing the 
necessary groundwork for practices to be passed on as tradition. Action as techné 
becomes a carrier of tradition and the mode through which tradition may be transmitted. 
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It is with this sense of action, understood as traditionary practice entailing the formation 
of a subjectivity that ritual finds conceptual similarity and allows me to establish a link 
between the notion of ritual and the notion of tradition highlighted previously. Shils 
describes ‘tradition’ as ‘mechanisms of persistence’ operating through the beliefs and 
practices of a community,
192
 and Hammer, based on his important work on Oakeshott 
and Gadamer’s use of ‘tradition’, claims that ‘the origin of tradition lies in human 
activity’. 193  Valliere argues that the noun form of ‘tradition’ i.e. traditio (‘handing 
over’), which is closely related to the Greek term paradosis, is best understood to 
designate the ‘content’ of what is being handed over.194 Pieper argues that the Latin 
preposition trans, hidden in the use of ‘tradition’ is closely related to the ‘act of 
tradition’ which is described in French as transmettre, suggesting the notion of tradition 
as an act of transmission.
195
 Therefore, traditio as a generic ‘something’ transmitted in 
time can be seen to have a unique relationship with ritual. This relationship is 
particularly pertinent when ritual, as I have highlighted, is taken as a religio practice. 
The Latin term religio, which was taken by Cicero to have originated from relegere, 
referring to the ‘lore of the rituals’ of one’s ancestors that is being ‘reread’ or ‘retraced’, 
is similar to the Latin term traditio in the noun form, which equally refers to the 
‘content’ of what is being delivered or transmitted. King points out that this 
understanding of the term religio ‘seems to have gained provenance in the “pagan” 
Roman Empire’ where religio was ‘virtually synonymous with traditio.’ 196 
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Balagangadhara also claims that ‘religio is what traditio is all about’ and points out that 
religion as tradition is ‘a set of practices transmitted over generations’.197 
It is in light of this that I claim ritual, re-understood as a traditionary practice, can be 
taken as a meaningful religio practice, which responsibly embodies (internalizes and 
inscribes) the practical rationality of a tradition, and actualizes it in enactment. This 
conception of ritual allows me to develop the centrality of the notion of ritual 
subjectivity in an attempt to investigate and understand the phenomenon of ritual.  
SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have provided the conceptual framework for the two aims of the 
central argument that I seek to pursue in this thesis. With regard to the first aim, the 
groundwork for the claim that Jaimini’s conception of dharma can be read as a 
philosophy of Vedic practice centred on the subject, and whose stages of transformation 
can be seen to possess the structure of a hermeneutic tradition, began by locating of 
Jaimini’s text between the codification-driven Śrauta-sūtras and the speculation-driven 
Darśana-sūtras where, following Clooney’s observation, I argue that Jaimini’s vision 
and approach can already be seen to be hermeneutical in orientation. In providing an 
overview of the Mīmāṃsā corpus through the commentarial tradition, I argued that 
Jaimini’s predominant concern, in his quest to understand dharma, was the 
intelligibility of ritual practice and I showed that the continuing scholarship-through-
commentary had largely sidelined the concern for the centrality of practice. These 
commentaries have taken the foundational text of the Mīmāṃsā system viz. the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras, out of its ritual context and have only scantily studied it as a source for 
understanding the nature of ‘ritual’ that Jaimini makes intelligible and consistently 
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defends. Therefore, these studies were not able to account for Jaimini’s conception of 
dharma and his concern for the sanctity and continuation of the practice of ritual in the 
Vedic world. I then provided a historical background to the hermeneutic tradition as I 
sought to explicate its constitutive structure as telos, internal rationality and practising 
community. The hermeneutic tradition of enquiry was developed on this groundwork in 
light of the claim that Jaimini’s ritualistic understanding of dharma, when pursued 
through the theme of subjectivity and tradition, also possessed a structure that can be 
argued to be akin to that of the hermeneutic tradition. 
With regard to the second aim, the groundwork for the claim that Jaimini’s enquiry can 
offer insights to the contentions within the academic study of ritual began by developing 
a historical background to the scholarship on ritual, particularly in light of the myth-
ritual and thought-action dichotomy, to argue that these fundamental attitudes to ritual 
gave rise to an understanding of ritual as an empty and thoughtless action. This claim is 
divided into three contentions which are stated as the representation of ritual as 
meaningful practice, the challenges of a universal rationality and the articulation of 
ritual through the agency of the ritual actant. The aim, in the following chapters, is to 
show that these contentious discussions are unable to move forward because the notion 
of ritual subjectivity formed within a practising tradition has not been seriously 
considered. I then briefly highlighted the conceptual ties identifiable between ritual, 
tradition and subjectivity and ended the chapter with a preliminary sketch of how the 
theme of ritual, tradition and subjectivity may be conceptually tied together. 
Having introduced the conceptual framework for this thesis, I now move on to the three 
core chapters that will focus primarily on explicating the significance of Jaimini’s 
enquiry by approaching the Mīmāṃsāsūtras through the lens of the transformation of 
the subject and the stages of enjoinment, as I continue to be guided by the attempt to 
 79 
 
understand Jaimini’s conception of dharma. These stages of enjoinment that include the 
mode of desire, appropriation and answerable enactment will allow me to account for 
the pursuit of dharma, the authority of the Veda and the realization of dharma. This will 
in turn help me to argue that Jaimini’s conception of dharma is closely intertwined with 
his concern for the preservation and continuation of an unbroken tradition. 
Each of these three core chapters will be guided by a hermeneutical re-reading of 
Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras even as it engages with questions that are raised in the 
scholarship on ritual, questions whose underlying issues can also be seen to be related to 
hermeneutical traditions in general. The next chapter begins with an investigation on the 
theme of the pursuit of dharma. It will be read in light of the discussions on the problem 
of meaning and reductionism in the study of ritual, particularly with a focus on the 
notion of sacrifice and the end towards which the practice is directed and made 
meaningful.
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CHAPTER THREE: PURSUIT OF DHARMA 
TELOS, DESIRE AND SUBJECTIVITY 
INTRODUCTION 
The debate concerning the question of ‘ritual’, in light of the two fundamental attitudes 
that I have mentioned in the previous chapter, can be discussed in terms of the ‘what’ 
and the ‘how’ of ritual. The issues that concern both of these queries can be discussed as 
two forms of reductionist enquiry; the former ontological and the latter epistemological. 
While these two queries can be discussed as two separate and distinct debates in their 
own right, they are nonetheless conceptually inseparable. The question of the ‘thing’ or 
‘phenomenon’ that constitutes or identifies ritual is closely interrelated with the 
question of how one may investigate and talk about ‘ritual’. Ricoeur argued and 
demonstrated that these two forms of enquiry are two overlapping domains that can and 
must be investigated together. According to him, a discussion ‘begins as the simple 
analysis of our manner of thinking and talking about things’, and the process of 
discussion and analysis eventually shifts to an investigation or enquiry about ‘the things 
themselves and the requirements they place on our conceptions about them.’1 In this 
chapter and the last (Chapter Five), I will engage with the question of the ontology of 
ritual by looking at the problem of representation and articulation as it relates to the 
phenomenon of ritual, even as I discuss the question of the epistemology of ritual in the 
next chapter (Chapter Four) as it relates to its formal study. 
If the focus in the enquiry into ritual is an attempt to understand the thing-in-itself, then 
what thing-in-itself or phenomenon does ritual actually represent? As I discuss below, 
this underlying question forms the debate on the problem of meaning in the study of 
ritual, with the formalist-structuralists reducing ritual to a meaningless activity that is 
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solely constituted by the formality of its rules, and the semiotic-symbolists reducing 
ritual to an epiphenomenon that derives its meaning only externally i.e. outside its 
situated enactment or practice.   
Ritual and the Question of Meaning 
Claiming that the chief characteristic of rituals is orthopraxis and not orthodoxy, Staal, 
an influential proponent who based his study on the Vedic fire ritual (agnicayana),
2
 
critiques the general supposition that ritual is an act oriented towards goals and purpose, 
and not with itself. He argues that ritual is an autonomous practice where the performers 
of rituals are concerned only with the correct execution of specified acts: ‘their primary 
concern, if not obsession, is with rules. There are no symbolic meanings going through 
their minds when they are engaged in performing ritual.’3 While Staal does not dispute 
the value of ritual in society, he defines ritual ‘as an activity governed by explicit rules. 
With the importance of the act being what you do, not what you think, believe, or say.’4 
He describes rituals as forms of actions that are basically context-independent and self-
referential, and therefore, are ‘primary’ and ‘pure activity’ that is ‘without function, aim 
or goal’ necessitating an investigation for their own sake.5 He goes on to claim that ‘the 
chief provider of meaning is religion’ and ritual became meaningful only through its 
association with religion - with the imposition of meaning onto such primordial 
utterances as mantras and other meaningless practices. Therefore, Staal argues that 
while religion is best understood as the coming together of ritual and meaning; rituals in 
and of themselves; are meaningless activities and more importantly, are anti-religion.
6
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Staal’s idea of the meaninglessness of ritual seems far-fetched given the continuing 
scholarship on ritual that demonstrates the social, communicative, or performative 
meaning of such activities, he is reacting precisely against the predominant position that 
reduces the practice of ritual as mediums or tools for understanding ‘larger’ and more 
encompassing social phenomena, particularly the over-elaborate ‘meaning-under-every-
rock symbolic analysis’ of much of the early theorists of ritual and culture such as 
Turner and Geertz.
7
 Kreinath also argued that ‘as long as texts and discourse are taken 
as the major source or primary model for inquiring into religious traditions’, and as long 
as the practice of ritual is unaccounted for except as the by-product of religious beliefs, 
the study of religion and culture ‘will be limited to such issues as representation and 
meaning’.8 Geertz’s two programmatic articles entitled Thick Description: Towards an 
Interpretative Theory of Culture and Religion as a Cultural System, where he outlines a 
theoretical perspective that emphasizes the meaningfulness of ritual based on his 
semiotic theory of culture, are often taken as an example of the textualizing of culture 
and practices that both Staal and Kreinath protest against.  
Geertz identifies ritual and religion as concepts that are interrelated and defines religion 
‘as a system of symbols’ where the the essence of religion, the notion of the ‘really real’ 
is understood to originate in ritual because ‘the world as lived, and the world as 
imagined, [are] fused under the agency of a set of symbolic forms.’9 Kreinath elaborates 
Geertz’s position by arguing that ritual is what generates religion for Geertz because ‘it 
is capable of combining the “model of” and the “model for” reality in a way that acts to 
establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by 
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formulating conceptions of a general order of existence.’10 For Kreinath, while Geertz’s 
approach is important for ‘the study of religion’, it is problematic for the study of ritual 
because ‘it presupposes a concept of symbol that he believes misconceives the analysis 
of ritual performance - as long as it is grasped as a category that can only determine the 
type of unit that “serves as a vehicle for a conception”.’11 He argues that a serious 
engagement with Geertz’s approach will result in the analysis of ‘the conceptions or 
models of reality as embodied in, or exemplified by, rituals’ and would lead to the 
sidelining of the analysis of ‘the rituals themselves’. 12  While Geertz’s approach is 
significant, particularly for the study of culture and religion, and also introduced useful 
notions such as the ‘emic’ and ‘etic’ perspectives, Kreinath contends that ‘he is unable 
to analyze rituals on their own terms,’ and his approach ‘systematically relates the 
rituals back to religious conceptions that he takes to be the representation or meaning of 
ritual symbols’. Kreinath argues that Geertz’s understanding of ritual therefore, is 
reduced to ‘a mode of communicative behaviour that functions to ascertain religious 
moods and motivations, rather than a form of human action that establishes and 
transforms relations’. 13  In a similar manner, the accounts of the ‘functionalist’, 
‘ethologist’, and ‘confessionalist’ also tend to reduce ritual practices to an 
epiphenomenon that points outward towards some external meaning, rather than 
towards the activity or the performed act itself.
14
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It is this lack of interest in accounting for the complexity of the ritual act that provoked 
Staal and the formalist-structuralists to suggest that the ‘study of ritual’ must be a 
separate ‘field of its own’ rather than an extension of the larger study of religion, or 
society and culture,
15
 and it should be studied ‘in terms of the syntactic rules they 
follow’ rather than through the dimension of any external myths or beliefs.16 For these 
theorists, the subsuming of the analysis of ritual within other studies such as the study 
of culture and religion, and the attempt to distil religious meanings from rituals without 
analyzing the ritual practices themselves is inadequate for a comprehensive analysis and 
understanding of the phenomenon.  
One may not agree with Staal’s thesis in its entirety, however, his provocative idea of 
the ‘meaninglessness’ of the ‘pure activity’ of ritual is significant in pointing to the self-
justifying dimensions of ritual practice and in advancing the possibility of looking at 
rituals as essentially self-referential. It is precisely this concern for, as well as lack of, 
the self-justification of ritual that encouraged contemporary scholars to seek a ‘science 
of ritual’ that would make the study of ritual a distinct science which can stand in its 
own right - independent of their contexts and from any underlying meanings that may 
be attributed to them. However, Staal’s total rejection of meaning (and the relationship 
between ritual and religion) and his privileging of (abstract) rules in his attempt to 
highlight the independence of ritual and the primacy of the act of ritual, does not accord 
him the space to explore the particularity that exhibits meaning that is generated from 
within - the particularity and uniqueness of ritual understood as a traditionary practice. 
Staal’s select insistence on the rules of performance prevented him from pursuing the 
complexity that constitutes traditionary practice, and thereby, also the attendant notion 
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of the subject who ushers meaning to the act. Therefore, while Staal opposes the 
reductionism implied in functionalist and symbolic theories, he is himself a reductionist, 
and his account of ‘pure activity’ remains limited insofar as he neglects all meaningful 
aspects that people, and particularly ritual actants, attribute to their own practices.
17
  
While Geertz, in his attempt to privilege the conception of religion, does not accord 
primacy to the discussion of the performed act, Staal, in his attempt to act as a 
corrective does not accord any space for the discussion of the theme of religion, which 
he argues entails the borrowing and imposition of meanings from outside the performed 
act. Therefore, the ‘objectivist’ representation of ritual as an epiphenomenon and the 
‘formalist’ abstraction of ritual in terms of its forms and structure (rules), are both 
unable to account for the act of ritual thereby, only serving to repudiate the supposition 
that ritual in itself is an unreflective and thoughtless action. Even contemporary 
scholars, such as Michaels, who sought to ‘solve the conundrum’ by proposing a 
‘middle way’, nonetheless maintain that ‘rituals are indeed without meaning’. Michaels 
supports this claim by developing three points whose overarching argument revolves 
around the notion that rituals are ‘mimetic’ actions that are ultimately ‘changeless’ and 
‘invariable’. According to him, ‘rituals are staged productions of timelessness, the effort 
to oppose change, which implies finality (and, ultimately, death).’18 
Stuck between Geertz’s objective analysis of ritual as ‘datum’ that is seen as a window 
for understanding larger social phenomena, and Staal’s deconstructionist analysis of 
ritual as meaningless activities that nonetheless sought universal features, how does one 
account for the notion of ritual as a meaningful practice without falling into either of 
these reductionist positions? I would like to argue that it is when ritual is re-imagined 
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and posited in the language of a traditionary practice that its intrinsic relationship with 
religion and meaning can be acknowledged without sidelining the specificity and 
integrity of the practice of ritual. It is then that ritual can be discussed in the sense of a 
specific religious practice and the agency of the subject of that practice who pursues 
meaning taken into consideration. 
It is in light of this tension that I turn to Jaimini’s philosophy, and look at his discussion 
on the practice of Vedic sacrifice, to seek a way forward from these contending 
positions. The problem of meaning,
19
 understood particularly as a separate and external 
entity that is then imposed onto ritual activity, is an impasse that Jaimini in his 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras not only grappled with but sought to propose a way forward from. It is 
this structure and process of negotiating a way forward, without the devaluation of the 
event of enactment or the sidelining of the tradition within which the enactment is 
situated, that I will seek to develop in this chapter. I will discuss Jaimini’s notion of 
sacrifice as a meaningful practice primarily through an excavation of the ritual 
subjectivity that emerges within the interplay of his introduction of dharma as the telos 
of tradition and his defence of the intelligibility and vitality of the continuation of 
sacrifice.  
To that end, this chapter will be discussed under three main themes, with each theme 
seeking to build on the previous one. I will begin by giving a brief historical overview 
of the Vedic world of sacrifice, within which the Mīmāṃsā was formulated, to help 
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on the meaning of religious action, see Flood, The Importance of Religion: Meaning and Action in our 
Strange World, pp. 53-60. 
 88 
enquire into Jaimini’s rationale for his introduction of and concern for dharma as the 
central theme in his enquiry. I will argue that Jaimini’s sidelining of an important 
alternative that offers itself as a viable rationale for claiming sacrifice as a meaningful 
practice, when taken together with his insistence on the pursuit of dharma, discloses his 
concern for the continuity and vitality of tradition. To help me develop the conceptual 
lens with which the pursuit of the invisible dharma may be investigated, I will take a 
detour through Heidegger’s phenomenology to explore the possibility of relating the 
invisible with the formation of subjectivity. I will end the discussion with an explication 
of the emergence of the Mīmāṃsā subject, who as a sacrificial agent desiring the telos 
of dharma, ushers the identification of sacrificial activity as an intrinsically meaningful 
event. This disclosing of invisibility as firmly grounded in ritual subjectivity in turn 
enables me to explicate the practice of Vedic sacrifice as a meaningful event, and one 
that can also be validated as one of the constitutive structures of a hermeneutic tradition 
- telos. The reduction of ritual as empty action, this chapter seeks to argue, is because 
the question of the ritual practitioner and his impulse towards meaning have not been 
seriously taken into consideration.  
THE DEMYSTIFICATION OF SACRIFICE IN MĪMĀṂSĀ  
Many of the early prominent theories about sacrifice, particularly in anthropology, have 
largely centred on the predominant theme of a human-divine communication or 
relationship. This relationship is primarily based on the presumed assumption of a 
polarity between the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’, where the human sacrificial agent, who 
is known to be polluted, sinful and guilt-ridden, is looking to transform and redeem or 
purify himself through the propitiation of a deity or a higher extra-temporal power in 
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the performance of the specified sacrifice.
20
 Sacrifice, which according to Tylor, 
‘evolved from the idea of giving a gift to a deity as if he were a man’,21 was minimally 
defined by Smith and Doniger as ‘the act of giving up something in order to receive 
something of greater worth.’22  
Sacrifice was generally understood as a ‘transaction’, an ‘offering’ or a ‘substitution’ 
undertaken for the mutual benefit of the deity and the human sacrificer,
23
 where the 
sacrificial agent brings an offering of sacrifice to the deity who in turn rewards them 
with blessings.
24
 Hubert and Mauss claim that ‘in every sacrifice an object passes from 
the common into the religious domain; it is consecrated’.25 Beattie, taking the case of 
the ‘Nuer’ and ‘the ancient Hebrews’, adds that a sacrifice is made ‘to a High God, 
variously conceived’ and sometimes also to ‘lesser divinities and spirits believed to be 
able to affect man’s condition’. 26  Evans-Pritchard, who conducted an extensive 
anthropological survey of the Nuer religious symbolism, also regards sacrifices as 
invocations to a transcendent God. According to him, if one had to ‘sum up the Nuer 
sacrifice in a single word or idea’, it would be best categorized as ‘a substitution, vita 
pro vita.’27 
While Stroumsa claimed that this fundamental pattern of offering-and-blessing centred 
around the notion of a transcendent being (taken both in the theological and 
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metaphysical sense) is found throughout the history of religions,
28
 Das challenged that 
assumption by pointing out that these presupposed universal features in the discourse 
about the sacrificial processes are drawn heavily from ‘assumptions about man, society 
and God in Semitic traditions’ 29  and, therefore, failed to recognize and appreciate 
different sacrificial systems within the context of their own cosmologies and traditions. 
Das suggested that the general theory of ritual as elaborated by ‘anthropological 
discourse on sacrifice’ was inadequate because it fails to recognize that in other contexts 
such as the Vedic sacrifice, the gods are not identified as the central focus around which 
the sacrificial performance is oriented.
30
 According to her, sacrifice in the Vedic 
practice, is not an activity in which the objects are simply transferred from men to gods 
but one in which ‘sacrifice to god is complemented by sacrifice of god’, suggesting a 
different conception of the nature and role of both ‘god’ and sacrifice. 31  This 
observation opens the path for a re-imagining of the possibility of enriching the 
discourse about the nature of sacrifice and its presumed connection with the 
transcendent or the invisible.  
As Beattie has pointed out, even the understanding of what one means when one says 
something is made ‘holy’ or ‘sacred’ and how one changes something into that 
condition is unclear,
32
 and in an increasingly secularized post-modern world,
33
 the 
question of ‘God’, of transcendence, of the invisible, of the irreducible, is often 
burdened with the question of relevance, particularly in the academy.
34
 Flood observes 
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that we are now living in a ‘secular age where belief in a transcendent reality, or rather 
the experience of a transcendent reality as a fact in our lives’, has been seriously 
challenged and even replaced by ‘skepticism towards transcendence as the default 
position.’35 Clooney points out that ‘traditional religious discourse’ has come under 
sustained scrutiny and analysis in the ‘post-modern West’ whereby ‘the most important 
works in theology and the study of religion’ no longer center on ‘questions about the 
nature of God, the revelatory capacity of scriptures, or the explanation of religious 
experience in ways satisfying to the contemporary mind’ but ‘the discussion of religion 
has been systematically detached from the sure unifying foci - God, Scripture, and the 
meaning of life - that have traditionally afforded at least minimal coherence within even 
the most acrimonious discussions’.36  He believes that this ‘unsettling development’ 
poses ‘a challenge of the first order to traditional religious discourse and to those who 
have articulated their faith and understanding of religions in terms of that discourse’.37   
Although this concern seems to be presented as a more recent modern development,
38
 
one finds that in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, which precede us by thousands of years, notions 
such as ‘God’ or ‘gods’ or ‘authors’ of [sacred] texts were already subjected to critical 
discussions and their centrality challenged and sidelined. It is this curious sidelining of 
the importance of gods by Jaimini, while simultaneously forefronting the centrality of 
the practice of sacrifice in his pursuit of dharma that enables me to suggest the event of 
sacrifice as an intrinsically meaningful activity. I lay the groundwork for that suggestion 
by first offering a brief overview of the historical background within which the 
Mīmāṃsā as a school was formulated. 
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Background: Centrality of Yajña in the Vedic World 
The significance and centrality of sacrificial activity for the Vedic world throughout the 
Vedic period cannot be overemphasized. Staal asserts that Vedic ritual is not only the 
‘oldest surviving ritual of mankind’ but also that it ‘provides the best source material for 
a theory of ritual’.39 According to him, it is the ‘largest’, ‘most elaborate’ and ‘best 
documented’ among the ‘rituals of man’.40 Gonda also remarked that ‘no other nation of 
antiquity has left us so detailed, considered, and systematic descriptions of their ritual 
and ceremonial as the Vedic specialists.’41 Sacrifice, according to Phillips, is the soul of 
the Veda: ‘It is older than the hymns, for they were composed for its 
celebration…Viṣṇu and Indra made the spacious world for the sake of sacrifice.’42 
Clayton also notes that ‘even before the hymns in the Ṛg-veda were collected the idea 
of sacrifice had so fully laid hold of the mind of the Aryans that all the thousand hymns 
in the Ṛg-veda refer directly or indirectly to sacrifice.’43 Panikkar, while certainly aware 
that the conception of sacrifice and the connotation of the term itself varied through the 
ages in Vedic history, makes the claim that ‘if one had to choose a single word to 
express the quintessence of the Vedic Revelation, the word yajña (to sacrifice), would 
perhaps be the most adequate.’44  
Clooney observes that the Brāhmaṇas, which are texts ‘composed earlier than the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras’, are ‘closely connected with the actual prescriptions and prayers’ and 
are more commonly understood to be concerned with the exegesis of sacrifice.
45
 Renou 
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notes that they presuppose a thorough acquaintance with the course and details of 
sacrifice, and from the period of the Brāhmaṇas, the act of sacrifice significantly 
became the central activity around which the Vedic world was organized.
46
 According 
to Gonda, ‘the contents of the Brāhmaṇas may be classified under the heads of 
sacrificial directions, explanations and exegetical, “mythological”, polemical or 
“philosophical” speculations on the great rites and their “connections”, and the 
advantages to be gained by means of the rites.’47   
These descriptions of sacrifices in the Brāhmaṇas were followed by two diverging 
perspective on the Vedic practice of sacrifice. On the one hand, according to Clooney, 
‘at the “end” of the Brāhmaṇical period’, and with the introduction of the Upaniṣads, 
‘speculation on the sacrifice incorporated a new attitude regarding the essential or 
higher aspects of the sacrifice’ that is beyond its performed act. He highlights that this 
period witnessed ‘the sacrificer’s construction of his own spiritual self in the elaborate 
actions he performs’ and culminated with the development of the Upaniṣadic notion of a 
brahman and an ātman which while independent of the sacrifice as ‘higher realities’ are 
nonetheless made manifest by its performance.
48
 According to Mus, in the Upaniṣadic 
speculation, sacrifice was taken to be significant only in so far as it relates and points 
towards these notions of ātman and brahman and to the extent to which they are made 
manifest by them.
49
 On the other hand, the Brāhmaṇas were also followed by the sūtra 
literature, and works such as the Śrauta-sūtras, which are concerned primarily with the 
systematic exposition of the ‘rules of sacrifice’, prescribe the manner and employment 
of rules for the various ceremonies. The Śrauta-sūtras sought to record in detail the 
actions to be undertaken in a specific order and according to strict instructions, such as 
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in the agniṣṭoma sacrifice. Their main concern is to facilitate the correct performance of 
rituals, and to ensure that these performances are executed exactly as prescribed by the 
Vedic texts. They presuppose that rituals are to be performed because they have been 
laid down by the Veda directly and therefore, do not concern their investigations with 
attempts to elucidate the significance or meaning of those performances.
50
 Therefore, in 
comparison and contrast to the Upaniṣadic speculations that rationalize and locate 
sacrifice in light of the higher realities of brahman and the self, the descriptions of the 
Śrauta-sūtras are unconcerned about issues of meaning and significance. Clooney 
suggests that ‘the intellectual ancestry of the Mīmāṃsā’ may have been constituted by 
these prior ‘reflections’ and set of instructions.51 
Mīmāṃsā and the Empty World of Yajña  
The Mīmāṃsā as a school of thought was generally taken to originate at a time when 
the whole religious and sacrificial system of the Brahmins was, as Thibaut puts it, in a 
‘comparatively floating and unsettled condition’.52 He argued that this was a time when, 
owing to differences in tradition, beliefs and ritual practices, the various Vedic Śākhās 
began to form themselves.
53
 Gonda claims that in the post-ṚgVedic period when the 
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rituals came to develop considerably, the separation of groups of followers formed not 
only divergent views received as śruti but also generated different interpretations.54 
Thibaut notes that the growth of ritual activities and its diffusion over a wide extent of 
territory in turn led to the growth of different usages in connection with the sacrifice. As 
a result, multiple centres of the study of rituals began to develop. According to him, 
there was a shift from the full and circumstantial oral tradition where the sacrifices were 
performed based on the negotiation of the double ground of the (sacred) texts and the 
community (priestly schools and customs) that preserved those oral traditions,
55
 to a 
critical period where the oral tradition became obscure and the performance of the 
sacrifices was sought to be preserved solely by the formulation of rules and 
interpretative techniques founded on an implicit faith in the authority and infallibility of 
the (sacred) texts.
56
 The great mass of śruti materials handed down by memorial 
tradition orally from generation to generation was gradually assembled into a collection 
of treatises, accomplished by the aid of writing.
57
  
The changing circumstantial milieu and the way in which the Vedic tradition itself was 
evolving and diversifying meant that the world of sacrifice brought new and unique 
challenges. Thibaut mentions that the earlier ‘creative period of Brahmanical religious 
thought’ was a period in which doubts raised concerning sacrifice were discussed and 
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reasoned about collectively in a spirit of free enquiry. However, the altered 
circumstances of the time in which Mīmāṃsā was formulated, even in the Brahmins 
concern to preserve the tradition of performing sacrifices based on the authority of the 
Veda, presented several difficulties which demanded attention: 
Firstly, the attempt to systematize and codify all the knowledge and understanding 
about the soundness and validity of sacrifice in treatises as pregnant and concise as the 
sūtra form, without careful consideration of the immediate (oral) practising community, 
meant that the sacrificial performances were transformed into a doctrine based 
increasingly on the nature of the sacred texts. The ‘fixation’ that writing enabled was 
taken as a guarantor for the persistence of practice and more importantly as its 
conservation. This necessitated the sacrifice to be placed on an incontrovertible 
foundation for its continued dutiful performance, which in turn gradually changed it into 
a rule-governed mechanistic practice.
58
 However, the peculiar nature of the Vedic texts, 
and the character of the Brāhmaṇas and the nature of the prescriptions contained in 
them were such that the understanding and performance of them were ‘assailed by 
numerous doubts and misgivings’ as to whether they were a ‘faithful representation of 
what the sacred texts intimate’.59 According to Thibaut:  
The description of the sacrifices contained in the Brāhmaṇas is so incomplete and obscure, in the 
best cases so disjointed and unsystematic, so frequently interrupted by remarks and comments on 
the mystical signification of the sacrifice and its constituent acts that it would appear almost 
impossible for the sacrificer to feel assured of having done exactly what he ought to have done 
unless he had some other help to guide him.
60
  
Chakrabarti claims that the growing communities found the task of understanding the 
correct procedures of the Vedic performances increasingly complicated and 
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unfavourable.
61
 This problem of interpretation was also the beginning of the Brahmins’ 
preoccupation with the task of finding a method - an elaborate procedure and rules - for 
the performance of sacrifice. The event of sacrifice was no longer characterized by 
collective negotiation amongst the practising community but by an impersonal 
imperative that demanded dutiful compliance. There was an emerging gap between the 
world of the authoritative text and the world of the receivers of that text.
62
 
Secondly, the growing focus on rules and the complicated process through which a 
sacrifice is interpreted and performed brought in the question of attainment of the result 
of sacrifice and particularly the issue of where the fruits would originate from, at the 
centre of the sacrifice.
63
 This was not helped by the lack of clarity concerning the 
conception of ‘gods’ in Vedic thought. As Clooney highlighted, ‘the authors of the 
Brāhmaṇas generally refuse to subordinate the sacrifice, as homage or propitiation, to 
the gods to whom the sacrifices are offered’.64 This uncertainty concerning the place of 
the gods, combined with the growing cynicism over the fruits of the sacrifices allowed 
skeptics, came to be known later as the materialists (Lokāyatas), to charge that the 
sacrifices cannot ensure their results and that they were ultimately futile.
65
 The claim 
that sacrifice was primarily a reciprocal relation between the gods and men gained 
prominence, and the absence of this reciprocity and exchange was in turn used to 
challenge the very purpose and efficacy of sacrifice itself. 
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Thirdly, the complicated nature of the sacrifices and the growing scepticism over its 
fruit allowed room for criticisms from the other schools which were developing during 
that period, particularly on the question of the efficacy of sacrificial performance and its 
relation with dharma. For the sceptics, in particular the Cārvākas, dharma as a telos was 
understood as a concept that the Brahmin priests merely paid lip service to, in order to 
maintain their superiority and dominance; and as something that was taken to be 
transcendental in nature and invisible to sense perception, it could not have had any real 
significance for the immediate society.
66
 It also led to the heightening of criticisms from 
the Buddhists and the Jains
67
 who were intent on disputing the authority of the Veda in 
the tenets of their own system, and the ‘world-renouncers within the Vedic fold’ who 
sought to mythologize the idea of sacrifice and its relation to performance.
68
 
Therefore, owing to the shift from the full and circumstantial oral tradition to the critical 
period of the codifying of culture, the period around which the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, first as 
a form of engagement and later as a redaction, took shape can be taken as a period when 
the rational plausibility of the ritual of sacrifice and its necessity for the preservation of 
the Vedic tradition was no longer accepted as original and significant. There was 
confusion about the intelligibility of the traditional sacrifices from the inside i.e. from 
within the Brahmanical world,
69
 as well as criticism about the validity of the Veda as 
means of enquiring into dharma from the outside, particularly from the Buddhists, and 
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later the Jains.
70
 Not only was it a period when ‘the traditional Vedic orthodoxy had lost 
its power to convince [gradually] and the question of the intelligibility of sacrifice 
demanded attention’,71 but it was also a period that saw the individuation of society that 
no longer had a ground upon which it may be firmly rooted.  
In these circumstances, the impending danger of Vedic sacrifice being reduced to a 
claim of mere ritualism without meaning was a real one. The continuance of a practice 
that made the formation and transmission of a heritage possible and its relationship with 
the community’s own construction of a collective identity plausible was under threat of 
being dismissed in the absence of a ground upon which the foundation of sacrifice could 
be laid. Once the validity of sacrifice, within the context of this changing circumstantial 
milieu, was premised primarily on the production of tangible results or visible phalas 
i.e. an exchange and reciprocation between the sacrificer and gods, the question of how 
and where these results originated from had to be addressed.  
On the one hand, there was the Vedic orthodoxy whose response was to simply put 
aside the question of meaning and purpose and assert that the complex system of 
sacrifices and ceremonies had to be performed regardless of beliefs and results.
72
 On the 
other, there was the alternative of directing the question of results and phalas towards 
external referents such as the devatās (deities) as the endowers and rewarders of the 
sacrificial efforts. The nature and role of the devatās as guarantors of the 
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meaningfulness and purposefulness of the practice of sacrifice was an important 
contention. 
It is in light of this ‘empty’ world of sacrifice and Jaimini’s engagement with these 
alternatives, that I seek to highlight his unique hermeneutical concern for the 
intelligibility of traditionary practice as well as the emergence of a Mīmāṃsā 
subjectivity in his efforts to claim the intrinsic validity of the practice of sacrifice. It is 
to Jaimini’s discussion on the theological issue of devatās that I now turn, in order to 
explicate the depth of his vision to restore the high status of sacrifice in the Vedic 
world. 
Beyond Devatās: The Quest for Intrinsic Meaning 
While yajña is a central category for the understanding of both the Vedic and Mīmāṃsā 
world,
73
 the question of how the category may be understood, particularly in existential 
terms, as the affirmation of practice in the face of nothingness or in the collapse of 
foundations, has not been developed. Much of Vedic and later Hindu sacrifices have 
also been understood primarily in terms of a relationship between those who seek 
phalas (fruits, results) from powerful deities through offerings in sacrifices and those 
deities themselves. Sacrifice was then seen in terms of its function within the 
framework of a gift-exchange and communication between men and deities. According 
to Renou, sacrifice as ‘the center of the Vedic religion’ comprised ‘a succession of 
oblations and prayers, fixed according to strict liturgy, in which the culmination was 
reached when the offering was placed in the fire.’74 He claims that ‘the objective of the 
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ritual was to enter into communication with the divine world and thence to acquire 
certain advantages which profane initiative could not enjoy.’75 
This notion of sacrifice as a practice that resulted in the yielding of fruits is not an 
uncommon theme in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras. In sūtra 11.1.20, Jaimini states: 
[In the case of] sacrifice, there should be results (fruits) that follow from [each] performance, as 
in the case of common experiences such as agricultural tasks, because they are brought about by 
actual performance. [Each time an action is performed, therefore, a result occurs].
76
 
Jaimini further suggests in sūtra 1.2.17 that the outcome of the fruits of these 
performances were taken to be dependent on the kind and magnitude of the actions that 
were performed. He writes: ‘Results are accomplished by means of actions, [and] as in 
ordinary experience, [the] results are measured by the extent of actions accomplished.’77 
People are primarily connected with the sacrifice (particularly the optional sacrifices) 
because its performance leads to material effects i.e. fruits (phala), and it is this phala 
that expresses the puruṣārtha (that which is for the purpose of man) of the sacrifice for 
the performer.
78
 As Jha notes, one may claim that it is through this puruṣārtha that the 
sacrificial agent’s inclination to sacrifice and introduction to the sacrificial event first 
takes shape.
79
  
While sacrifice is taken in its most basic sense as a phala-oriented performance and 
pursuit, for Jaimini this performance is not governed by or centred on the notion of a 
gift-giving deity (devatā) or deities (devatās). In his efforts to find an economic and 
                                                 
75
 Ibid. 
76
 MS 11.1.20: Karmanyārambhabhāvyatvāt kṛṣivat pratyārambhaṁ phalānī syuḥ 
77
 MS 1.2.17: Phalasya karmaniṣpattes teṣāṁ lokavat parimāṇataḥ phalaviśeṣaḥ syāt 
78
 MS 3.7.6: Phalasaṁyogāt tu svāmiyuktaṁ pradhānasya.  
What is laid down in connection with the master (the sacrificer) should appertain to the primary sacrifice, 
as the sacrificer is related to the result. 
MS 6.3.21: Tathā svāminaḥ phalasamavāyāt phalasya karmayogitvāt.  
Similarly for the master of sacrifice, [there can be no substitute] because the results accrue to him, and the 
result follow the act. 
79
 Jha, The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, pp. 48, 196-199.  
 102 
coherent arrangement for the plurality of devatās which necessitated both (a) the 
invoking of their distinct names (MS 2.2.9-12) and (b) the inevitable substitutions of 
one or several devatās in place of others in the ‘modified rites’ (MS 6.3.17-18), Jaimini 
in his engagement with the pūrvapakṣin (holder of the prima facie view in the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras) also discussed the important theological issue of the nature of the gods, 
and particularly their functions in relation to sacrifice. This engagement is best 
exemplified in sūtras 9.1.6-10 where the argument with regard to devatās is posited in 
terms of who fulfils the sacrificial ritual and brings it to fruition - Is it the devatās or is it 
the sacrificial act itself, which brings about the fruition of the results? How are 
sacrificial results generated from the actions performed?  
Discussing the theme of prayojana in the context of the fulfilment of sacrificial action 
in sūtras 9.1.1-5, Jaimini presents the position of the siddhāntin (holder of the 
established or conclusive view in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras) that the sacrificial action 
(yajñakarma) itself is the main motivation (principal or primary factor) for each of the 
enacted sacrifice. 
9.1.1: That which is the yajñakarma is the principal factor [primary in relation to all else], as that 
is what is enjoined (created through injunction); hence the preparation (embellishment) of the 
materials must be regarded as motivated (prompted) by that primary purpose.
80
 
 
 
As a viable competing position, the pūrvapakṣin, in sūtras 9.1.6-8, puts forward the 
argument that the devatā should be taken as the one who fulfils the sacrificial ritual and 
brings it to fruition and, therefore, be regarded as the principal motivating factor around 
                                                 
80
 MS 9.1.1: Yajñakarma pradhānaṁ taddhi codanābhūtaṁ tasya dravyeṣu 
saṁskārastatprayuktastadarthatvāt 
MS 9.1.4: Phaladevatayośca.  
The fruit [of the sacrifice] and the deity [to whom the sacrifice is offered] also [have the character of 
being the motivator (prompter) of details]. 
MS 9.1.5: Na codanāto hi tādguṇyaṃ.  
Not so; they are enjoined as subordinate to the primary action [by reason of injunction]. 
 103 
 
which the sacrifice is organized and performed.
81
 The pūrvapakṣin uses the analogy of a 
meal prepared for the honour and pleasing of a guest, to claim that the sacrificial 
offering similarly serves as a meal for the deities as the guest, and is not prepared for its 
own sake. In sūtras 9.1.6-8 the pūrvapakṣin states:  
The deity should be taken as primary [and as prompting the details of the sacrifice], because he 
is like a guest for whom a meal is prepared, and is the “lord (owner) of wealth” [who is the one 
to] grant the wealth and fulfil the purpose desired.
82
  
The deities, as the explicitly intended recipient of the offerings, can be claimed to be the 
motivating factor for the performance of sacrifices.
83
 Sacrifice for the pūrvapakṣin was 
understood primarily as the act of giving an offering to the deities as propitiation, and 
the deities were taken to be the centre of the conceptual rationalization of sacrifice, the 
telos towards which sacrifice was oriented.  
In the subsequent sūtras in 9.1.9-10, Jaimini responds by arguing that sacrifices are not 
aimed at the propitiation of devatās, but the various materials, including the devatās, are 
needed for their contribution to the fulfilment of the sacrificial activity. He argues that 
the sacrificial action (yajñakarma) is what must be primary, because it is the act that is 
prompted by the force and authority of the injunctive statement: 
9.1.9: It is the yajñakarma that should be regarded as the principal factor, because the act is 
brought about only by the Vedic word; and the Deity is [spoken of only as] a subordinate factor. 
9.1.10: In the case of the guest, he is primary, as his pleasure (happiness) is primary; [but] it is 
not so in [the case of] the sacrificial act.
84
   
In his treatment of the particular cases of ‘extended sacrifices’ or ‘transferences’ in 
sūtra 8.1.34, Jaimini mentions that ‘the deity is spoken of only as a subsidiary factor’85 
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 MS 9.1.6-10 forms what is known as the devatādhikaraṇa which discusses the nature of the Vedic 
deities, and the issue raised here is concerning the form of the deities, that is, whether they have material 
bodies or whether their graphic descriptions in the Vedic literatures are to be seen as allegories. 
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 MS 9.1.6: Devatā vā prayojayedatithivad bhojanasya tadarthatvāt 
MS 9.1.7: Ārthapatyācca 
MS 9.1.8: Tataśca tena sambandhaḥ 
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 Jha, The Prabhākara School of Mīmāṃsā, p. 250.  
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 MS 9.1.9: Api vā śabdapūrvatvādyajñakarma pradhānaṁ syād guṇatve devatāśrutiḥ 
MS 9.1.10: Atithau tatpradhānatvam abhāvaḥ karmaṇi syāttasya prītipradhānatvāt 
 104 
to suggest that they are not the primary motivating factor but merely one of the 
constituting factors (guṇa) that helps fulfil (complete) the sacrificial activity. Śabara, in 
his commentary on sūtra 9.1.9, elaborates the nature of this subordinate position of the 
deity by arguing the following: 
The substance and the deity are both accomplished entities; and while what is denoted by the 
root “to sacrifice” is something that has to be accomplished, whenever an accomplished entity 
and a thing to be accomplished are spoken of together, the former is mentioned only for the 
purposes of the latter.
86
  
Does this mean that the deities cannot be defined as the recipients of offerings made in 
the sacrifice, and therefore, cannot accrue results? What role do they play in the 
sacrifice? Mādhavācārya (c. 14th CE), in his commentary on sūtras 9.1.6-10 mentions 
the following:  
…Nor are the gods givers of the results due to a real capacity to do so, for the mantras and 
arthavādas which describe their five attributes – having bodies, etc. – do not have that [i.e., 
establishment of divine capacity] as their intent. Otherwise we would have to conclude that gods 
mentioned in mantras such as “Hail to vanaspatis, hail to the mūlas” would have bodies, and this 
would contradict perception [for no one thinks of these as “real” deities]. Therefore [there is no 
evidence in such texts that] the gods do function like kings who give rewards.
87
 
In his Tantraratnam commentary on the same passage, Pārthasārathi (c. 11th CE) 
emphasizes that the sacrificial action is the primary factor and points out that the dravya 
and devatā are materials that serve the primary action. Focussing on the argument over 
whether the devatā is primary as the one that accrues and ensures the results, he first 
presents the pūrvapakṣin argument that claims that the devatā must be considered as the 
object of reference as he is the recipient of the sacrificial action. He then presents the 
siddhāntin position that argues that even if the sacrificial act may be argued to be 
subservient to the result, the devatā cannot be taken as the object of reference because it 
is still subordinate to the act in that it contributes to its accomplishment. He maintains 
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 ŚBh 9.1.9 in Śabarasvāmi, Śabara-bhāṣya, p. 1454. Quoted also in Clooney, ‘Devatādhikaraṇa: A 
Theological Debate in the Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta Tradition’, p. 281. 
87  Mādhavācārya, Jaiminīyanyāyamālā, 3 vols., Anandasrama Sanskrit Series, No. 24, Anandasrama 
Press, Pune, 1892. Quote and translation taken from FX Clooney, ‘Devatāadhikaraṇa: A Theological 
Debate in the Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta Tradition’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 16, no. 3, 1988, p. 282. 
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that while the notion of a recipient devatā is an important element of the architecture of 
sacrifice, it does not mean that the sacrifice is subordinate to the devatā, but on the 
contrary, the devatā participates as a subordinate element to ensure the fulfilment of the 
sacrificial act.
88
 
Drawing from the sixth adhyāya, Jha mentions that there are three important sacrificial 
actions that constitute the ‘subject-matter’ of Mīmāṃsā particularly as forms of 
offerings to deities, namely yāga, dāna and homa. He notes that an offering becomes a 
yāga when the ‘proprietary right’ is relinquished by means of utterance in favour of a 
deity; and when that same offering is transferred to another person who is near at hand, 
the offering becomes a dāna, a giving; and it is called a homa when the thing offered is 
thrown into the ‘fire’ or ‘water’.89 Jha goes on to claim that the deity to whom the 
offerings are made is ‘a purely hypothetical entity’ posited and uttered primarily ‘for the 
sake of accomplishment of the sacrifice’. Drawing from Śabara’s Bhāṣya, he argues that 
the deities cannot be regarded as the principal factor primarily because ‘the Deity has no 
body, it does not eat anything, it cannot be either pleased or displeased; nor can it award 
prizes or punishments’.90 Highlighting that there are three sources of information which 
identify the nature of the ‘deity of sacrifices’, which he mentions as (a) the nominal 
affixes, (b) the dative termination, and (c) mantras, Jha argues that the deity is ‘not 
necessarily a person or being’ but a linguistic requirement that is spoken of by 
‘injunctive sentences as one to whom the offering is to be made.’91 Biardeau also goes 
to the extent of claiming that devatās in the Mīmāṃsā are nothing more than names 
                                                 
88
 Pārthasārathimiśra, Tantraratnam, vol 1, ed. G Jha, Vidya Vilas Press, Benares, 1930. 
89
 Jha, The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, pp. 248-252. Śabara in his Bhāṣya, while 
acknowledging that the relinquishing of one’s proprietary right is the common factor, explains the 
differences between the three in the following way – ‘in Yāga, there is mere verbal relinquishment (the 
thing offered is not actually taken away by the recepient), - in Dāna, the thing is actually made over (to 
the recipient), - and in Homa, the thing offered has got to be thrown into some receptacle (water or fire).’ 
Refer Śabarasvāmi, Śabara-bhāṣya, pp. 780-786. 
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mentioned in Vedic texts.
92
 While Jaimini does indeed suggest in sūtra 10.4.23 that the 
deities, indicated by the mantras, may only have a verbal reality however, he also 
mentions, as can be gleaned from sūtra 6.3.18, that ‘the devatās’, along with the 
‘sacrificial fire, the mantras and the distinctive enactment (rite)’ are all intrinsically 
essential to the constitution of the sacrifice and that they are ‘non-substitutable’.93 For 
Jaimini and Śabara and the ensuing Mīmāṃsākas that follow, in the focus on bringing 
about the invisible referent (what has yet to exist) in sacrificial practice, the devatās, 
along with other accessories such as the sacrificial fire, the firewood, the chanting, and 
so on, are taken primarily as instruments that ensure the fulfilment of the enactment of 
sacrifice, and therefore, regardless of whether they are real embodied beings or not, 
devatās are neither the principal motivation nor end-results or even the issuer of fruits 
themselves.
94
 As Kumārila has pointed out: ‘the sacrifice is enjoined with regard to the 
result. It requires its fulfillment [in the result] and this is not possible without the 
material and the devatā. They are both needed because they contribute to the action but 
are not the object of accomplishment.’95 Clooney notes that for the Mīmāṃsākas, the 
‘truth’ of ‘what lies behind the divine name is not a relevant issue’ and the ‘possibilities 
of extra-verbal reality do not bind the interpretation’ of the name of the deity.96 Quoting 
Śabara’s Bhasya 10.4.23, he exclaims: ‘It ultimately does not matter if the deities exist 
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 MS 6.3.18: Na devatāgniśabdakriyamanyārthasaṁyogāt 
[The] deity, [the] fire, [the] mantra and [the] action (act) are non-substitutable, because they are related to 
a [totally] different purpose (object). 
94
 The subordinate role of the devatās is one topic where the Mīmāṃsākas, from Kumārila and 
Prabhākara to the followers of these two commentators, and the subsequent proponents of the schools that 
they developed, mostly agreed on. However, even if the reality of the existence of gods is not their 
primary concern, this does not mean that the Mīmāṃsā tradition is necessarily atheistic, as some scholars 
would claim. 
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 Clooney, ‘Devatāadhikaraṇa: A Theological Debate in the Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta Tradition’, p. 283. 
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apart from the Veda, their “linguistic reality”...they are “part of the mantra,” not part of 
the kriyā.’97  
In sūtra 4.2.27, Jaimini mentions that sacrifice, which is denoted by the root word yaj, 
should be understood as that act which brings about a connection between the various 
factors that are involved and, therefore, is an activity in which the sacrificial agent, the 
materials for the sacrificial performance, as well as the invoked deities are brought 
together and integrated within the wholeness of the sacrificial event so that the verb ‘to 
sacrifice’ may be actualized.98 According to Clooney, Jaimini is seeking ‘a meaningful 
understanding of devatā’ that is characterized by its harmony ‘with the logic of the 
performance of the sacrifice’ and its ‘coherent overall understanding of the texts related 
to it’.99 According to him, ‘devatā, as relevant to the ritual, exists only within the verbal 
formulation of the distinctive characteristics of that ritual’ and the ‘ritual’ is not ‘distinct 
from the devatā’ but they are both ‘interdependent realities, not independent entities 
merely connected by assertion.’100 
Jaimini’s development of the intrinsic purpose of sacrifice and his concern for the 
primacy of sacrificial action necessarily entails the devaluation of the other elements of 
sacrifice, such as the gods and other external referents that seek to provide meaning and 
purpose. The possibility of gods as an external authority upon which the purpose of 
sacrifice is dependent is sidelined, and the gods are limited to the role of a verbal 
necessity that is invoked in the sacrifices. In the absence of the gods and in the denial of 
their ability to accrue the fruits desired by the sacrificer, the general question which 
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 Ibid., p. 284. 
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 MS 4.2.27: Yajaticodanā dravyadevatākriyaṁ samudāye kṛtārthatvāt 
What is denoted by the root ‘yaj’, should be understood as that act which brings about the connection 
between substance and deity; as this is the sense applicable to the whole [of primary actions]. 
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arises is concerning the mechanism that ensures the efficacy of the practice of sacrifice 
and the nature of its intrinsic purposefulness. Jaimini goes on to claim in sūtra 9.1.13 
that it is ‘the (transcendental) purpose [that] should be regarded as the prompter of these 
details as the others have not been enjoined, and as they are subservient to the said 
purpose’, it is the purpose (artha) that should be regarded as the prompter and the 
reason for the fulfilment of the details of sacrifice.
101
  
Jaimini’s view of yajña, though not entirely disconnected from the older Vedic view,102 
is unique in that he is careful not to allow the traditionary practice of sacrifice, which 
for him is the constituent core of dharma, be dependent on external referents or values. 
It is this concern that made him develop a demystified ‘non-covenantal’ model of 
sacrifice. For Jaimini, deities are not conceived of as above or apart from the sacrificial 
system and he is unwilling to establish the transcendental nature of the sacrifice through 
extrinsic reference. Therefore, his subordination of the gods can be taken as merely one 
aspect of his attempt to elevate the sacrifice to the status of an unquestionable practice 
intrinsically worthwhile on its own terms. In presenting his conception of sacrifice 
where the core act of practice is accorded a privileged centrality, he seemed to be 
shifting the focus back on tradition. Moreover, in dismissing all possible external 
referents such as deities, he is forefronting traditionary practice. 
Jaimini’s refusal to found the intelligibility of sacrifice on the ground that the deities 
can provide, however, gives rise to new challenges concerning the validity and efficacy 
of sacrificial activity. If the devatās do not have the responsibility of bringing about the 
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The purpose should be regarded as the motivator (prompter) of these [details], as others have not been 
enjoined; they are subservient to the said purpose. 
102
 Clooney mentions that while Jaimini’s view of yajña is unique, it is not without precedent, and argues 
that we can note several aspects of the older Vedic view taken into account by Jaimini. For a detailed 
elaboration of these aspects that Clooney has pointed out, refer FX Clooney, ‘Sacrifice and Its 
Spiritualizations in the Christian and Hindu Traditions: A Study in Comparative Theology’, The Harvard 
Theological Review, vol. 78, no. 3/4, 1985, pp. 367-368. 
 109 
 
fruition of the results and fulfilling the sacrifice, how then does Jaimini seek to account 
for the intelligibility and purposefulness of the sacrificial act? What is the principal 
motivation for sacrifice, and more importantly, how does that ensure fulfilment? Or 
does Jaimini offer a different understanding of fruit (results); one that is not related to 
material rewards as more commonly understood? 
The general question at issue then is, what will ensure the validity and efficacy of a 
sacrifice in the absence of those external referents that can be taken to be the rewarder 
of the good efforts made causally? How could one talk about the intelligibility of 
sacrifice in the absence of those referents that can provide meaning to it?  
It is against the historical background of this ‘empty’ world of sacrifice and the absence 
of a ground upon which to found the traditionary practice of sacrifice that Jaimini’s 
insistence on the pursuit of dharma demands further elaboration. The concern for 
Jaimini in his Sūtras was to go beyond providing an explanation of the rules and 
structures of the sacrifice to an understanding of the telos that makes the Vedic practice 
intelligible and its relation with tradition purposeful and meaningful. I would like to 
argue that it is precisely within this concern for the vitality of Vedic practice and its 
purposefulness that one is able to cull out the interrelation between the pursuit of 
dharma, the telos of tradition and the ritual subject seeking to affirm the practice of 
sacrifice. In the rejection of the intelligibility and ground that deities can provide, 
Jaimini’s account of sacrifice as an intrinsically meaningful practice had to be 
developed through a disclosing of the subject that emerges from the dialogical structure 
of call and response vis-à-vis tradition.  
 
 
 110 
DHARMA AND THE TELOS OF TRADITION 
Hitherto, I have mentioned that Jaimini’s refusal to establish meaning as originating 
from outside the event and enactment of sacrifice can be read as a commitment to seek 
an intrinsic evaluation of the meaning and purpose of sacrifice. Jaimini takes up a 
position where he dismisses external impositions of meaning, particularly the notion of 
devatās as the reciprocator of acts that are performed. This position raises an important 
question regarding the connection between the practice of sacrifice and the outcome of 
that sacrifice. If in sacrificial traditions the notion of a ‘God’ or ‘gods’ is generally taken 
to represent the transcendent or invisible element towards which all religious acts are 
oriented and if in the Mīmāṃsā system the gods are not accorded that privileged status, 
how then does Jaimini seek to validate his primary concern for the continuing practice 
of sacrifice and how does he defend the idea that the performed act is not an end in itself 
- a meaningless pursuit? It is in light of this rejection of external meaning and the 
continuing affirmation of the practice of sacrifice that I seek to locate Jaimini’s 
introduction of dharma as a pursuit for the telos of tradition.  
Dharma, despite being one of the most important and fundamental features of Indian 
civilization and intellectual history, the nature and concept of dharma has never been a 
theme that incurred sustained Indological scrutiny. Olivelle, who charted the 
Brahmanical concept of social order through the notion of dharma explores the ways in 
which the term was largely developed out of ideas linked to the sovereignity of the deity 
Varuṇa, into a concept of good rule in the edicts of the Buddhist king Aśoka. This was 
then subsequently adopted as a Vedic concept of sovereign socio-moral order.
103
 
Hiltebeitel, while agreeing that the concept has changed greatly over the centuries, 
claims that dharma, as a derivative from the Sanskrit root word dhr which means ‘to 
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hold, to support, to sustain’, has never lost the sense of holding entirely, even when, for 
example, one meaning of dharma came to exclusively mean ‘the Buddha’s teachings’. 
He argues that the precursor to the classical term dharma can be found in older Vedic 
Sanskrit, where one finds the mention of the term dharman. Dharman, for Hiltebeitel, 
can also be translated as ‘foundation’, in the sense of depicting something which 
‘holds’.104 Horsch, in his account of the progression of the meanings of ṛta and dharma, 
shows that ‘dharma’ as a polysemous concept can be attributed to a range of things that 
includes society, rituals and even the foundations of the world.
105
 According to Doniger, 
dharma, which is often understood simply as ‘duty’ or ‘correct activity’, is a ‘context 
sensitive’ concept in that even the notion of correct action for different people will be 
different.
106
 
Dharma has been variously discussed as a concept associated with kingship, order, and 
duties, and has pervaded all sections of Hindu society today. However, the Sūtras of 
Jaimini have been concerned more explicitly with the traditionary practice of Vedic 
sacrifice and the accompanying enjoinment and obligations of the Vaidika sacrificial 
agent. Although the majority of Jaimini’s Sūtras are a discussion about the complicated 
details of enacting the Vedic traditionary practice of sacrifice, Jaimini introduces his 
project as an enquiry into dharma, as a ‘dharmajijñāsā’,107 where he also elaborates 
dharma as an ‘artha’ which possessess the characteristics of a ‘codanā’.108 The question 
of dharma in light of Jaimini’s commitment towards the affirmation of sacrifice, and the 
life of Vedic practice, posed interpretive challenges for those seeking to understand this 
unique conception of dharma and of the nature of the invisible. While the interpretation 
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of dharma as ritualistic i.e. as pertaining to the performance of sacrifices is generally 
accepted, the structure of this relationship between the invisible and the material has 
largely remained under-explored. Dharma has often been loosely assumed and defined 
under various categories which include: (a) an overarching principle of cosmic 
‘significance’ that is sought in the performance of sacrifice,109 (b) prescribed duty or 
moral actions of the Brahmanical tradition,
110
 (c) injunctions or prescriptions that 
impels one to sacrifice,
111
 and (d) even the sacrifice itself.
112
  
In his study of the Mīmāṃsā experience of language, D’Sa cites several discussions 
from modern scholarship on the Mīmāmsā notion of dharma and points out that the 
general consensus is that the concept of dharma is best understood as duty, including 
the dutiful compliance to the right performance of the Vedic rituals. Critiquing what he 
deems an essentializing of the nature of dharma to ‘duty’ alone, he goes on to develop a 
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three-pronged meaning of dharma based on his reading of Jaimini’s sūtra 1.1.2. He 
states: ‘The primary meaning of dharma refers to something supersensible, the 
secondary to the means through which the primary purpose is achieved and the third 
meaning is extrinsically attributed to the one who makes use of this means.’113 
Claiming that his analysis is motivated by the desire to see the ‘metaphysical depth in 
the Mīmāmsā’, D’Sa provides a systematic account of the principal doctrines of the 
Mīmāmsā’s philosophy of language. He argues against the common view that the 
Mīmāmsā is primarily a manual of Vedic exegesis, or meta-exegesis, which lays down 
principles for interpreting Vedic sacrificial texts unambiguously, where all 
philosophical discussion is strictly secondary. He presents the Mīmāmsā as a 
‘worldview which rests on a certain concept of ultimate reality and offers a truly 
spiritual kind of salvation’. The key to his effort is his interpretation of dharma, which 
according to him ‘is that Significance which puts one in touch with [one’s] final 
fulfillment’.114 He states: ‘Dharma is [that] Significance (artha-) whose characteristic is 
a vedavacanam. Whereas the former is an eschatological statement about dharma, the 
latter is a phenomenological one.’115 He supports this definition by building from the 
definition of dharma as declared in the Sūtras as an object that is not amenable to the 
senses. He remarks: 
If we keep before our eyes the actual assumption of the Mīmāmsāka-s that Dharma is not 
amenable to the senses, then there should be no difficulty in conceding that yāgadi cannot be the 
primary meaning of dharma. If the yāga-ritual were the chief meaning of dharma, then the chief 
assumption (that dharma is not amenable to the senses) will be rendered both senseless and 
superfluous. And this, for the simple reason that the yāgadi-ritual is obviously amenable to the 
senses. On the other hand, if the assumption that dharma is not amenable to the senses is given 
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its due (which means that dharma is beyond the ken of the senses) then the primary purpose and 
meaning of dharma cannot be reduced to the yāgadi-ritual.116  
While D’Sa’s backreading of the theme of ‘a spiritual kind of salvation’ to Jaimini’s 
Sūtras is certainly open to critique and further discussion, his development of the 
primary and secondary meaning of dharma which is then connected to ‘the one who 
performs the yāgadi-ritual’, whom he refers to as the ‘dharmika’, is important in 
introducing the vitality of the ritual actant as the means through which the telos of 
dharma is actualized.    
How then, is one to pursue this invisible telos of tradition and how is this pursuit related 
to the ritual actant? While Jaimini does immediately point to śabda as the only means 
through which the invisible dharma may be pursued or accessed,
117
 I wish to show that 
this quest for the invisible telos also gave rise to the emergence of the Mīmāṃsā subject 
- a ritual subjectivity constituted by a desire for purpose and meaning. I argue that this 
preliminary excavation of the theme of subjectivity in our quest to understand the nature 
of Jaimini’s dharma helps in laying the groundwork for understanding the purport of 
Jaimini’s definition of dharma in sūtra 1.1.2 – ‘an artha whose characteristic feature is 
a codanā’ – which implicitly presupposes an enjoinment and enactment by an obligated 
sacrificial agent.   
Therefore, to aid me in developing a path that can conceptually connect the theme of 
subjectivity (and particularly the religious subject) with the theme of invisibility, I take 
a brief detour via Heidegger’s phenomenological method to seek for insights from his 
notion of the ontology of a religious life and his retrieval of the ‘historical life’. I turn to 
Heidegger’s early lectures and writings on ‘phenomenology’, ‘religious life’, and the 
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‘hermeneutics of facticity’,118 and particularly the discussion on the ‘formal indication’ 
(die formale Anzeige), which is a key concept for his phenomenological method.
119
  
Heidegger and the Phenomenological Retrieval of the Historical ‘Life’ 
In his lectures on the phenomenology of religious life, Heidegger discusses ‘the 
historical’ (das Historische) as the ‘core phenomenon of the phenomenology of 
religion’.120 For Heidegger, any phenomenon is intimately bound up with history; and 
phenomenological enquiry must begin from the ‘factical life experience’121 that is able 
to designate both the experiencing and that which is experienced. It is what allows the 
phenomenon in question to show itself in accordance with its manner of being or 
existing. Factical life experience i.e. ‘the originality of the absolute-historical in its 
absolute unrepeatability’ is, for Heidegger, the point of departure as well as the place 
within which philosophy and its goal can be pursued. If the factical life and situation is 
the phenomenon, then the task is to grasp the conditions of its possibility and 
Heidegger’s ‘formal indication’ is the attempt to find the right mode of access to this 
phenomenon, such that it can be explicated and analyzed hermeneutically.
122
 
For Heidegger, the ‘formal indication’ is therefore, a way of entering into a genuine 
interpretation of the factical situation in the mode of its unfolding and expressing as 
historical existence. To formally indicate is to primarily bind oneself to investigate and 
to move as close to the concrete life in its mode or manner of being as possible. It is a 
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general orientation that seeks to engage with the phenomenon by appropriating it as our 
own and interpreting it from the standpoint of our own concrete historical situation, 
even as we do so in a way which seeks to touch on something essential in that situation. 
Flood, in discussing the relationship between ‘the formal indication’ and Husserl’s 
phenomenological method, argues that the formal indication is ‘not so much a method, 
as bracketing might be understood, but rather a general orientation to “phenomena” that 
seeks to move from an account of contingency to essential features of what is being 
enquired into’, and for him, this means that Heidegger’s formal indication is seeking to 
indicate, or point to, ‘a primordial sense of being’ and its mode of unfolding as life i.e. 
as a concrete way of being or existing temporally.
123
 This indicating or pointing to is a 
mode of formalization which is beyond simple generalization in the sense that it looks 
in the direction not of typologies but of the manner in which something is related to as a 
thing - the how in which it is experienced in the concreteness of life. A formal indicator 
is thus, grounded in the structure of Dasein and one of the primary features of Dasein is 
self-disclosure i.e. it lets itself be seen as it is in itself. As Flood writes: ‘In contrast to 
the Husserlian model of intentionality in which a subject intends an object, here both 
subjectivity and objectivity are modes of self-revealing - of being-there.’ 124  Flood 
suggests that it is in this sense that all phenomenological enquiries in Heidegger’s 
discussions can be taken to be simply formal indications of the historical beings or 
entities of humans.
125
  
The implication, then, is that religious life has an ontological sense and one that is 
disclosed only through its being existentially carried forward in further interpretative 
unfolding. For Heidegger, the religious life in its most basic sense fundamentally is the 
decisive moment wherein the possibility of being a self is actualized. Factical life is the 
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manner in which it rises into expressiveness according to its own mode of being. 
Heidegger brings to light his own view of the modes of being of factical life and the 
manner of approach appropriate to grasp these modes in their structural coherence. He 
names the three basic modes or senses of the being or intentionality of life as the 
content-sense (Gehaltssinn), relational-sense (Bezugssinn) and actualization-sense 
(Vollzugssinn). The first sense concerns the meaning of the ‘what’ of experience, i.e. 
life in its manner of being a ‘this’. The second addresses life in its manner or in the 
‘how’ of its being directed or oriented as the actualization of its possibilities. The third 
sense concerns the fundamental manner in which the directedness of life is fulfilled or 
in which life is pulled in its particular direction.
126
  
In presenting a phenomenological explication of the Letters of Paul as an example of a 
distinct religious phenomenon, Heidegger talks about a form of empathy that he calls 
‘something like an I’ (Ichlichkeit) that allows one to understand Paul’s communal world 
through the factical life experience, and shift from the position of reading it as an 
object-history to its enactment situation. There are two kinds of invisibility that 
Heidegger is dealing with: (a) the invisibility of the historical past that is opaque due to 
the passage of time, and (b) the invisibility of the focus of religious practice, such as, in 
the case of Paul, the invisibility of the coming of the spirit, the parousia.
127
 
Flood notes that in contrast to Husserl’s phenomenology as a first reduction or 
bracketing, Heidegger’s formal indication ‘does not claim to suspend judgement about 
being but rather assumes human being and our location in time as a precondition for 
understanding’.128 Therefore, the formal indication does not point to a suspension of 
judgement concerning the being behind appearances but rather to an enquiry that can 
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raise ontological questions. Flood points out that it is in this sense that Heidegger claims 
the understanding of the religious life (views and practices) as the understanding of the 
historical.
129
 It is in the understanding of history that one is able to appreciate the 
narratives and actions of religious appearances which are given life within specific 
cultures and traditions and which have been handed down from the past and are in their 
own way invisible today. 
Drawing from Heidegger, one can suggest that the invisible nature of the historical past 
and the invisible nature of religious practices share conceptual similarities, particularly 
in that these practices have been handed down from a past which are now distant from 
our own location. It is only through the recognition of structures of being in its 
temporality and self-disclosure that one can enquire into the invisible.  
The Invisible and the Religious Subject 
As Flood extensively points out in the majority of his works, practices and forms of 
religious manifestations are cultural forms whose significance lies primarily in the 
nature of the person revealed i.e. the way in which the person comes to appropriate and 
inhabit these practices within the recognized tradition.
130
 For the religious practitioner, 
the invisible comes to exert a force, a power, on his or her life through the memory and 
repetition of religious practices that have been handed down from the past. Flood argues 
that it is precisely through this process that the ‘practitioner’s identity’ is ‘subsumed’ 
and ‘overwhelmed’ by the ‘implied self of tradition’. Through repeated acts of ritual, 
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and through acting in the world in conformity to tradition, the practitioner seeks to 
realize the invisible ideals and goals of the particular religious tradition.
131
 
It is in these repeated acts of conforming to and preserving the memory of a tradition 
that the religious subject, in the process, ushers the revelation of the ‘truth’ behind the 
appearances of practices. The spiritual practices developed over long periods of time by 
practitioners are intended to diminish the ‘egocentric’ view of the self and to cultivate a 
habitus that is oriented towards the telos of a tradition and towards the world. The 
orientating of the person to the transcendent goals of tradition thereby, simultaneously 
discloses the tradition that was once invisible. It is this almost paradoxical claim of 
finding oneself while letting one’s self go that Flood identifies as an important marker 
for the understanding and situating of the invisible. In the growing invisibility of the 
religious subject, one can find an appearance and disclosing of what was once invisible 
- transcendence, the telos of tradition.
132
  
This revealing of the invisible in the life of the practitioner is our entry into the invisible 
and is the window through which one can glimpse the ‘spirit’ of the invisible. Every 
revelation occurs with respect to Dasein, a consciousness of a thing in which it is 
meaningful in a particular meaningful world, which has a history. So, the question that 
can be posed going forward is: What is the mode of being of the religious subject and 
how does it relate with the invisible in a way that allows the uncovering of the telos of a 
tradition? It is in light of this question that I seek to claim that the practice of sacrifice, 
now read through the lens of the emergence of a ritual subjectivity, can be re-elevated to 
the status of a traditionary practice, which is a practice that entails a quest guided by the 
pursuit of meaning. The validity of this traditionary practice can then be related to the 
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emergence of responsible subjects who have immersed themselves in tradition. Who, 
then, are these responsible subjects and how may they be located?  
It is with this question in mind that I now look at Jaimini’s enquiry into the nature of the 
invisible and the tradition-constituted transformation of the Mīmāṃsā subject, and argue 
that the subject constituted by the desire for meaning is the being through which the 
telos of dharma is made visible. In the remaining sections, I discuss Jaimini’s notion of 
desire in light of the theme of the eligibility to perform sacrifices in an attempt to 
discuss the specific modes in which the subject, in his pursuit for dharma in light of its 
invisibility, bears witness to the transmission of meaning and finds himself initiated into 
the dynamic process of an unbroken tradition. 
DESIRE AND THE EMERGENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY 
In the history of Indic religious traditions, discussions concerning conceptions about the 
person (the self, the subject) have varied greatly. The notion of the self and its 
relationship with the quest for ‘truth’ has been one of the fundamental characteristics of 
Hindu traditions.
133
 From speculations about ‘mystical possibilities’ (ways of being and 
awareness) of the spiritual self (ātman) that transcends and elevates ordinary 
consciousness through layers of self-experience in the Upaniṣadic thought, where ātman 
seeks to realize the true nature of reality as oneness with Brahman, to the rejection of 
the multiple forms of self-awareness and personalities that identify the self (puruṣā) 
with the mind and body in Sāṅkhya, where the goal is to return to the native state of 
self-absorption and bliss, one is introduced to a diverse range of views and conceptions. 
The concern with the nature of the self in the philosophy of the Vedānta was expressed 
through a range of positions that viewed the self in the end as ‘the only true reality and 
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[is] the same in all of us’, to ones that posited that there are ‘innumerable distinct selves 
embodied in a real world’, to those that claim that the ‘true self is distinct from matter 
and the goal of life is to free our self from its bonds’.134 Flood notes that ‘along with the 
philosophy of the hidden self, a social institution developed devoted, at least 
theoretically, to this realization, namely the institution of renunciation’.135  
Other accounts, such as those derived from Yoga and Buddhist thought, advocate the 
disciplines of yogic-practice and moral-action as the means through which one’s true-
self or no-self is discovered. The true self, in their accounts, is conceived differently and 
apart from the self that performs action. The highest good is understood to be achieved 
by practices that disentangle the self from the world, culminating, in the case of 
Buddhism, in the notion of an awakening or enlightenment as the extinguishing of the 
concept of the self (anātman) and desire. The goal of the self, according to the 
Yogasūtras, is the development of an, ‘intense sense of inwardness through 
concentration on a single point that transforms consciousness’ for the ‘final liberation’ 
conceptualized as ‘inner solitude (kaivalya)’. The Yogasūtras develop the idea of the 
realization of the inner self that transcends the outer self that is associated with the 
body.
136
  
The understanding of the self, and the body, in each of these accounts tend towards the 
idea that ‘being human implies a unique capability for final liberation, a rare or 
exclusive soteriological privilege’,137 and this theme continued to be quite familiar for 
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both the early and later Vedic texts as well as texts of later classical Hinduism. As 
Halbfass puts it: ‘Human existence may be full of misery; yet it is the only gateway to 
liberation, the only opportunity to choose one’s future instead of simply living in 
accordance with the karma accumulated in the past.’138 Mauss claims that the concept of 
the ‘individual’ never developed in India due to the influence of the world-renouncing 
traditions, particularly Buddhism, Vedānta and Sāṅkhya.139 Ram-Prasad also claims that 
‘classical Indian theories of consciousness generally evolved within a soteriological 
context in which the ultimate goal was some transcendental spiritual state’.140  
However, in contrast to these common preoccupations with soteriology, with liberation 
from worldly, temporal existence in Indian thought, where the idea of self-negation in 
the quest for freedom from the limiting conditions of temporality and the humanness of 
life is pervasive, Halbfass mentioned that there is a more worldly, earthly, temporal 
atmosphere in older Vedic texts than in later Indian thought. He writes: ‘Words like 
ātman and puruṣa which in later thought are commonly associated with the absolute 
self’, are closer in their Vedic usage ‘to the embodied person, to man in his concrete 
individuality’. 141  Within the Vedic ritualistic contexts, ‘man is distinguished and 
preeminent because he is the only one among the animals who perform rituals or 
sacrifices’.142 Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras, which deal primarily with dharma and ritual, 
uphold the notion of the subject as the affirmer of practice, of sacrifice, of empirical life 
- not as a seeker of liberation but I wish to argue, as a carrier of tradition. 
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Flood mentions that the question of desire, particularly in the debate concerning the 
relation between the ‘body and desire’, has generally revolved around a ‘dichotomy 
between the rational control of the passions concerned with bodily disciplines’ on the 
one hand, and ‘the body’s uncontrolled impulses associated with irrationality and 
freedom’ on the other. This, he shows, is an old debate where Western thinkers such as 
Freud and Weber have gone to the extent of claiming that the ‘control of the body 
through various “technologies” and the renunciation of desire’ through dedicated 
disciplines has ‘allowed for the development of culture and civilization’ as we know it 
today.
143
 While the ‘rationalized control of body and desire’ has also been often 
discussed as ‘one of the major concerns of the orthodox Brāhmaṇical tradition’,144 the 
religiosity proposed in the Sūtras, where desire is affirmed as the main motive of ritual 
practice, offers a unique understanding of both desire and the significance of sacrifice. 
In the following sections, I wish to show that Jaimini’s introduction of the pursuit of 
dharma is primarily a concern for developing and affirming the intelligibility of 
tradition and particularly the intrinsic meaning of the practice of sacrifice. This concern 
is centred on his notion of the subject who, in the context of the changing world of 
Vedic sacrifice that I have highlighted in the first section above, seeks to affirm its 
practice and discover his place within tradition. This process of learning to conform to 
the patterns of tradition not only introduces the mechanisms through which the meaning 
and content of tradition is pursued and transmitted but also discloses the transformation 
of the subject whose self-enhancing and self-transforming potentiality is centred on his 
desire for meaning and purpose. In this ritual transformation, the subject is initiated into 
tradition through a journey of seeking to become one with the ones who have gone 
before him - his ancestors; with the past. This subjectivity, immersed in tradition, ceases 
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to be the individuated subject, instead, becoming the artistic impulse of tradition. It is 
through this desiring subject that the affirmation for the viability of pursuing the telos of 
dharma is revealed. 
Jijñāsā and the Guru-Śiṣya Paramparā 
In the very beginning of the sūtras where Jaimini introduces the nature and field of his 
enquiry in the tarka-pāda, he declares: ‘Now, therefore, the desire to know [enquire into 
the nature of] dharma.’145 The first two words atha (now, or next) and ataḥ (therefore) 
are pregnant introductions offering a first glimpse into the Mīmāṃsā notion of the 
subject. Biderman argues that these two sūtras relate to two closely interwoven themes 
which constitute the whole of Mīmāṃsā’s religious and philosophical endeavour.146 
They immediately throw open the question regarding the import and meaning of the 
term ‘now/next’, and while its usage can be taken to suggest a sequence, the question of 
a ‘sequence to what?’ must still be posed.  
Jha, in his translations of Jaimini’s Sūtras that includes his ‘original commentary’, 
mentions that there are two Mīmāṃsā positions on the usage of the term atha, based on 
two different implied injunctions. According to him, these two positions are in 
accordance with the interpretations of Kumārila and Prabhākara, who are later 
commentators of Śabara’s Bhāṣya. On the one hand, the position of Kumārila mentions 
that the term atha is used in the context of a discussion over the scope and method of 
the injunction svādhyāyo’dhyetavyaḥ (the Veda should be studied). According to this, 
the term atha is taken to imply a moment ‘after the text of the Veda has been learnt [by 
the student] during residence with the teacher’. It expresses an immediate succession to 
the study of the Veda where the result of knowing the sense of the Veda has already 
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been achieved. Taken together with the term ataḥ, it then has the implication that this 
knowledge of the sense of the Veda has to be followed by the enquiry into its meaning 
through an investigation of dharma.
147
  
The position of Prabhākara on the other hand, mentions that the term aṭha is used in the 
context of a discussion over the scope and method of the injunction aṣṭavarṣam 
brāhmaṇam upanayīta tam adhyāpayīta (one should initiate the eight year-old 
Brāhmaṇa boy and should teach him). Prabhākara takes this injunction together with a 
text from the Smṛtis that states - upanīya tu yaḥ śiṣyaṃ vedam adhyāpayed dvijaḥ 
sakalpam sarahsyañchaṭam āchāryam prachakṣaṭe (that Brāhmaṇ who, having initiated 
the pupil, teaches him the Veda along with the ritualistic rules and esoteric explanations, 
him they call the teacher).
148
 According to this position, the term atha is taken to imply 
a moment where the Brāhmaṇ, who is desirous of acquiring for himself the title of 
ācārya (teacher) is contemplating the initiation and teaching of the student as his duty. 
The student, having learnt the skills of expositing the meaning of the Veda by 
developing the skills of the sciences of grammar, prosody, lexicography and the like, is 
understood to be engaged in the next stage of seeking the true meaning of dharma with 
the help of his teacher.
149
  
Both of these positions, even if based on the interpretations of two separate injunctions, 
are important indicators suggesting that Jaimini’s introduction of a desire to know 
dharma, and his use of jijñāsā already point towards the notion of a quest for an artha 
(purpose and/or meaning) that entails the transformation and production of a certain 
kind of subjectivity, be it the teacher or the pupil or both. For example, in the injunction 
stated by Prabhākara above (aṣṭavarṣam brāhmaṇam upanayīta tam adhyāpayīta), the 
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two injunctive words ‘upanayīta’ and ‘adhyāpayīta’ both have the ātmanepada ending, 
which indicates that the action is enjoined towards the nominative agent who will 
accrue the result by responsible submission to the injunction.
150
 Jaimini’s introduction 
of the desire to know dharma reveals an unveiling of a subject who is on the threshold 
of seeking to expand the limits of what it means to be a subject appropriating a tradition, 
and engaging with the preliminary task to overcome the split between the acquiring of 
knowledge and its realization and appropriation with responsibility. Understanding, for 
Jaimini and, therefore, for the Mīmāṃsā subject, based on this introduction suggests a 
fusion of both knowledge and action and presupposes a form of embodied traditionary 
practice where the acting is never independent of the knowledge of the Veda. It is 
within this intricate interplay between the pursuit of dharma and the submission to the 
teachings of the Veda that one is able to locate the mode of being (existing) of the 
Mīmāṃsā subject and is offered a glimpse of the notion of dharma as a meaningful 
pursuit that is constitutive of Vedic existence. This interplay is not only a submission or 
an initiation into tradition but a submission in a particular way in which the possibility 
of the intimate connection between remembrance and the re-enactment of a traditionary 
practice is negotiated and realized. 
Desire and the Mīmāṃsā Subject 
In the introduction to the fourth adhyāya where Jaimini sought to discuss the two kinds 
of motivation organizing the sacrifice, he mentions that ‘humans desire to get what 
pleases them (what brings them happiness), and this [obtaining of pleasure and/or 
happiness] is not separate from [that which defines] their purpose (or goal).’151 In the 
first and second pāda of the sixth adhyāya, amongst the several adhikāras that are 
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discussed to identify the one who can and who ought to sacrifice, ‘desire’ is mentioned 
as one of the most fundamental markers (lakṣaṇa) for identifying the sacrificial agent: 
6.1.3: In as much as the act [of sacrifice] is related [to something], it should be taken as related 
to the desired thing; hence the text should be seen as enjoining the act [of sacrifice, as a means to 
the attainment of the desired purpose]. 
6.1.13: But the desire for results [arising] from sacrifices is equally present [in the woman also]. 
6.1.20: It is by virtue of her desiring the fruits [of sacrifice] that the wife is regarded as endowed 
with ownership. 
6.2.1: As the desired end (goal) is accomplished only in individuals, so each individual is 
authorized to sacrifice and accomplish that goal. 
6.2.6: The man should be taken as mentioned only for the sake of the performance [of the act], 
his relationship [to the act] being indicated by the mention of the ‘desire’…[all emphasis are 
mine].
152
 
 
 
The existence of purpose and meaning in any activity is vital for Jaimini and it is desire 
that ensures the presence and pursuit of that purpose and makes the action intentional 
and directed towards an object. It is desire that distinctly individuates the subject and 
determines his participation in the event of sacrifice as a sacrificial agent. The subject 
emerges as a sacrificial agent (yajamāna) primarily because of his desire for something 
that motivates his acting, and it is this motivation that enables him to ‘carry out the 
entire details of the act’ to completion. 153  Observing that the ‘inseparable bond of 
subject and desire’ in the Mīmāṃsā contradicts the ‘common view that liberation is 
attained through the extinction of desires’, Freschi emphasizes that ‘desire is the key 
factor for the identification of the subject and for every single person’s understanding of 
herself as an “I”.’154 Desire is the motive of ritual action that enables his pursuit and 
                                                 
152
 MS 6.1.3: Pratyarthaṁ cā’bhisaṁyogāt karmato hy abhisambandhaḥ tasmāt karmopadeśaḥ syāt 
MS 6.1.13: Phalotsāhā’viśeṣāttu 
MS 6.1.20: Phalārthitvāttu svāmitvenā’bhisambandhaḥ 
MS 6.2.1: Puruṣārthaikasiddhitvāt tasya tasyādhikāraḥ syāt 
MS 6.2.6: Api vā kāmasaṁyoge sambandhāt prayogāyopadiśyeta pratyartha hi vidhiśruti viṣāṇāvat 
153
 MS 6.1.5: Karturvā śrutisaṁyogād vidhiḥ kātsnryena gamyate 
The injunctions [of an act] pertain to only such an agent (potential performers) as may be able to carry out 
the entire details [of the act], as such is the sense given in the Vedic texts. 
154
 E Freschi, ‘Desidero Ergo Sum: The Subject as the Desirous One in Mīmāṃsā’, Rivista Degli Studi 
Orientali, vol. 80, no. 1/4, 2007, p. 51. 
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without desire the agent is not only purposeless, but cannot be identified as a sacrificial 
agent. His existence as a subject is dependent on his desire to act.
155
  
The Nature of Desire: From Phala to Svargaḥ 
Jaimini makes a distinction between various kinds of sacrifices which may be more 
generally classified under these three main categories: (a) optional (kāmya), (b) 
occasional (naimittika) and (c) necessary or fixed (nitya) sacrifices. The Sūtras mention 
a number of optional (kāmya) sacrifices performed purely because of the desire for a 
tangible result, such as the kārīrī sacrifice, which is performed for the obtaining of 
rainfall. The kind of desire that is mentioned here is closer to a worldly passion (rāga) 
arising out of specific wants or needs. In sūtras 11.1.26-27, Jaimini writes: ‘In ordinary 
experience, the action is determined by the need for perceptible goals (fruits)…[and] the 
action is taken to be complete when the goals are perceived to have been received.’156 
These sacrifices are performed as often as one desires the result proceeding from them 
and are repeated as often as necessary for the accomplishment of the result. It is the 
fulfilment of the sacrificer’s satisfaction that is sought in pursuing these wants and 
needs. They issue from and are initiated by the subject out of an ordinary and everyday 
engagement with the material world.
157
 
                                                 
155
 Ibid., p. 54. 
156
 MS 11.1.26: Loke karmā’rthalakṣaṇaṃ 
In ordinary experience, the action is determined by the need [for perceptible goals (fruits)]. 
MS 11.1.27: Kriyāṇāmarthaśeṣatvāt pratyakṣo’tastannirvṛttyā’pavargaḥ syāt 
The actions are subservient to the purpose, [and the purpose is perceptible]; hence the action is taken to be 
complete when the goals are perceived to have been received. 
157
 MS 11.1.20: Karmanyārambhabhāvyatvāt kṛṣivat pratyārambhaṁ phalānī syuḥ 
‘The results of action occur only upon actual performance, and are proportionate (one performance, one 
result, etc.), as in the case of common areas of experience, e.g., agriculture (there is a proportion between 
the work done and the fruit).’  
MS 11.1.21: Adhikāraś ca sarveṣāṁ kāryyatvād upapadyate viśeṣaḥ 
‘The repetition of sacrifices duplicates the result, and the performances re-occur whenever someone 
desires the the result.’ 
MS 11.1.22: Sakṛttu syāt kṛtārthatvādaṅgavat 
MS 11.1.23: Śabdārthaśca tathā loke 
MS 11.1.24: Api vā samprayoge yathākāmī sampratīyetāśrutitvādvidhiṣu vacanāni syuḥ 
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The occasional and fixed sacrifices are usually described as mandatory and are not 
directly connected with a specific need for something in the sense of being worldly. The 
jyotīs sacrifices, which are performed on the advent of spring, or the jātakarman 
performed at the birth of a son, are examples of necessary sacrifices performed only on 
specified occasions. Some examples of the fixed sacrifice are the agnihotra, which is 
performed throughout the course of one’s life, and the performance of the daily 
sandhyā. The sacrificial agent of the occasional and fixed sacrifices performs 
independently of a need for something and reflects a responsibility and a desire that one 
may claim is more originary than the one that has arisen out of worldly wants and 
needs. In the absence of a tangible result as suggested in the case of the optional 
sacrifices, the rationale for a desire to perform sacrifices and to submit oneself to the 
order of sacrifice has to be investigated beyond the worldly passions to a more 
existential longing and submission. In Jaimini’s system, there is no room for actions that 
are purely duty undertaken without any consideration for results. When the pūrvapakṣin 
suggests this notion of a purposeless action (action in and for itself) in sūtra 4.3.10, the 
siddhāntin replies in the following sūtra 4.3.11 by stating that the purpose that renders 
the act purposeful will still be implied even in such cases.
158
 The discussion of karma 
and phala in sūtras 11.1.20-28 also suggests that actions are primarily phalavat, with 
the only exception being actions already subordinated to actions-with-results, so that 
                                                                                                                                               
‘Since this (arising of desire which prompts performance) is a matter of perception, the performances can 
be taken as one wishes; there is no scriptural prescription in this regard.’ The translations of these sūtras 
are borrowed from Clooney. See KH Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Philosophy of Pūrva-
Mīmāṃsā, vol 16, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2014, p. 97. 
158
 MS 4.3.10: Codanāyāṁ phalāśruteḥ karmamātraṁ vidhīyate na hyaśabdaṁ pratīyate  
In as much as the result is not mentioned in the injunction, only the act [without any result] should be 
taken as enjoined, as what is not actually enjoined [by the text] cannot be recognized. 
MS 4.3.11: Api vā’mnānasāmarthyāc codanārthena gamyate arthānāṁ hyarthavattvena vacanāni 
pratīyante arthato hyasamarthānāmānantaryye’pyasambandhaḥ tasmācśrutyekadeśaḥ 
‘Not so; the binding force (command) is inferred fom the authority of the Vedic text; the texts are 
recognized to be for some object by reason of their having rewards. Those that do not contain any reward 
and have no connection with any (sentence) in the proximity, (their connection should be sought in a 
remote passage) because it is a portion of the Vedic text.’ The translation of this particular sūtra is 
borrowed from Sandal. See Jaimini, Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini, trans. ML Sandal, Motilal Banarsidass, 
Delhi, 1993, p. 67. 
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their own results are not independently considered. The distinction between the three 
sacrifices primarily pertains to time/duration as the person is presumed to be always 
desirous and always interested in the outcome of action.
159
  
I argue that it is this dimension of desire as existential longing and pursuit, predominant 
in the case of occasional and fixed sacrifices, which best articulates the primary 
contours of subjectivity in Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras. This is not to claim that the 
dimension of needs is not related to the dimension of desire. The Mīmāṃsā subject is in 
the first instance absorbed in the quest to satisfy a need. So, subjectivity is primarily 
made up of ‘needs’ and the mode of immediately satisfying those needs. This concept of 
need can grow into the concept of desire where need forms an important component of 
this more originary desire. While need, as the first instance of desire, knows precisely 
what it seeks to accomplish, desire is characterized by a non-comprehension. It is 
precisely because of this that fixed sacrifices i.e. sacrifices for which no specific results 
are mentioned in the Sūtras are commonly associated with the desire for ‘heaven’ - 
svargakāmo yajeta (the one who desires svarga must sacrifice).160  
The question concerning the nature of svarga, and whether it should be understood as a 
‘substance’ or as a ‘quality’, was a point of contention that continued to be investigated 
by many of the later Mīmāṃsakas. The use of svarga, literally translated as ‘heaven’, 
suggests a longing and desire for what is not ‘given’ before, of which there is no idea - 
                                                 
159
 MS 11.1.20: Karmanyārambhabhāvyatvāt kṛṣivat pratyārambhaṁ phalānī syuḥ 
MS 11.1.21: Adhikāraś ca sarveṣāṁ kāryyatvād upapadyate viśeṣaḥ 
MS 11.1.22: Sakṛttu syāt kṛtārthatvādaṅgavat 
MS 11.1.23: Śabdārthaśca tathā loke 
MS 11.1.24: Api vā samprayoge yathākāmī sampratīyetāśrutitvādvidhiṣu vacanāni syuḥ 
MS 11.1.25: Aikaśabdyāt tathāṅgeṣu 
MS 11.1.26: Loke karmā’rthalakṣaṇaṃ 
MS 11.1.27: Kriyāṇāmarthaśeṣatvāt pratyakṣo’tastannirvṛttyā’pavargaḥ syāt 
MS 11.1.28: Dharmamātre tvadarśanāc chabdārthenāpavargaḥ syāt 
For these sūtras, refer to the translations provided in previous footnotes. 
160
 MS 4.3.14: Ekaṁ vā codanaikatvāt 
Only one result should be assumed, as the injunction instigates only one action. 
MS 4.3.15: Sa svargaḥ syāt, sarvān pratyaviśiṣṭatvāt 
That one result assumed is ‘heaven’, as that is equally desirable for all. 
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the transcendent invisible - and which is not perceivably available as some specified 
purpose or object at the moment one desires it. It is also at the same time taken by 
Śabara in the sense of denoting ‘a state of happiness’ or contentment (prītiḥ) that 
accrues upon the realization or fulfilment of the ‘highest good’.161 According to Jaimini 
and Śabara, ‘heaven is the outcome of an action whose result is not explicitly 
specified.’162 This is not a desire for objects (in the way the visible or material objects 
are understood); this desire does not know the object of its satisfaction, and in and of 
itself, it is not endowed primarily with anticipation but clings more closely to the prior 
affirmation of the present.  
Studying the three components of the Vedic statement ‘svargakāmo yajeta’ which 
include (a) the desirous sacrificial agent, (b) heaven as the object of desire, and (c) the 
verb ‘to sacrifice’, Das argues that the use of the ‘imperative optative mood’ rather than 
the ‘indicative present’ in the verb yajeta implies three things when viewed in its usage 
within the context of sacrifice: (a) the sacrificial agent acting as a free agent, (b) the 
action to be performed as not contrary to the desire of the agent, and (c) the action as 
not contrary to the larger welfare of the agent.
163
 The use of the imperative optative is 
important in pointing out that the command to sacrifice, even when its purpose is not 
tangibly perceived, is a responsible and free act that ultimately seeks to bring the 
concern and welfare of the agent to fruition. In the absence of a ‘corporeal reality’ 
granted to the deities or gods, and the Mīmāṃsakas’ unwillingness to grant a ‘spatial 
reality to heaven’,164 the desire for svarga and how that may be understood is to be 
sought in the type of action that is performed and the mode through which the 
                                                 
161
 Traditionally, the Vedic ritualists are represented (for example in the Mahābhārata) as holding svarga 
to be the highest goal. Śabara describes svarga not as an actual place but as a state of being – of 
contentment or happiness (prītiḥ). See Śabarasvāmi, Śabara-bhāṣya, p. 807.  
162
 MS 4.3.15: Sa svargaḥ syāt, sarvān pratyaviśiṣṭatvāt 
ŚBh 4.3.16 in Śabarasvāmi, Śabara-bhāṣya, p. 807. 
163
 Das, ‘Language of Sacrifice’, p. 447. 
164
 Ibid., p. 448. 
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performance is fulfilled. It is in this sense that svarga is often related to prītiḥ, 
understood as a state of being.
165
 Śabara insists in his commentary on sūtra 6.1.2, that 
heaven is a state of pure bliss/happiness, and that the desire for happiness is ever-
present.
166
 When the sacrificial agent is impelled to perform a sacrifice that arises out of 
his needs and wants, the indicative present is used, mostly to suggest that the agent is 
willing to submit to the correct procedures for the accomplishment of his specific 
desires and purposes. On the contrary, when the sacrificial agent performs a sacrifice 
out of his desire for happiness, the implementation of correct procedures is no longer a 
submission to an injunction but an appropriation of an imperative that the agent knows 
is not only good for him, but also desires it fully to become a part of him, to allow it to 
constitute him. This desire contrasts with the wants and needs of the optional sacrifices 
in the sense that this desire originates from outside of the subject and is thus a pull 
outwards that is better understood as a yearning, a longing to transcend, without 
immediately knowing or anticipating towards what or where. 
The desiring subject seeks in the sacrifice something that goes beyond the confines of 
anything that can be presented as a phenomenon, yet the subject (sacrificer) does not 
know what that something is, and it is this unknown that calls forth responsibility. In 
this sense, the practice of sacrifice, in its telos is transcendental and resembles a kind of 
‘metaphysical desire’. The elusiveness of the object of sacrifice, which so far is only 
mentioned as dharma, is what generates the very pathos of the world of sacrifice but it 
is this same elusiveness that ultimately constitutes the subject as a responsible agent - of 
a certain kind that can be firmly distinguished from the worldly (laukika).  
                                                 
165
 Jha claims that the word ‘svarga’ or ‘heaven’ is applied to that ‘happiness which is totally free from all 
touch of pain, and which as such is desired by all men.’ Jha, The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, 
p. 94. 
166
 Śabarasvāmi, Śabara-bhāṣya, pp. 964-965. 
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There is a shift from a worldly desire for objects, inherent in human beings to a desire 
for the invisible, for heaven, which can only be brought about through the 
understanding of the Vedic word and the tradition within which it is intelligible. As Das 
succintly remarked: ‘Desire freed from its slavery to objects, becomes desire created by 
the Logos itself’.167 The features of this desire then may be expanded as the following: 
(a) desire is a mode of questing, a mode of seeking the invisible; (b) desire does not 
proceed only from the subject out of a vacuum but is prompted from outside, from the 
word (of tradition) or the memory of the past; (c) desire is a living for the other, a 
continuation of what was already started, a realization of inter-connectedness, and a 
transformation that entails narrative. It is within the context of this more originary 
desire for the invisible that one is able to appreciate Jaimini’s concern for the emergence 
of a responsible subject who not only seeks to participate in the traditionary practice of 
sacrifice but also serves as the mode through which it is continually transmitted.   
Adhikaraṇa: Desire and the Responsibility of Fulfilment 
As we have seen in the previous section, the general principle that presents itself in the 
case of sacrifices that entail material results is that any person who is desirous of 
attaining a certain result is entitled to the performance for the accomplishment of that 
end.
168
 The pūrvapakṣin uses this principle to argue, in the first pāda of the sixth 
adhyāya, that all beings therefore, should then be entitled to perform the acts prescribed 
in the Veda.
169
 This argument proposed by the pūrvapakṣin generates a lengthy 
discussion in the sixth adhyāya over who really is entitled and who ought to perform the 
sacrifices. In considering cases that includes the entitlements of women, the four-
                                                 
167
 Das, ‘Language of Sacrifice’, p. 446. 
168
 Jha, The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, p. 205.  
169
 MS 6.1.4: Phalārthatvāt karmaṇaḥ śāstraṁ sarvādhikāraṁ syāt 
In as much as an act is performed for the purpose of obtaining results, all beings should be entitled to 
perform the acts [prescribed in the Vedic texts]. 
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castes,
170
 the gods and ṛṣis and even animals,171 the pūrvapakṣin’s argument, starting 
with sūtra 6.1.6, seeks to draw certain boundaries regarding the eligibility of women,172 
while also arguing for the inclusion of all the four castes in the performance of 
sacrifices.
173
   
Jaimini makes the claim in the beginning of the conversation, by way of a siddhānta, 
that the injunction to perform actions prescribed by the Veda is addressed primarily to 
an agent who is able to carry out the entire details of the sacrifice: ‘In reality, the 
injunction of an act should be taken to apply to only such an agent as may be able to 
carry out the entire details of the sacrifice; because such is the sense given in the Vedic 
texts.’174  
The question of the entitlement of a person to perform the sacrifice is taken together 
with the question of the ability of the person to perform the sacrifices consistently until 
its fulfilment. This responsibility includes not only the material and physical ability to 
perform the details of the sacrifices, but also the ability to understand and ensure the 
completion of the process. Therefore, the concern for Jaimini is primarily the fulfilment 
of the act of sacrifice in accordance with the injunctions prescribed by the Veda.  
                                                 
170
 MS 6.1.25: Cāturvarṇyam aviśeṣāt 
All the four castes [are entitled to the performance of sacrifices], there being no distinction. 
MS 6.1.26: Nirdeśādvā trayāṇāṁ syādagnyādheye hy asambandhaḥ kratuṣu brāhmaṇaśrutirityātreyaḥ 
The acts [in question] can be performed by the three [higher] castes, as in connection with the installation 
of fire only these three have been mentioned; [therefore] the [Śūdra] can have no connection with 
sacrifices, the veda being applicable only to the Brāhmaṇa, so says Ātreya. 
MS 6.1.27: Nimittārthena bādariḥ tasmāt sarvādhikāraḥ syāt 
The text quoted is only a contingent one, [hence] all castes should be entitled, so says Bādari. 
MS 6.1.28: Api vā’nyārthadarśanāt yathāśruti pratīyet 
The text must be understood in its literal sense, because we find other texts pointing to the same 
conclusion. 
MS 6.1.37: Avaidyatvādabhāvaḥ karmaṇi syāt 
It being impossible for him (the Śūdra) to acquire the knowledge, he is [therefore deemed] incapable of 
performing sacrifices. 
171
 MS 6.1.4: Phalārthatvāt karmaṇaḥ śāstraṁ sarvādhikāraṁ syāt 
172
 MS 6.1.6: Liṅgaviśeṣanirdeśāttu puṁyukttamaitiśāyanaḥ 
‘On account of the use of a particular gender (masculin), only men are entitled,’ says Aitiśāyana. 
173
 MS 6.1.25: Cāturvarṇyam aviśeṣāt 
All the four castes [are entitled for the performance of sacrifices], there being no distinction. 
174
 MS 6.1.5: Karturvā śrutisaṁyogād vidhiḥ kārtsnyena gamyate 
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With regard to the question of the eligibility of women, in sūtra 6.1.8 Jaimini clearly 
states that ‘it is the whole genus i.e. the whole human community, that is enjoined to 
perform sacrifices; there is no ground for distinction between male and female, and that 
women are equally entitled to perform sacrifices.’ 175  The pūrvapakṣin’s argument 
against the right of women to perform sacrifices is that women do not possess any 
wealth as they belong to their husbands and as their husband’s properties, whatever they 
earn from their work also belong to the husbands.
176
 Jaimini, after pointing out that 
women, in Vedic texts, can be clearly indicated to possess property and wealth,
177
 
reiterates once again that it is primarily the presence of a desire to sacrifice
178
 and the 
desire for the fruits that accrue from it that identifies women as eligible for its 
performance.
179
 Jaimini argues that the possession of wealth is a variable factor and the 
possession of wealth can be brought about as the need arises.
180
 Regarding the scope of 
the functions of the wife in a sacrificial performance, Jaimini concludes by clarifying 
that in the performance, there are some details distinctly performed by the man alone, 
such as the shaving of the head, and there are others that are distinctly performed by the 
wife alone, such as the wearing of the gold ring. It is only in the sense of their 
                                                 
175
 MS 6.1.8: Jātiṁ tu bādarāyaṇo’viśeṣāt tasmāt strayapi pratīyeta jātyarthasyāviśiṣṭatvāt 
176
 MS 6.1.10: Dravyavattvāttu puṁsāṁ syāt dravyasaṁyuktaṁ krayavikrayābhyām adravyatvaṁ strīṇām 
dravyaiḥ samānayogitvāt 
[The ability to perform sacrifices] should belong to men only as they alone possess wealth (property), and 
sacrifices are dependent on wealth; in terms sale and purchase, women are devoid of wealth; they belong 
to the same level as property. 
MS 6.1.12: Tādarthyāt karmatādarthyaṃ 
As they belong to their husbands, their actions are also for the sake of their husbands. 
177
 MS 6.1.14: Arthena ca samavetatvāt 
[The woman is spoken of] as being connected with wealth. 
MS 6.1.15: Krayasya dharmamātratvaṃ 
The ‘sale’ is merely a form of ritual action. 
MS 6.1.16: Svavattāmapi darśayati 
There are texts that indicate that women do possess property. 
178
 MS 6.1.13: Phalotsāhā’viśeṣāttu 
But the desire for results [arising] from sacrifices is equally present [in the woman also]. 
179
 MS 6.1.20: Phalārthitvāttu svāmitvenā’bhisambandhaḥ 
It is by virtue of her desiring the fruits [of sacrifice] that the wife is regarded as endowed with ownership. 
180
 MS 6.1.40: Anityatvāttu naivaṁ syādarthāddhi dravyasaṁyogaḥ 
It cannot be so, because it is a variable factor (not permanent); and [the possession of] wealth can be 
brought about as the need arises.  
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respective roles that they are ‘unequal’.181 However, Jaimini also clearly states in  sūtra 
6.1.17 that there are some sacrifices which the man and his wife must perform jointly, 
such as, for instance, the darśapūrṇamāsa and the jyotiṣṭoma where the clarified butter 
that has been laid down as oblation has to be examined by both of them together.
182
   
It is in light of this absence of distinction between men and women, husband and wife, 
that the pūrvapakṣin goes on to then suggest that there should be no distinction amongst 
the four castes and that they should all be entitled to the performance of sacrifices.
183
  
The siddhānta view on this suggestion is that the agnihotra and such sacrifices can only 
be performed by the three higher castes because in connection with the primary rite of 
fire installation, only three castes have been mentioned in the Veda.
184
 The main 
premise upon which the Śūdra is omitted from the performance of sacrifice is primarly 
due to the impossibility for him to acquire the knowledge to do so.
185
 However, Jaimini 
does make mention of the ‘Rathakāra’ who can participate in the fire-installation.186 He 
also mentions the chief who is a Niṣāda and, therefore, does not belong to the three 
higher castes, but who can perform the raudrā sacrifice,187 thereby, showing that the 
performance is not entirely exclusive as long as the sacrificial agent possesses the 
knowledge and know-how to execute his role. In sūtra 6.1.44 Jaimini mentions that as 
laid down by the Vedic injunction, the fire-installation has to be accomplished 
                                                 
181
 MS 6.1.24: Tasyā yāvaduktamāśīrbrahmacaryyamatulyatvāt 
Śabarasvāmi, Śabara-bhāṣya, pp. 983-986. 
182
 MS 6.1.17: Svavatostu vacanādaikakarmyaṁ syāt 
Husband and wife possessing wealth are entitled to perform a joint (one and the same) sacrificial act.  
183
 MS 6.1.25: Cāturvarṇyam aviśeṣāt 
All the four castes [are entitled to the performance of sacrifices], there being no distinction. 
184
 MS 6.1.26: Nirdeśādvā trayāṇāṁ syādagnyādheye hy asambandhaḥ kratuṣu brāhmaṇaśrutirityātreyaḥ 
The acts [in question] can be performed by the three [higher] castes, as in connection with the installation 
of fire only these three have been mentioned; [therefore] the [Śūdra] can have no connection with 
sacrifices, the veda being applicable only to the Brāhmaṇa, so says Ātreya. 
185
 MS 6.1.37: Avaidyatvādabhāvaḥ karmaṇi syāt 
It being impossible for him (the Śūdra) to acquire the knowledge, he is [therefore deemed] incapable of 
performing sacrifices. 
186
 MS 6.1.44: Vacanād rathakārasyādhāne’sya sarvaśeṣatvāt 
The text in question speaks of the installation to be done by the Rathakāra, because such is the direct 
declaration, which must refer to one not already mentioned. 
187
 MS 6.1.51: Sthapatirniṣādaḥ syāt śabdasāmarthyāt 
The chief (sthapati) should be taken to be a Niṣāda because such is the sense in the word. 
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specifically by the Rathakāra. While the pūrvapakṣin in sūtra 6.1.45 claims that the use 
of the term Rathakāra indicates a profession taken to mean the profession of chariot-
making, the siddhāntin’s position in sūtra 6.1.50 is that the word refers to a 
Saudhanvana (mixed caste), which is a caste slightly inferior to the three higher 
castes
188
 and refers to one whose mother is a Śūdra.189 Similarly, with regard to the 
Niṣāda who performs the raudrā sacrifice as mentioned in sūtra 6.1.51, Śabara 
mentions that he belonged to a mixed caste and is technically devoid of Vedic learning, 
and therefore, should be incapable of participation, but in light of the injunction that is 
addressed specifically to him, he is taken to have learned (been taught) the texts needed 
for the performance of that particular sacrifice.
190
 
Between sūtras 6.1.39-42, Jaimini also discussed two important disqualifiers that were 
brought up: (a) lack of necessary wealth, and (b) physical disability. Jaimini, stating that 
it is not right that the man without wealth should not be entitled to perform sacrifice, 
argues that the possession of wealth is not a prerequisite as wealth is a variable factor 
and that possession of wealth could always be brought about as the need arises. With 
regard to the question of physical and bodily defect, Jaimini concludes by arguing that a 
person with such a defect need not necessarily be excluded from sacrifices, as it is 
always possible that people may be cured or healed from the defect that prevents them 
from performing an act.
191
  While Jaimini is aware that not all who desire will possess 
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 Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, p. 270. See also C Minkowski, ‘The Rathakāra’s 
Eligibility to Sacrifice’, Indo-Iranian Journal, vol. 32, no. 3, 1989, pp. 177-194. 
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 MS 6.1.39: Trayāṇāṁ dravyasampannaḥ karmaṇo dravyasiddhitvāt 
Among the three castes, only a person possessing wealth [is entitled to perform sacrifices], because the 
performance of sacrifices can be accomplished only by means of wealth. 
MS 6.1.40: Anityatvāttu naivaṁ syādarthāddhi dravyasaṁyogaḥ 
It cannot be so, because it is a variable factor (not permanent); and [the possession of] wealth can be 
brought about as the need arises.  
MS 6.1.41: Aṅgahīnaśca taddharmā 
The case of a man suffering from a bodily defect is like that of the man dealt with [in the preceding 
discussion]. 
MS 6.1.42: Utpattau nityasaṁyogāt 
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the ability to perform the sacrifice to its fulfilment, in sūtra 6.2.1, he claims that as long 
as every participant helps in the accomplishment of the desired end and the fulfilment of 
the act of sacrifice, each of their respective roles is taken to be entitled and is, therefore, 
significant.
192
 
JAIMINI AND RITUAL SUBJECTIVITY 
I have argued so far that while dharma as the telos of Vedic practice of sacrifice is 
invisible, its invisibility can be pursued and disclosed through the life of the ritual 
practitioner. I have also discussed that the Mīmāṃsā ritual practitioner is unique in that 
he is constituted by a desire to seek the meaning and purpose of sacrifice, a desire that 
entailed the responsibility of submission to tradition to fully pursue its telos. Therefore, 
it is the notion of the desirious ritual practitioner that allows me to discuss the practice 
of sacrifice as an intrinsically meaningful activity. I have demonstrated that not only is 
the sacrificial agent distinguished by a desire for fruits but also by a desire that moves 
him to appropriate the call of an imperative as that which is good for him. It is this 
longing that sets him on a quest to pursue and seek to understand dharma, the first 
initiation of which is to understand the nature of knowledge as necessarily entailing and 
resulting in embodiment and responsible enactment.  
This initiation, which is best understood within the context of the guru-śiṣya 
paramparā, allows the sacrificial agent to acknowledge the chain of memories 
preceeding him and is now connecting him with others through the call of the Veda. It is 
this process of learning to intentionally conform to the patterns of tradition that allows 
the desirous Mīmāṃsā subject to undergo a transformation of the ego cogito or 
                                                                                                                                               
In as much as what is there [defect] since birth remains forever [the person suffering from such a bodily 
defect cannot be entitled to perform sacrfices]. 
192
 MS 6.2.1: Puruṣārthaikasiddhitvāt tasya tasyādhikāraḥ syāt 
As the desired end (goal) is accomplished only in individuals, so each individual is authorized to sacrifice 
and accomplish that goal. 
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personality and make room to allow the gradual development of a ‘narrative space of 
tradition’. This process of conforming to the patterns of tradition and the transformation 
which the subject undergoes whereby the ego cogito is subsumed by a sense of 
identification with a ‘collectivity greater than the individual’ through an understanding 
of the import of the Veda is similar in its structure with what Flood develops as 
‘inwardness’ and ‘shared subjectivity’ formed through ‘the cultivation of text-informed 
spiritual practices’.193 Such spiritual practices, argues Flood, offer ‘resistence to the 
exteriorization of religion that sees religion purely in terms of law and injunction’ and 
helps one in advancing ‘an existential understanding of religions’ whereby traditionary 
practices such as sacrifices in the Vedic world can be discussed as meaningful practices 
inseparable from the religious imagination and tradition within which they are 
locatable.
194
  
It is this cultivation of practices in the quest to pursue dharma which discloses a ritual 
subjectivity - a tradition-specific text-informed subjectivity that will be developed as the 
enjoined subject in subsequent chapters. The pattern of enjoinment, for which desire for 
a meaningful telos is the first stage, and followed by appropriation and enactment of the 
rationality of tradition as the second and third stage, is discussed in the following 
chapters. These three inter-related stages can be more simply summed up as the pursuit, 
appropriation and enactment of the practical rationality of a tradition by a desiring 
subject, and it is this pattern that I discuss as constituting traditionary practice. This 
traditionary practice, disclosed through a mode of being that serves as a carrier and 
validator of the rationality of tradition, is what is identified as ritual in this thesis. 
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In line with Flood, I suggest that the argument for the centrality of subjectivity in the 
enquiry into ritual is an attempt to reintroduce a sense of subjectivity that is not cut off 
from its ‘cosmological roots’ but rather, is formed and intensified in text-specific ways 
in their quest to appropriate a telos greater than their egocentric individualist pursuits.
195
 
Jaimini’s introduction of dharma as the telos of sacrifice, in his concern to preserve and 
maintain the continuity of the Vedic tradition of sacrifice is, therefore, closely 
connected with the notion of the subject who cumulatively realizes the possibilities of 
his own being within this traditionary practice and pursuit. From the very outset, there 
is, to borrow Sloterdijk’s phrase, a ‘vertical tension’ or a ‘self-surpassing tendency’196 
inherent in the subject’s existence that help him affirm virtues, particularly in the 
absence of absolute external foundations. The cultivation of this trait of affirming life 
and the desire to go beyond oneself, when introduced in light of Jaimini’s larger 
concern for the intelligibility of Vedic sacrifice and the justification for dharma, gives 
rise to the emergence of the desirous sacrificial agent enjoined by the Veda, by 
tradition. It is through this formation of a tradition specific subjectivity that one can 
reimagine sacrifice, not as a reciprocal relationship of gift-exchange but as a process of 
becoming - an intensification of a subjectivity transformed in its willing submission to 
tradition. Sacrifice, as a form of traditionary practice, then becomes the realm through 
which the existence of the Vaidika is made meaningful with every new ritual act taken 
as a participation in this realm of meaning and the reinvigoration of the significance of 
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idea of religion to self-forming exercises.  
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practice in their world affirmed. This sense of subjectivity allows me to take the pursuit 
of dharma as a pursuit for the meaning and purpose of sacrificial action, and a pursuit 
for understanding the telos of tradition. 
SUMMARY 
Starting with the goal of seeking to enquire into the nature of the phenomenon of ritual, 
in this chapter, I introduced the problematic of meaning in the study of ritual and 
discussed Jaimini’s pursuit of dharma through the theme of desire and subjectivity as it 
relates to the practice of sacrifice. I have argued that Jaimini’s insistence on the quest 
for the telos of tradition and his introduction of dharma, particularly in light of the 
disintegration of the foundations of the Vedic world of sacrifice in the period within 
which the Mīmāṃsāsūtras was formulated, allowed a closer look at his concern for 
developing the significance of the practice of sacrifice even as he sought to reimagine 
and affirm it as a traditionary practice. This in turn enabled the explication of the 
emergence of the Mīmāṃsā subject who not only desires the telos of meaning, but also 
opens the narrative space of tradition and is constituted by it. I have also shown that it is 
this emergence of a ritual subjectivity that allows an enquiry into the elusive nature of 
the realm of the invisible and validates Jaimini’s introduction of dharma as one of the 
constitutive structures of a hermeneutic tradition – telos. 
I have limited my focus in this chapter primarily to the introduction of the Mīmāṃsā 
subject through his mode of being and the process of his initiation into tradition. In the 
next chapter I will look at the development of the internal rationality of the Mīmāṃsā 
tradition primarily through the theme of the constitution of the authority of the Veda 
and discuss the mechanisms that entail its dependency on the responsible subject who 
must take up the task of embodying that rationality through the process of enjoinment. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: AUTHORITY OF VEDA 
RATIONALITY, REDUCTIONISM AND TRADITION 
INTRODUCTION 
The discussion in the previous chapter on the pursuit of dharma was directed by the 
question of reductionism and the ontology of ritual, and in this chapter, I focus 
primarily on Jaimini’s epistemology in light of the prevailing problem of reductionist 
methodological presuppositions in the study of ritual. I claim that reductionist enquiry 
in the human sciences, which includes the modern invention of ‘ritual’ and its study, is 
propelled by a ‘Western’ rationality whose universalizing presuppositions are 
uncritically borrowed from the scientific methods of enquiry emanating from the natural 
sciences. I present this claim to argue for the importance of identifying tradition-
constituted rationalities and validating their enquiries. It is primarily in light of this 
framework that I develop Jaimini’s understanding of the authority of the Veda. 
With regard to the first aim of the thesis, I seek to argue that Jaimini’s demonstration of 
the authority of the Veda as an infallible revelation that necessitates (enjoins) enactment 
not only discloses his concern for the continuation of tradition but also serves as an 
example of a tradition-constituted rationality. The intelligibility of this internal 
rationality, in light of Jaimini’s concern for the realization of dharma, is demonstrated 
in his elucidation of the dialogic constitution of the sacredness of the Veda that ensures 
its appropriation in practice.  
With regard to the second aim of the thesis, the reductionist tendencies in the study of 
ritual that sought to offer explanations and critiques which are externalist in their 
approach, are unable to provide accounts of internal concerns and forms of reasoning 
that are specific to a tradition. The intelligibility of Jaimini’s demonstration of the 
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authority of the Veda is discussed with the goal of highlighting the need for developing 
an appreciation of internal rationalities governing traditions in the study of ritual. The 
argument suggested is that the study of ritual needs to seriously take into account 
‘tradition-internal reasoning’ and its ‘ways of forming tradition-specific subjectivities’1 
in order to have a clearer understanding of the internal mechanisms that uniquely make 
up traditionary practice taken here as ritual. 
To that end, since the issue of rationality in humanistic enquiry is the point of departure 
in this chapter, I will begin the first section by presenting a brief genealogical sketch of 
the adoption of a standard universal rationality that has influenced the enquiries of both 
the natural and human sciences, including the modern invention of ritual and its study. I 
will then present an explication of the intelligibility of Jaimini’s enquiry as an example 
of a tradition-constituted rationality in the second section, even as I point out the 
importance of taking tradition-constituted rationalities and their forms of reasoning into 
account in the study of ritual. I will argue that while Jaimini’s enquiry can be said to be 
guided by a tradition-constituted rationality, it does not lend itself to simplistic 
categorizations of being a relativistic enquiry bounded within its own tradition. This is  
because Jaimini’s own position can be seen to be an outcome of a dialogical encounter 
and engagement with other contending positions. 
THE QUESTION CONCERNING RATIONALITY 
The classical humanist tradition in the West, which tended to locate its origins in 
ancient Greece,
2
 attributes this era with the ‘invention’ of logic and the establishment of 
a set of principles for the existence of ‘pure rationality’. According to King, modern 
                                                 
1
 Refer G Flood, ‘Reflections on Tradition and Inquiry in the Study of Religions’, Journal of the 
American Academy of Religions, vol. 74, no. 1, 2006, p. 50. 
2
 For a fuller explication of this relation between the humanist tradition and ancient Greece, see P 
Sloterdijk, The Art of Philosophy: Wisdom as Practice, trans. K Margolis, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 2012. 
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academic philosophers in Western academia have displayed a tendency to locate the 
origins of ‘modern Western civilization’ in the Greek differentiation between mythos 
and logos. Consequently, a distinction is drawn between ‘mythology (denoting the 
sacred stories that give meaning to particular communities) and history (what actually 
happens in an objective sense)’, where the latter is privileged over the former.3 He 
further adds that this principle of rationality primarily influenced by the idea of logos, 
has often been understood as a ‘culturally independent and neutral faculty capable of 
promoting a new kind of thinking (free thought)’, which is thereby, firmly distinguished 
from a ‘dogmatic adherence to tradition’.4 Flood mentions that the idea of rationality in 
the Western academia, beginning with Aristotle’s distinction between theoria 
(theoretical rationality) and phronesis (practical rationality), has been understood in two 
ways: firstly, as ‘knowledge of truth through inference from valid premises’, and 
secondly, as ‘the development of logic from Aristotle and the two rules of logic’, the 
‘law of non-contradiction’ and the ‘law of the excluded middle’.5 Therefore, the notion 
of rationality which had predominated in the modern West, particularly since the 
Enlightenment, was not only ambiguously secular in form but also strongly aligned with 
the natural sciences as the basis for a universal and objective foundation of knowledge.  
The extensive debates on the nature of human rationality predominating throughout the 
twentieth century were closely connected with the question of whether the nature of 
enquiry in the human sciences is essentially of the same nature as that of the natural 
sciences (and the rationality that was dominant in that particular method of enquiry). 
From the works of Kant and his influence on Enlightenment thinking, to the post-
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 Ibid., p. 13. 
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 As Flood has highlighted, ‘the law of non-contradiction’ states that ‘a statement (p) cannot be 
simultaneously true and false’, and ‘the law of the excluded middle’ states that ‘for any statement p, it is 
the case that “either p or not p” is true’ where ‘p’ is understood exactly in the same way in both 
occurences. See Flood, The Importance of Religion: Meaning and Action in our Strange World, p. 131.  
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modern, post-secular affirmation of pluralities, the debate has primarily revolved around 
attempts to establish ‘standards’ of rationality to validate ‘scientific’ enquiry where the 
natural sciences are often taken as the paradigm of rationality in action.
6
 
The Rationality of ‘Sciences’  
The beginning of contemporary ‘scientific methodology’ is often traced back to the 
mid-seventeenth century, to the dawn of the ‘modern age’, whose two influential 
protagonists were Galileo in physics and astronomy and Descartes in mathematics and 
epistemology.
7
 The narrative of modernity, particularly as evident in the 
‘foundationalism’ of Descartes, was governed by a striving for the possibility of 
achieving ‘absolute certainty’ in knowledge and thereby, the end of all doubt.8 Cartesian 
foundationalism was influential as a framework for modernity’s scientific enquiry and 
with the works of Hobbes and the later empiricists, the identification of atomistic 
objectivist matter as the ontological ‘real’ was gradually established. Science came to be 
understood as the quest for the ahistorical ‘universal laws of nature’ valid across history 
and across traditions.
9
 Kant was significant in giving rise to the development of 
Enlightenment thinking wherein the idea of man freed from the shackles of location and 
tradition was vehemently advanced. Kant defined the meaning of the Enlightenment 
with the Horatian motto, sapere aude (dare to know), which he renders as ‘Have 
courage to use your own understanding’. As he puts it:  
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability 
to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred 
if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the 
                                                 
6
 See JK Smith, The Nature of Social and Educational Inquiry: Empiricism versus Interpretation, Ablex, 
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guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use 
your own understanding!
10
  
Fay argues that the introduction of neopositivism (or logical empiricism) as an 
approach to ‘explain’ the practices of the natural sciences had in turn influenced the 
development of a human science that pursued quantitative and causal generalizations 
in their investigations.
11
 Social-scientific research, for example, was primarily based 
on a methodology developed from Comteian positivism and laid great stress on the 
methods of empirical research designs such as the generation of data, sampling, and 
the location of causes based on ‘prediction’ and ‘measurement’. 12  The human 
sciences were concerned with the scientific tasks of identifying ‘empirical 
generalizations’ which can explain human activities and behaviour across historical 
and cultural contexts, independent of time and place. The fundamental positivist 
principle of Newtonian science and Cartesian dualism which worked with ‘the 
assumption that there is a fundamental distinction between nature and humans, 
between matter and mind, between the physical and the social/spiritual world’,13 had 
also increasingly promoted the distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘values’, 14  and 
ultimately between the researcher and the researched in the human sciences.
15
  
In the attempt to organize social order on a solid base, the foundation of modern 
social-scientific research in the first half of the nineteenth century turned to 
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‘Newtonian physics as a model to imitate.’ 16  According to this principle, the 
scientificity of a research enquiry was grounded on the adoption of a ‘value-neutral’ 
orientation towards the investigation of empirical and ‘factual’ phenomena. As Smith 
remarked: ‘Positivism provided a powerful statement for the unity of all the sciences 
and thus for the acceptability and necessity of employing the methods of the natural 
sciences in the study of social affairs.’17  
Classical social theorists, from Weber and Durkheim in the discipline of sociology, to 
Menger and Walras in economics, to Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski in social 
anthropology, and Freud in psychoanalysis, were all concerned with justifying their 
varied approaches in terms of their scientificity. As Somekh and Lewin pointed out, 
many of the ‘early twentieth-century social scientists struggled to extricate 
themselves from the accusations made by logical positivism that research which 
lacked the solid foundation of measurement was no better than fancy and invention’ 
and therefore, they attempted to develop methods that were able to conform to the 
methodological standards adopted in the natural sciences, whereby researchers 
‘focused on seeking generalizable laws governing the behaviour of human groups’.18 
Wagner mentions that one of the unintended consequences of those strivings for 
‘scientificity’ during the constitutive era of the human sciences was the relative 
closure of the understanding of what the human science really was about, and what it 
means to be human.
19
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Human Science and the Problem of Rationalities 
In the nineteenth century, there was also a reorientation of the natural sciences away 
from the realist-representation towards a more relativist-pragmatic understanding of 
science which was characterized by Mach’s withdrawal from the ‘explanatory 
ambition’, Dilthey’s separation of the models of the natural and the human sciences, 
and Nietzsche’s radical critique of science.20 Kuhn had also mentioned that these 
practitioners (scientists) were influenced by a variety of contextual factors and had 
stressed the importance of understanding their enquiries as the relative product of 
research processes where opinions and findings were primarily organized around their 
specific ‘internal power structures, interests and status claims’. 21  Therefore, the 
recognition of scientific enquiry as a social practice that is ‘falsifiable’ started to gain 
prominence.
22
 This opened up the debate about the nature of rationality, especially in 
light of the relation between the natural and the human sciences, whose underlying 
issue was best exemplified by the position taken by Winch, on the one hand and 
Taylor, on the other. 
Winch, in his book, The Idea of Social Science, strongly challenged the accepted 
parallels between the natural and the human sciences and denied the role of anything 
parallel to a law of nature in explaining human behaviour. According to him, ‘social 
relations really exist only in and through the ideas that are current in a society; … 
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social relations fall into the same category as relations between ideas’.23  Winch, 
following Wittgenstein, emphasizes the social nature of human action and underlined 
the importance of rules and norms of behaviour. Social rules, according to Winch, do 
not cause the act, but they rather constitute the act by giving it its specific meaning. 
For Winch, to understand human behaviour, one requires more than just abstract 
knowledge of the rules of a society; one needs to know what counts as following a 
rule in a particular case. He writes: ‘All meaningful behaviour must be social, since it 
can be meaningful only if governed by rules, and rules presuppose a social setting.’24 
To elucidate this, he says that one must somehow learn to share the viewpoints, 
attitudes and feelings of the actors, and one must understand the meaning and 
deliberation of human action from ‘the inside’ if one is to understand it as human 
action; it is not just a matter of observing it from the outside as in the natural sciences. 
He discusses this idea in Understanding a Primitive Society where he highlights the 
Azande notions of witchcraft as a coherent and meaningful practice within the world 
inhabited by the Azande. For Winch and many post-Second World War 
anthropologists and philosophers, cultures are taken as closed-systems with their own 
standards of rationality bounded within their own cultures and, therefore, had to be 
understood within their own contexts and in their own terms.  
Taylor, who also offered a theory demarcating the human sciences and the natural 
sciences based on the central role that interpretation plays in the human sciences,
25
 
agrees with Winch’s claim that there are no universal standards of rationality that can 
be applied across cultures. He argues against the reduction of other cultures as simply 
engaging in a ‘different language game’ unrelated with other cultures. Taylor argues 
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that while every culture’s rationality may be linked to coherence and the ability to 
follow a rule as proposed by Winch, they must also possess the ability to account or 
give reasons for the coherence of their own practices and beliefs. For Taylor, it is this 
ability to articulate and formulate a coherent theoretical understanding that not only 
differentiates between cultures, without claiming one or the other as ‘irrational’, but 
also allows communicability across cultures.
26
  
Under what conditions then, can one categorize the worldviews and cosmologies of 
other traditions as ‘rationally’ adequate or inadequate? Are cultures and traditions 
exclusively relative and radically independent to such an extent that their rationalities 
and modes of intelligibility are incommensurable and therefore, inhibit the discussion of 
rationalities that can be judged across cultures? 
The Modern Invention of Ritual 
The notion of a ‘common rationality’ applicable to all forms of enquiry was 
particularly problematic in the study of ritual. The study of ritual was introduced and 
developed within the framework of the social sciences whose presuppositions were 
borrowed from the natural sciences. The ‘scientific’ models of enquiry that these 
social sciences adopted distanced themselves from notions of ‘traditions’ and were 
unable to access the implicit mechanisms through which social communities construct 
their own understandings of realities or discuss the truth claims implicit within the 
‘objects’ of their enquiries. The social scientific approach to religion and ritual where 
‘any theory or method of investigation in any of the human or social sciences is or 
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may be applied to the study of specific sets of religious data’27 resulted in a form of 
theorizing that exacerbated the division between what can be categorized as the 
positions of the ‘idealists’ and the ‘critical-realists’. 28  The reductionist form of 
enquiry influenced by the natural sciences was adopted in the human sciences with an 
attempt to investigate the kind of ‘object’ ritual is and the way it can be analyzed and 
explained. 
According to Bell, the ‘emergence of the concept of “ritual” as a universal 
phenomenon that is substantively manifest in human nature, biology, or culture’ is the 
consequence of a ‘successive layering of scholarly and popular attitudes’.29 She notes 
that ‘the whole issue of ritual’ historically began as the identification of a ‘discrete 
phenomenon to the eyes of social observers in that period in which “reason”. The 
scientific pursuit of knowledge were defining a particular hegemony in Western 
intellectual life’,30 and the category ‘ritual’ exposed ‘the beginnings of a major shift 
in the way European culture compared itself to other cultures and religions’.31  
Ever since the mid-nineteenth century, the general view is that ritual as well as religion 
declined in relative proportion to modernization and the secularization that accompanied 
it.
32
 Bell identifies the British philosopher Spencer as one of the ‘first to formulate an 
evolutionary opposition’ between the ‘industrialization of modern culture’ and the 
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‘rituals of tribal or feudal cultures’. Weber, who followed a generation later, contrasted 
‘ritual and magic’ with ‘the rationalization and disenchantment of modern life’.33 Bell 
notes that the ‘emerging fields of study focused on ritual as an ideal representation of 
what was different from reason, what reason needed to explain and, ultimately, 
enlighten and transform’.34 Lukes pointed out that the scholar identifies ritual whenever 
cultural actions and beliefs present themselves to him as ‘non-rational’, or as certain 
actions in which the means seem to be disproportionate to the ends.
35
 Sax argues that 
many of the post-Enlightenment theories label ritual as ‘certain activities that seem to be 
nonrational’, without taking into account how the performers of those activities 
understand them within their own cosmologies and narrative frameworks. He cites an 
example: ‘According to our meteorological theories, dancing cannot really make it rain, 
and so when someone performs a rain dance, we call it “ritual”.’36 He laments that 
scholarly endeavour gives rise to the ‘sin of reification’ where scholars ‘conduct 
research on the rituals, they teach and write about them, and after some time they begin 
to think that “ritual” is something out there in the world, whose characteristics can be 
classified, enumerated, and analyzed.’37  
Bell notes that the ‘twists and turns’ of the ‘repudiating’, ‘returning’ and even 
‘romanticizing’ of ritual are ‘closely intertwined with the emergence of the very concept 
of “ritual” as a universal phenomenon’ which is then ‘accessible to formal identification 
and analysis’. The formal analysis discloses ‘concerted intellectual efforts’ which 
sought to ‘deal with the “other” in the various religious and cultural guises in which this 
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“other” has been perceived.’38 These efforts not only showed the manner in which 
studies, particularly of other cultures, were carried out, but the concept of ritual became 
a useful scholarly tool to differentiate ‘the magical’ and ‘the religious’ from ‘the 
rational’. While on the one hand, ‘a focus on ritual has enabled scholars to determine 
basic similarities among very different ritual practices and traditions’, on the other hand, 
the ‘deployment of “ritual” as a universal’ category has also led to the establishing of 
‘new distinctions and borderlands’, particularly between ‘those who wield such 
universal categories and thereby transcend their culture and, those who, locked in their 
cultural perspectives, are the recipients of categorizations that may seem meaningless or 
threatening’.39 As a result, the perspectives on ritual in contemporary scholarship tend 
to undermine forms of traditionary rationalities and authorities and tradition specific 
ways of living and acting. 
‘Ritual’, whose concept was the outcome of a ‘drawn-out, complex and intrinsically 
political process of negotiating differences and similarities’ between cultures, came to 
be conceived as a ‘panhuman phenomenon’. Its study resulted in the emergence of a 
dichotomy between the ‘scholars of ritual practices’ and the ‘practitioners of ritual’ i.e. 
the people that the scholars studied.
40
 Bell argues that ‘the study of ritual has gone 
through historical perspectives’ which have ‘less to do with how people ritualize and 
more with how Western culture’ sought to figure out the relation between ‘science and 
religion’, and between ‘tradition and modernity’, and it therefore reflected the nature of 
Western scholarly involvement with the ‘other’.41 Ritual as a formal category and a 
phenomenon was invented, identified and understood primarily through the lens of a 
Western ‘universal’ rationality.  
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While there are various ways through which the study of ritual was approached, all of 
these approaches generally understood ritual as a universal and representational medium 
of symbolic expressions based on a model of ritual theory looking for a universal 
expression of religious experiences, and which mapped religious phenomena in terms of 
morphological categories, guided by cross-cultural methods of comparison.
42
 Each of 
these approaches worked under an Enlightenment-influenced universalist framework, 
and tend to argue for ‘a coherent and meaningful unity to the diversities of religions, 
cultures and histories.’43 These accounts, however, did not seek to enquire into the 
nature of theological accounts that as Anselm’s ‘faith seeking understanding’ suggests, 
are accounts working strictly within the presuppositions of theological beliefs.
44
 In their 
objective generalization and sidelining of cultural specificities, they were unable to 
excavate the rationalities and theologies of these traditionary practices and the tradition 
specific ways in which they meaningfully organize their world and affirm it.  
MĪMĀṂSĀ AND THE RATIONALITY OF TRADITIONS 
It is problematic to ascertain a central constituting idea that distinguishes rationality 
because the term ‘rational’ is a polysemous term suggesting a wide variety of meanings 
whose standards of interpretation vary amongst different theorists. Flood points out that 
the ‘range of rationality’ cannot be restricted to ‘logical rules’ and emphasized the need 
to understand rationality ‘in terms of human practices that have been developed over 
millennia that involve making judgements in particular situations that are the best 
means to achieve a particular end.’45 He points out that the debate about rationality has 
not only been about ‘the application of logical rules to statements’ but more broadly 
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about ‘coherence and the degree to which statements correspond to reality’.46 He further 
argues that one could claim ‘minimally, that rationality entails coherence and 
intelligibility’ which can be articulated to others, if not across traditions, certainly 
within traditions. For Flood, it is in this sense that a ‘culture’s schema involves a 
narrative dimension’ and it is what enables religion to be understood as a ‘story’, the 
explanation of which is precisely the function of rationality.
47
  
Arguing that conflicting views on an issue generally arise as a result of ‘fundamental 
disagreements about the character of rationality’, MacIntyre seeks to develop the idea of 
‘rationality of traditions’ as an alternative to both the universalist and relativist 
rationalities that he argues predominated the debate about rationality.
48
 For MacIntyre, 
as opposed to the notion of standard ‘laws of logic’ that are generally identified as the 
universal premise of rationality, there are different ‘laws of logic’ that do not 
necessarily identify with the Aristotelian laws of logic. He further notes that these ‘laws 
of logic’ have to be supplemented by other criteria such as the ‘modes of enquiry’ and 
the ‘justifications of belief’, all of which shape the internal structures of a rationality.  
MacIntyre, who formulates Thomism as one example of an essentially tradition-
constituted enquiry, points out that rationality is always ‘tradition-constituted and 
tradition-constitutive’ and consists of a teleological ‘progress’ made through ‘a number 
of well-defined types of stage’ particular to a tradition. MacIntyre lists three stages for 
the initial development of a tradition-constituted rationality, which encompasses the 
understanding of rationality as an articulation that is not only coherent but theoretical in 
the Taylorian sense. According to MacIntyre, the first stage of enquiry ‘begins from 
some condition of pure historical contingency, from the beliefs, institutions, and 
                                                 
46
 Ibid., p. 132. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, p. 4. 
 157 
 
practices’ which can be taken as a given for a particular community and from which a 
‘community authority’ is accepted and conferred, particularly ‘upon certain texts and 
certain voices’. In this stage, a given community, and often ones that are ‘to greater or 
lesser degree, in a state of change’, take certain ‘beliefs, utterances, texts, and persons’ 
to be ‘authoritative’ unquestioningly, or at least without ‘systematic questioning’.49 In 
the second stage, the inadequacies of these previously unquestioned authority structures 
are ‘shown to be susceptible to…alternative and incompatible interpretations’ which 
then give rise to ‘incompatible courses of action’. This stage can be identified by the 
growing evidence of ‘incoherences in the established system of belief’, ‘confrontation 
by new situations’ or the ‘coming together of two previously separate communities’, 
thereby, resulting in the opening up of ‘new alternative possibilities’ that ‘the existing 
means of evaluation’ are unable to provide. In this stage, while the ‘inadequacies of 
various types have been identified’, they have ‘not yet’ been ‘remedied’. In the third 
stage, the ‘inhabitants of a particular community’ respond to these challenges and 
inadequacies by not only taking ‘stock of reasons and of questioning and reasoning 
abilities they already possess’ but also by developing new ‘inventiveness’. This 
response results in ‘a set of reformulations, reevaluations, and new formulations and 
evaluations, designed to remedy inadequacies and overcome limitations.’50 According 
to MacIntyre, it is at this stage - where the possibility of developing a ‘theory of truth’ 
and ‘judgement’ which are accepted as necessary for the continued relevance of the 
authority structures - that the tradition itself has reached a point of development where it 
becomes ‘a form of enquiry’ with its own rationality that can then be institutionalised 
and regulated as a method of enquiry.
51
  
                                                 
49
 Ibid., p. 354. 
50
 Ibid., p. 355. 
51
 Ibid., pp. 356-358. 
 158 
It is in light of Flood’s emphasis on ‘coherence and intelligibility’ and the framework of 
a ‘tradition-constituted rationality’ propounded by MacIntyre that I now seek to present 
Jaimini’s enquiry not only as possessing structures that are akin to what constitutes a 
tradition-constituted rationality à la MacIntyre but one that also introduces the 
mechanisms of what is entailed in the transmission of the Vedic practice of sacrifice as 
a living unbroken tradition.  
The Authority of the Veda and the Unbroken Tradition 
I have mentioned in the previous chapter that yajña is the central activity governing the 
Vaidika way of life. The very first two sūtras of the first adhyāya already indicate that 
the concept of dharma, the understanding of the Veda and the practice of yajña are 
closely interwoven together.
52
 For Jaimini, the enquiry into dharma as a seeking for 
truth beyond the phenomenological and transitory reality of the world is taken to be 
accessible only through the medium of śabda, and particularly the codanās of the Veda. 
It is through the Veda that the desiring subject then actualizes dharma. This relentless 
commitment to affirm the vitality of the authority of the Veda as the only means 
through which the invisible realm is accessible and the practice of sacrifice is made 
intelligible,
53
 allows me to enquire into and explicate the internal rationality governing 
Jaimini’s enquiry. 
This commitment to justify the authority of the Veda involves three tasks that are 
developed here as stages of enquiry akin to the stages that make up a tradition-
constituted rationality in the hermeneutical sense as developed by MacIntyre. These 
three stages highlight the relationship between the constitution of the Veda as verbal 
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testimony and the traditionary practice of sacrifice, and validate this relationship by 
establishing the authority of the Veda as a pramāṇa that is infallible for the goal of 
actualizing dharma through practice. The first stage involves a presentation of Jaimini’s 
unquestioning acceptance of the authority of the Veda through his proposal of śabda-
pramāṇa as the only valid means of accessing dharma. This places Jaimini firmly as a 
Vaidika who locates himself within a particular tradition that recognizes and accepts the 
authority of the Veda. The second stage involves his awareness of the challenges and 
criticisms, and the potential incoherencies or inadequacies, evident through his 
engagements with opponents to his system whose objections are presented in the form 
of several pūrvapakṣas. This stage of negotiating and engaging closely with the 
pūrvapakṣins then lead to the third stage that involves Jaimini’s reconceptualization of 
authoritativeness as infallibility that presents an intelligible position accepted as 
intrinsically valid by the Mīmāṃsakas. This reconceptualization also discloses the 
mechanism that maintains the Vedic tradition of sacrificial practice as a living 
hermeneutic tradition. This involves an understanding of sacredness as necessarily 
entailing enactment that allows the Veda to be received and performed as an unbroken 
tradition. 
In the sections below, I will begin by discussing the first and the third stage through the 
theme of śabda-prāmāṇam and the intrinsic infallibility of śabda respectively. I will 
then discuss the second stage of the dialogical constitution of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras as a 
way of re-engaging the question of whether MacIntyre’s proposal of a tradition-
constituted rationality is a universalist or a relativist position, or whether there is a third 
way of understanding his proposal that is beyond these two extreme positions. 
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Śabda-Pramāṇa: Verbal Testimony and Valid Knowledge 
Jha mentions that ‘from the earliest time, man has made the distinction between Matter - 
regarded, roughly, as what is tangible, - and Spirit - what is not tangible’.54 He states 
that ancient Vedic speculation was based on the matter (visible) and spirit (non-visible) 
dichotomy; and while Sāṅkhya acknowledges and maintains this dichotomy, and Nyāya 
provides the rationale for this distinction, neither school provide the means of knowing 
(pramāṇa) or accessing the suprasensible spirit world. Jha writes:  
In the group known as the Nyāya, we find expounded in detail the means and methods for 
ascertaining of the real nature of things, both material and spiritual; this is done on the basis of 
common sense and the aid of supernatural means of knowledge is not emphasized. Mīmāṃsā 
deals entirely with spiritual truths, which are not amenable to any ordinary means of knowledge 
- being cognisable only through the Reliable Word, Revelation.
55
 
Mīmāṃsā, in its quest for the highest truth that is not amenable to the senses, argues 
that śabda is that very means of knowing the invisible and accessing the realm of the 
unknowable, of which dharma is its main focus of enquiry. The Mīmāṃsā 
understanding of reality is divided along the dimensions of the visible (dṛṣṭa) and the 
invisible (adṛṣṭa). Visible reality is taken as the reality accessible through pratyakṣa and 
the invisible as that which can only be accessed through śabda.56 For Jaimini, śabda is 
infallible with regard to all that concerns the invisible (imperceptible) and it is never 
erroneous in matters invisible.
57
 After introducing the telos of Mīmāṃsā investigation 
as dharma and defining it as a purpose whose characteristic is injunctive in nature,
58
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cārthe’nupalabdhe tat pramāṇaṁ bādarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt 
The relationship between the word and what they express (denote) is inborn (originary). Instruction 
(teaching) is the only means of knowing it, [as it is] infallible regarding all that is imperceptible; [it is a 
valid means of knowledge] as it is independent, according to Bādarāyaṇa. 
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Dharma is that ‘artha’ whose characteristic feature is that of a ‘codanā’. 
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Jaimini goes on to argue that the other accepted pramāṇas cannot validate dharma 
because sense-perception (pratyakṣa), which is the main pramāṇa upon which all other 
pramāṇas are dependent upon except śabda, is only capable of denoting tangible 
material objects.
59
  
The recognition of the authority of the Veda is one of the most important criteria of 
Hindu ‘orthodoxy’; it is what eventually gave rise to one way of separating the āstika 
from the nāstika traditions.60 According to Pandurangi, ‘of all the schools of Indian 
philosophy, the Mīmāṃsā is the most powerful champion of Vedic authority’ and 
therefore, its most important proponent.
61
 It is this commitment to Vedic testimony or 
revelation that has also often resulted in the charge, particularly by modern scholars, 
that the system is no longer a living or relevant one.
62
 As Arnold has pointed out, 
Mīmāṃsā’s concern with establishing the authority of the Veda has prompted many 
modern scholars ‘to characterize this tradition as virtually antithetical to truly 
philosophical inquiry’. 63  He notes that even those who advance a more nuanced 
understanding and are sensitive observers of the Mīmāṃsā, such as Matilal and 
Clooney, have tended to dismiss its ‘scriptural way of knowing’ as ‘a sort of 
fundamentalism’ and a ‘non-philosophical’ description that is then taken as the ‘true 
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predecessor to Advaita.’64 However, in the following discussions I seek to argue that the 
nature of Jaimini’s commitment to Vedic revelation, and his proposal of śabda as the 
only pramāṇa to enquire into dharma, when understood in light of the vitality of yajña 
in the Vedic world, discloses his unique concern for the preservation and continuation 
of Vedic practice as an unbroken tradition that pushes one to reimagine the very notion 
of both ‘authority’ and ‘orthodoxy’.  
Having mentioned in sūtra 1.1.4 that the enquiry into dharma is not amenable to such 
means of cognition as sense-perception and inference, Jaimini, in the following sūtra 
1.1.5 claims that śabda is the only means of cognizing all that is beyond the limits of 
possible sensory experience, and particularly dharma: 
1.1.4: [That] cognition by a person which occurs when there is contact (connection) of the sense-
organs (human senses) [with an existent object] is sense-perception; it is not a means [of 
knowing dharma] since it apprehends only what is present [existing at the present time].  
1.1.5: The relationship between the word and what they express (denote) is inborn (originary). 
Instruction (teaching) is the only means of knowing it, [as it is] infallible regarding all that is 
imperceptible; [it is a valid means of knowledge] as it is independent, according to Bādarāyaṇa.65 
Although dharma is accepted as an object of knowledge, it is an object that has no given 
external or tangible form or features through which it can be visibly identified and 
distinctively defined. Therefore, dharma is not amenable to sense-perception because 
sense-perception is taken to be able to apprehend only those objects which are in visible 
existence at the time of perception. Moreover, since all the other means of knowledge 
are also dependent on and has their foundation primarily in sense-perception, they 
cannot be taken as valid means for knowing dharma.
66
 It is within this attempt to grasp 
the invisibility of dharma that śabda is introduced as the only means of knowledge that 
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can access and actualize dharma. It is precisely within this concern to bring dharma into 
existence in a world that is oriented around yajña, that Jaimini is interested in the 
validity of śabda as a pramāṇa.  
To understand the significance and contours of Jaimini’s epistemology through a 
discussion of his proposal of śabda as the only pramāṇa for matters pertaining to 
dharma, one has to acquire a preliminary understanding of the nature of pramāṇa and 
its role in the context of the darśana-based culture.67 
Pramāṇa 
Pramāṇa, in the Indian philosophical tradition, is generally understood as a means of 
cognition or a medium of accessing valid cognition. Mohanty, however, considers it in 
the sense of a ‘philosophical theory’ which seeks to discuss the nature of things with a 
rationale and justification that is coherent and intelligible within a particular darśana.68 
According to Bilimoria, pramāṇa seeks to deal with the question of ‘the possibility and 
grounds of the valid means of knowing’.69 For him, it includes such questions as ‘how 
do we know?, how do we know what we know?, how do we know, or establish, the 
truth or falsity of what we claim to know?, how many ways of knowing are there? and 
do they all lead to the same truth?.’70 Pramāṇa for him, is defined ‘in terms of the 
instruments (karaṇa-karaṇa) and the concatenation of conditions and factors (sāmagrī) 
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that are capable of bringing about a desired result, in this instance, a genuine piece of 
knowledge.’ The criteria for determining the truth or otherwise of this ‘knowledge’, i.e. 
pramāṇyaniścaya, are also given alongside the definition.71  
Pramāṇa, writes Mohanty, is understood as ‘the specific cause of an irreducible type of 
pramā [true cognition]’, which for him amounts to three claims that together constitute 
his ‘pramāṇa theory’ - one, ‘some cognitions are true, i.e. pramā’; two, ‘some of these 
true cognitions belong to a type that is irreducible to any other type’; and three, ‘true 
cognitions belonging to an irreducible type are caused by a unique aggregate of causal 
conditions’.72 Mohanty notes that while knowledge in the Western tradition ‘arises from 
reason or from experience’ which, not until recently, was the point of contention 
between the ‘rationalists’ and the ‘empiricists’, in the Indian context, knowledge or ‘true 
cognition’ is negotiated through the means of varied pramāṇas which are not easily 
reducible to the distinction between reason and experience. Indian epistemology 
generally involves four basic accepted factors, which includes: (a) pramātā - the knower 
or cogniser of knowledge, (b) prameya – the knowable i.e. the object of knowledge, (c) 
pramāṇa – the chief means of knowing, and (d) pramā or pramiti – the valid knowledge 
of the subject.
73
  
According to Hiriyanna, there are three overall functions of pramāṇa that are basic to 
philosophy. Firstly, as ‘karaṇa’, the ‘source or sources of knowledge’, i.e. the means or 
‘instruments of knowing’. Secondly, as a means for ‘scrutinising, criticising and 
evaluating through the process of reasoning the knowledge derived through the 
“source/s”.’ Thirdly, as ‘pramāṇya’, the ‘measurement for the criterion of determining 
the validity of knowledge either as true or false’. Together these constitute the grounds 
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for the possibility of knowing: pramāṇavada.74 What then, are the conditions that a 
pramāṇyam has to qualify to be accepted as valid?  
In seeking to engage this question as it relates particularly to the Mīmāṃsā tradition, 
Arnold writes that there is a ‘systematic ambiguity’ in the Indian philosophical tradition 
concerning pramāṇa, with its definition ‘alternately refering to a reliable means of 
knowing, and to an episode of veridical awareness.’ He critiques the approach adopted 
by modern scholars such as Matilal and Mohanty as effectively ‘capturing the 
foundationalist tenor of the Indic discourse on ways of knowing’. For him, the former’s 
observation that ‘a pramāṇa in the Sanskrit tradition is conceived as a combination of 
evidence and causal factor’ and the latter’s ‘causal approach’ which is influenced by the 
‘later Indic tradition of the Navya-Nyāya’ are both too committed to the ‘foundationalist 
presupposition’ to see that their position is precisely what the Mīmāṃsākas sought to 
call into question. Arnold points to Śabara’s development of svataḥ prāmāṇya (which 
he translates as ‘intrinsic validity’) as the cornerstone of Mīmāṃsā epistemology. He 
suggests that prāmāṇya ‘refers to that abstract quality in virtue of which a prāmāṇa has 
whatever status it has.’75 Kataoka argues that for the Mīmāṃsā tradition, besides the 
‘epistemological’ correspondence with an object, one of the most important 
characteristics of a pramāṇa is being a source of new information.76 For him, it is 
precisely this characteristic of ‘not having a preceding element’ (apūrva) that makes 
śabda an important pramāṇa for the Mīmāṃsā. In comparison with pramāṇas such as 
perception which can only communicate an object that is perceived, the independent 
status (anapekṣatva) of a Vedic injunction allows it to be a reliable source of knowledge 
about dharma. Therefore, for Kataoka, though the notion of ‘novelty’ is understood 
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primarily from a ‘ritualistically pragmatic viewpoint’ in the Mīmāṃsā tradition, it is 
also ‘closely connected with the independence of the Veda’. 77  Śabara, in his 
commentary on sūtra 1.1.2, where he responded to a pūrvapakṣin who claims that ‘there 
are many cases where people speak falsely’, argues what is important is not the 
demonstration of absolute certainty but the ability to falsify claims that are presented. 
Śabara goes on to state that if a claim is not susceptible to any criteria of falsification, it 
is then accepted to stand as true until otherwise proven.
78
 D’Sa notes that in the 
Mīmāṃsā, every pramāṇa has to satisfy two conditions: (a) every cognition has to be 
free of doubt (asaṃśaya), and (b) it should not be contradicted (abādhita) by another 
source of knowledge.
79
 Jha also notes that both commentators of Śabara’s Bhāṣya, 
namely Kumārila and Prabhākara, are agreed on the claim that valid cognitions are 
cognitions that consist in being an apprehension, by which they mean cognitions that 
bears directly upon their object until they are contradicted otherwise through the 
illumination of the real state of things of that which is cognized.
80
 Therefore, while 
sense-perception is readily accepted by all the darśanas as a vital pramāṇa for objects 
within the visible realm, śabda as a pramāṇa is more complicated and contentious in 
that its validity and authority is solely dependent on its manner of establishing 
intelligibility and the nature of what is established. In the case of directly non-
perceptible objects, this can be taken to mean that the truth of valid cognition is 
dependent on the manner in which the cognized object and the cognizer affirm one 
another and are made intelligible. 
                                                 
77
 Ibid. 
78
 Śabarasvāmi, Śabara-bhāṣya, pp. 7-8. 
79
 FX D’Sa, ‘The Happening of Tradition: The Mīmāṃsā’s Vedapramāṇam’, in D’Sa, Mesquita & 
Oberhammer, Hermeneutics of Encounter: Essays in Honour of Gerhard Oberhammer on the Occasion 
of his 65
th
 Birthday, p. 83.  
80
 Jha, The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, pp. 19-22. 
 167 
 
Seeking to understand verbal cognition
81
 and its ‘manner’ of making a meaning or 
object intelligible necessitates a brief discussion of the tradition of Veda-transmission to 
look for insights that may help connect Jaimini’s concern for dharma and its 
actualization in practice. To understand Veda-transmission, I briefly present a 
preliminary discussion on how śabda is equated to the Veda taken as śruti, particularly 
in the context of the Mīmāṃsā. 
Śabda 
Śabda is a term that has wide currency in Indian philosophical and linguistic 
speculations and is used to mean different things in different contexts. Śabda, translated 
in the literal sense, can be taken primarily as ‘sound’ - a verbal sound that is uttered and 
heard. However as Deshpande notes, the term śabda is ‘elastic enough to range from 
individual sounds to sentential sequences and from pronounced words to the 
communicative aspects of language’. 82  Therefore, śabda as a term can denote the 
spoken word that is heard and also the written word as a token of the spoken or heard 
word. ‘Śabda’, within the study of liguistics, while often loosely translatable as ‘word’ 
or ‘language’, is more commonly understood in the wider sense of ‘speech’, which 
covers a wide range of linguistic behaviour, such as making utterances, forming 
linguistic units, constructing grammatical complexes, conveying thoughts and ideas, as 
well as linguistic items such as vākya (sentence), pāda (morpheme), sphoṭa (word-
whole), vāc (sacred word), dhvani (sound-syllable), varṇa (letter), pronouncement, 
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mystic syllables (such as Oṃ), and any speech-act. As a generic term śabda can also 
stand for the whole field of speech and language.
83
 
In Jaimini’s discussions in his Sūtras, śabda is taken in the sense of the Veda – an 
authoritative sound that is all-pervasive, infallible and everlasting but which is made up 
of an implicit sound-element that manifests itself in a more ostensive form that can be 
broken up in speech, into aggregates of sound-sequences, or letters (varṇas). Jaimini’s 
arrangement of the Veda, as I will discuss in the next chapter, is essentially injunctive in 
nature.
84
 
Śruti and Āgama 
Bilimoria mentions that one of the major source of knowledge accepted in traditional 
times, apart from the various pramāṇas, was āgama or the ‘word of tradition’, where 
‘word’ is largely identified with inherited wisdom enshrined in the scriptures that are 
traditionally revered and sanctioned. He argues that ‘tradition, whether in a culture or in 
a structure, functions as an important source of knowledge’ for determining what is 
authoritative and worth preserving from what is not. He makes it clear that it is not 
‘tradition as such that becomes a distinct source of knowledge, but rather a tradition that 
has been systematised as a result of reasoned enquiry, and which has specified a set of 
epistemological criteria’. 85  He adds that the functions of a pramāṇa such as 
examination, interpretation, and evaluation are equally brought to bear on tradition as a 
viable source of knowledge. Bilimoria states all this to make his claim that the 
‘theoretical underpinning of śabdapramāṇa - as the more precise articulation of āgama 
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or “tradition” came to be known - has its roots in the very early attempt to systematise 
and justify tradition as one but a legitimate and significant means of knowing.’86  
It is this sense of āgama as closely related to the development of śabdapramāṇa that is 
important to take into account to understand the mechanisms through which śruti, as 
revealed word, constitutes the Veda. Śruti, which is literally translated as ‘heard sound’, 
is traditionally identified as revealed sounds that embody ‘truths of ultimate value’ 
(paramārtha). These revealed sounds ‘seen’ by seers are then understood to have passed 
on as the Veda.
87
 The revelation, which is constituted by both authority and sanctity, is 
taken in the sense of possessing eternal value and whose authority is characterized as 
being apauruṣeyā i.e. without personal origin (non-human). 
Mohanty, in stressing that the ‘Indian scriptures’ have their primary ‘existence not in 
writing but in aural form’, mentions that ‘śabda, as a pramāṇa, is not a mere word, but a 
sentence, and not a written, but a spoken sentence.’88 Jha, in his discussion on the 
Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, maintains that śabda is ‘verbal cognition’ which is ‘the 
cognition of something not present before the eyes, and which is produced by the 
knowledge of words’, and he connects ‘words’ with ‘letters’ which are heard as 
‘sounds’.89 Biderman, in stressing the importance of the ‘memory’ of an ‘authoritative 
recaller’ in carrying and transmitting ‘sacred material’, claims that revelation in the 
Indian context has to be understood as ‘revelation in the form of sound, which is 
transmitted orally, through recitation.’ According to him, this process of the formation 
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of Vedic ‘scripture’ where it is transmitted from teacher to pupil introduces śabda as 
‘ontologically prior to the written text.’90 Halbfass takes this understanding of śabda as 
that which constitutes the ‘language of the Veda’ and referencing Bhartṛhari, recollects 
the claim that ‘the Veda is the “organizing principle” (vidhātṛ) of the world, that is, not 
only its “teacher” or principle of instruction (upadestṛ), but also its underlying cause 
and essence (prakṛti).’ Halbfass goes on to claim that ‘the Veda is the foundation of 
language’ and that the ‘recitation, memorization and exegesis of the Vedic texts, just as 
the corrrect usage of the Sanskrit language in general, has ritual implications.’ He also 
adds that the Veda ‘precedes or transcends the entire semantic dimension’, and claims 
that it is in this sense that the Veda is equated with ‘word’ (śabdapradhāna).91  
Taking all these together, śabda can best be understood as speech, primarily heard as or 
revealed in the form of sounds (utterances), and which thereby constitutes the language 
of the Veda, and serves as the organizing principle of the Vedic world. It is against this 
background of the verbal constitution of the Veda as authoritative testimony or 
revelation that śabda is best understood as a pramāṇa. In the context of the oral 
formation and constitution of Vedic ‘scripture’, the aspects of śabda may be broken 
down as: (a) sounds that are heard i.e. śruti; (b) sounds that are received in the form of 
lettered words, transmitted through the mechanism of teacher-pupil relationships; (c) 
lettered words whose primary concern is imperative i.e. whose artha is produced and 
validated by the knowledge of letters and sentences and not by the senses; and (d) words 
whose domain is the realm of the invisible, beyond the material. 
Once śabda is understood in this manner, the task of validating the authority of Veda 
for Jaimini entails that both the Veda as śabda and the tradition (āgama) of its 
transmission are made intelligible as being self-evident and self-sustaining respectively. 
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He proceeds by taking up a two-fold task: one, to ensure that the content of what is 
transmitted i.e. śabda endures through time, and two, to ensure that the mechanisms 
through which these transmissions are rendered possible are both justifiable, and more 
importantly for the Mīmāṃsā, repeatable.  
It is this relentless commitment to adhere to the unquestioned authority of the Veda that 
firmly locates Jaimini as a Vaidika. His creative endeavour to make the Veda intelligible 
in light of the practices of yajña makes him one of the most important proponents of the 
validity and authority of the Veda. 
Intrinsic Infallibility and the Features of Śabda  
Having claimed in sūtra 1.1.5 that śabda is the only means of understanding and 
realizing that which is invisible i.e. dharma, Jaimini developed this position in his 
engagement with the pūrvapakṣin in the subsequent sūtras where he sought to 
reconceptualize the very notion of the authority of the Veda by introducing the theme of 
infallibility. For the Veda to be infallible for Jaimini it had to be both self-evident and 
self-sustaining i.e. independent of any external source from which a fault could arise. It 
is this insistence on the vitality of intrinsic validity or independence, as evidenced in his 
discussion on the originary and authorless nature of the Veda, that I discuss below with 
an attempt to disclose how this also relates to Jaimini’s concern for the unbroken 
tradition of Vedic practice. 
Śabda as Originary 
In sūtra 1.1.5, Jaimini cites Bādarāyaṇa to claim that śabda is the only valid means of 
knowing dharma because it is independent and infallible in its authority. This 
independence, he argues, is based on the inborn or eternal (ever-present) relationship 
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between word and its intended meaning or purpose (object-referent). Instruction or 
teaching, as word or utterance that is communicated, serves as the means of knowing 
objects (or realizing meanings) that are not perceptible to the senses. He claims that 
there is an originary, primordial (autpattika) relation (sambandha) between word and 
purpose (meaning), which is not established by human convention (i.e. it is prior to the 
action of any speaker).
92
  
The opponents of Jaimini sought to bring him to task by arguing that word is the 
product of human convention and it is not eternal (the connection of the word and its 
intended meaning or object referent is not eternal) but transitory in nature. This 
particular understanding of word as a human product is presented in the following 
pūrvapakṣas from sūtras 1.1.6-11:  
1.1.6: Words are impermanent (non-eternal) because they are made [they follow after 
effort]; 
1.1.7: Because it does not persist, [because they lack stability (i.e., they quickly cease to 
exist)]; 
1.1.8: [Also] because of expressions like ‘he makes’ (karoti) [which are conjugated], 
being used in connection with words; 
1.1.9: [Also] because they are used simultaneously in diverse places [and denote 
diverse existent things]; 
1.1.10: [Also] because they have original forms and modifications (derivative forms); 
1.1.11: Further, because they multiply due to the plurality (multiplicity) of its producers 
(speakers).
93
 
According to the pūrvapakṣin, words cannot be eternal because they are the results of 
the efforts of the person using or uttering them and they can only exist when they are 
spoken, and disappear (are destroyed, cease to exist) after they are pronounced.
94
 The 
opponent also adds that words cannot be eternal because multiple speakers can produce 
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a word in different places simultaneously. The word that is produced is not the same 
word but a word that is created anew, to be destroyed after it is pronounced. This is the 
suggestion that śabda is transitory. In the last three pūrvapakṣas, the opponent argues 
against the claim that words are manifested rather than produced, by claiming that the 
forms and sound-magnitude of words are modifiable.
95
 This insistence on the transitory 
nature of words based on the argument that its production is a human convention can be 
seen as the attempt to forefront (a) the agency of the subjective individual consciousness 
as the creator and inventor of words and (b) the multiplicity of contexts (within which 
words can be invented and produced).   
This concern to account for the usage of language by any given individual at any given 
moment in time makes the pūrvapakṣin challenge what can be perceived as an 
‘objective’ or ‘generalized’ reading of language by Jaimini. How does Jaimini respond 
to this claim? Is Jaimini’s understanding of śabda a linguistic form that is always stable 
and is not changeable or adaptable? How does he understand śabda in light of this claim 
for individual production?  
In response to the claim that words are transitory because they exist only when they are 
spoken and disappear immediately after utterance, in sūtras 1.1.13-14, Jaimini stressed 
that words, as already in existence, are only made manifest or rendered perceptible 
through human utterance. He states: ‘(They do not lack stability,) but they are distant 
from near-at-hand existent objects and so do not become objects of knowledge. 
Conjugations, etc. pertain to the utterance or usage of words, not to their creation.’96 
Utterance, as making manifest, is mentioned in sūtra 1.1.14 to argue against the claim 
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that words are produced by the speaker. He contends that the role of utterance is to 
make the already existing word perceptible, not to create it.  
For Jaimini, the whole notion of the transient character of words which takes the 
moment of utterance as the moment of the creation of a (new) word is problematic 
because it forbids words from becoming and performing precisely their main role, 
which, as he mentions in sūtra 1.1.18 is to communicate. For him, utterance is not the 
production or creation of the word, but for the primary purpose of expressing the 
designation or meaning of the word; the word for Jaimini is always directed towards an 
addressee and towards meaning (object referent). In sūtra 1.1.18, he argues that ‘the 
word must be eternal as (its) utterance is for the purpose of another’97 i.e. primarily for 
the purpose of making the meaning known to another.
98
 If the words ceased as soon as 
they are uttered, no meaning could be comprehended and there would be no 
communication. For the speaker, the linguistic form exists only in the context of 
specific utterences. This is not to claim that the meaning of the word is not determined 
by its context, for even for Jaimini, the meaning of the word is understood specifically 
within the context of Vedic practice. Bakhtin, claiming that ‘any utterance is a line in a 
very complex organized chain of utterances’,99 elaborates this interrelation in his theory 
of heteroglossic utterance, albeit in a different context: 
The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in a 
socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic 
threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it 
cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue. After all, the utterance arises out 
of this dialogue as a continuation of it and as a rejoinder to it - it does not approach the object 
from the sidelines.
100
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Jaimini was not as concerned about the origin of the word as he is about the relation 
between the word and its purpose. Bilimoria remarks that while the standard practice by 
modern scholars has been to render autpattika as ‘eternal’, he highlights several related 
meanings of the term listed by Monier-Williams,
101
 and argues that autpattika as a 
construction from ‘utpattih + dhak’ can be taken to mean ‘originating or arising 
simultaneously, or without interruption’. He argues that the relation between the ‘word’ 
and its ‘meaning’ is best understood as ‘originary’, ‘in the sense that the presentment of 
the word and its meaning is simultaneous’, in that they are inseparable from one 
another; ‘The relation is sui generis, natural and with a sense of permanency about 
it’.102 He relates this sense of originary with Heidegger’s definition of origin (Ursprung) 
as ‘that from which and by which something is what it is as it is.’ Building from 
Heidegger’s point that our quest should not be for an original language, nor discursive 
primordiality but for an ontologico-existential immediacy, i.e. for the roots and basic a 
priori structure which makes discourse or speaking possible, and in which signification 
is ultimately embedded.
103
 Bilimoria contends that the autpattika principle, read as 
originary without having an origin, defines the ‘relational structure (sambandhena) that 
belongs to the very nature of śabda and artha. The emphatic stress is on the constancy 
of the relation: “śabda is never outside of or apart from the autpattika relation”.’104 
D’Sa looks at sūtra 1.1.18105 and argues that the eternal aspect of language is not for 
itself but for the sake or purpose of something else (parārtha), which according to him 
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is, ‘the sake of the historical aspect of language’.106 He elaborates that when we utter 
phonemes (varṇas) coherently, language makes itself available to us in our situatedness 
and meaning is revealed in and through the sequences of phonemes. Space and time 
ensure that only an aspect of language is manifested at a time but in a manner that when 
a word is formed by a definite phoneme-sequence a polysemous meaning emerges.
107
 
The eternal aspect of language reveals itself in the form of phonemes in a particular 
context to anyone who utters them in an appropriate sequence and this is possible due to 
the intrinsic and natural or inborn relationship (autpattikah sambandhah) of word and 
meaning (sabdārthah). A gathering together of words and their specific meanings gives 
birth to a sentence and sentence meaning and it is the sentence-meaning that has a 
specific reference to the world of sacrificial action for Jaimini. A sentence meaning has 
specific reference to our being in the world. Our being-in-the-world is not a statement 
about one’s situation nor about one’s dwelling place but it is a statement of how one’s 
being is, of how one ‘ek-sists’. The world and I are intrinsically related and it is here 
where historical language is grounded.
108
 In the same way, Jaimini also seems to 
suggest that while there is a word that is united as a single entity originally or eternally, 
that same word is not broken apart into as many separate words as there are contexts of 
its usage. It is in this sense that the word, which is taken to be indeclinable in sūtra 
1.1.16 can also be understood.
109
 
Jaimini’s point about autpattika can be seen to argue that whenever we participate by 
speaking or communicating, we are always already in śabda and this is the eternality, 
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the given aspect of śabda. Everyone speaks and communicates but no one invents 
śabda. It can only be manifested and put in motion or used the moment one begins to 
utter or speak. To begin to speak, therefore, is to assume the totality of language as that 
which precedes us and is authorizing us to speak. Language should be understood not 
only as rules that preside over the constitution of the phonological, syntactic and lexical 
or stylistic systems but also as the accumulation of things said before and their 
continuation in participation. To participate in speech is to appear in a situation where 
things have already been said before us.
110
 Therefore, both D’Sa and Clooney argue that 
for Jaimini śabda is not merely an ‘instrument’ or a ‘tool of communication’111 or a 
‘book to be read’,112 but a living dialogue that both precedes and forms its users through 
its usage. 
However, while śabda is unchangeably eternal, at the same time it has to be historically 
available and useful for the performance of sacrifice in a particular time and place.
113
 
This is the sense in which Jaimini puts forth his argument that the eternality of the Veda 
is connected with the dependence of its ‘meaning’ being realized in the performance in 
sacrifice. The Veda is ‘ahistorical’ only in the sense that it depends on the successive 
repetitions of the performers who preserve and embody it as tradition. In this sense, the 
relation between the word and its purpose remains in some cases to be realized. For 
Jaimini, the eternal nature of the Veda is important in that it allows him to establish the 
                                                 
110
 This understanding of language is very similar to the philosophy of language that Ricoeur, Voloshinov 
and Bakhtin developed in their works. See P Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, 
trans. K Blamey & JB Thompson, Continuum, London, 2008; VN Voloshinov, Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language, Seminar Press, New York, 1973; MM Bakhtin, Towards a Philosophy of the 
Act, M Holquist and V Laipunov (eds), trans. and notes V Liapunov, Texas University Press, Austin, 
1993. 
111
 FX D’Sa, ‘The Happening of Tradition: The Mīmāṃsā’s Vedapramāṇam’, in D’Sa, Mesquita & 
Oberhammer, Hermeneutics of Encounter: Essays in Honour of Gerhard Oberhammer on the Occasion 
of his 65
th
 Birthday, p. 80. 
112
 Clooney, ‘Why the Veda has no Author: Language and Ritual in Early Mīmāṃsā and Post-Modern 
Theology’, p. 660. 
113
 MS 4.2.23: Kartṛdeśakālānāmacodanaṁ prayoge nityasamavāyāt 
There is no injunction for the agent, place and time as these are necessary factors in every performance 
(essentially connected with every performance). 
 178 
actualization of dharma in a realm beyond the perceptible (visible) i.e. in the realm of 
language. More importantly, it also allows him to provide a rationale for the 
‘beginningless process of Veda-learning’,114 which is the foundation upon which the 
authorlessness of the Veda can be made intelligible. 
Veda as Authorless 
Jaimini establishes that śabda is not the production or invention of human convention 
but an ongoing given which enables the engagement and communication of humans 
from within their own context of usage. The pūrvapakṣin now shifts the discussion 
towards a challenge against the trustworthiness and efficacy of śabda for expressing the 
primary subject matter of the Sūtras i.e. dharma, particularly in light of Vedic 
injunctions. In sūtra 1.1.24, the pūrvapakṣin states: ‘Even though they [the word, its 
meaning and the relationship between the two] are eternal, they do not express the 
subject-matter (dharma) because they are not efficient for that purpose.’115  
The challenge, regarding the nature of the trustworthiness and efficacy of Vedic 
injunctions as a source for realizing dharma, brought about the question of the location 
and source of where the authority of the Veda is ultimately derived from. In sūtra 
1.1.27, the authorship of learned men or seers is made mention as a candidate: 
‘According to some people, the Vedas are the work of human authors; being as they 
were, named after men.’116 The pūrvapakṣin argues that the Veda must be composed by 
human authors because one finds various sections of the Veda named after men, such as 
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‘Kāṭhaka’ (named after Kāṭha), ‘Kālāpaka’ (named after Kālāpa) and so forth, who 
were understood to be seers.
117
 
In concluding the first pāda, Jaimini, in his response to the above pūrvapakṣa regarding 
the authorship of the Veda, briefly states in sūtra 1.1.29 the following: ‘It has been 
explained that the word is prior (to its usage by speakers)’.118 This sūtra in Śabara’s 
commentary has been interpreted to mean that ‘there is an unbroken tradition 
(continuity) of the texts among the students of the Veda’ suggesting that traditional 
wisdom is passed on orally from the old to the young through countless generations.  
The Veda is prior to, and independent in terms of composition from those who have 
taught it over the centuries.
119
 Śabara argues that the names Kāṭhaka and others are due 
to the sages being especially efficient teachers and expounders of that section of the 
Veda.
120
 The Veda has speakers (or articulators) but not authors.
121
 This assertion came 
to be known as the doctrine of apauruṣeyatva (authorlessness) of the Veda.122  Its usage 
here seem to suggest that ṛṣis, while they form part of an unbroken tradition of 
transmission, cannot claim an authorial function regarding the content of their 
transmission of the living text.  
In sūtra 1.1.30 and 1.1.31 Jaimini further mentions the presence of ‘special study’ by 
persons of different names regarded as ‘specialists’ or ‘teachers’. He also discusses that 
the names mentioned in the Veda should be taken in the sense of ‘excellent carriers’ 
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rather than as authors. ‘We have already explained that words always precede those who 
use them. The so-called authors are merely the expositors, while the temporal references 
are only apparent.’123  
In his response, Jaimini shifts the discussion concerning the question of authority from 
the theme of authorship to the mechanisms of interaction facilitating the reception and 
transmission of a traditionary practice. While the position concerning the authorlessness 
of the Veda is discussed briefly without subsequent elaborations, these concluding 
sūtras are vital in providing a window for understanding Jaimini’s concern for tradition, 
and his efforts to establish the interplay between yajña, dharma and the oral 
transmission of the Veda as an intrinsically valid and intelligible one.  
The doctrine of authorlessness of the Veda was significant for Jaimini in the following 
ways: Firstly, Jaimini’s concern and task had always been to establish the independent 
status of the Veda as a faultless source of knowledge in order to validate it as the only 
means of knowing dharma. For the Veda to be faultless, it had to be independent of any 
external source from which a fault may arise.
124
 This was important because the 
positing of an author, either human or divine, to the Veda will make it susceptible to the 
subjective intentionalities and defects of the authors, which can then reduce the validity 
of the relation between the word and its purpose (meaning) to one of interpretations 
rather than enacted validation. 
The theme of authorlessness within the general Brahmanical orthodoxy is not entirely 
new in that the notion of the seers (ṛṣis) hearing the Veda is generally accepted.  
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Clooney, however points out that some ‘logicians of the Nyāya school sought to refute 
the notion of authorlessness on the grounds that it made no sense to say that there are 
texts no one has composed’.125 Given the possibility of fallible human authors, the 
notion of God as the perfect author is presented as an option that could be 
uncontroversially taken up as the source of authority and eternal wisdom. As Biderman 
has stressed, what is crucial to emphasize for Jaimini is that the signifying capacity of 
utterances is not at the level of enunciation (the intentional communication of a self-
willed agent) but at the level of its reception. The authorlessness of the Veda makes it 
impossible to be interpreted solely by reference to the intentions of the author(s).
126
 
Jaimini’s concern is primarily not with the attempt to discover the origin of a ‘creator’ 
or to recover the intentionality of an ‘author’ at some concrete point in history but to 
find a way to ensure the continuation and transmission of tradition. 
Secondly, in order to ensure the transmission of tradition, Jaimini sought to forefront the 
orality of the Veda by positing it as a ‘living dialogue’ 127  whose authority, or 
sacredness, was one that can only be continually affirmed and activated in enactment. If 
I bring the orality of the constitution and transmission of the Veda, together with the 
understanding that while words possess inherent signifying power for Jaimini, meaning 
is not an automatic causally conditioned product of an aggregate of words, then it 
becomes evident that the way in which meaning is produced in Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā 
necessitates enactment. Biderman, in highlighting the oral tradition predominant in the 
Indian context, makes an important observation about the sacredness of the Veda:  
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In the Indian context, it is not the inability to write that has resulted in the supremacy of the oral 
form of religious texts, but the conscious choice of oral transmission as the only appropriate 
vehicle for holy utterance. The “scriptural” quality of sacredness is established within the 
relationship between persons as part of a continous tradition [emphasis mine].
128
  
The Veda is a living dialogue for Jaimini precisely because it is inseparable from his 
concern for sacrifice and this event of sacrifice can only be performed together in the 
presence and participation of the other. While it is probable to assume that the teacher, 
who has memorized the Veda by heart, is the one whose interpretation is the reliable 
guarantor of the sacred truth, it is in the matrix of the performative-relationship that 
meaning is realized. The role of the teacher is not to impose his meaning onto the text, 
but as Biderman has proposed, it is to ‘confer the status of authority’129 upon it. This 
authority then enables both the student and the pupil to submit themselves to the 
wholeness of the sacrifice within which they are both participants. The expounder and 
reciter of the Veda and the desiring sacrificial agent are brought together by the sacrifice 
where their primary role is to accomplish and fulfil the sacrifice. It is within this living 
dialogue and interaction in enactment that meanings are realized. The source of 
authority, therefore, is inherent not only in the eternality of words but also in the 
relationship between the words and their usage in student-teacher relationships within a 
specified sacrificial setting. As Clooney writes: ‘The Veda has no author, no meaning 
beyond the words and the sacrificial actions themselves…People do not invent their 
rituals, nor author their sacred texts.’130 
Therefore, any meaning that may be found in the Veda is the result of its having been 
pronounced and heard, and received in enactment. The dependence of meaning on 
enactment makes it impossible for the meaning of the Veda to be understood from its 
words alone. The source of authority is not inherent in the words alone but rather in the 
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interplay between the words and the teacher-pupil relationship that enact them. 
Therefore, the intention and authority of the Veda cannot be realized without the 
intention of hearers - the pupils, the believers - without whom the authority of the text 
cannot be established or maintained.
131
 The intelligibility of the Veda alone does not 
entail authority; it is the performance that confers it. Performances of the texts, together 
with adherence to the ritualistic injunctions and prohibitions that may be found in them, 
constitute the texts as authoritative, infallible and absolute. 
Thirdly, the performative model of validation
132
 introduced by Jaimini can also be read 
as a re-orientation of the understanding of history through the lens of an ongoing 
tradition. Jaimini, in establishing the independence and performativity of the Veda, 
sought to highlight a sense of ‘ahistoricality’ which entailed the affirmation of the 
present and enabled successive repetitions as a way of preserving and maintaining the 
continuity of tradition.
133
 This concept of authorlessness is often misunderstood as a 
denial of history,
134
 or is accused of playing a power game with the intention of reifying 
the foundational doctrines of the ‘elite’ orthodox Brahmanical ritual tradition,135 but to 
do so would be to oversimplify the concern and import of Jaimini.  
Therefore, Jaimini’s concept of authorlessness, and the discussion of utterance-as-
manifestation, is best read in light of his conception of tradition and his concern for the 
continuity of the practice of sacrifice. His fundamental insistence that the Veda is 
apauruṣeya i.e. it transcends the realm of human discourse, can be best understood in 
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terms of a ‘finitude’ and a ‘belonging-to’136 (to borrow Ricoeurian terminology) in an 
ongoing and living tradition. It is to claim that we are always limited by our historicality 
and can belong only as creative participants in an ongoing tradition. We have no role in 
its composition or its creation.  
MacIntyre and the Dialogical Constitution of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras 
The problem of rationality that I have alluded to, in light of the growing acceptance of 
cultural variations in traditions, poses a challenge over ‘whether, and to what extent’, 
one can accept ‘the tradition-bound nature of rationality’ without falling into ‘the 
relativistic thesis that no contention between competing traditions is rationally 
resolvable’. 137  MacIntyre’s proposal of a ‘tradition-dependent rationality’ has 
particularly received criticism in light of the perceived ambiguity in relation to its 
position i.e. whether it should be understood as a relativist or a universalist position. As 
Seipel points out, most critics of MacIntyre generally ‘maintain that his claims about the 
possibility of rational evaluation across traditions are irreconcilable with his conception 
of the tradition-dependent nature of rationality’. They argue that ‘his theory of the 
rationality of traditions has a tradition-independent basis, in which case his conception 
of rationality is false, or the theory is merely justified within and for the members of a 
particular tradition, and in which case it fails to refute relativism.’138 Kuna, for example 
calls MacIntyre a ‘consistent universalist’,139 and Jones points out that ‘MacIntyre’s 
formal claim about the narrative quality of human life qua human life is at odds with his 
claim about tradition/community’.140 He argues that while MacIntyre ‘wants to claim 
that epistemology is tradition-specific’, his own ‘claim…(at least in its explicit 
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formulation) is not specific to any tradition.’141 Gunnemann claims that MacIntyre is 
proposing a ‘meta-narrative’ which is seeking to encompass all other narrative traditions 
but without a systematic exposition of how this meta-narrative is integrated within his 
privileged tradition.
142
 Therefore, the question about whether MacIntyre’s proposal is 
able to provide a way forward from the dichotomy of objectivism and relativism it 
claims to go beyond continues to be a point of contention.
143
 
I would like to argue, however, that when MacIntyre’s thesis is located and read 
through the two orders of enquiry he alludes to in framing his project, one can see that 
the criticisms are misguided. While MacIntyre’s development of a first order points to 
his proposal of tradition as a form of rational enquiry, in anticipation of the question of 
cultural variations and pluralities, he goes on to problematize this proposal through a 
second-order enquiry by locating it within a wider context that assumes the plurality of 
traditions. As I discussed above, MacIntyre develops three interrelated stages in his 
account of traditionary rationality he referred to as ‘the very earliest stages in the 
development of anything worth calling a tradition of enquiry’.144 Although MacIntyre 
mentions these three stages as the ‘initial’ and ‘earliest’ stages, he also states that ‘a 
tradition which reaches this point of development will have become to greater or lesser 
degree a form of enquiry.’145 Upon drawing this aspect of his discussion to a close, 
MacIntyre proceeds to propose a new stage in the development of rationality, which 
while continuing to be internal and specific to tradition, is now discussed in the wider 
context of a plurality of traditions. He concedes that ‘at some point it may be discovered 
within some developing tradition that some of the same problems and issues - 
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recognized as the same in the light of the standards internal to this particular tradition - 
are being debated within some other tradition’ which results in the development of 
‘defined areas of agreement and disagreement’.146  According to MacIntyre, this order is 
not primarily about what is internal or specific to traditions, but it is about negotiating 
the particularity and differences between different traditions that are in contention and, 
even in conflict.
147
 
It is at this juncture that I return to Jaimini, firstly, to present the pūrvapakṣa-siddhānta 
dialectic as the second stage of tradition-constituted rationality that I have delayed till 
now, and secondly, to also argue that the dialogic manner and imagination with which 
his Mīmāṃsāsūtras was constituted challenges the very presupposition upon which the 
objectivist-relativist bifurcation debate is generally presented, that is, that the rationality 
of a tradition is necessarily relativistic. I argue that the dialogical constitution of the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras challenges this simplistic reduction of traditionary enquiry as 
necessarily a ‘relativistic’ or a ‘closed’ enquiry intelligible only for the participants of a 
specified or particular community. Jaimini’s text discloses the structures of a dialogical 
engagement and negotiation between two or more traditions that can be identified as 
dialogical hermeneutics.  
The Dialogic Constitution of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras 
The term mīmāṃsā, drawn primarily from its etymological roots, has generally been 
taken to denote a sense of discussion and deliberation over matters of doubts and 
confusion concerning ritual activities.
148
 However, the nature and form of this 
discussion and the style of engagement between competing traditions of enquiry has not 
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yet been properly theorized. Apart from general mentions that the term mīmāṃsā is a 
derivative of the Sanskrit verb ‘man’ in introductory passages,149 no work has been 
done on a sustained excavation of the concept of mīmāṁsā, particularly for the 
methodological insights that it can offer as a form of inter-tradition and intra-tradition 
engagement and dialogue.  
I have already mentioned in the first section of the third chapter that prior to the 
formulation of the Sūtras by Jaimini, discussion and debates concerning matters relating 
to sacrifice were a regular occurrence. I have also mentioned that in the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras, Jaimini himself makes reference to a number of predecessors such as 
Bādarāyaṇa, Bādarī, Atiśāyana, Kṛṣṇājini, Lāvukāyana, Kāmukāyana, Ātreya and 
Ālekhana. Keith points out that it will not be entirely wrong to assume that the Sūtras 
themselves are a redaction of the compilation of the discussions and clarifications 
amongst these hosts of seers.
150
 However, according to Verpoorten, even before these 
teachers and thinkers, occasional discussions of the Mīmāṃsā type are found in the 
Brāhmaṇas and later in the Śrauta-sūtras as well. He argues that the beginnings of the 
Mīmāṃsā and the very use of the term mīmāṃsate can therefore, be traced to the Veda 
where the term is used to denote doubts and discussions with regard to contentious 
points of doctrine and ritual.
151
 
According to Garge, it is only the Mīmāṃsā tradition that raised and discussed the 
problem of the rising differences in teachings among the various Vedic schools 
(śākhās).152 The question of differences arises particularly over the question of whether 
specific sacrifices, such as the darśapūrṇamāsa and the jyotiṣṭoma, differ from school 
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to school, or whether it is the case that regardless of the differences in name or form that 
are distinctive to each school, the sacrifices themselves are not affected by these 
variations and, are therefore, unchanged in their enactment from setting to setting.  
In allowing these differences to be highlighted and discussed, with the intention of 
developing a way forward to ensure the continuity of the practice of sacrifice, Jaimini is 
risking the possibility of being dismissed as lacking an established position. Indeed, as 
Clooney has pointed out, this was precisely the charge with which the Buddhists 
critiques the āstika traditions, particularly the Mīmāṃsā: How could truth (valid 
cognition) be found in the Vedic system if its own proponents cannot agree amongst 
themselves?
153
  
Concerning the question of the nature of sacrifices, Jaimini in sūtra 2.2.1 cites six 
means of differentiation by which one can ascertain the difference or non-difference 
among various acts (rites). Garge elaborates these differentiations with the following 
examples:
154
 
(i) Differentiation by different words: When there is a different word enjoining an Act, it 
should be treated as a different Act, because of its special equipment. There are such texts 
as: (a) one should sacrifice with Soma, (b) One should pour the libation into Fire, and (c) 
Give gold to Ātreya. Here we have three sentences containing three different verbs, 
denoting Acts. Unless there be reasons to the contrary, these three Acts must be different 
since each has its own equipment of accessories. 
(ii) Differentiation by Repetition: In a case where the same verb is used several times, the 
Repetition of one and the same word should indicate difference among Acts, - because if 
one and the same Act were meant to be enjoined, then there would be no point in repeating 
the verb a number of times. For example, - in the texts - ‘samidho yajati’, ‘tanūnapātaṁ 
yajati’, ‘iḍo yajati’, ‘barhir yajati’, ‘svāhākāraṁ yajati’…where the verb ‘yajati’ has been 
repeated five times. Hence the texts should be taken as laying down five different sacrifices. 
(iii) Differentiation by Number: The text ‘one sacrifices seventeen animals dedicated to 
Prajāpati’ - lays down seventeen distinct acts constituting one main sacrifice. 
(iv) Differentiation by Accessory details: such as the Deity, the substance (dravya) to be offered 
and so on. When a substance is prescribed to be offered to a Deity other than the one gone 
before, it becomes a differentiator of the Acts. E.g. the text ‘when curd is put into hot milk, 
the milk becomes turned into curdled solids, called ‘āmikṣā’ which is offered to Viśvedevas 
- and the liquid, the skimmed milk, is offered to the Vājins’ - is taken as laying down two 
distinct offerings. 
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(v) Differentiation by the Name: The Name - the slightest change in the Name, also 
differentiates Acts, as it occurs in the very passage enjoining that Act, e.g. the text, ‘Athaiṣa 
jyotiḥ, viśvajyotiḥ, athaiṣa sarvajyotiḥ’ - is taken as mentioning three different acts of those 
different names. 
(vi) Differentiation by Context: We have the injunction of the compulsory daily Agnihotra in the 
text ‘one should offer the Agnihotra’, and in a different section of the Veda we have another 
text enjoining the performance of the Agnihotra ‘for a month’. In this case Jaimini 
concludes that since the context is different, the purpose must be different. So the monthly 
Agnihotra laid down in the second context must be different from the daily Agnihotra laid 
down in the former text. 
While distinctions and differences as they relate to different śākhās are acknowledged, 
in sūtra 2.4.9 Jaimini defends the unity of the ritual while allowing for the many 
differences accruing in various schools over time.
155
 His conception of sacrifice as an 
event is one in which these differences are incorporated and guided towards the final 
goal of ensuring the enactment and fulfilment of the act.
156
 In so far as each sacrifice 
commits to the overall yajñārtha underlying the Vedic texts, the enactments of each 
school, although distinctive in their own styles, are taken as practices oriented towards 
the same purpose.
157
 
The attempt in this section is to propose that the constitutive structures of the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras can be taken as grounded in a form of reflection, discussion and debate 
prevalent between competing strands of intellectual traditions prior to their formulation. 
The intention is to highlight that the redacted Sūtras, in the form that is available today, 
reveal a structure of both intra-tradition and inter-tradition debates, particularly between 
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the Mīmāṃsākas and the Naiyāyikas that can be claimed as dialogic, one in which the 
‘other’ is neither imagined, invisible or diplomatically tolerated, but is actively 
presented in their own terms and through their own voice. 
As Jha highlights in detail in his translations of Jaimini’s text, each of the twelve 
adhyāyas (chapters) of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras is made up of various adhikaraṇas (topics), 
and each of these topics take up one doubtful point which is then contested through a 
series of discussions with the goal of establishing a valid conclusion. Jha notes that for 
every adhikaraṇa, there is the following: (1) viṣayavākya, a Vedic sentence, which is 
followed by (2) a saṁśaya, doubt as to its correct meaning, which is then followed by 
(3) a pūrvapakṣa which is the prima facie view put forward, after which is presented (4) 
an uttarapakṣa or clarifying refutation, which then finally results in (5) the siddhānta, 
the final or conclusive view. These are also known as the five limbs of every 
adhikaraṇa. 158  For topics that are particularly complex and need longer and more 
elaborated discussions, most of these points, particularly points three to five as above, 
are repeated as often as necessary. 
For every adhikāra, the pūrvapaksa is usually the first position that is put forth, which 
is the view of the opponent. In much of the discussions in the Sūtras, the pūrvapakṣa is 
usually presented first, though there are a few instances where the pūrvapakṣa follows 
an initial statement of the siddhānta. The siddhānta is the finally accepted view that is 
presented after a thorough engagement with the pūrvapakṣa position. As Clooney notes, 
Jaimini’s text is almost entirely constituted by this debate and discussion between the 
pūrvapakṣin and the siddhāntin, with Śabara’s Bhāṣya serving to provide additional 
back-and-forth arguments and elaboration of the context in more details.
159
 To borrow 
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MacIntyre’s phrase, the nature of dialogue in Jaimini’s text and its conclusion is ‘…no 
more than, the best answer reached so far.’160 
There are four crucial points one may derive from this pūrvapakṣa-siddhānta dialectic 
in our attempt to excavate a style of dialogical engagement: First, both the pūrvapakṣin 
and the siddhāntin are participants in a shared discourse where the preliminary 
knowledge about a topic or a theme are presented and contested together. Second, while 
the pūrvapakṣa position is gradually rejected over a course or stages of discussions, the 
preliminary rejections give birth to new stages of disagreements that enhance and enrich 
the understanding of the topic itself. Third, the siddhāntin comes to a conclusion not 
only after hearing the pūrvapakṣin’s position and engaging with his disagreements but 
often after accepting and incorporating most of the pūrvapakṣin’s more salient points. 
The siddhānta, therefore, is not an imposition of an already set viewpoint but a 
negotiated conclusion. Fourth, the goal of the discussion or debate is not always the 
achievement of consensus, but more importantly the clarification of difference, which at 
the same time, opens a window for further engagement. It is this clarification and 
respect of differences between contending and dialoguing traditions that was pointed 
out by Clayton as the hallmark of the vāda-tradition prevalent throughout the course of 
the Vedic period.
161
 Therefore, the contextual milieu within which the Mīmāṃsāsūtras 
were formulated as a text was a place of a hermeneutic encounter between competing 
traditions of enquiry where the nuances of that encounter form the very constitution of 
the text itself.  
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Intelligibility, Tradition and Enquiry  
Jaimini’s position on the infallibility of the Veda based on its characteristics of being 
both autpattika and apauruseyā can be taken as the attempt to elaborate a precautionary 
strategy to ensure the continuation of the practice of Vedic sacrifice. According to Taber 
and Arnold, Jaimini’s formulation of this position, and the ways in which Śabara and 
later Mīmāṃsākas in the course of the development of the Mīmāṃsā tradition 
developed it, can be read as an important ‘formulation of a sophisticated critique of 
foundationalism’. Taber and Arnold, in their respective essays on svataḥ prāmāṇya, 
claim that this doctrine is a relevant ‘philosophical insight,’ which can be read ‘as a 
compelling critique of foundationalist epistemologies’.162  Arnold points out that the 
insights on this doctrine can be read as ‘an important Mīmāṃsā contribution to a 
discussion in which foundationalist options (those of the Naiyāyikas, and particularly 
those of Indian Buddhists in the tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) 
predominated’.163 Athough he carefully mentions that he does not fully subscribe to the 
Mīmāṃsā position, he sees it as a relevant insight which can contribute to 
‘contemporary Western discussions in the philosophy of religion’.164 Summing up what 
came to be characterized as the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of svataḥ prāmāṇya, Pollock writes:  
First – this is where we encounter the essential a priori of Mīmāṃsā – dharma is stipulatively 
defined, or rather posited without argument, as a transcendent entity, and so is unknowable by 
any form of knowledge not itself transcendent. Second – and this is the basic epistemological 
position of Mīmāṃsā – all cognitions must be accepted as true unless and until they are falsified 
by other cognitions. The first principle eliminates as sources of knowledge of dharma perception 
and any cognitive act based on perception (verbal communication, inference, and the like). The 
commitment to falsifiability (without Popper’s corollary that what is not falsifiable cannot be 
counted as true) renders the truth claims of a transcendent source of knowledge – revelation – 
inviolable.
165
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As I have pointed out in the previous section, even as Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā is dialogically 
constituted out of their direct engagement and negotiation amongst themselves and with 
the Naiyāyikas, his project, which was elaborated by Śabara and the following 
commentators, was also partly motivated by the threat of the rise of Buddhist thought 
and their criticism on the orthodoxy of the Mīmāṃsā.166 Concerning the question of 
validity (prāmāṇya), Vaidyanātha Śāstri (c. 17th CE) laid out four different positions 
held by different schools of thought:  
The Sāṁkhyas say it is ascertained that the validity and invalidity of awareness is intrinsic; the 
Logicians (i.e., Naiyāyikas) say that both (validity and invalidity) are (determined) by cause, 
quality, deficiency, and so forth (i.e. are determined extrinsically); the Buddhists say (there is) 
intrinsic-ness of invalidity, and external-dependence of validity; but the Mīmāṃsākas say (that) 
validity is intrinsic, and invalidity is dependent.
167
 
Clooney claims that Jaimini’s discussion and affirmation of action in his Sūtras is much 
closer to Buddhist thought than it is to Upaniṣadic thought.168 However, on the question 
of prāmāṇya, it is with Buddhist thought that they had the most conflicting position. As 
can be seen from the view attributed to the Buddhist in the quote presented above, 
validity for them was established by prāmāṇas such as perception (pratyakṣa) and the 
like and anything else is necessarily taken as erroneous. According to them, perception 
is the only prāmāṇa with which the ‘undistorted knowledge of the world’ can be 
known. While the Mīmāṃsākas maintain the position that one is prima facie justified in 
taking as valid any prāmāṇa that can provide ‘intelligible conception’, the Buddhists 
posit that until one can eliminate the distortion that comes from the activity of thinking 
and conceptualizing, one should maintain the assumption that all beliefs prior to that 
realization are false. Arnold argues that it is this position, of qualifying ‘a valid instance 
of awareness (jñāna)’ as such by its simply ‘being coherent (lack of ambiguity) or 
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determinate (niścita), as opposed to “essentially ambiguous” (saṃśayātmaka)’ which 
allows critics to question whether the Mīmāṃsākas can really talk about ‘truth’.169 In 
engaging this criticism one can begin to see, as Taber and Arnold suggest, the Mīmāṃsā 
critique of the foundationalist project, particularly the one proposed by the Naiyāyikas. 
For Śabara, the task of enquiry is not to attempt foundationalist demonstrations of once-
and-for-all certainty which, as Kumārila points out, only leads to infinite regress but 
rather to consider and maintain as justified all beliefs that have not been falsified. In his 
Ślokavārttika, where Kumārila develops the doctrine of intrinsic validity more 
comprehensively than any other Mīmāṃsākas, he discusses the criticism that the 
character of validity (prāmāṇya) is not applicable to Vedic injunctions, by claiming that 
infinite regress would follow if one were to take the criteria (pramāṇa) as also requiring 
the criteria of validity. He states: ‘The validity of all valid criteria must be intrinsic, for 
a validity that is not intrinsic cannot be produced by anything else.’170 
Arnold highlights that ‘the Mīmāṃsākas experienced Buddhist epistemologists as 
representing a serious challenge to the worthiness of their enterprise’. Later 
commentators such as Kumārila were particularly preoccupied with responding to the 
arguments laid out by the Buddhist Diṅnāga. 171  While the nature of engagement 
between these traditions of thought is not always explicit in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, the 
Buddhist, Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsākas are understood to be close interlocutors of 
one another. The Mīmāṃsā is taken to represent one of the voices that constitute these 
inter-traditionary conversations which eventually led to the development and growth of 
various schools that took up the task of defending, negotiating and reworking their 
positions in light of the criticisms from other thinkers and schools.   
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For Jaimini, pramāṇas and knowledge (jñāna) are considered to be valid only in 
relation to their pragmatic efficacy. This is primarily because his concern is guided by a 
quest to find the means that most effectively usher in the understanding and realization 
of dharma. As alluded to by Arnold towards the end of his essay and as I have 
elaborated previously in the sections above, the Veda is authoritative, as far as the 
Mīmāṃsākas are concerned, because its appropriation and affirmation of ‘sacredness’ in 
enactment where the text is received in enjoinment and embodiment is ‘a socially 
validated practice’. 172  ‘This is what has always been done’, as far as anyone can 
remember, and continuing and maintaining that practice is their initiation and 
submission into tradition as historical beings who desire to responsibly carry that 
traditionary practice forward.
173
 
In the early nineties, Clayton, writing on the philosophy of religion, had discussed the 
importance of the Indian vāda tradition as a model of dialogical enquiry in a pluralist 
context. Clayton observes that in opposition to Jefferson’s Enlightenment ideals and his 
views on the study of religion ‘with its basis in universal reason’, 174  in the vāda 
tradition ‘religious claims are made and contested in a variety of contexts’.175 He lists 
three different contexts: intra-traditional, inter-religious and extra-religious contexts.
176
 
While Clayton’s intra-traditional context resonates with the pūrvapakṣa-siddhānta form 
of dialogical enquiry I have discussed above, the challenge of dealing with two or more 
traditions falling under dialogical hermeneutics can also be seen to resonate with 
Mīmāṃsā’s engagement with both the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas. One can see clear 
resemblances between the vāda tradition and the dialogical form of engagement adopted 
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by the Mīmāṃsākas in their efforts to clarify their differences as well as hold on to the 
integrity of their traditionary practice.  
In light of the second concern of this thesis, I presented an example of the intelligibility 
of traditionary practice to argue that the study of ritual must be taken not just as ‘the 
social scientific study’ of ritual but as an enquiry that can offer ‘legitimacy to traditions’ 
self-enquiry, albeit ‘within a framework of rational discourse’. This argument for the 
legitimacy of the self-enquiries of traditions such as the Mīmāṃsā is developed to 
highlight the possibility of rethinking ritual studies as a field of enquiry that can 
accommodate and accord ‘hospitality to traditions and their self-representations’177 and 
that can take into account the internal rationalities that shape such practices that are 
identified here as ‘rituals’. However, the claim for the need to recognize the legitimacy 
of self-representation of tradition as can be found in Jaimini’s enquiry is not proposed to 
simply suggest an uncritical hospitality where the study of ritual is thrown open to the 
relativistic tendencies of differing traditionary particularities without seeing windows of 
communicability together. What is proposed is not the conglomeration of a plurality of 
theologies studied for their own sake which are unable to offer insights to one another. 
The commitment to claiming the legitimacy of traditions’ self-understanding and self-
representation is to accept a historicism that traditions, in the hermeneutical sense, are 
not static but changing through time. Traditions are in the process of continuously 
reinventing their rationalities in new settings and contexts, and are seeking to 
continually provide a defence of their intelligibility in light of new ‘external critique’.  
Therefore, this thesis is sympathetic to the self-descriptions and conceptions of varied 
traditions, and presents the Mīmāṃsā tradition as but one important example of a living 
tradition sustained with its own internal rationality. However, it does not present it 
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without opening it to the possibility of critique from other perspectives, such as the 
‘text-historical’ or socio-political perspectives. While the suggestion for the study of 
ritual is ‘deeply sympathetic to tradition-internal concerns’, it is a suggestion that seeks 
to propose a dialogical model in that it allows ritual studies to ‘offer corrective readings 
to traditions’ and vice-versa. 178  It is in this sense that originary texts such as the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras are argued to be relevant for our contemporary world, where forgotten 
traditionary meanings and insights are recalled and reinvigorated in a renewed form to 
guide our interrogations and understandings of contemporary contentions today. Ritual 
studies can establish itself as a field of enquiry that promotes the self-representation of 
traditions’ rationalities or theologies ‘alongside [the] social scientific, hermeneutical, 
historical and philological accounts’.179 In the dialogical relationship and engagement 
between a traditions’ internal rationality and its formal investigation, a fresh perspective 
may be imagined anew. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I focussed primarily on Jaimini’s epistemology in light of the problem of 
rationality and the study of ritual. Discussing the nature of reductionist enquiry that an 
unchallenged notion of universal rationality, uncritically borrowed from the natural 
sciences, engenders, I discussed the invention and study of ritual as closely related to 
contentions about rationalities that informs enquiry in the social sciences. I then 
introduced Jaimini to argue that while he does not explicitly articulate a concept of 
traditionary rationality, his insistence on the intelligibility of the Vedic practice of 
sacrifice through a re-formulation of the authority of the Veda as intrinsically infallible 
disclosed structures akin to a ‘tradition-internal reasoning’ or a rationality of tradition.  
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I then argued that Jaimini’s demonstration of the authority of the Veda is significant not 
only in disclosing the mechanisms that constitute the unbroken tradition of Vedic 
practice but also for presenting a form of tradition-constituted rationality which 
challenges the universalist-relativist presuppositions upon which the contentions 
concerning rationalities are often premised. This opens the pathway for a dialogical 
approach whose form of enquiry is able to accommodate discussions that concern 
tradition-internal reasoning and tradition-constituted subjectivities. 
Following the introduction of the desiring subject in Chapter Three and the excavation 
of the internal rationality of tradition in this chapter, in the next chapter I will discuss 
the nature of Vedic practice and the agency of the ritual subject in light of the 
problematic ways in which both ‘action’ and ‘ritual’ have often been theorized and 
understood. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: REALIZATION OF DHARMA 
KARMAN, CODANĀ AND ANSWERABILITY 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Three, I discussed the mode of desire of the Mīmāmsā subject as the medium 
through which the invisible telos of dharma is pursued and in Chapter Four, I discussed 
the infallible Veda which enjoins responsible enactment as the only means of accessing 
dharma. Building on these preceding discussions, in this chapter I will discuss Jaimini’s 
elaboration of the nature of Vedic practice (yajñakarma) and its relationship with the 
realization of dharma primarily by looking at the event of yajña through the lens of the 
‘enjoinment’ and ‘answerability’ of the yajamāna (sacrificial agent). I argue that this 
elaboration showcases both the textuality of Vedic practice and the agency of the 
enjoined subject which points towards the conceptualization of dharma as a narratively-
structured traditionary practice. This conception of traditionary practice will contribute 
to the discussion on the articulation of ritual which, in its contemporary study, is deeply 
influenced by the larger theory-action dichotomy that pervades the enquiries in the 
human sciences. This has often resulted in the reduction of ritual to an empty action 
characterized by imitation-governed formality and non-intentionality. 
The previous two chapters focussed on excavating the relationship between subjectivity, 
text and tradition in the discussion on Jaimini’s enquiry into dharma. In this chapter I 
will outline the internal structure of Jaimini’s institution of yajña by bringing the themes 
of karman, codanā and yajamāna conceptually together. I will seek to claim that these 
themes constitute the heart of his discussion on the realization of the fullness of dharma 
in sacrifice. The discussion of the interrelation between these three themes will also 
enable me to pursue the theme of enjoinment and answerability of the subject, which, I 
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will argue, is the foundation upon which the intelligibility of the unbroken tradition for 
Jaimini is ultimately constituted. It is the enjoined subject who holds the unique 
particularity and answerability of the sacrifice together and upon whom the fulfilment of 
the sacrifice is ultimately contingent.  
I will begin this chapter by discussing the question of praxis and the theory-action 
dichotomy as genealogically traced by both Sloterdijk and Tull for the Western 
intellectual tradition and the Vedic tradition respectively. I will highlight that both their 
accounts, while drawn from completely different contexts, share a conceptual similarity 
in that they both suggest the need to retrieve a conception of practice akin to a 
traditionary practice. I will follow this brief sketch by introducing Bakhtin’s notion of 
‘answerability’ and his discussion on the ‘integrity’ of the ‘act’ and use that as the lens 
through which the traditionary practice of sacrifice is accounted for and the tradition-
specific subjectivity that it entails given more prominence. This will be followed by a 
discussion on the eventness and textuality of Vedic sacrifice where the enjoinment of 
the subject is discussed through the theme of answerable enactment. The discussion will 
conclude with an elaboration on Jaimini’s ritualistic conception of dharma followed by 
a discussion on the articulation of ritual and the insights that Jaimini’s notion of dharma 
and traditionary practice offers towards its understanding.  
THE QUESTION CONCERNING PRAXIS 
The last century is described to have made the ‘linguistic turn’ wherein consciousness 
or experience is understood to have always already been mediated by language.
1
 This 
century is taken by some scholars to be making a similar turn to ‘practice’ i.e. the 
contention that practice or action can be seen as fundamental for understanding the 
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human condition and disclosing the complexity and mystery of our world.
2
 While this 
turn to practice is seen as opening up new vistas for understanding,
3
 it has also served to 
revive the dichotomy that has plagued modern thought and life - the dichotomy between 
what is more generally known as ‘action’ and ‘theory’. The ambiguous nature of what 
we consider ‘action’ and its relationship with ‘theory’ as a separate category continues 
to be a point of contention and confusion. Bernstein reminds us that these categories are 
not just ‘artificial distinctions introduced by philosophers’ but are concerns that 
‘pervade and shape’ our daily lives.4 Sloterdijk effectively maps this distinction out as a 
central problem in the humanities, originating particularly within the Western 
intellectual tradition. 
Seeking to explicate the conditions that created the bios theoretikos or the theoretical 
life in the West, Sloterdijk, in his book The Art of Philosophy, traces the problem of the 
relationship between theory and polis by looking at the origins of the theoretical person 
among the Greeks of the classical and post-classical age. He argues that ‘theory’ as a 
distinct category was developed primarily as a consequence of an estrangement from the 
polis. Sloterdijk begins his argument by going back to the founding of Plato’s academy 
in 387 BC, outside the city gates of Athens, at a time when life in the Athenian polis 
was facing a difficult period, particularly with the trial of Socrates, the Rule of the 
Thirty, and also the thirty years war against Sparta. Sloterdijk argues that it was against 
this background of the end of the ‘polis culture’ and as ‘a reaction to the collapse of the 
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Athenian polis model’ that Plato founded his Academy, with the conviction that 
‘politics, as a shared concern for the community, had ceased to be the highest need for 
the intellect.’5 Democracy had failed and academia qua ars moriendi was born. It is here 
that Sloterdijk traces the transformation of the active citizen into a contemplative 
cosmopolitan with a strong dissociative propensity. He argues that the philosophy 
which orginated in the aftermath of this period in Greek history ‘is a child of defeat that 
simultaneously compensates for this defeat by ingeniously attacking it as the best form 
of defense’. This gave rise to ‘the idea that the thinking person has to be a kind of dead 
person on holiday’. He therefore, is a dispassionate theoretical person who takes the 
position of a ‘superior’ ‘spectator’ and whose ‘life of observation’ as ‘citizens of the 
universe’ is founded on the ‘exile ability’ of their soul and their epoché from the local 
affairs of the polis.
6
 Sloterdijk claims that ‘there is a connection to be made between an 
important aspect of the production of persons fit for epoché and the original institutions 
for educating boys.’7 
Sloterdijk’s deconstruction of the theoretical person is significant in that it highlights 
the limitations of a philosophy that champions the modalities of contemplation (homo 
theoreticus, bios thoretikos) right from the founding of the Western intellectual tradition 
until the contemporary period. Sloterdijk points out that this privileging and 
championing of the theoretical served to push the category of human practice aside. 
Claiming that his concern is to ‘restore the high status of practice’ in his You Must 
Change Your Life, he comprehensively develops how the traditional approach of 
classifying human action through the distinction between the vita activa and vita 
contemplativa served to make the dimension of practice as such invisible, if not actually 
inconceivable. He argues that the acceptance of this distinction as total and exclusive 
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makes us lose sight of a substantial complex of human behaviour that is neither merely 
active nor merely contemplative. It is this ‘complex of human behaviour’ that he 
discusses as ‘the life of practice’.8 
While Sloterdijk maps this distinction as a problem originating particularly within 
Western intellectual tradition, the distinction between theory and action, or knowledge 
and action, is a general concern that has also been a long-debated issue in the Indic 
tradition, particularly in discussions concerning the nature of relationship between the 
Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and the Uttara-mīmāṃsā tradition. As I have mentioned in the second 
chapter, it is also an issue that concerns the understanding and study of the category 
‘ritual’. 
MĪMĀṂSĀ AND THE KNOWLEDGE-ACTION POLEMIC 
The nature of the relationship between the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā and the Uttara-mīmāṁsā has 
been a long-standing contention, particularly amongst a number of Vedānta schools.9 As 
Pollock has remarked, the problematic relationship between the two is ‘embodied in the 
very nomenclature that links them, in the differentiation itself of a “posterior” from a 
“prior” darśana.’ 10  On the one hand, there are those who claim that there are no 
justifications for separating the two forms of enquiry. For instance, Jha claims that ‘as 
regards the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta, there has never been any justification for 
regarding them as two distinct ‘systems of Philosophy’. They have always been and 
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continue to be known as ‘Pūrva’ (Preliminary) Mīmāṃsā and ‘Uttara’ (Final) 
Mīmāṃsā.11 He further states: 
We are alive to the fact that later on differences cropped up between the two ‘Mīmāṃsās’; but 
they always appertained to minor details; on the main issues, there has not arisen any serious 
controversy. Vedānta proper finds its ultimate sanction in the Vedic texts; in fact for all practical 
purposes, the Vedānta accepts the tenets of the Mīmāṃsā, hence the statement by the Vedāntin – 
‘Vyavahāré Bhaṭṭanayaḥ’.12  
The interdependence and interrelation of the two Mīmāṃsās is indeed indicated by the 
fact that one of the main purposes of both the Mīmāṃsās was to defend the Vaidika 
notion of dharma from the criticisms of other schools such as the Buddhists. Both 
systems also firmly presuppose the authority of the Veda and engage a number of 
similar principles in their exegesis of the Vedic corpuses. However, controversies did 
arise later, particularly in light of the growing popularity of the notion that the 
attainment of jñāna (right knowledge) is the path to final liberation.13 According to 
Pandurangi, it was Śaṅkarā’s demarcation of areas concerning the two Mīmāṃsās that 
was particularly significant. According to Śaṅkarā: (a) the object of enquiry for the 
Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and for the Vedānta is completely different in that ‘dharma’ and 
‘brahman’ constitute the primary objects of their enquiries respectively. For Śaṅkarā, 
‘these are not even related as main and subordinate’ objects (goals) ‘so as to warrant a 
consideration of one after the other’ but they are exclusively opposed to one another; (b) 
the fruits of the two enquiries are different in that dharma is meant for fulfilment 
‘within the field of avidyā while brahmajñāna is intended to cross over avidyā’; and (c) 
‘the nature of dharma is such that it has to be performed, while that of brahman is to be 
realized’ through knowledge. 14  Pandurangi adds that most scholars have often 
uncritically taken ‘Śaṅkarā’s polemic against certain Mīmāṃsākas as a basis for 
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ignoring the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā as a ritualistic precursor to the wisdom and thought of the 
Uttarā Mīmāṃsā’.15 Therefore, there are scholars who generally assume that the two 
Mīmāṃsās are radically incommensurable. This assumption is affirmed to a large extent 
by Western scholars of Vedānta such as Deussen and Hacker who claim that the 
Vedānta has very little in common with what was often known as the Karma-Mīmāṃsā 
i.e. the Mīmāṃsā that deals specifically with action.16  
In modern scholarship the general term commonly used for Pūrva-mīmāṃsā is 
Mīmāṃsā as opposed to Vedānta for Uttara-mīmāṃsā, with the former taken to focus 
its enquiry exclusively on karma and the latter on jñāna.17 This distinction between 
karma and jñāna not only created a polemic between Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta but also 
led to the re-interpretation of karma, especially by the nineteenth century Indologists, as 
an Upaniṣadic ‘doctrine’ which is seen in opposition to the ‘priestly rubbish’ of the 
Brāhmaṇas. Henceforth, even those who treat the subject of action and knowledge as 
interrelated treat it as geared towards the telos of liberation.
18
 
Karman and the Upaniṣads 
I have suggested in Chapter Three that early Vedic society revolved around religious 
insights that came by way of revelation (śruti) and presupposed a ritual context. Talbott 
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stressed that ‘at the heart of all Vedic literature lies the matter of ritual thought’ and 
argues that ‘in the early texts everything religious was a matter of acting’. Karma(n), 
which etymologically translates as ‘to do, to make’, in Vedic texts predominantly 
denotes a religious sacrifice. Yajña was, therefore, considered to be the heart of the 
Veda and karman was taken to be the most distinctively significant feature of Indian 
thought about action.
19
 According to Tull, this emphasis upon the sacred act in Vedic 
religion shows up in the Sanskrit word karman which initially denoted ritual activity: 
‘At the most basic level, the Vedic tradition employed the term karman, from the 
Sanskrit root kṛ (to do), to describe the “doing” of the sacrificial ritual.’20  
However, Tull further notes that with the gradual development and transformation of 
the Vedic yajña from a ‘matter of simple action’ to ‘an entity of astounding complexity’ 
over the centuries, the ‘doing of the sacrifice’ became slowly disaffiliated from the 
emerging ‘doctrine’ of karma and retribution.21 The notion of karma came to be closely 
related with the idea of rebirth (attainments of the afterlife) and this emerging doctrine 
continued to be reflected in Indological scholarship to the extent that the twelve essays 
compiled in the edited book entitled Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions 
gathered a general consensus that the definition of karma was founded upon ‘a theory of 
rebirth based on the moral quality of previous lives’. The theory of karma came to be 
constituted by three essential constituents which include: (a) ‘causality (ethical or non-
ethical, involving one life or several lives)’; (b) ‘ethicization (the belief that good and 
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bad acts lead to certain results in one life or several lives)’; (c) ‘rebirth’ and liberation. 
Yajña was not even included in the index of the book.
22
  
Observing that the textual point of this emergence of karma as a ‘doctrine’ specifically 
concerned with the idea of rebirth is generally taken to be the early Upaniṣads, Tull 
sought to uncover the ‘Vedic origins’23 of karma ‘to see where scholarship made a 
wrong turn and so obfuscated karma’s early history.’24 Tull attributes the problem of 
ascertaining karma doctrine’s pre-Upaniṣadic history particularly to the view held by 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century Indologists regarding the relationship of the 
Upaniṣads to the preceding Brāhmaṇic period, ‘namely that the Upaniṣads rejected 
entirely the viewpoints expressed in the Brāhmaṇas and so expressed views 
unprecedented in ancient Indian thought’.25 Tull claims that ‘these scholars remained 
curiously silent about the doctrine’s attachment here to the paradigmatic event of the 
Vedic ritual’.26 He argues that this perspective arises from ‘a larger tendency among 
these scholars to disparage priestcraft’. This Enlightenment-influenced perspective 
resulted in their categorization of ‘the Brāhmaṇas, ritual texts par excellence and the 
exclusive possession of the Vedic sacerdotalists’, as distinctly separate from ‘the 
Upaniṣads, discursive texts that seek to express the nature of reality’. Consequently, 
karma was seen as a doctrine that was first elaborated in the Upaniṣads and addressed 
‘issues not germane to the Vedic ritual tradition’.27  
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structures, patterns, and paradigms already contained in both ideology and practice in Vedic rite’. Tull, 
The Vedic Origins of Karma: Cosmos as Man in Ancient Indian Myth and Ritual, p. 7. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid., p. 2.  
27
 Ibid., p. 3. 
 208 
According to Tull, there was a marked tendency in these scholars’ interpretations to 
emphasize that the Upaniṣadic karma doctrine was characterized by concerns about 
ethical behaviours and their consequences. The supposed range of the Upaniṣadic karma 
doctrine’s ethical concern contrasts sharply with the sphere of Brāhmaṇic ethics, which 
values behaviour in terms of ritual performance. Yet, rather than turn to the Brāhmaṇas’ 
ritual orientation, scholars preferred to interpret this doctrine through imposing upon it a 
broad notion of ethics. He argues that as a result, ‘scholars often failed to acknowledge 
or simply ignored that the Upaniṣadic contexts in which the doctrine first appears 
exhibit themes clearly drawn from the Brāhmaṇas’.28 
Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads and Classical Indology 
Müller, in the 1860s, more than a decade before critical editions of a significant number 
of Brāhmaṇas became available to scholars in the West, declared that the ‘general 
character of these works is marked by shallow and insipid grandiloquence, by priestly 
conceit, and antiquarian pedantry.’ He goes on to remark that ‘no person who is not 
acquainted beforehand with the place which the Brāhmaṇas fill in the history of the 
Indian corpus, could read more than ten pages without being disgusted.’29 From the 
mid-nineteenth century to the first decades of the twentieth century, Indologists 
repeatedly expressed similar sentiments. In the early history of Vedic studies, even 
before the range of the Vedic literature had been thoroughly collected and investigated, 
Schopenhauer expressed that ‘the Upaniṣads were the only portion of the Veda which 
deserved our study and that all the rest was priestly rubbish (Priesterwirtschaft).’30 
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According to Tull, when scholars did turn their attention to the study of the early Vedic 
texts, they found this preconceived notion of ‘priestly rubbish’ disproved by the tenor of 
the earliest of these texts, the Ṛgveda. Noting the Ṛgveda as a case of Vedic religion 
before the rise of Indian sacerdotalism, the history of Hinduism following the Ṛgvedic 
period was then seen as a period of complete degeneration, until the emergence of the 
Upaniṣads. According to von Roth and other nineteenth century Indologists, the initial 
stages of this decline occurred within the Vedic period itself, being clearly visible in the 
texts that immediately followed the hymns, the Brāhmaṇas. As von Roth noted: ‘[India] 
has, indeed, carefully treasured up and at all times regarded as sacred, the production of 
its earliest period [i.e., the Ṛgveda]; but it has attached the main importance to a 
worthless supplement [i.e., the Brāhmaṇas], and lost from sight and from knowledge the 
truly valuable portion.’31  
Although the composition of the Upaniṣads followed immediately that of the 
Brāhmaṇas, scholars tended to posit a line of development that aligned Upaniṣadic 
thought with that of the Ṛgveda, a milieu they perceived to be in opposition to the 
intervening Brāhmaṇic period. This position, according to Tull, is most evident in the 
view scholars took of the Upaniṣadic doctrine of karma and rebirth, particularly in 
regard to the doctrine’s problematic origin. The notion that the Upaniṣadic karma 
doctrine emerged together with the intent of much earlier Ṛgvedic beliefs while it 
opposed that of the Brāhmaṇas was partly due to what scholars perceived to be a 
general pattern in the ‘evolution’ of a religious tradition. Referring to such an 
evolutionary model, Whitney noted that the later introduction of the doctrine ‘is equally 
in accordance with the general course of religious history; it is a part of the prevailing 
shift from the basis of nature to that of morality.’ In the case of the karma doctrine, this 
                                                 
31
 RV Roth, ‘On the Morality of the Veda’, trans. WD Whitney, Journal of the American Oriental 
Society, vol. 3, 1853, p. 346. 
 210 
pattern of evolution was given impetus by what was perceived to be the degenerate state 
of the religion of the Brāhmaṇas. This shift to morality found in the Upaniṣadic doctrine 
was interpreted as being ‘anti-sacrificial’, to oppose the ‘corrupt’ sacerdotalism 
systematically promoted in the Brāhmaṇas.32  
For Tull, this tendency to separate the Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads from the Brāhmaṇas, 
and to place them in opposition, may be attributed to the general view that nineteenth 
century Indologists held of the role of priestcraft in the decline of a religious tradition.
33
 
The Brāhmaṇas, which were compiled over several centuries, record the growth of the 
sacrificial ritual and its subsequent dominance in ancient Indian religion. The growth of 
the sacrifice (in both complexity and stature) during this period naturally coincided with 
the growth of a specialized sacerdotal class. In the view of many nineteenth century 
Indologists, the religion of the early Veda became devitalized in the hands of these 
sacerdotalists.
34
  
Every aspect of the Brahmaṇic ritual was interpreted in light of this supposed 
‘debauchery’. Scholars also asserted that the priests maintained their interest in the 
sacrifice because it provided them with a pretence to sanctity and thus, an exalted 
position in society.
35
 Nineteenth century scholars, with their deprecatory view of 
sacerdotalism, had little patience for the intricacies of Brāhmaṇic thought. Bloomfield, 
for example, remarked of the Brāhmaṇas that: ‘Both the performances and their 
explanations are treated in such a way, and spun out to such lengths, as to render these 
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works on the whole monuments of tediousness and intrinsic stupidity.’ 36  Hence, 
scholars agreed that these texts did not merit even the most cursory examination.   
These same preconceived notions about sacrificial ritual hamper any serious discussions 
about the Mīmāṃsā contributions to ritual today. Clooney claims that the lack of 
attention given to the Mīmāṃsā is a consequence of a general back-reading of the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras through a Vedāntic lens. He mentions that ‘as a school of philosophy, 
the attention given to the Mīmāṃsā has often been filtered through Vedānta’s 
evaluation of ritual action, [and] in particular Śaṅkara’s bifurcation of knowledge and 
ritual’ and this caricature ‘confuses performance of rituals with the Mīmāṃsā 
explanation of why rituals are performed’. They are therefore, taken to be a lower 
‘work-oriented foil to the higher path of knowledge’.37 Müller made the claim that ‘the 
object of the Upanishads was to show the utter uselessness, nay the mischievousness of 
all ritual performances; to condemn every sacrificial act which has for its motive a 
desire or hope or reward.’38  Mīmāṃsā darśana is also generally referred to as the 
Karma-Mīmāṃsā to suggest that it is a purely ritualistic and action oriented darśana 
that is yet to reach the true path to salvation, that is the path of correct knowledge 
(jñāna).39 
While notions of ‘action’ and ‘knowledge’ differ in many ways in the Western and 
Indian intellectual traditions, the genealogy of the bifurcation between action and 
knowledge highlighted in the Greek and Indian [Vedic] tradition respectively by both 
Sloterdijk and Tull point towards a similar concern for the retrieval of a conception of 
what can best be described as a traditionary practice. They both suggest the existence of 
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a notion of praxis or karman that not only precedes this bifurcation but more 
importantly is oriented towards the constitution of a certain kind of subjectivity 
locatable firmly within a tradition.  
This notion of traditionary practice finds itself increasingly sidelined in contemporary 
discussions of praxis and ritual. Traditionary practices such as [Vedic] sacrifices have 
generally been dismissed as actions that are purely habitual, imitative and repetitive 
particularly in the study of ritual and are largely distinguished from moral actions that 
are taken to be intuitive, intentional and instrumental.
40
 I wish to demonstrate that 
Jaimini’s notion of karma, when explicated in the context of the Vedic event of 
sacrifice, discloses not only the textuality of Vedic practice but also the ‘answerability’ 
of the enjoined ritual subject of injunction. To help me demonstrate this notion of 
‘answerability’, I will draw insights from Bakhtin’s philosophy of the ‘act’ and his 
proposal of the notion of the ‘once-occurrent’ ‘unique’ ‘event’ of action and the 
answerability of the actant. Jaimini’s event of Vedic yajña read through the lens of 
Bakhtin’s answerability will not only allow me to account for the eventness of sacrifice 
and the agency of the yajamāna but will also help me develop insights to reimagine 
ritual as an intentional act that is nonetheless traditionary. 
BAKHTIN AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE ANSWERABLE ACT 
Holquist, in his foreword to Toward a Philosophy of the Act, points out that Bakhtin sets 
for himself the mammoth task of seeking to describe the undivided wholeness of the 
performed act in its ‘answerability’ viz. the unitary act. Bakhtin sought to bridge the gap 
between the theorizing and representations of acts or experience and those acts as they 
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were actually performed or immediately experienced.
41
 Bakhtin claims that the integrity 
of the once-occurrent event is realized only in the relationship of understanding that 
constitutes and ensures the obligation of acting from the position of a particular 
perspective. For Bakhtin, the truth or the integrity of an act is not accessible outside the 
act but in the very act itself where the unique self (actor) plays a crucial part. He states: 
‘Once-occurrent uniqueness or singularity cannot be thought of, it can only be 
participatively experienced or lived through…This Being cannot be determined in the 
categories of non-participant theoretical consciousness - it can be determined only in the 
categories of actual communion, i.e., of an actually performed act.’42 This answerable 
deed, whereby the answerable unity of thinking and performed act is acquired, is termed 
by Bakhtin postupok, which etymologically means ‘a step taken’ or ‘the taking of a 
step’.43 
Going beyond the existential solipsism and the rejection of the objective world (and 
theory and thought) by those he termed the ‘so-called life philosophers’, Bakhtin 
introduced categories such as ‘action-performing thinking’ [posupaiushchee myshlenie] 
and ‘participative thinking’ [uchastnoe myshlenie] to talk about the participative thinker 
whose performed act does not detach from its product.
44
 In attempting to 
‘detranscendentalize Kant’ and to ‘think beyond Kant’s formulation of the ethical 
imperative’,45 Bakhtin argues:  
The unity of an act and its account, a deed and its meaning, is something that is never a priori, 
but which must always and everywhere be achieved. The act is a deed, and not a mere happening 
(as in “one damned thing after another”), only if the subject of such a postupok, from within his 
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own radical uniqueness, weaves a relation to it in his accounting for it. Responsibility, then, is 
the ground of moral action.
46
 
While Bakhtin focuses his attention on the unique locations of individuals and their 
acts, this attention is not meant to lead to the notion that the self is complete or even 
possible as a construction outside concrete relations with other people. In other words, 
his responsible self is not the Cartesian ego cogito; Bakhtin does not view a world apart 
from the specific, responsible relationships that constitute it.
47
 As Bender has noted, 
Bakhtin developed the notion of ‘answerability’ to invoke the ‘necessity of dialogue 
between two people who come into an event with specific horizons of meaning and who 
then act to answer others’ actions’.48 The act, the unrepeatable deed, as Bakhtin has 
shown, cannot be abstracted from its concrete materiality and separated from its 
immediate context or from its author. Nevertheless, it takes shape in a particular 
historical moment and social environment as a participant in the complexly organized 
chain of events. There is no ideal or abstract act that arises out of nowhere because an 
act in all its unique singularity is already an interaction that is inherently dialogical. The 
doing or done of action (the content of action) possesses not only an ‘addressee’ but 
also a ‘super-addressee’ i.e. it is not without reference.49 
Bakhtin’s perspective of the answerability of the act provides fresh insight not only into 
the gap between the act and its theorizing, but also between the macro-societal world 
and the finite micro-societal specificity of individual life. It provides a window to see 
how the subject and the tradition (community) within which he is located are both 
constituted in the act. This notion of responsible participative thinking and Being-as-
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event allows me to account for the agency and the answerability of ritual acts, which 
hitherto have been reduced to non-intentional formalized behaviour. 
In light of these discussions concerning the understanding of ‘action’, I wish to stress 
the importance of re-investigating Jaimini’s concern for the intelligibility of sacrifice 
and highlight the vitality of his unique ritualistic conception of dharma as the 
mechanism through which the Vedic tradition is both defended and carried forward. 
Jaimini’s conception of dharma in light of subjectivity, tradition and ritual, presents a 
move beyond the knowledge-action dichotomy and introduces an understanding of 
karma that discloses the agency of the ritual subject upon whom the responsibility of 
fulfilling the entire event of sacrifice is accorded. 
THE TEXTUALITY OF PRACTICE: YAJÑA, CODANĀ AND ENJOINMENT 
In dealing with the question of what distinguishes and constitutes the ‘sacredness’ of a 
given text, Flood maintains that sacred texts (scriptures) are distinct from other texts in 
that they possess the quality of ‘semantic density’,50 that is, ‘the propensity to be read 
and re-read repeatedly without semantic exhaustion’, which is combined with a 
‘liturgical reception’ by a practising community.51 Flood’s definition of the sacredness 
of a text as the coming together of ‘semantic density’ and ‘liturgical reception’ is 
significant in its suggestion that ‘sacredness’ is not something that is given or ascribed 
beforehand but it is something that has to be received and actualized through enactment 
by a community of practitioners (believers).  
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The relationship between text and tradition can be further understood through the 
mechanism of what Ricoeur calls the ‘chain of interpretations’. Ricoeur claims that we, 
as historical beings, are in our situated ‘present’ always ‘in the situation of being heirs’ 
and not ‘in a position of being absolute innovators’. According to him, we are 
introduced to the past through the ‘texts’ (both oral and written) that have been passed 
down through generations.
52
 Ricoeur argues that if discourse is always addressed ‘to 
someone about something’, then it is only in the act of ‘reading’ that the text as ‘an 
archive available for individual and collective memory’ becomes a discourse involved 
in the act of interpretation.
53
 Therefore, the nature of the text is such that it not only 
possesses a ‘world’ of its own that is available to any reader or interpretant but also has 
the potentiality and openness to re-enter living discourse and the world of action 
through the act of reading and appropriation by an interpretant (reader). The fusion of 
the world of action and the act of reading is acquired through the mechanism of 
‘appropriation’ and ‘revelation’. Ricoeur suggests that it is this ‘link between 
appropriation and revelation’ that is the ‘cornerstone’ of hermeneutics.54  
In discussing the rationality of Mīmāṃsā’s internal-reasoning, I have pointed out that 
the Veda is characterized by both self-sufficiency (independence) and infallibility in a 
way that presuposses enactment. In elaborating these characteristics, I have only 
stopped short of elaborating how the ‘revelation-appropriation’ mechanism is made 
effective, particularly for the goal of fulfilling the practice of sacrifice and ensuring the 
realization of dharma. Therefore, it is here that I seek to address the question - What is 
the core constituent feature of the Veda that ensures its pragmatic efficacy, particularly 
in matters concerning ritual and dharma?  
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Codanā, the Unifying Principle of the Veda 
One of the main challenges following Jaimini’s claim that śabda is originary and 
authorless is the question of the nature of Vedic injunctions, particularly its efficacy in 
relation to the realization of dharma. The Mīmāṃsā has suffered contemptuous attacks 
and has been ‘condemned for being a sterile, or mechanistic, or dogmatic, or 
fundamentalistic ritualism’ precisely because of the correlation of the authority of the 
Veda with injunctions.
55
 Jaimini’s identification of his enquiry into dharma with 
injunctions made explicitly in sūtra 1.1.2 is often taken as ‘advocating the demand for 
unconditional observance of inexplicable commands.’56 While the nature of ‘injunction’ 
and ‘obligation’ might seem to convey a mechanistic and rule-governed habitual 
performance with little room for expression and agency, Jaimini’s work suggests an 
understanding of injunction that is not only desired by the subject but also willingly and 
responsibly appropriated, internalized and enacted.  
In sūtra 1.1.24 Jaimini was confronted with the question of the relationship between 
word and act and its possible discrepancy in relation to its purpose. The interrogation 
was concerning the efficacy of injunctions in bringing about the primary purpose of the 
word, the invisible dharma.
57
 In seeking to address this discrepancy, as I have discussed 
in the previous chapter, Jaimini sought to first establish the Veda as an authorless living 
dialogue whose sacredness can only be conferred in relationships and actualized in 
enactment. It is only within this re-conceptualization of the Veda, from a purely 
historical corpus that is read (heard) to a living text that is liturgically received and 
                                                 
55
 S Biderman, ‘Escaping the Paradox of Scripture: The Mīmāṃsā Solution’, in Dwivedi (ed.), Studies in 
Mīmāṃsā, p. 88.  
56
 Ibid.  
57
 MS 1.1.24: Utpattau vā’vacanāḥ syur arthasyāt annimittatvāt 
Even though they [the word, its meaning, and the relationship between the two] are eternal, they do not 
express the subject-matter (dharma) because they are not efficient for that purpose. 
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enacted, that the injunctive character of the Veda can be more comprehensively 
understood. 
In light of the absence of authorship, the questions concerning the authority of 
injunctions, from whence they arose, to whom they are addressed and how they can be 
received are difficult queries. It is here that the dynamic process through which Jaimini 
sought to account for these questions and his insistence on reducing the entire Veda to a 
single unifying principle is illuminating. For Jaimini, the manner of his establishing the 
nature and authority of the Veda enables him to argue that the words of the Veda are 
fundamentally pragmatic in their orientation and, therefore, the essential character of the 
Veda is not denotation or description but injunction. In sūtra 1.4.1, Jaimini states: ‘It 
has already been explained that the Veda is primarily oriented towards the performance 
of sacrifices, and hence the whole of it should be accepted as serving that purpose.’58 
Jaimini’s argument suggests that the Veda informs one not what there is, but what needs 
to be done; it is concerned primarily with ‘prescriptions’ and not ‘descriptions’.59 Keith 
argues that the Veda lays down ‘injunctions for the performance of actions’, from which 
arise ‘an invisible potency’ that enables the arrangement and realization of the 
‘desirable end’. This potency arises only in the context of actions that are enjoined i.e 
actions that prompt the subject and call forth responsibility.
60
 In other words, the Veda 
communicates only in terms of injunctions because its primary sense is realized only 
through enactment. 
                                                 
58
 MS 1.4.1: Uktaṁ sāmāmnāyaidamarthya tasmāt sarvaṁ tadarthaṁ syāt 
59
 As Elisa Freschi has remarked in her footnote, which is reproduced here, the distinction between 
‘prescription’ and ‘description’ is a crucial one. ‘Both schools of Mīmāṃsā agree that the Veda is an 
instrument of knowledge insofar as it conveys something sādhya “to be realized” and not something 
siddha “already established.” In this terminology, the choice of gerundive (sādhya) is revealing. The point 
is not that the Veda conveys something not yet established, as would have been expressed by a future 
particle, but, rather, something that could be done or should be done. In other words, the Veda is not a 
fortune teller. It does not tell one day what will happen tomorrow (or in any other moment of the future).’ 
See E Freschi, ‘Freedom Because of Duty: The Problem of Agency in Mīmāṃsā’, in MR Dasti & EF 
Bryant (ed.), Free Will, Agency and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2014, p. 139, fn 3. 
60
 Keith, The Karma-Mīmāṃsā, pp. 36-37. 
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To enable him to substantiate this claim, Jaimini had to rearrange the Veda in such a 
way as to gear everything towards purposeful action and this necessitated the re-
classification of the contents that make up the Veda. Following the first pāda of the first 
adhyāya (which is an elaboration of his introduction of the theme of dharma), Jaimini’s 
discussion is guided by his task to lay down principles and guidelines with which 
people can perform and bring sacrifices enjoined by the Veda to fulfilment. While the 
classification of the corpus collected as the Veda is an enormous and complicated one, 
in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras they are divided more simply into five categories, namely, 
Brāhmaṇas, Mantras, Namādheya, Niṣedha and Arthavāda. Jaimini considers 
injunctions (prescriptions) to be the core of the Brāhmaṇas and places all the other 
categories as subsidiary to injunctions whose authority is derived from their being a 
eulogy for specific injunctions: 
1.2.7: These statements form single statements with injunctions, and [encourage the performance 
of what is enjoined and] is authoritative as eulogising the particular injunctions. 
2.1.32: The name mantra applies to those of which the purpose is denotation. 
2.1.33: The name brāhmaṇa is applied to the rest. 
2.1.34: The character of mantras does not belong to that which is actually mentioned in the 
Veda, as it is only with reference to the sentences actually mentioned in the Veda that we have 
the above distinction.
61
 
 
  
The Brāhmaṇas, which contain both positive and negative injunctions, are taken as the 
essential portions of the Veda, and the other passages that do not constitute either of 
these two injunctions, are classified as explanatory matter, arthāvada,62  and name, 
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 MS 1.2.7: Vidhinā tv ekavākyatvāt stuty arthena vidhīnā syuḥ 
MS 2.1.32: Taccodakeṣu mantrākhyā 
MS 2.1.33: Śeṣe brāhmaṇaśabdaḥ 
MS 2.1.34: Anāmnāteṣvamantratvamāmnāteṣu hi vibhāgaḥ syāt 
62
 MS 1.2.23: Vidhiścānarthakaḥ kvacit tasmātstutiḥ pratīyet tatsāmānyāditareṣu tathātvaṃ 
In some cases, such injunctions would be useless [without any purpose]; hence they must be taken as 
expressing praise [eulogy]; and the same may be said with regard to all other passages similar to these. 
MS 1.2.27: Stutistu śabdapūrvatvāt acodanā ca tasya 
It is [a] praise; because it presupposes [is preceded by] injunction [verbal authority]; it is not authoritative 
in itself. 
MS 1.2.28: Arthe stutiranyāyyeti cet 
Any praise which is useless is not allowed. 
MS 1.2.29: Arthastu vidhiśeṣatvāt yathā loke 
But there is use for it; in as much as it forms part of the injunction, as in the ordinary world. 
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namādheya respectively.63 Arthavāda statements are taken to be participating in the 
larger purpose by supporting injunctive statements, and even the mantras, although they 
are not injunctive statements, are likewise defended as supporting statements.
64
 These 
mantras are further categorized under various divisions such as Ṛc, Sāman and Yajus, 
according to which they are sung and recited or uttered usually in a low tone.
65
 
According to Keith: ‘Mantras do not lay down injunctions but they serve to denote 
something of value in connection with injunctions, especially the deity to whom 
offering is to be made.’66 Mantras are usually composed of prayers to deities but also 
contain suggestions as to the performance of sacrifices. Jaimini also devoted a section 
of his Sūtras to the consideration of the authoritative character of the ‘smṛti’.67 He takes 
the position that the smṛtis can be regarded as authoritative whenever they do not 
directly contradict the Veda, and only in so far as they are based upon and derive their 
authority from the Veda. Between sūtras 1.3.1-7 Jaimini argues the following:  
Even though dharma (i.e. correct sacrificial performance) is based on scripture, practices without 
scriptural basis can still be known to be authoritative inferentially, because performed by the 
                                                 
63
 MS 1.4.2: Api vā nāmadheyaṁ syāt yadutpattāvapūrvamavidhāyakatvāt 
That [word] must be a name; it is new in origin because it cannot lay down [the material] i.e. [it is not 
injunctive]. See Keith, The Karma-Mīmāṃsā, pp. 79-80. 
64
 MS 2.1.30: Vidhimantrayor aikārthyam aikaśabdyāt 
The vidhi and the mantra serve the same purpose, in as much as they contain the same words. 
MS 2.1.31: Api vā prayogasāmarthyāt mantro’bhidhānavācī syāt 
But because of the force of application [power of usage], the mantra conveys denotation [meaning]. 
MS 2.1.32: Taccodakeṣu mantrākhyā 
The name mantra applies to those of which the purpose is denotation. 
MS 5.1.16: Mantratastu virodhe syāt prayogarūpasāmarthyāt tasmādutpattideśaḥ saḥ 
When there is conflict, the order of the mantra-text should be followed because the capacity to be used as 
it stands is inherent in the mantra; the brāhmaṇa-text is taken as the originative injunction [of acts]. 
65
 MS 2.1.35: Teṣāmṛg yatrārthavaśena pādavyavasthā 
[Among the mantras,] the name ṛg is given to those wherein there is a metrical arrangement (division) by 
sense. 
MS 2.1.36: Gītiṣu sāmākhyā 
The name sāmā is given to songs. 
MS 2.1.37: Śeṣe yajuḥśabdaḥ 
To the rest, the name yajuṣ is given. 
66
 Keith, The Karma-Mīmāṃsā, p. 81. 
67
 While Śabara’s Bhāṣya does not state explicitly what works are included under the name ‘smṛti’, 
Kumārila places under the category the Itihāsas, Puräṇas, and the Manusmṛti only. See Kumārilabhaṭṭa, 
Tantravārttika: A Commentary on Śabara’s Bhāṣya on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini, 2 vols., 
trans. G Jha, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1924, p. 244.  
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same people who perform the scripturally authorized actions. However, this inference is valid 
only when there is no contradiction with what is scriptural, and no ulterior motive involved.
68
  
The privileging of the Brāhmaṇas and the intent of the re-classification of the Veda 
around injunctions point towards Jaimini’s concern for the actualization of the authority 
(sacredness) of the Veda, particularly through the performance of what is to be done 
(kārya). Thibaut, in his introduction to the translations of the Arthasaṁgraha, argues 
that Jaimini is keen to show that every part of the sacrifice, every word and gesture, are 
of use and that they can each contribute their share towards the proper accomplishment 
of the sacrifice. He claims that Jaimini is devising a comprehensive framework within 
which he is able to describe action as the foundation of meaning and order and is 
seeking to reflect a harmonizing view of the Veda that is centred primarily on the 
sacrificial action.
69
  
Characteristics of Codanā 
The first introduction to the notion of codanā is found in the introductory pāda in sūtra 
1.1.2 where Jaimini defines ‘dharma’ as ‘that artha whose characteristic feature is that 
of a codanā.’70 In the discussions in the previous chapter, I have suggested that the 
Veda, as the only valid means of knowing and accessing the invisible, is oriented 
towards purposive action. In light of the definition above, one can see that the 
realization of dharma through purposive action is not only intrinsically connected to 
codanā but more importantly, an understanding of codanā serves as a gateway to 
                                                 
68
 MS 1.3.1: Dharmasya śabdamūlatvāt aśabdamanapekṣyaṁ syāt 
MS 1.3.2: Api vā kartṛsāmānyāt pramāṇamanumānaṁ syāt 
MS 1.3.3: Virodhe tvanapekṣyaṁ syāt asati hyanumānaṃ 
MS 1.3.4: Hetudarśanācca 
MS 1.3.5: Śiṣṭākope viruddhamiti cet 
MS 1.3.6: Na śāstraparimāṇatvāt 
MS 1.3.7: Api vā karaṇāgrahaṇe prayuktānipratīyeran 
The translations of these sūtras are borrowed from Clooney. See KH Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian 
Philosophies: Philosophy of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, vol 16, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2014, p. 66. 
69
 Bhāskara, The Arthasaṁgraha: An Elementary Treatise on Mīmāṃsā, p. xi.  
70
 MS 1.1.2: Codanālakṣaṇo’rtho dharmaḥ 
Dharma is that ‘artha’ whose characteristic feature is that of a ‘codanā’. 
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understanding the nature of dharma. What then is codanā according to Jaimini and how 
is it related to ‘act’ and ‘purpose’ (fulfilment of the event of sacrifice)? 
Jaimini, responding to the question posed in sūtra 2.1.2 regarding the relation between 
bhāvanā (that which comes into being) and words,71 proceeded by introducing a three-
fold distinction of words between sūtras 2.1.3-5. This three-fold distinction include: (a) 
nouns - such words, on the utterance whereof the forms of the objects denoted are 
directly cognised, and as such do not stand in need of anything else, on account of their 
being self-sufficient in regard to their denotation, (b) verbs - such words, on whose 
utterances the objects denoted are yet to exist, and by means of which what has not 
existed is cognized, and (c) codanā - that which brings into existence something which 
did not exist - something new, something not known before.
72
 This distinction of words 
shows that for Jaimini, while the noun as a self-sufficient word is related to the 
denotation of objects that are directly cognisable, the verbs which cognize objects which 
are not yet in existence are not self-sufficient in that they have to be taken together with 
codanā to ensure that the invisible objects are brought into existence. In that sense, 
every verb, as indicative of bhāvanā,73 is necessarily related to codanā. Codanā is what 
allows the meanings or purposes (objects) of verbs to be actualized. Therefore, in the 
first instance, codanā can be taken as the force or potency that impels and prompts one 
towards a certain course of action and causes something that is previously invisible, to 
be. 
                                                 
71
 MS 2.1.1: Bhāvārthāh karmaśabdāḥ tebhyaḥ kriyā pratīyetaiṣahyartho vidhīyate 
‘Words expressive of action are creative of something new and from them in particular [and not from all 
the words of the sentence] we understand the activity to be performed.’ This translation is borrowed from 
Clooney. See KH Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Philosophy of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, vol 16, 
Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2014, p. 69. 
MS 2.1.2: Sarveṣāṁ bhāvo’rtha iti cet 
But bhāva forms the meaning of all words? 
72
 MS 2.1.3: Yeṣāmutpattau sve prayoge rūpopalabdhistāni nāmāni tasmāt tebhyaḥ parākāṅkṣā bhūtatvāt 
sve prayoge 
MS 2.1.4: Yeṣāṁ tūtpattāvarthe sve prayogo na vidyate tānyākhyātāni tasmāt tebhyaḥ pratīyet āśritatvāt 
prayogasya 
MS 2.1.5: Codanā punarārambhaḥ 
73
 MS 2.1.1: Bhāvārthāh karmaśabdāḥ tebhyaḥ kriyā pratīyetaiṣahyartho vidhīyate 
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However, codanā is not only a force that just prompts a certain course of action but also 
prompts the action in a certain way. The notion of codanā as the laying down of 
something that is not known before, as opposed to the description of what already 
exists, is also very closely related to another term that Jaimini uses in a similar way - 
vidhi. In sūtra 1.2.7 and 1.2.19 for instance, vidhi designates an injunctive passage that 
lays down something not existing before, apūrva: 
1.2.7: But they are taken along with the injunctive passages; and as such could be authoritative 
as eulogising the particular injunctions. 
1.2.19: It would be an injunction, as laying down something not known before, because a mere 
description would be useless.
74
  
What then, is the relationship between vidhi and codanā? Taking sūtra 7.1.7 along with 
sūtra 7.4.10 where the words vidhi and codanā are used in the same sentences 
together,
75
 Clooney argues that there is an ‘enjoined arrangement found in any ritual 
setting’ which tells us about the ‘concrete organization’ of a particular enactment (rite), 
within which the content of enjoinment may change from action to action.
76
 This 
content of what is enjoined in a certain arrangement for a particular enactment is what 
Clooney categorizes in the Sūtras as vidhi. Clooney claims that while ‘the codanā is the 
injunctive force’ which ‘impinges on the hearer and makes him begin action’, ‘the vidhi 
is the particular content of any injunction’.77 A detailed look at the first adhyāya where 
one is first introduced to the concept of vidhi will also suggest that, as Clooney has 
remarked, vidhi is an injunction related to the organization and enjoinment of every 
accessory and specification that makes up a particular sacrifice. Therefore, in the second 
instance, codanā can also be taken as the content of enjoinment (vidhi) balancing and 
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 MS 1.2.7: Vidhinā tv ekavākyatvāt stuty arthena vidhīnā syuḥ 
MS 1.2.19: Vidhirvā syād apūrvatvād vādamātraṁ hy anarthakaṃ 
75
 MS 7.1.7: Utpattau vidhyabhāvādvā codanāyāṁ pravṛttiḥ syāt tataśca karmabhedaḥ syāt 
MS 7.4.10: Vidhyanto vā prakṛtivaccodanāyāṁ pravarteta tathā hi liṅgadarśanaṃ 
76
 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 137. 
77
 Ibid., p. 138. 
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organizing the structures of the sacrificial event and ensures the correct enactment of 
specified injunctions. 
Both codanā and vidhi are also intrinsically related to the laying down of something not 
already known or the coming into being of something that has not existed prior - an 
apūrva. For Jaimini, an utterance or a sentence can be taken as an injunction only by 
virtue of it denoting an apūrva, when it brings about something that has not existed 
before: 
3.4.3: It should be taken as an injunction, as it lays down something not already known. 
3.5.21: The texts are direct injunctions, as they speak of what is not already known; hence the 
‘eating’ would be in accordance with direct injunctions. 
6.5.5: There is injunction, as it is something new.
78
 
The notion of apūrva as something new, something independent or original, is also 
extended to a range of other accessories used in a sacrifice for the first time in a novel 
way, as well as to certain types of sacrifices. In sūtra 8.1.5 and 9.3.20 for 
example,apūrva is taken in the sense of an independent sacrifice, such as the soma 
sacrifice, because it does not require ‘extended application’ or ‘transference’. 79 
Therefore, by way of an extension, what is newly introduced can be spoken of as 
apūrva, be it names (MS 1.4.2), actions (MS 5.1.29) or substitutes (MS 9.2.43): 
1.4.2: That [word] must be a name, which at first appears new; because it cannot lay down [the 
material]. 
5.1.29: Similarly, [also] that which has no antecedent [should not be anticipated]. 
9.2.43: The name also would apply to the substitute by reason of the coming in of the details, 
especially as they are something new.
80
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 MS 3.4.3: Vidhis tv apūrvatvāt syāt 
MS 3.5.21: Vacanāni tv apūrvatvāt tasmād yathopadeśaṁ syuḥ 
MS 6.5.5: Apūrvatvādvidhānaṁ syāt 
79
 MS 8.1.5: Kṛtsnavidhānādvā’pūrvatvaṃ 
The Soma-sacrifice should be regarded as an independent sacrifice, because it has its entire procedure laid 
down. 
MS 9.3.20: Apūrve tvavikāro’pradeśāt pratīyeta 
At a sacrifice which has no precedent, there should be no modification, as in this case no transference is 
possible. 
80
 MS 1.4.2: Api vā nāmadheyaṁ syāt yadutpattāv apūrvam avidhāyakatvāt 
MS 5.1.29: Tathā’pūrvaṃ 
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For Jaimini, apūrva can also refer to a sense of time in that it is something new, and is 
used to describe that which occurs due to the instigation of the Vedic text. Therefore, in 
the third instance, codanā can also be taken as the realization (bringing forth) of 
fulfilment that introduces something new; the force that enables something to be 
complete in itself in a new way. 
The three senses in which codanā can be summarized includes: (a) a force that prompts 
one towards a certain course of action   towards something new, (b) a content that 
balances and organizes the structures of a particular sacrificial event, and (c) a force that 
ensures the realization of something new or the realization of completeness. It is the 
combination of these three senses that in turn identifies, prompts and obligates the 
desiring subject towards purposeful action and gives rise to the processes of the 
enjoinment of the subject. Therefore, codanā is the mechanism through which the Veda, 
as obligation, is appropriated by the responsible subject who is already initiated into the 
tradition. It is the coming together of the desiring subject and codanā that engenders the 
enjoinment of the subject. 
With regard to the question concerning the subject of injunctions as it relates to 
sacrificial enactment, Jaimini discusses this in terms of adhikāra. Adhikāra, while 
generally understood as the criteria or conditions that identify the eligibility of the 
sacrificial actant, can also be discussed in light of the responsibility it entails towards 
fulfilment. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
MS 9.2.43: Ākhyā caivaṁ tadāveśād vikṛtau syād pūrvatvāt 
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The Enjoined Adhikārin: Desire and Obligation 
In the fourth chapter, I elaborated the complicated internal rationality and textuality of 
the Vedic tradition as a tradition that ultimately relies on the responsible subject to 
understand the nature of the obligation to act and to ensure the enactment of the 
injunctions of the Veda. Dwivedi notes that the ‘truth value’ and ‘authority’ of the Veda 
in Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras are not in the propositional knowledge they appear to 
convey but in the pragmatic coherence they produce by orienting a practitioner of Vedic 
sacrifice towards efficacious practice. The dependence of meaning on enactment makes 
it impossible for the meaning of the Veda to be understood from its words alone and 
that is why the enjoinment of the ritual subject is a necessary constitutive factor in 
Jaimini’s revelation-appropriation governed sacrifice.81 
Once the centrality of the codanā, understood as the unifying principle of the Veda, is 
established, Jaimini goes on to discuss its necessary complements, primary amongst 
which is the prompted person. Within the Mīmāṃsā framework, as I have highlighted in 
Chapter Three, a subject becomes a sacrificial agent primarily based on the desire to 
commit to the practice of sacrifice. Therefore, desire and obligation, taken respectively 
as the sense of being called and the sense of submission to the narrative of the tradition, 
are not opposed to each other but intertwined in their telos of seeking to fulfil the 
enactment of sacrifice and realizing dharma. 
In the beginning of the sixth adhyāya between sūtras 6.1.1-5, the discussion highlights 
that the injunctive sentences denote something to be done (kārya). By virtue of being 
related to the kārya denoted by the sentence, the agent as the desirous one who is in a 
position to responsibly appropriate the obligation and carry it out until its fulfilment is 
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 S Biderman, ‘Escaping the Paradox of Scripture: The Mīmāṃsā Solution’, in Dwivedi (ed.), Studies in 
Mīmāṃsā, p. 92. 
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taken to be denoted by the same injunctive sentence. The kārya, by its very nature is 
something that has to be brought about by a kṛti (an exertion or effort). This effort in the 
Mīmāṃsā sacrificial world is taken to be none other than the effort that comes from the 
sacrificial agent. I have mentioned previously that no such effort is possible 
independently of a desire to act.
82
 For example, whenever the Veda states that ‘the one 
who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the Full-and-New-Moon Sacrifices’, the 
sentence is taken to imply that everyone who desires the fruit of heaven is directly 
addressed by the injunction. Therefore, it results in the identification of oneself as the 
one who is enjoined by the injunction and is entitled to carry out the enactment of the 
sacrifice. In the Mīmāṃsā context the word adhikārin, which is usually translated as 
‘eligible’ subject, designates not only the eligibility to perform a ritual, but as Freschi 
has elaborated, also the understanding that the eligible person is bound to perform it.
83
 
According to David, the concept of adhikārin, which he translates as the ‘person in 
charge [of a certain act]’, is the primary concept adopted by scholars to identify the 
‘subjective response’ to an injunctive statement. He mentions that the ‘status of being 
an adhikārin has three correlates’ which are: (a) ‘knowledge (vidyā)’ – understanding of 
the Vedic text and its meaning, (b) ‘the possession of fires (agnimattva) having 
undergone proper installation rites’ and, (c) ‘the capacity (sāmarthya) to perform the 
rite along with its auxiliaries’. He argues that the central issue in the understanding of 
injunctions is ‘to determine the relation between a certain prescription and the listener’s 
“qualification” (adhikāra) to perform the corresponding act’.84 Eligibility entails both 
obligation and responsibility; the Veda presupposes and requires a doer for its authority 
                                                 
82
 This kārya has been called apūrva by the Bhāṣya by reason of its being something new to all other 
means of knowledge, apart from the injunctive sentence; but the name given to it by Prabhākara is niyoga 
or prompting, because it acts as an incentive to the prompted person and makes him initiate an exertion 
for the goal of accomplishing the action. This kārya or niyoga is expressed neither by the verbal root, nor 
by the injunctive affix, nor by any other word in the sentence, but it is denoted by the sentence as a whole. 
See Jha, The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, pp. 161-166. 
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 E Freschi, Duty, Language and Exegesis in Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā, Brill, Leiden, 2012, p. 118.  
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 H David, ‘Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism (600-1000): Activity, Speech and 
Desire’, The Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 49, no. 4, 2015, pp. 579-580. 
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to be realized and being a doer means understanding and identifying oneself as being 
prompted and called to responsibly carry out the act. 
For Jaimini, there is always an underlying human motive for action even when an 
injunction ultimately is taken as the main reason for doing something. As I have already 
discussed in the third chapter, the question of the entitlement of a person to the 
performance of sacrifice is taken together with the question of the ability of the person 
to perform the sacrifice consistently until its fulfilment. This responsibility includes not 
only the material and physical ability to perform the details of the sacrifice but also the 
ability to understand and ensure the completion of the process. Therefore, the concern 
for Jaimini is primarily the fulfilment of the act of sacrifice in accordance with the 
injunctions from the Veda.
85
 However, what is it about injunctions that make them 
prescriptive? What ensures prompting, response and enjoinment?   
David points out the Mīmāṃsā position that vidhi is best understood as the ‘content’ of 
an injunction or a ‘certain knowledge-event (jñāna)’ i.e. ‘something that can be 
cognized’. He draws insights from the treatise on the Vidhiviveka by Maṇḍana Miśra (c. 
660-700 CE), which demonstrates that ‘the most common description of an action found 
in Mīmāṃsā texts’, can be illustrated as comprising three stages: ‘vidhi (cause of an 
activity)’  ‘pravṛtti (activity/effort)’  ‘karman (movement (physical))’.86  In this 
schematization, ‘free will’ or ‘intention’ is generally presupposed to play no role in the 
process that leads from vidhi to pravṛtti. However, the role of desire in the appropriation 
of injunctions as a responsibility that must be embodied, suggests that there is space to 
trace the agency of the ritual subject both at the level of reflection (deliberation) on the 
injunction and also at the level of activity/effort (appropriation) and eventual movement 
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 MS 6.1.5: Karturvā śrutisaṁyogād vidhiḥ kātsnryena gamyate 
In reality, the injunction of an act should be taken to apply to only such an agent as may be able to carry 
out the entire details of the sacrifice; because such is the sense given in the Vedic texts. 
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(enactment). It is specifically in this relationship between injunction and desire that 
Maṇḍana Miśra has offered some of his most important insights concerning the nature 
of vidhi and action. In Vidhiviveka 2 he states: 
If speech was independent [as a cause of human activity], the activity would take place with 
necessity (niyogataḥ); thus there would be no point in saying [as Manu does] that “When a man 
fails to carry out prescribed acts [(…) he is subject to a penance]”, for then, even desire (icchā) 
would not be central to man (puruṣasya tantram), [who would behave] as if [he was] pushed by 
a strong wind or by the flow of water.
87
 
As David has pointed out, Maṇḍana’s ‘anthropological (rather than purely linguistic) 
reflection on the omnipresence of desire’, is in accordance with the ‘absolute priority 
conferred on desire in human psychology: if external rules of dharma should have any 
authority over human beings, this can only be because they teach (upa-diś) the means 
(sādhana/upāya/abhyupāya) to obtaining something desired (iṣṭa).’ 88  Maṇḍana, in 
seeking to point out the close relationship between the presence of desire and the means 
of pursuing an end, claims that even such practices performed by the ascetics are not the 
cessation or rejection of desires but are the dedicated concentration of all their activities 
(pravṛtti) as a means towards a desired goal or end. Therefore, the previous illustration 
or schematization can be revised as thus:  Desire  vidhi (cause of an activity)  
pravṛtti (activity/effort)  karman (movement)  fruit. Therefore, it is the vital 
presence of desire that prompts the ritual subject to appropriate the obligation of an 
injunction and integrate the enjoined acts to his embodiment and enactment.
89
 Maṇḍana 
sums up this viewpoint in his Vidhiviveka 28: 
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For a human being, there is no other incitement towards action (kriyā) than [there] being a means 
for realizing what he desires (iṣṭābhyupāya), and what [people] call ‘impelling’ (pravartana) is 
[nothing but this same] property [of an action], which is the cause of [their] activity.
90
 
It is through this appropriation of injunctions that the subject becomes fully enjoined, 
becoming the niyojya (to borrow Prabhakāra’s terminology) who is tasked not only with 
the performance of the sacrifice but also embodying the rationality of the Vedic 
tradition. In taking the practice of sacrifice as the enactment of the living dialogue that 
is the Veda, Jaimini is positing the claim that action, particularly ritual action, is 
textually infused and mediated. The meaning of the Veda is completely intertwined with 
the meaning of the action. The sacred text is mapped onto the body and the text and the 
act are fused together to become a carrier of tradition - the body thus becoming the 
locus through which the living dialogue and revelation is affirmed and appropriated. In 
Jaimini’s discussion, the Veda is not presented as a sacred text that provides historical, 
cosmological, psychological or moral percepts. It is not a text that tells the practitioner 
something is the case or offers a description about something but obliges him/her to act 
in a certain way to make something the case.
91
 It is this acting in a certain way that 
transforms the subject into a ritual subjectivity. Sacred texts therefore, need to be 
understood as primarily dependent on enactment and their reception as a bodily act that 
shares in the gestures, postures, and expressions within a community. Following Flood, 
one might say that the voice of the sacred text, the community’s revelation, is received 
by a community of reception and brought to life in the ritual act. The reception of the 
sacred text is not restricted to reading but entails an appropriation that brings forth 
activity.
92
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THE ANSWERABILITY OF YAJÑA: AGENCY AND RITUAL 
Discussing the theme of ‘agency’, ‘action’ and ‘selfhood’, Dasti and Bryant point out 
that classical Indian philosophers have largely perceived and argued that ‘a person’s 
karmic inheritance’ determines the ‘range of options’ one has in the present life and 
articulate ‘the role of the human effort in light of both the causal weight of the past and 
the complicated sense of current relationships that impinge upon individual agency’.93 
They argue that despite varied differences in their philosophical outlook, ‘Buddhism, 
Jainism, and the Upaniṣadic tradition’ agree that ‘one’s decisions and actions’ can cause 
a cycle that continues after death and into the next lifetime and have ‘consequences that 
unfold over the course of multiple embodiments’.94  
The Nyāya philosophers argue that the ‘enduring individual self must be the locus of 
agency and moral responsibility’, and correspondingly disagree with the Buddhist 
theory of the ‘no-self’ by arguing that the absence of an enduring self makes it 
impossible to explain moral responsibility over time. The Mādhyamaka Buddhists argue 
that ‘moral responsibility is not to be found in an enduring self, but in the network of 
relationships, states and interconnections that constitute our rich identities’.95  Other 
traditions that pursue contemplative practice such as the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vedānta and 
Kashmir Śaivism appeal to both meditational and philosophical analysis. They seek to 
‘deconstruct the empirical ego into various components and tie such components to 
more fundamental metaphysical realities and causal processes’.96  
Dasti and Bryant claim that for each of these schools, the notion of agency, by which 
they mean ‘the notion that we are in control, that we are beings who act’, is a mistake 
                                                 
93
 MR Dasti, ‘Introduction’, in Dasti & Bryant (ed.), Free Will, Agency and Selfhood in Indian 
Philosophy, 2014, p. 5. 
94
 Ibid. 
95
 Ibid., p. 6. 
96
 Ibid. 
 232 
that can be attributed to ‘cognitive and affective disorders collectively called avidyā, 
existential ignorance’, which thereby, also constitutes ‘a fundamental part of spiritual 
ignorance’.97  Though the distinctiveness of each of these positions is developed in 
different ways, ‘the ultimate and final goal of life’, which is freeing oneself from the 
cycle of re-birth and re-death and from ‘the pain of ordinary embodied existence’, in 
most of these traditions is more commonly taken as ‘liberation’.98 In light of these 
deconstructive notions of the self, how does one move forward in an attempt to 
introduce the notion of agency and responsibility within traditions such as the 
Mīmāṃsā? 
Although there is no reference to the ideas of rebirth and liberation in the work of 
Jaimini in his Sūtras,99 he is nonetheless concerned with the question of karman and its 
effects because of its close links to ritual practice, and the question of the motive and 
purpose of sacrifice - why deeds are performed and how they bring about the fruits of 
those labours - is one that persistently confronted him in his discussions. As Halbfass 
observes: 
[The Mīmāṃsā] disregards or rejects ideas or doctrines which have become basic premises for 
the other systems. Final liberation (mokṣa), commonly accepted as a leading theme or even as 
the basic concern of philosophical thought, does not play any role in the older literature of the 
system; Mīmāṃsā deals with dharma, not with mokṣa. Familiar ideas like the cyclical 
destruction of the world (mahāpralaya), ‘yogic perception’ (yogipratyakṣa), the ‘Lord’ (īśvara), 
and so forth, remain excluded even in its later literature…the Mīmāṃsā carries the heritage of 
the ‘pre-karmic’ past of the Indian tradition into an epoch for which karma and saṃsāra have 
become basic premises.
100
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Out of all the classical traditions, the Mīmāṃsā school is the most devoted to the 
preservation of ancient Vedic ritual culture. Its concern with agency stems from 
concerns with ritual motivations, obligations and its outcome.
101
 
The Event of Yajña: Prayoga and Integration 
Starting from the position that there can be no action where there is no useful purpose 
served,
102
 Jaimini, as in the case of the re-organization of the Veda around the centrality 
of codanā that I have elaborated in the previous section, assembles the number of 
sacrificial accessories and arranges and allocates them for their purposeful actualization 
(kriyā) to ensure the fulfilment of what is at the centre of the Vedic tradition - the 
sacrifice that realizes dharma. Jaimini is committed to show that every part of the 
sacrifice, every word, gesture and accessories are of visible use and that they contribute 
their respective parts towards the fulfilment of the primary sacrifice.
103
  
In the discussion in sūtras 9.1.1-10, Jaimini mentions that the event of sacrifice is 
organized around its central sacrificial action. Every detail related to the sacrifice is 
rendered purposeful to the extent that it contributes to the fulfilment of the central action 
of sacrifice. He poses the siddhānta position in sūtras 9.1.1-3 that the sacrificial action 
(yajñakarma) serves as the motivation (prayojana) for each of the sacrifices: ‘The 
sacrificial action itself, created through the injunction, is primary in relation to all else; 
preparatory actions and the material prepared are motivated by that primary purpose.’104 
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According to Jaimini, the sacrificial action (yajñakarma) is of central importance 
because it is action brought into being by the injunctions of the Veda (codanā-
bhūtam).105 As I will elaborate below, Jaimini insists on staying firmly grounded on the 
centrality of the primary action as he carefully weaves and integrates each of the 
components comprising the event of sacrifice together towards the fulfilment of the 
yajñakarma. In the same way as he understands the Veda and Vedic tradition, Jamini’s 
general position regarding sacrificial activity is to maintain that the validity and efficacy 
of practice is intrinsic in such a way that it brings about its own result independent of 
any external referent outside of tradition. In sūtras 6.2.13-18, Jaimini stresses the 
importance of carrying the sacrifice to its completion even when visible results that are 
desired such as cattle and rain are accomplished in the course of the performance. He 
maintains that the Veda denounces all unfinished acts and learned men decry those who 
begin a certain act without committing to it until the end:  
Once a sacrifice is begun, the performer is constrained to finish it, precisely because he has 
begun it. By contrast, ordinary activities may be stopped whenever the performer wishes (even if 
incomplete), and there is no reason to postulate texts requiring that such acts be completed. 
Scripture pertains only to what cannot be known by reasoning.
106
  
The privileged centrality of the yajñakarma in Jaimini’s discussion of sacrifice is 
primarily guided by the dual theme of the correct integration of accessories and 
                                                                                                                                               
As translated by Clooney in FX Clooney, ‘Devatāadhikaraṇa: A Theological Debate in the Mīmāṃsā-
Vedanta Tradition’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 16, no. 3, 1988, pp. 277-298.  
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 MS 9.1.1: Yajñakarma pradhānaṁ taddhi codanābhūtaṁ tasya dravyeṣu 
saṁskārastatprayuktastadarthatvāt 
That which is the yajñakarma is the principal factor [primary in relation to all else], as that is what is 
enjoined [created through injunction]; hence the preparation (embellishment) of the materials must be 
regarded as motivated (prompted) by that primary purpose. 
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 MS 6.2.13: Prakramāt tu niyamyetāsambhavasya kriyānimittatvāt 
MS 6.2.14: Phalārthitvādvā’niyamo yathānupakrānte 
MS 6.2.15: Niyamo vā tannimittatvāt kartustatkāraṇaṁ syāt 
MS 6.2.16: Loke karmāṇi vedavattato’dhipuruṣajñānaṃ 
MS 6.2.17: Aparādhe’pi ca taih sāstraṃ 
MS 6.2.18: Aśāstrāt tūpasamprāptiḥ sāstraṃ syānna prakalpakaṁ tasmādarthena gamyetāprāpte 
śāstramarthavat 
The translations of these sūtras are borrowed from Clooney. See KH Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian 
Philosophies: Philosophy of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, vol 16, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2014, p. 85. 
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responsible fulfilment. This assembling and integrating of details towards the realization 
of a purpose points one towards Jaimini’s notion of sacrifice as an event.  
Clooney, drawing from a pūrvapakṣa position in sūtra 4.2.23 that the siddhānta accepts, 
proposes prayoga as the term that best encapsulates ‘the overall pattern of a sacrifice, 
the relationships of various parts and aspects in right order.’107 The combination of 
general propositions and specific cases illustrated in the seventh adhyāya suggests that 
Jaimini was not looking to describe an abstract model of sacrifice or develop 
generalized methods of performing it. Rather, he was looking to negotiate the situated 
and responsible fulfilment of every enactment. Sacrifices, for Jaimini, are not essences 
but events constructed and re-constructed based on the particularity of each context. 
Therefore, it is prayoga that best denotes the sacrifice as a ‘once-occurent event’ i.e. ‘a 
particular happening in a particular time and place, done by a particular person’.108 
There is no abstract prayoga because prayoga is by definition an occurrence in 
historical time. As Clooney elaborates, the intersection of prayoga with the notion of 
motivation (prayojana) in the adjective prayukta also suggests the value and integrity of 
any particular sacrifice as a whole. Each sacrifice, ‘as a particular event, in a specific 
time and place’, ‘becomes a kind of “world”, valuable in itself, into which things, and 
people and actions enter for specific purposes’ and come into being.109 Prayoga allows 
one to claim that while the structures of sacrifices are strictly laid out to guide the 
performance, the event of enactment itself is a continuous re-negotiation and 
appropriation of those same structures to allow the specificity of that particular sacrifice 
to flourish and be accomplished.
110
 This notion of prayoga that Clooney propounds can 
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be seen in Jaimini’s analysis of actions, particularly concerning their arrangement and 
integration.  
Main Division of Actions: Primary and Subsidiary  
In sūtras 2.1.6-9, Jaimini introduces two kinds of actions which he classifies as 
pradhāna (primary) and guṇa (subsidiary) actions - that which rests upon itself and is 
performed for the purpose of its own fulfilment is a primary action and that which turns 
upon itself and imparts an aid to the materials for sacrifice is a subsidiary action: 
2.1.6: Actions are of two kinds – the primary and the subsidiary. 
2.1.7: Those that do not seek to make (prepare) a material are primary actions, because the 
material is a secondary factor. 
2.1.8: Those that are meant to make (prepare) a material are recognized as subsidiary, because 
with regard to them, the material is the predominant factor. 
2.1.9: In the case of dharmic actions, every action would be primary because of the non-
fulfilment [of anything visible] – as in the case of prayāja.
111
 
The chief basis of this distinction is based on the following rationale: every act is related 
to some material substance and this substance has been regarded as serving the visible 
purpose of accomplishing the act. In certain cases, the act mentioned turns upon itself 
and imparts an aid to the material substance, for instance, in the case of the act of 
threshing, which serves to clean the corn. However, in some cases, the act rests upon 
itself entirely, where its sole purpose is its own fulfilment, for example, a sacrificial 
performance. Some actions are regarded as ‘primary’ actions because they are actions 
not used as materials or accessories for sacrifice. Other actions are regarded as 
‘subsidiary’ actions because they are actions which constitute the preparation and 
production of material substances, such as the consecrating of the sacrificial fire, the 
appointment of priests at a sacrifice, the threshing and grinding of the corn and 
contribute towards the accomplishment of the primary actions.  
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 MS 2.1.6: Tāni dvaidhaṁ guṇapradhānabhūtāni 
MS 2.1.7: Yairdravyaṁ na cikīrṣyate tāni pradhānabhūtāni dravyasya guṇabhūtatvāt 
MS 2.1.8: Yaistu dravyaṁ cikīrṣyate gūṇastatra pratīyeta tasya dravyapradhānatvāt 
MS 2.1.9: Dharmamātre tu karma syādanirvṛtteḥ prayājavat 
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It may be noted here that the distinction of actions into ‘primary’ and ‘subsidiary’ is 
distinct from the subject of aṅgin (principal) and aṅga (auxiliary) in that the former 
distinction refers to actions alone, while the latter refers to a relationship that subsists 
between actions on the one hand and substances, qualities and purifications on the 
other.
112
 The latter distinction is important because once the differences between the 
two kinds of actions are established, the question about whether every enacted act is an 
independent act in itself or whether there are some acts that may be considered 
subordinate and therefore, auxiliary i.e. serving the purposes of some others actions, is 
immediately posited. It is the theme of the ‘auxiliary character’ of the acts and its 
concern with the motive of actions that is discussed at length between the fourth and 
twelfth adhyāya in the Sūtras. 
In sūtra 3.1.2, the character of the ‘auxiliary’ is defined as ‘that which subserves the 
purposes of something else, of another’,113 suggesting that they exist entirely for the 
purposes of helping others.
114
 The case of sprinkling of water on the corn in connection 
with a sacrifice or the prayājas in connection with the darśapūrṇamāsa, are such 
examples.
115
 While Jaimini mentions in sūtras 3.1.3-6 that the character of an 
‘auxiliary’ belongs to ‘substances’, ‘properties or accessories’, ‘embellishments’, ‘acts’, 
‘result, and even the ‘agent’,116 Kumārila, quoting Bādari, argues that the character of 
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MS 3.1.4: Karmāṇyapi jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt 
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MS 3.1.5: Phalaṁ ca puruṣārthatvāt 
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MS 3.1.6: Puruṣaśca karmāthatvāt 
The agent is also [an auxiliary], as he is for the purpose of action. 
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auxiliary can only belong to the first three. He claims that the ‘act’, the ‘result’ and the 
‘agent’ can serve both as ‘principal’ and ‘auxiliary’ in relation to one another.117 
Classification of Acts 
Before proceeding with the subject of the difference among actions, it is necessary to 
explain the various divisions and classifications made among acts. The first division is 
between what Jaimini classifies as the laukika (worldly) act and the vaidika (Vedic) act 
in sūtras 11.1.26-28.118 Laukika and vaidika actions are similar in that they are both 
governed by an artha (purpose), they can also be distinguihed in that vaidika action is 
further governed by a sabdārtha, which is the purpose accessible only through the 
Veda: 
11.1.20-25: The results of action occur only upon actual performance, and are proportionate (one 
performance, one result, etc.), as is the case in common areas of experience, e.g., agriculture 
(there is a proportion  between the work done and the fruit). Each time the action is performed, 
therefore, the result occurs. The repetition of the sacrifice duplicates the results, and 
performances re-occur whenever someone desires the result. Since this (arising of desire which 
prompts performance) is a matter of perception, the performances can be undertaken as one 
wishes; there is no scriptural prescription in this regard. Subsidiary sacrificial actions are 
governed by texts, however, and cannot be repeated as one might wish. (Thus, undertaking a 
sacrifice at all is a matter of personal decision; but within the sacrifice, performance of the 
actions is strictly governed by scripture). 
11.1.26-28: In ordinary experience, action is defined by (perceptible) goals, and the action is 
complete when the goal is perceived to have been attained. By contrast, in matters related to 
dharma and not governed by perception (i.e. pertaining to the purpose and result of the 
sacrifice), action is begun and completed only as scripture prescribes.
119
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 MS 11.1.26: Loke karmā’rthalakṣaṇaṃ 
In ordinary experience, the action is determined by the need [for perceptible goals (fruits)]. 
MS 11.1.27: Kriyāṇāmarthaśeṣatvāt pratyakṣo’tastannirvṛttyā’pavargaḥ syāt 
The actions are subservient to the purpose, and the purpose is perceptible; hence the actions should be 
regarded as complete only on the accomplishment of the purpose. 
MS 11.1.28: Dharmamātre tvadarśanāc chabdārthenāpavargaḥ syāt 
[On the other hand,] in the case of dharma, where there is no visible effect, the accomplishment is 
complete by doing exactly as enjoined by the word (text). 
119
 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini, p. 136.  
MS 11.1.20: Karmanyārambhabhāvyatvāt kṛṣivat pratyārambhaṁ phalānī syuḥ 
MS 11.1.21: Adhikāraś ca sarveṣāṁ kāryyatvād upapadyate viśeṣaḥ 
MS 11.1.22: Sakṛttu syāt kṛtārthatvādaṅgavat 
MS 11.1.23: Śabdārthaśca tathā loke 
MS 11.1.24: Api vā samprayoge yathākāmī sampratīyetāśrutitvādvidhiṣu vacanāni syuḥ 
MS 11.1.25: Aikaśabdyāt tathāṅgeṣu 
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The vaidika actions are further classified under two heads: (a) Positive or action proper, 
the performance of an act, and (b) negative or avoidance of an act.
120
 Of positive actions 
the three main divisions are: (a) ‘yāga’ – ‘sacrifice proper, the offering of a certain 
substance to a deity’, (b) ‘homa’ – ‘offering of the substance into fire or water’, and (c) 
‘dāna’ – ‘waiving of one’s own proprietary right over a thing in favour of another 
person’. 121  Another important division among the vaidika acts is in terms of (a) 
kratvartha, an act which helps in the fulfilment of the sacrifice and under which fall all 
subsidiary acts, and (b) puruṣārtha, an act accomplishing the desires of the sacrificial 
agent, under which fall all primary acts, as directly consequential for bringing about a 
result, both visible and invisible, that accrue to the agent.
122
 The classification of the 
vaidika acts into nitya (compulsory), naimittika (occasional), and kāmya (optional, 
performed for a particular purpose) is considered to be the most important. 
Artha and the Agency of the Yajamāna 
Artha, considered as ‘one of the driving forces of human life for more than two 
thousand years’ in India, is more commonly recognized as one of the ‘four ends of 
human life’ (puruṣārthas), which include kāma, dharma and mokṣa. 123  Within this 
perspective, artha as ‘wealth’ is understood to be interrelated with kāma as 
                                                                                                                                               
MS 11.1.26: Loke karmā’rthalakṣaṇaṃ 
MS 11.1.27: Kriyāṇāmarthaśeṣatvāt pratyakṣo’tastannirvṛttyā’pavargaḥ syāt 
MS 11.1.28: Dharmamātre tvadarśanāc chabdārthenāpavargaḥ syāt 
The translations of these sūtras are borrowed from Clooney. See KH Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian 
Philosophies: Philosophy of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, vol 16, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2014, p. 97. 
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Next then, an enquiry into kratvartha (what subserves the purposes of action) and puruṣārtha (what 
subserves the purposes of man). 
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‘enjoyment’, dharma as ‘rules of life’ and mokṣa as ‘spirituality’,124 together known as 
the caturāśrama.125 Klostermaier points out that while this ‘sequence of stages’ is not 
necessarily followed by Hindus in their lives, the ‘caturāśrama’ structure have certainly 
‘influenced the personal and social history of Hindus and Hinduism.’126 Scharfe traced 
the historical development of the term and its shift in meaning that ranges from ‘goal’ to 
‘worldly objective’ to ‘wealth’. According to him, the usage of the term in the Ṛg Veda 
is closer to denoting the sense of ‘a goal, especially the goal of a journey (“going to the 
same artha”) but also of an enterprise (“the matter at hand”)’. Towards the end of the 
Vedic period the term began to acquire ‘meanings of substantial and material content’ 
and ‘assumed a major role in the ethics and religion of the Hindu people’. Scharfe notes 
that ‘as an object of commerce and agriculture, artha came to denote wealth and 
worldly possessions, and as the object of statecraft, it denoted a wide range of political 
duties and objectives.’ He also mentioned that the transition from ‘a seminomadic 
society’ to ‘a society of sedentary peasants’ in the late Vedic period resulted in the 
denotation of artha as ‘material well being of the society’.127 Scharfe also pointed out 
that ‘it was only about the third century BCE onward’ that artha came to be 
‘incorporated under the heading of the “goals of man”.’128 Therefore, historically, these 
shifts in the meaning of artha ‘reflected different phases in the religious development in 
India’, and the term came to express a variety of meanings. Krishnamoorthy points out 
that ‘many modern writers’ are unfortunately ‘misled by the technical terms used by 
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ancient writers’ and have not been able to appreciate the ‘polysemous’ nature of 
terminologies adopted by them. For him, ‘artha’ can be taken to mean a ‘thing’, a 
‘meaning’ or an ‘end-value.’129  
The term artha in the definition of dharma in sūtra 1.1.2 can be taken in the sense of 
‘[that] human good’ or ‘[that] purpose’ (and it is in a similar sense that artha has been 
discussed so far in this thesis).
130
 However, the range of meanings adopted throughout 
the Sūtras and in Śabara’s Bhāṣya also includes meanings such as ‘object or thing’, ‘aim 
or purpose’, and ‘sense or meaning’.131 Artha is consistently taken as ‘meaning’ when it 
is used to refer to the meaning derived from words (śabdārtha) and it is taken as ‘the 
purpose of action’ (kriyārtha) when a group of words and a set of accessories set apart 
for a particular enactment of sacrifice are brought together. The notion of artha assumes 
particular significance in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras precisely because Jaimini claims that there 
is an underlying (intrinsic) relationship between each word and their meanings and also 
between action and its purpose. The ‘purpose or aim’ towards which this word-act 
interplay is directed brings about two related forms of purpose - the purpose of the 
sacrificer (puruṣārtha) and the purpose of the sacrifice (yajñārtha). These further 
determinations of ‘purpose’ guide both the reading of the Veda (texts) and the 
performance of actions.
132
  
In the preceding sections, I discussed the event of yajña primarily by looking at the way 
in which the task of the correct integration of accessories and the task of ensuring 
responsible fulfilment saw the orientation of the system cohere and centralize towards 
the integration of what actually happens in the enactment of sacrifice. In the midst of 
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this grand rearrangement (organizing) of the details of the sacrifice, and particularly in 
light of the two-fold classification of actions into primary and secondary, further 
distinguished along ‘principal’ and ‘auxiliary’ acts, where does one situate the agent of 
sacrifice, the yajamāna (svāmin),133 the one who enters the world of sacrifice with a 
desire for a phala, with a goal or purpose in mind? The location of the yajamāna, not 
only in light of his relationship with the hired ṛtviks (priests) but also in light of the 
centrality of the sacrificial act itself, is an important one, particularly because the 
efficacy of the practice of sacrifice continues to be seen through the lens of its phala, 
and to whom it accrues. 
Building on the interpretation of tyāga as ‘renunciation (of the fruits of the ritual acts)’ 
by Staal et al. in the well-known work on Vedic ritual, AGNI, Krishna claims that the 
‘distinction’ between the yajamāna and the ṛtviks in the context of retribution is 
significant because Staal’s interpretation (even if he agrees that it is misplaced and that 
what Staal is referring to is closer to a dravya) pushes one to consider the non-agency of 
the yajamāna as essentially in conflict with the active notion of karman. For him, the 
crucial features of the Vedic yajña from the viewpoint of the theory of action are the 
following:134 
1. It is an action done by a group of persons for someone else who has engaged them for 
performing that action by paying the prescribed fee. 
2. It is a collective action which can only be undertaken jointly by each person performing the part 
assigned to him in the total activity. 
3. The action, though performed by many persons with each contributing separately to it, is still 
supposed to be one action. 
4. The action, though done by many persons, is not regarded as their action, either singly or jointly, 
in the sense that the fruit of this action does not accrue to them. 
5. The fruit of action accrues not to those who actually perform it, but to the one who has paid 
them to perform it. 
6. The action is always undertaken for the achievement of a desired end, whether in this world or 
the next. It other words, it is a sakāma karma. 
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Krishna then quotes the Mīmāṃsāsūtras 3.7.36, which states that ‘the ṛtvik is one who is 
given the sacrificial fee as mentioned in the dakṣiṇāvākya’,135 as a justification for his 
claim that there is a clear distinction between the yajamāna (the person for whom the 
sacrifice is performed) and the ṛtviks (the priests who perform the sacrifice) in the 
context of Vedic sacrifice. He takes the relationship between the yajamāna and the 
ṛtviks to be limited to the ‘hiring’ of the latter by the former for the performance of a 
sacrifice whose fruits he desires to obtain. As he remarks:  
As far as Vedic yajña is concerned…the problem there relates not to the formulation of the 
principle according to which the fruit is to be distributed amongst those who have collectively 
participated in the action, but of the accrual of fruit to a person who has done practically nothing 
except hiring others to perform the yajña for him.
136
  
This ‘theory of the yajña’, that ‘one can reap the fruit of somebody else’s action’, is 
then posited against the ‘hard core of the theory of karma’ which ‘denies the very 
possibility of such a situation ever arising in a universe that is essentially moral in 
nature.’137 Krishna writes that the ‘theory of karma as elaborated in the Indian tradition, 
therefore, has to be seen not as a description of facts relating to human action, but as an 
attempt to render them intelligible in moral terms’.138 He further elaborates: ‘If “moral 
intelligibility” requires that each human being should reap only the fruit of his own 
actions, then no human being can really affect anyone else however much the 
appearances may seem to justify the contrary.
139
 
It is in the context of this interpretation of karman and its problematic relationship with 
yajña that I revisit Jaimini’s discussion and usage of artha to develop a more elaborate 
understanding of ritual as narratively-structured traditionary practice. If the event of 
sacrifice revolves around the yajñakarma, which is guided by a prayoga, the 
                                                 
135
 MS 3.7.36: Niyamastu dakṣiṇābhiḥ śrutisaṁyogāt 
136
 Krishna, Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective, p. 176.  
137
 Ibid., p. 175.  
138
 Ibid., p. 177. 
139
 Ibid., p. 178.  
 244 
answerability of sacrifice can be sought in the yajamāna - the one who ensures the 
fulfilment of the sacrifice. The question that concerns me here is whether the yajamāna 
is a non-participant in the sense that Krishna portrays and therefore, is just another 
accessory that make up the sacrifice entailing no agency in the enactment of the 
sacrifice or whether he can be conceptualized as a ‘participative thinker’ who, in light of 
his desire for purpose and meaning and willful submission to tradition, understands the 
nature and significance of traditionary practice and his place and role within it. 
Motive for Acting: Puruṣārtha, Kŗatvartha and Phalas 
After a discussion on the question of the two forms of actions and their classification, 
Jaimini addresses the question of ‘prayukti’, which can be translated as ‘motivation’. 
The term ‘motivation’ is posited in light of an enquiry to understand what it is that 
inspires the occasion of a certain act. I mentioned the role of ‘desire’ in the third chapter 
and the nature of ‘obligation’ in the fourth chapter; in this section I introduce the 
discussion of motivation as it relates to the ritual subject and the practice of sacrifice. 
Following the distinction between the principal and the auxiliary acts where the 
principal act is taken to motivate, incite and provide the occasion for the auxiliary, the 
question of the motive of an act necessarily turns upon the question as to whether the 
act by itself fulfils the purpose (or object) desired by the agent, or whether the act fulfils 
something related to another act. In these two instances, the former where the act 
subserves the purposes of man is termed as the puruṣārtha and the latter where the act 
subserves the purposes of another act is termed as the kratvartha. This distinction best 
clarifies the question of motive for practice. 
In sūtra 4.1.2 Jaimini claims that ‘what subserves the purposes of man (puruṣārtha) is 
that which follows the happiness of man, as the undertaking is due to his desire to 
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obtain happiness, and this is inseparable from his purpose (or goal).’140 Based on this 
sūtra, Clooney argues that puruṣārtha denotes a sacrifice which is done out of self-
interest and the nature of this enactment is closer to one that is pursued only for the 
satisfaction of visible human needs. He contrasts this with a kratu, which according to 
him, denotes a particular sacrifice in ‘the integral unity of all its parts: the fore-
sacrifices, accessories, subsidiaries etc.’ He claims that when the term kratu is used in 
the compound kratvartha, the compound can be translated to mean ‘that which is for the 
purpose of sacrifice’, where the word kratu takes on the general meaning of sacrifice. 
The kratvartha is then interpreted as the ‘driving force of inner coherence or purpose’, 
which holds the whole together, the ‘causal architectonic’ of the sacrifice requiring it to 
fit together smoothly and in proper hierarchy.
141
 Therefore, for Clooney, in this 
particular form, kratvartha is strictly contrasted with puruṣārtha, that which is for the 
sake of the person. Clooney quotes the fourth and the eleventh adhyāya and particularly 
sūtras 4.1.1-6 and 11.1.28 to highlight his claim that within the category of the action 
performed, in the case of puruṣārtha, the desire for visible phalas by the agent is taken 
to be primary and in the case of kratvartha, the fulfilment of the act is primary: 
4.1.2: Humans desire to have what gives them pleasure, and this is inseparable from their 
purpose (or goal).  
4.1.3-6: The surrender of what pleases the performer can also be for his sake, since scripture, 
which is indubitable, asserts this, and since such actions have no material object; however, they 
need not lead directly to the desired result.
142
 
11.1.28: By contrast, in matters related to dharma and not governed by perception (i.e., 
pertaining to the purpose and result of the sacrifice), action is begun and completed only as 
scripture prescribes.
143
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 MS 4.1.2: Yasmin prītiḥ puruṣasya tasya lipsā’rthalakṣaṇāvibhaktatvāt 
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It is this inter-relation between the two arthas which allow scholars such as Clooney 
and Das to claim that the relation between kratvartha and puruṣārtha is of a 
‘hierarchical encompassment’.144 This is shown by the fact that the performance of 
kratvartha necessarily entails the performance of certain activities described as 
puruṣārthas. They claim that stressing the second notion of dharma realized when an 
act is performed for the sake of sacrifice places the individual perspective in a 
subordinate role to the overall dharma realized in the total sacrificial system. This 
subordination enables the importance of the human dharma without reducing that 
dharma to a particular individualized meaning. According to Clooney, once a sacrificial 
agent (yajamāna) enters the event of a sacrifice as an obligated and desirous self, he 
realizes that he is participating in a ‘larger whole’ where the sacrificial act is no longer 
governed by his desires alone. He is required to meticulously perform according to the 
rules that are prescribed.
145
 He further adds that while the human person may approach 
the sacrifice as he wishes and according to his desire for certain results, once he has 
committed himself to undertake the enactment of a particular sacrifice, ‘the action is no 
longer governed by his viewpoint and desires. He himself is now a part of a larger event 
not totally dependent on him.’ He claims that this ‘relocation of human perspective - 
from center stage to a supporting role - is an intellectually useful position that enables 
the Mīmāṃsākas to affirm human significance without reducing it to an expression of 
this or that human meaning’.146 To sum up Clooney’s claim, it is ‘anthropocentrism’ 
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that is ultimately transcended to make way for the larger fulfilment of the sacrifice and 
the realization of dharma.
147
  
However, discussing the same sūtra (4.1.2), Jha argues that while the puruṣārtha is 
discussed in light of an action undertaken by man for the purposes of obtaining a reward 
in the form of happiness, he takes kratvartha as entailing an act which helps in the 
accomplishment of another act and more specifically the puruṣārtha act that does not 
itself bring any reward to the performer. Under the puruṣārtha, Jha includes all the 
principal sacrifices like the darśapūrṇamāsa, as these lead to results desired by the 
agent, while to the category of kratvartha he relegates all the auxiliary acts having their 
sole purpose in fulfilling the principal act itself, such as the prayajas which are auxiliary 
to the darśapūrṇamāsa for example. Jaimini’s discussion of sūtras 4.3.1-7 also suggests 
that all material substances, along with their ‘embellishments’ and ‘sanctifications’, are 
regarded as kratvartha and even in cases where the texts mention some special results 
accruing from these, the results are regarded as only commendatory.
148
 There are also 
certain things that can be regarded as both puruṣārtha and kratvartha, such as the 
mention of the curd, either as an offering in sacrifice or as a substance offered for 
obtaining efficient sense-organs. In the Rijuvimalā, Śālikanātha makes the following 
observation:  
The puruṣārtha should be defined as that which subserves the principal sacrifice and also the 
purposes of the agent, by itself, and not through being employed in another act – helping the 
principal act…those of this latter kind being regarded as kratvartha.149 
The question of puruṣārtha and kratvartha is important because it bears directly on the 
question of motive. In sūtras 4.1.22-24 it is mentioned that puruṣārtha viz. ‘what 
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subserves the purposes of man’ contains its own motive within itself, however, what is 
kratvartha viz. ‘what subserves the purposes of the sacrificial act’ is taken to have its 
motive primarily in that particular act towards whose fulfilment it would assist, or 
whose procedure it would form part.
150
 Although there are some acts which can be 
categorized neither as puruṣārtha nor kratvartha, such as fire installation or Vedic 
study, these acts are considered to be needed for bringing about the performance of acts 
and the results desired by man. Such acts are therefore usually taken as a puruṣārtha. 
There are other acts that do not help produce any sacrifice or bring about any desired 
results, such as the making of the juhū used at the sacrifice. In the same category belong 
the embellishments and sanctificatory acts whose main role is to sanctify certain 
materials used at sacrifices and render them fit for use. To the same category also 
belong the viśvajit sacrifice. Although an enjoined sacrifice, it is neither a part of 
another sacrifice nor brings about a desirable result by itself. The general conclusion 
regarding such acts is that they should be considered as bringing about the desired 
result, in the shape of heaven and, therefore, be considered as a puruṣārtha.151 
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MS 4.3.14: Ekaṁ vā codanaikatvāt 
Only one result should be assumed, as the injunction instigates only one action. 
MS 4.3.15: Sa svargaḥ syāt, sarvān pratyaviśiṣṭatvāt 
That one result assumed is ‘heaven’, as that is equally desirable for all. 
MS 4.3.16: Pratyayācca 
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I mentioned in the third chapter that the Mīmāṃsā subject does indeed overcome his 
egocentric and individualist view to understand the vastness of the traditionary practice 
within which he is located. I also mentioned that for Jaimini, the intelligibility and 
purpose of the sacrifice is located in the totality of the sacrificial event and not in the 
human sacrificial agent or the deities separately. While this thesis is sympathetic to the 
transcending of ‘anthropocentrism’ that Clooney espouses in his reading of the 
Mīmāṃsā event of sacrifice, Jaimini’s privileging of the act in his event of sacrifice, 
when taken together with the performability of the Veda and the centrality of 
injunctions, entails that his notion of sacrifice is one that is necessarily oriented towards 
a telos that is meaningful for the subject. Therefore, within the framework of Jaimini’s 
project, neither of these arthas is subordinate to the other in the definitive sense that 
Clooney claims, and both contribute to the fulfilment of the whole of the ritual 
performance. In Jaimini’s system, every artha seeks to integrate and harmonize with the 
other arthas in a way that allows their dharmic existence to be realized (carried out). 
Jaimini’s sacrifice contains a myriad of meaningful elements and relationships and the 
artha of the sacrifice is not measured by any one of them in isolation but only when 
they are integrated together in a harmonious whole.  
Under the telos of realizing dharma, all the components of what makes up a sacrificial 
event (prayoga) are ultimately taken as having the character of a subsidiary. These 
components include substances, accessories (mantra and deity), purifications, actions 
and even human agents:
152
 
                                                                                                                                               
Also because such is the common notion [of people]. 
152
 MS 3.1.2: Śeṣaḥ parārthatvāt 
MS 3.1.3: Dravyaguṇasaṁskāreṣu bādariḥ 
MS 3.1.4: Karmāṇyapi jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt 
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MS 3.1.7: Teṣāmarthena sambandhaḥ 
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3.1.2: An element is an auxiliary (subordinate) because it serves the purposes of another. 
3.1.3: [The character of auxiliary] belongs to substances (materials used), properties [of 
materials, performers, actions, etc.] and preparations (preparatory actions), says Bādari. 
3.1.4: Actions are also [auxiliary], because they serve the purpose of the result, says Jaimini. 
3.1.5: The result is also [an auxiliary], as he is for the purpose of agent. 
3.1.6: The agent is also [an auxiliary], as he is for the purpose of action. 
3.1.7: [All these subordinate elements] are connected to one another in terms of purpose. 
All actions are also taken to be ‘subservient’ to their arthas as it is for the sake of the 
purpose that they are carried out. The centrality of action for Jaimini is captured by 
Clooney when he argues that ‘actions take priority over every element used in them, and 
the sacrifice is a single overall action comprised of many component actions (along with 
all their component elements). The multiple actions are integrated in terms of their 
purposes, leading to the constitution of the single overall purpose’.153 
Shared Subjectivity: Yajamāna, Ṛtviks and Sattras 
In sūtra 3.7.18, an issue is raised regarding whether all sacrifices for the sake of heaven 
should be performed entirely by the ‘sacrificer’ himself, or whether he need perform 
only the ‘act of dedication’ i.e. utsarga and the rest may be done by himself or others or 
only by those who have been hired for the purpose.
154
 Clooney summarizes the 
discussion between sūtras 3.7.18-24 in the following manner:  
Even though the result accrues to the performer of the sacrifice, he himself need perform only 
those subordinate elements related to the primary act, the act of sacrifice. The rest may be done 
                                                                                                                                               
The human agent is subservient to the actions, being the performer who will accomplish the action, and 
for the sake of which he exists. Prabhākara adds that the result can also be taken as a subsidiary because 
the result is for the sake of the human agent, who accomplishes it by means of his acting. See Jha, The 
Prabhākara School of Mīmāṃsā, pp. 178-179. 
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 Clooney, ‘Sacrifice and its Spiritualizations in the Christian and Hindu Traditions: A Study in 
Comparative Theology’, p. 368. 
154
 MS 3.7.18: Śāstraphalaṁ prayoktari tallakṣaṇatvāt tasmāt svayaṁ prayoge syāt 
The fruit [mentioned in the scriptures] accrues to the actual performer; therefore the sacrificer himself 
should carry on the entire performance. 
MS 3.7.19: Utsarge tu pradhānatvāccheṣakārī pradhānasya, tasmādanyaḥ svayaṁ vā syāt 
In as much as dedication is the principal act, it must be done by the sacrificer himself, [he being the 
principal person concerned]; as for the other acts, they may be done either by the sacrificer himself or by 
another person. 
MS 3.7.20: Pradhānatvāt śeṣakārī pradhānasya, tasmād anyaḥ svayaṁ vā syāt 
[In reality,] another person should [perform the details] because the securing of hired priests (paid agents) 
has been actually enjoined, and that is not possible in the case of the sacrificer himself. 
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by someone else, as is indicated by the mention of “payment” – he could not very well pay 
himself. But the number of other, paid performers is regulated by scripture.
155
  
In connection with the subsidiaries, the pūrvapakṣa also raises the question as to 
whether the sacrificer himself is to perform the subsidiaries or whether it is necessary 
for him to perform the primary sacrifice only, the subsidiaries being performed for him 
by priests appointed by him. The siddhānta position is that he may have the subsidiaries 
performed by others yet, being the prime mover in these actions, the result of all actions 
- primary as well as subsidiary - will accrue to him.
156
 The agency of the yajamāna, 
according to the pūrvapakṣa, is understood in terms of his overarching centrality i.e. he 
does all the work. However, according to Jaimini, the agency of the yajamāna is 
understood in terms of his ability to appropriate specific enjoinments towards the goal 
of fulfilment and towards realizing the telos of dharma. Just as the basic fruitfulness of 
sacrificial action still allows for the distinction of primary and subsidiary actions, the 
fact of human participation in sacrifice allows for various distinctions such as that 
between the yajamāna and the priests. It is this precise ability that allows the shared 
cultivation of meaning and purpose in the practice of sacrifice.  
It is impossible for the person who undertakes a sacrifice to enact every enjoined act by 
himself. In the context of an enjoined practice where the task is to understand your 
specific role and to appreciate the role of others, the necessity of interaction is part of 
the duties of a yajamāna. It is this presence of the role of others that is often mistaken as 
outside assistance. Even though the yajamāna appoints and pays for the services 
rendered by these assistants, he is the prime mover of all the acts done by these persons. 
The results and benefits of these acts accrue to the sacrificial agent who arranges the fee 
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 See KH Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Philosophy of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, vol 16, Motilal 
Banarsidass, Delhi, 2014, p. 77. 
156
 MS 3.7.20: Pradhānatvāt śeṣakārī pradhānasya, tasmād anyaḥ svayaṁ vā syāt 
[In reality,] another person should [perform the details] because the securing of hired priests (paid agents) 
has been actually enjoined, and that is not possible in the case of the sacrificer himself. 
See Jha, The Prabhākara School of Mīmāṃsā, p. 195. 
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prescribed in connection with each act. Jaimini goes on to claim that the number of 
priests to be engaged could be as many as the duties enjoined to be performed by the 
several performers in the Veda.
157
  
Jaimini has also devoted some sūtras to the consideration of various questions regarding 
the performance of sattras. Sattras are ‘communistic sacrificial performances’ i.e. done 
by several persons together. Since each of these persons help in the accomplishment of 
the desired ‘phala’ each of them is considered a ‘sacrificer’ and as such the ‘phala’ of 
the sattras accrues to each of the sacrificers. Even though the performance of sattras is 
undertaken by a number of persons collectively, the phala accrues to each of them 
individually. The sattras differ from other forms of Vedic sacrifices in that; (a) they 
cannot be performed by one man and (b) there is no distinction between the priest and 
the sacrificer (yajamāna): 
10.6.45: Only one man should perform the Sattra, like its archetype. 
10.6.46: On account of direct declaration, it should be performed by several men. 
10.6.50: If there were only one performer, then the specific mention of ‘several’ would be 
meaningless. 
10.6.59: To the Dvādaśāha belongs the character of ‘Sattra’ (a) when the injunction is of 
‘sitting’ and ‘proceeding’, and (b) where there is a plurality of sacrificers – these being 
associated with the name Sattra. 
10.6.60: To it belongs the character of ‘Ahīna’ when (a) the injunction is of ‘sacrificing’ and (b) 
there is no restriction regarding the number of ‘masters’.158  
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 Some of the names of such performers that have been listed are the following: (a) the adhvaryu, who 
does the distribution (b) the pratiprasthātṛ, who offers the manthin (c) the neṣṭṛ, who brings up the 
sacrificer’s wife (d) the unnetṛ, who fills the cup (e) the prastotṛ, who introduces the chant (f) the udgātṛ, 
who sings the chant (g) the pratihartṛ, who sings the pratihāra chant (h) the subrahmaṇya, who recites 
the subrahmaṇyā (i) the hotṛ, who recites the prāṭaranuvāka hymn (j) the maitrāvaruṇa, who gives 
directions and recites the puronuvākyā (k) the acchāvakā, who recites the yajyā (l) the grāvastut, who 
recites the grāvastotrīya mantra. The exact number of priests at the soma sacrifice and also at the 
darśapūrṇamāsa is seventeen. The functions of priests are restricted by their names, that is on the basis of 
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of the acts and the priests is the general rule but there are practical exceptions. Refer Garge, Citations in 
Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, p. 289. 
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 MS 10.6.45: Satramekaḥ prakṛtivat 
MS 10.6.46: Vacanāt tu bahūnāṁ syāt 
MS 10.6.50: Bahūnāmiti caikasmin viśeṣavacanaṁ vyarthaṃ 
MS 10.6.59: Dvādaśāhasya satratvam āsanopāyicodanena yajamānabahutvena ca 
satraśabdābhisaṁyogāt 
MS 10.6.60: Yajaticodanādahīnatvaṁ svāmināṁ cā’sthitaparimāṇatvāt 
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For this reason, there is no appointment of the priests nor are their services exchanged 
for any promised gift. In the case of the sattras, there are seventeen sacrificers and all 
the sacrificers take part in the performance not only as ‘sacrificers’ but also as 
‘priests’.159 
In my introduction to this section on the answerability of yajña, I have mentioned that 
Krishna claims a distinction between the yajamāna and the ṛtviks, where the former is 
taken as just an observer and the latter is taken as a hired hand. In Jaimini’s conception 
of sacrifice, no role towards its fulfilment is just a role but is always one that is 
enjoined. The distinction between the yajamāna, that is, the person for whom the 
sacrifice is performed and the ṛtviks, that is, the priests who performs the sacrifice, is 
not clear-cut in the case of all the sacrifices, as discussed above. In the context of the 
jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, for example, the yajamāna himself is technically regarded as a ṛtvik 
in order to complete the number of ṛtviks, which is mentioned as seventeen. In sūtra 
3.7.38, Jaimini seeks to justify this on the basis of ‘karmasāmānyāt’, that is, the 
similarity of functions between the ṛtviks and the yajamāna.160  
Krishna sees this shared cultivation and negotiation of purpose as the non-agency and 
therefore, non-answerability of the yajamāna. When one takes this shared co-authoring 
in light of the centrality of the correct performance of the once-occurent event of 
sacrifice in Jaimini’s project, one can start to appreciate the transformation and 
intensification that the yajamāna allows himself to go through. According to Jaimini, 
each of the different elements of the sacrificial event (prayoga) including the smallest 
details possesses their own dharm. The yajamāna is compelled to keep his attention 
focussed through the course of the performance to ensure that each enactment is a 
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 Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya: A Study, pp. 293-294. 
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 MS 3.7.38: Svāmisaptadaśāḥ karmasāmānyāt 
The master of the house is to be regarded as the seventeenth priest, on the basis of the similarity of 
function. 
 254 
dharmic one. When the dharma of all the components of the sacrificial event is 
correctly understood and performed efficaciously and all the elements fit correctly into 
the myriad of meanings constituting the act, it is then that, as Clooney claims, the 
‘dharma of sacrifice’ is known and realized. 161  When the yajamāna knows and 
understands his own dharma, he is then able to channel his own desires to participate in 
the larger sacrificial arrangement. In the process he learns to appreciate the dharma of 
each of the enjoined acts that serves the fulfilment of the sacrificial event (prayoga) and 
contributes to the realization of the yajñārtha. This channeling is best observable in 
Jaimini’s discussion of the interplay of the two arthas that realize ‘the dharma of 
sacrifice’, and it is to that I finally turn.  
DHARMA AND THE HARMONIZED YAJÑA 
So far I have discussed that the yajamāna, as the agent of sacrifice can be taken to be 
the prime mover of traditionary practice who not only understands his role within the 
community but is committed to enacting his specific enjoinments while seeking to 
ensure the fulfilment of all enactments in harmony. In this process, he has come to 
understand the nature of the tradition within which he is located, its historicality, and 
the responsibility of appropriating it and carrying the weight of its continuation through 
his action. Without the agent of sacrifice, there is no enactment and without enactment, 
there is no authoritativeness that can be derived from the living dialogue that is Veda, 
upon which all things Vedic are ultimately founded and renewed.  
Now I turn to the question of how Jaimini’s conception of dharma is intrinsically 
related to the sacrificial agent and the enactment of the traditionary practice of sacrifice. 
In short, I want to come to a clearer understanding of how dharma, subjectivity and 
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 Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, p. 160. 
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traditionary practice are conceptually tied together in a way that can inform me about 
Jaimini’s fundamental concern and the nature of his enquiry. 
Jaimini introduces his enquiry into dharma as unamenable to common sense-
perceptions and the telos of realizing dharma is characterized by its nature of 
invisibility. Moreover, the event of sacrifice is posited to belong to the deontological 
realm of the obligatory act, which thereby can be read as reinforcing the radical split 
between what is amenable and what remains invisible. Jaimini’s concern is to bring 
these two together in a way that enables him to ground the invisible in the realm of the 
immediacy of lived experience. Therefore, his insistence that dharma could be realized 
only through the correct performance of rituals paves the way for understanding dharma 
as primarily constitutive of the human existentiale and of society.  
Jaimini’s inquiry into dharma, which he declared in the first sūtra 1.1.1 162  in his 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras, begins with the definition ‘codanālakṣaṇārtho dharmaḥ’ that Jha 
translates as the following: ‘Dharma is that artha (purpose, meaning) which, being 
desirable, is distinguished by or possesses the characteristics of a codanā.’163 Flood, in 
his overview of Hindu rituals in his Introduction to Hinduism, also takes Jaimini’s 
definition of dharma ‘as that of which the characteristic is an injunction (vidhi)…an 
obligation that is declared by the Veda, to perform ritual action (karma).’ 164  This 
suggestion of a deep correlation between the complexity of the enactment of sacrifice 
and the notion of dharma allows Heesterman to claim that dharma is best understood as 
‘the ritualistic order of Vedic sacrifice’.165 That Jaimini’s Sūtras are about dharma and 
his concern to understand it is primarily through an explication of the event of sacrifice 
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 Jha, The Purva-Mimamsa-Sutras of Jaimini, p. 3. 
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 Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, p. 53. 
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 JC Heesterman, The Inner Conflict of Traditions: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship and Society, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1985, p. 3. 
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(yajña) is generally not doubted in scholarship. It is the nature of this relationship that I 
seek to establish even as I remain committed to the notion that dharma, in Jaimini’s 
definition, is primarily an artha that possesses the characteristics of a codanā. 
The discussion of the uses of the term dharma in sūtras 1.1.1-2 and 1.3.1 are 
comparatively more prominent and more comprehensively studied. In my investigation 
of dharma as the telos of tradition in the third chapter, this introductory definition has 
been the guiding framework. However, dharma has also been variously conceived by 
Jaimini in subsequent adhikāras particularly as it relates to the organization and 
integration of the details of Vedic sacrifice. Dharma is discussed in unique ways in 
different chapters in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras and in turning to the other discussions one can 
find a more comprehensive elaboration of Jaimini’s dharma whose characteristic, as 
already mentioned, is similar to that of the codanā. 
First, dharma in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras is discussed, in the sūtras that follow pāda 1.3, as a 
concept strictly embedded in the details of sacrifice and concerns the question of the 
harmonization of injunctions with their appropriation in practice. While dharma is 
closely related to the details that make up a sacrifice, it is also clearly distinguished 
from the guṇas in a way that suggests guṇas to have a peculiar mode of existing in the 
sacrificial context that could be considered as their dharmic existence. In sūtra 3.3.35-
36 for example, the grinding of the rice for the ektypal sacrifice is taken as the dharma 
of rice, as though the act of being ground is the very mode of being and purpose of rice 
in the sacrifice.
166
 Similarly, in sūtra 9.4.41, one finds that it is the dharma of milk to be 
boiled at the abhyudayeṣṭi and each of the accessories, such as the sacrificial post, the 
gold offered, the ghee or grain-offering, is taken to possess its own dharmic existence 
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 MS 3.3.35: Tatsarvārthamaviśeṣāt 
The grinding is to be done to all offering materials; as there is no distinction among them. 
MS 3.3.36: Carau vā, arthoktaṁ puroḍāśe’rthavipratiṣedhātpaśau syāt 
[In reality,] the grinding should be done to the rice only; in the case of the cake, it is implied by its very 
nature; [and] in the case of animal-flesh, it could not be done to it, as its very purpose would be defeated. 
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specific to the sacrifice that is performed.
167
 Jaimini goes on to mention that texts and 
words also have their specified dharmas, as do sacrificial agents and sacrificial 
actions.
168
 Based on the sacrifice to be enacted, these dharmas label the accessories, the 
persons and the actions and constitute the role they play in the specified event of 
sacrifice. This role entails what the element (accessory) in question does, what it is 
related to, when it is introduced in the sacrifice and when its role is over, so it can be 
taken as a description of the properties of an element in its sacrificial existence. 
Therefore, all guṇas pertaining to the presence of an element in their ordinary laukika 
existence possess the qualities of a dharma based on certain Vedic directives accorded 
in a given sacrificial setting. While the properties of a thing in its laukika existence can 
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 MS 9.4.41: Abhyudaye dohāpanayaḥ sadharmā syāt pravṛttatvāt 
At the rise of the moon, when there is transference of milking, its own procedure (details) applies, 
because it is already in operation (has already commenced). 
MS 11.3.6: Tatkālastu yūpakarmatvāttasya dharmavidhānāt sarvārthānāṁ ca vacanādanyakālatvaṃ 
On the other hand, they have their own time, as they have the post for their objective; and they have been 
enjoined for the post; [in the case of all things,] another time is adopted only when there is a declaration 
to that effect. 
MS 8.1.35: Hiraṇyamājyadharma, tejastvāt 
The gold should be taken in the details of the clarified butter, as both are of the nature of ‘tejas’ (essence). 
MS 8.1.36: Dharmānugrahācca 
[Also] because many of the details can be adopted. 
MS 8.1.37: Auṣadhaṁ vā viśadatvāt 
[In reality,] it is the procedure of the grain offering that should be adopted, because of solidity. 
MS 9.4.39: Vratadharmāc ca lepavat 
It may be treated as an observance, as in the case of the ‘smearing’. 
168
 MS 2.1.41: Vacanāddharmaviśeṣah 
On account of the special text, there is special (peculiar) quality (qualification). 
MS 10.5.11: Ekasyāṁ vā stomasyāvṛttidharmatvāt 
It should be done over one [verse] only; because the song [has the character of being] repreated. 
MS 2.3.23: Tatsaṁyogāt kratustadākhyaḥ syāt tena dharmavidhānāni 
On account of the fact of the connection of Agni with all sacrifices, any sacrifice may be named ‘Agni’, 
but that name would only serve to lay down the details of the sacrifice. 
MS 2.4.2: Kraturvā śrutisaṁyogāt  
[In reality,] the property is of the agent, because of the direct signification of the agent. 
MS 2.4.8: Nāmarūpadharma viśeṣapunaruktinindā’saktisamāptivacanaprāyaścittānyārthadarśanāt 
śākhāntareṣu karmabhedaḥ syāt 
If an act is mentioned in different recensional texts, it should be regarded as different, [because of 
differences in] name, form, peculiar details (qualities), repetition, censure, incapacity, declaration of 
completion, explatory rites, perception of distinct purposes (objects).  
MS 3.4.1: Nivītamiti manuṣyadharmaḥ śabdasya tatpradhānatvāt 
The Nivīta should be regarded [as enjoined] as an attribute of man, because the text speaks of man as the 
predominant factor. 
MS 3.4.20: Aprakaraṇe tu taddharmas tato viśeṣāt 
That which does not occur in the context of any particular sacrifice should appertain to man in general, 
because it differs on that point from those others [that occur in particular contexts]. 
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be known through perception, its dharma can only be known through the Vedic text and 
their enjoinments. The dharma of every sacrificial accessory, which as I have pointed 
out, can also include the sacrificial agents and the gods, is how each of them is treated, 
acted upon, related to, during the sacrifice and in relation to the sacrifice. These 
dharmas thereby, label the person and clarify and constitute the role one plays in the 
sacrificial ritual.
169
 As Clooney pointed out: ‘Dharma is most often discussed and 
argued, and therefore understood in the negotiation of sacrificial details’.170 In this sense 
dharma reflects the functional description and practicality (value) of a sacrificial 
element (accessory) in a given sacrificial setting.
171
  
As I have pointed out in the previous sections, the sacrificial event comprises a 
conglomeration of texts (Vedic statements), acts (of various kinds), material substances 
and accessories. All of these derive their meaning and purpose only in the 
interrelationship and negotiation as factors that establish the main enactment. The 
dharmas of each of these factors are realized (brought forth) when they are organized 
properly in a harmonious relation to one another and the enactment generated and 
fulfilled according to the specified injunctions.
172
 Therefore, the event of sacrifice is 
also the constitution and negotiation of the interaction of each of the respective dharmas 
even as they are employed for the purpose of fulfilling the enactment in the correct 
manner as prescribed by the injunctions. To judge and validate how and when one can 
ascertain whether the integration of each of these sacrificial factors and elements are in 
harmony, Clooney highlights that Jaimini develops the notion of ‘inherent cohesion’173 
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 MS 4.1.2: Yasmin prītiḥ puruṣasya tasya lipsā’rthalakṣaṇāvibhaktatvāt 
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and the notion of ‘purposefulness’. 174  This is to ensure that the organization and 
integration is directed towards the realization of the satisfaction of human desires and 
the overall purpose.
175
 According to Jaimini, each of the different elements of the 
sacrificial event including the smallest details possesses its own dharma:  
9.1.26: Being an accessory of the fire, it should be repeated with each brick, because it is a 
collection, like the Paurṇamāsī. 
9.1.27: [In reality,] it should be done to the fire altar, because it is one substance; the others only 
subserve the purposes of that substance. 
9.4.39: It may be treated as an observance, as in the case of the smearing. 
8.1.35: The gold should be taken in the details of the clarified butter, as both are of the nature of 
tejas (essence). 
8.1.36: [Also] because many of the details can be adopted. 
8.1.37: [In reality,] it is the procedure of the grain offering that should be adopted, because of 
solidity. 
1.3.23: But this is too similar to the qualification of the agent. 
2.1.41: It is on account (of the fact of the Nigada) being employed in indicating to others that the 
peculiar qualification of the Nigada is mentioned.  
2.3.23: On account of the fact of the connection of Agni with all sacrifices, any sacrifice may be 
named Agni, but that name would only serve to lay down the details of the sacrifice. 
2.4.2: [In reality,] the property is of the agent, because of the direct signification of the text. 
2.4.8: If an act is mentioned in different recensional texts, it should be regarded as different, 
because of differences in name, in form, in particular details, and because of repetition, 
deprecation, incapacity, declaration of completion, explanatory rites, perception of distinct 
purposes. 
3.7.51: The assignation of subordinate elements because of their names is based on perception, 
whereas assignation because of the general rule that the ektypes are similar to their archetypes is 
based on inference. Usually, perception is more authoritative than inference, but because here 
the latter is based on scriptural evidence while names are secular in origin, the inference is more 
authoritative than perception. 
6.7.14: The same would be done in connection with the Viśvajit performed in the course of 
Ahargaṇa as all are (Viśvajit) alike.176 
When each of the dharmas of all the components constituting the unique sacrificial 
event is correctly understood and performed efficaciously and when all the elements fit 
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 MS 9.1.26: Agnidharmaḥ pratīṣṭakaṁ saṅghātātpaurṇamāsīvat 
MS 9.1.27: Agnervā syād dravyaikatvāditarāsāṁ tadarthatvāt 
MS 9.4.39: Vratadharmāc ca lepavat 
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śākhāntareṣu karmabhedaḥ syāt 
MS 3.7.51: Tadguṇādvā svadharmaḥ syād adhikārasāmarthyāt sahāṅgairavyaktaḥ śeṣe 
MS 6.7.14: Ahargaṇe ca taddharmā syāt sarvesāmaviśeṣāt 
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correctly into the myriad of meanings that constitute the enjoined enactment, then the 
‘dharma of sacrifice’ (to borrow Clooney’s phrase)177 i.e. the force that brings each of 
the elements of sacrifice into a harmonious order, is realized. Therefore, Jaimini’s use of 
dharma, in the first instance, suggests that the various elements that make up the event 
of sacrifice has its own specified meaning and functional identity within the event of the 
particular sacrifice. These are then organized and harmoniously brought together in the 
act of sacrifice. Not unlike the vidhi that I have highlighted in the previous chapter, 
dharma is both the cause of order (cohesion) and the force that brings forth harmony. It 
is also the outcome and fruit of that harmonious arrangement and fulfilment. 
Second, dharma in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras is also explored as an invisible reality that arises 
when ‘practice and the language of practice are properly ordered’. Clooney identifies 
several adhikaraṇas whose discussions concerning ‘the nature of sacrifice and its verbal 
dimensions’, are both ‘practical and conceptual, intelligible and to be enacted’.178 He 
argues that in such adhikaraṇas the discussion shifts from a consideration of dharmas 
as the functional details of a particular sacrifice to an understanding of dharma as the 
‘larger reality’ of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy of Vedic practice that encompasses each of 
these functional details. One example of this discussion is found in sūtras 2.1.9-12, 
where Jaimini discusses what he calls dharmamātra karma i.e. ‘dharmic actions’ or 
‘action that is uniquely dharmic’:179  
2.1.9-12: Sentences denote actions of three varieties: a. secondary actions, preparatory of 
materials; b. primary actions, which do not prepare any materials; c. so-called dharmic or 
relational actions involving a material, without their own results, but not strictly preparatory - 
these are nevertheless primary and not subordinate to the materials used in the actions. 
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Dharmamātra karma is defined as an action that is significant and complete in itself, 
primarily because it does not constitute a secondary action such as those that entail 
preparing materials to be used in the sacrifice. However, it contributes directly to 
ushering in the completion of a particular sacrifice. Such an act is considered dharmic in 
that it is ‘effective in itself’, without reliance on the mediation of visible fruits.180 
Jaimini, again in sūtras 11.1.26-28,181 talks about actions that are purely dharmic where 
the performed act does not result in anything else apart from fulfilment i.e. enactment 
according to the Veda. These dharmic actions, while closely similar to primary actions 
(pradhāna), are actions that do not fit into the category of primary actions because they 
do not affect any visible preparation or result (phala) apart from ensuring a harmonized 
interaction between the elements involved in a sacrifice. Therefore, there is a sense in 
which even primary actions pursued and enacted out of desire also become actions 
performed because they are enjoined. It is here that the concept of desire and obligation 
come together to form the dharmamātra, which as Śabara glosses, can also be 
understood as karmamātra, ‘pure action’, action for its own sake. Therefore, Jaimini’s 
notion of dharmic action introduces an action, a sacrifice that is not subservient to a 
result or a purpose but one that is primary and complete in itself. 
Third, inseparable from action, dharma is not presented as something ‘already there’ as 
the given object of some particular word or injunction. Words grouped and handed 
down in the tradition instigate particular actions. Dharma is known in the ‘event’ which 
only occurs due to the correct harmonization of word, its enjoinment and enactment. 
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Therefore, dharma is intelligible only in the context of a sacrificial event and involves 
an enquiry into the interplay of an authorless Veda and the performance of the Vedic 
injunctions in that particular event. The Mīmāṁsā understanding of dharma as the 
completely harmonized, understood and appropriated set of words, actions, persons and 
events constituting Vedic sacrifice is closely connected to ‘the novelty, the apūrva, of a 
sacrifice’. Clooney notes that ‘the appeal to the notion of apūrva gives priority to 
sacrifice as a process and act over any reification of it and hearkens to the energy and 
vitality of the injunctive verbal force over against conceptual, essentialist extensions of 
one sacrifice to others’.182 Dharma is then identified with the yajñārtha that comes from 
the fulfilled performance of the Vedic text, the artha which undergirds every element of 
the sacrifice as purposeful and includes every perspective, even that of the performer. 
While Jaimini introduces dharma as transcendent in the sense that it belongs to the 
invisible realm, the knowledge of dharma through the word and the realization of it in 
the Vedic ritual pave the way for the understanding of dharma as significant for ‘this’ 
life and for ‘this’ society. As Clooney observes, Jaimini ‘sought to replace the “laws of 
the cosmos” with the “laws of language and ritual”, and reliance on gods and 
humans…with an appreciation for the harmony of text and action’ that underlies the 
event of sacrifice and the world of Vedic practice.
183
  
The Mīmāṃsā argument developed in this section is that dharma is not an essential 
entity out there (that can be posited like a ‘God’) but is something that comes into being 
(bhāvanā) every time an act is perfected. It is that force whose ‘spirit’ pervades the 
enactment of sacrifice and ensures that the practice becomes a perfected craft that fully 
appropriates and validates the obligations and injunctions of the Veda. Sacrifice, for 
Jaimini, is an activity in which the sacrificial agent, the ingredients for the sacrificial 
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enactment, as well as the invoked deities are brought together and integrated within the 
sacrificial event and guided towards the realization of meaning and purpose that only a 
correct and responsible enactment can provide.
184
 When a sacrifice is correctly ordered 
and enacted, with the words uttered in the right manner and the materials utilized at the 
right places, by agents with a desire and ability to appropriate and embody the values of 
the community, then the enactment becomes an enjoined enactment. This enjoined 
enactment brings together the dharmic-existence of each of the components of sacrifice 
and their harmonious assemblage results in the disclosing of the overarching dharma, 
the ultimate value that is the fruit of fulfilment. The idea of dharma is articulated and 
understood through the injunctions of the Veda embodied in the figure of the sacrificial 
agent and manifested in the social world through the negotiated rules of interpersonal 
interaction and ritual injunctions. Jaimini locates the enjoined subject in a world that is 
organized and ordered around the practice of sacrifice. This world and ordering is 
closely related with his concept of dharma – an artha that is realized in correct activity. 
Therefore, the perfected sacrifice itself is the fullness of dharma and the realization of 
dharma is the affirmation of the traditionary practice of sacrifice. This perfected 
traditionary practice of sacrifice involves the interplay between the ritual subject in all 
its transformative stages, the rationality of the text, particularly injunctions, and the 
participation of others (both people and things) in the ‘once-occurrent’ event where 
dharma is sought and realized and the sacrifice is fulfilled in its entirety. 
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RITUAL AND THE ENJOINED SUBJECT 
There are scholars who are wary at the task of proposing universally acceptable 
definitions
185
 and for good reason, since it is impossible for a theoretical discussion on 
ritual to avoid the tedious question of the definition of ritual. In most cases, a certain 
notion if not an outright definition, of ritual is presupposed. At the beginning of any 
theoretical focus on rituals, two interrelated questions about the distinctiveness of ritual 
and the nature of its relation to other forms of [social] action tend to dominate 
discussions concerning definitions.
186
 Bell pointed out that most influential theories of 
ritual have ‘a tendency to define ritual either as a distinct and autonomous set of 
activities’, or an ‘aspect of all human activity’.187  While some scholars ‘stress the 
distinctiveness of ritual’ and ‘how it is clearly different from all other kinds of activity’, 
‘others stress the congruity of ritual with other forms of human action’, by reducing 
ritual to ‘the formal aspect’ of action in general.188 In both of these accounts, the notion 
of ritual as a form of action or behaviour opposed to intentionality, to sincerity, and to 
thinking can largely be identified. 
With regard to the first group, ‘most attempts to define ritual proceed by formulating the 
universal qualities of an autonomous phenomenon’.189 They maintain the premise that 
what are categorized as ‘rituals’ can be found in particular societies and cultures and 
possess ‘distinctive characteristics’.190 These definitions then lead to the development of 
‘a set of criteria’ that decides which activities constitute ritual actions and which 
constitute non-ritual ones. Bell points out that this has led to the separate classification 
of what was defined as ‘ritual or magical activity’ and what was taken as ‘technical or 
                                                 
185
 J Goody, ‘Religion and Ritual: The Definitional Problem’, British Journal of Sociology, vol. 12, 1961, 
pp. 142-164.  
186
 Kreinath, Snoek, & Stausberg (eds), Theorizing Rituals: Issues, Topics, Approaches, Concepts, Brill, 
Leiden, 2006, p. xviii. 
187
 Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice, p. 70. 
188
 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
189
 Ibid., p. 69. 
190
 Ibid.  
 265 
 
utilitarian activity’. The relationship between means and ends in ritual-activity is 
described as rule-governed, routinized, habitual and non-instrumental. However, the 
nature of non-ritual technical activity is described as pragmatic, spontaneous, and 
instrumentally effective. This distinction between the habitual and the instrumental in 
turn collapses into a distinction between the ‘rational and the irrational’ and the ‘logical 
and the emotional’.191 Ritual was therefore, understood as a ‘kind of action that is 
ineffective, superficial and/or purely formal’ based on the unexamined and 
unchallenged premise that the scholar ‘know[s] it when he see[s] it’.192 
As ‘ritual’ continued to be ‘discovered’ and as the development of a plethora of what 
Grimes called ‘ritual types’ ensued, the difficulty in ‘identifying’ ‘ritual’s center or 
boundaries’ through categorization became evident. Snoek has remarked that ‘looking 
at the wide range of phenomena, that scholars have become inclined to call “rituals” 
over the last few decades, it seems highly unlikely to me that…there is any 
characteristic that really occurs in all of them. And those that do are surely not specific 
to “rituals” alone.’193  As ‘ritual types’ proliferate, and the acceptance that there can be 
no single essential quality or set of characteristics found in all uses of a concept grew, 
the confusion over the phenomenon also grew and nearly all actions came to be 
associated with the term ritual.
194
 This inability to clarify the distinctiveness of ritual as 
a category and the difficulty of managing the plethora of ritual types that continue to be 
suggested gave rise to a second group of theorists in recent years who sought to define 
‘ritual as an aspect of all activity’. It was Erving Goffman who extended the notion of 
‘ritual’ to the description of everyday interactions. This extension of ritual in a narrow 
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sense to ritual-like activity or ritualization made the term applicable to many activities 
and events to such an extent that it became an almost empty term, denoting everything 
from animal behaviour to greeting gestures, to birthday parties, and coronation 
ceremonies.
195
 Goody also claims that ‘routinisation’, ‘regularisation’ and ‘repetition’ 
lie at the basis of social life itself.
196
  
These accounts, in their efforts to establish the notion of ritual as a universal or 
transcultural category, sought to impose either universal characteristic (as in the first 
instance) onto activities across contexts or sought to assume the rituality of all forms of 
actions (as in the second instance). The distinctiveness of ritual as a form of action - 
first taken as irrational and magical practice, later identified with all forms of everyday 
routine behaviors - is reduced to an empty action that is (a) rule-governed, non-
instrumental behaviour and (b) that is ultimately transcultural i.e. beyond contexts and 
cultures.  
In their book Ritual and Its Consequences, Adam Seligman et al. differentiate the 
‘antiritualistic’ ‘sincere’ mode of thought and practice from the ‘mere convention’ ritual 
that depicts ‘action without intent’ and ‘performance without belief’.197 Arguing that 
‘sincerity grows out of a reaction against ritual’, they seek to emphasize the need to 
replace ritual with a sincere mode of behavior characterized by ‘a genuine and 
thoughtful state of internal conviction’ that brings out authenticity and responsibility. 
However, they also point out and demonstrate that while this aspect of the sincere mode 
of behaviour has characterized human action at all times, the exclusive privileging of it 
by the modernist or Enlightenment project influenced by ‘Cartesian orientations of 
modern science’, has in turn resulted in the sidelining and segregation of ritual forms of 
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action from moral and instrumental acts.
198
 Tambiah claims that rituals, understood as 
‘conventionalized behaviour’ are not ‘designed or meant to express the intentions, 
emotions, and states of mind of individuals in a direct, spontaneous and “natural” way’ 
but ‘the formalization of rituals’ in turn ‘psychically distances the participants from the 
ritual enactment.’199  
Schilbrack claims that the central obstacle to an understanding of ritual as ‘actions or 
practices in which people engage’ is the supposition that ‘ritual activities are 
thoughtless’. He argues that this supposition is characteristic of ‘a set of modern views 
about what knowledge is’, which according to him involves the accurate representation 
of the external world.
200
 Ritual therefore, is treated as a ‘vehicle for thought’ and not as 
a ‘mode of thinking itself.’ 201  As Bell points out, the problem with ‘the ritual-
instrumental distinction’ is not only that the distinction is completely ‘alien’ ‘to many 
societies’ but also that ‘this distinction collapses into a problematic dichotomy of 
rational and irrational behavior’ and tend to cast ritual ‘as an object’ that is ‘dead’.202  
This tendency, in both accounts, to cast off ritual activity as formalized, mimetic and 
non-instrumental, in their efforts to claim its universality is problematic because they 
are unable to accord space for the discussion of actions as narratively-structured 
practices, where the telos of the particular tradition, the agency of the subject and the 
answerability of the performed act is at the centre of ritualization. Therefore, in 
continuation to the notion of ritual as traditionary practice that I have highlighted in the 
second chapter, in this chapter,  I have sought, both to retrieve the notion of traditionary 
practice that I have been introducing and highlight the answerability and the 
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intentionality that constitutes it by drawing from Vedic practice of sacrifice as 
elaborated by Jaimini. 
While the Vedic traditions and their rituals may be frowned upon for their ‘orthodoxy’ 
and ‘ritualism’ and their practices may have largely been discontinued (even if not 
entirely)
203
 in contemporary modern India, the notion of practice in Hindu cultures has 
always been one of the most important expressions of their worldviews and their 
theoretical underpinnings. Although the distinction between doctrine on the one hand, 
and practice on the other, has predominantly been the framework within which even 
scriptural traditions have generally been understood and accepted, however, the notion 
of practice has been so pervasive in Hindu cultures that scholars, starting with Staal, 
have often claimed that ‘Hindu-ism’ (taken in a general sense) is more closely 
identifiable as an ‘orthoprax rather than orthodox’ tradition, arguing that what matters is 
not what one believes but how one behaves.
204
 As Frazier has remarked, in ‘many 
respects the lived text of religious practice is a more robust manifestation of Hinduism 
than its written text’. This is because in Hinduism, rituals are reliably passed down 
through time and create ‘a point of reference across both cultural and theological shifts 
in contradistinction to a changing and often politically unstable political and economic 
history.’205 As Flood reminds us, the concept of dharma, even if variedly perceived, is 
precisely the central ideology of orthoprax Hinduism that derives from the revelation of 
the Veda (as well as the secondary revelation of the smṛti dharma literature) and is 
believed to be eternal.
206
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Ritual, as highlighted above, has often been taken as a constrictive practice that favours 
‘repetition’ and ‘orthodoxy’. However, the perspective from the Mīmāṃsāsūtras and the 
conception of both authority and tradition in light of the practice of sacrifice reveals the 
creative dimension of ritual practice. In contrast to theories that see ritual as a form of 
social constraint, Jaimini emphasizes the elements of creativity and self-determination 
where, in the constitution and transformation of ritual subjectivity, one can identify a 
participatory, innovative and expressive dimension within the institution of sacrifice. 
Smith, in his extensive studies on Vedic rituals also emphasizes a similar creative aspect 
of ritual: ‘Reality, according to Vedic savants, is not given but made…sacrifice for them 
was not…regarded as a symbolic representation of an already concretised reality…the 
ritual was the workshop in which reality was forged.’207  
Ritual, for Jaimini, is never merely an imitation or repetition of the past but a practice 
where every new enactment in the ‘once-occurent’ event of sacrifice is a point at which 
the past and the present intersect in a fresh creation. Therefore, Vedic practices are 
never just thoughtless actions but are much more closer to what Bakhtin refers to as 
‘participative thinking’ by the subject who takes the form of a Being-as-event 
answerable agent. The prescribed injunctions appropriated in every ritual practice 
become participatory patterns through which the basic human capacity to create new 
actions is elevated as a way of contributing to the broader structure of the Vedic 
tradition. As Frazier remarks, ‘practitioners are put in the role of an engineer or artist of 
the universe’,208 and in this respect one can claim that the enacted rituals are traditionary 
practices engaging humans in the construction of their world.  
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The idea of the enjoined subject as a practice where the body (and mind) is trained to 
develop virtues, techniques and disciplines rather than representation is a process that 
unsettles the simplified bifurcation between belief and practice, myth and ritual, text and 
action. The introduction of the enjoined subject allows me to identify tradition as a 
continuity; as the ‘narrative of tradition’ that shapes the individual’s life. In following 
tradition, the ritual subjectivity subordinates and renounces the sense of self ‘to 
tradition, to a master’ in order to achieve intensification and transformation. In order to 
achieve this, the enjoined subject appropriates the rationality of a tradition and shapes 
the narrative of his life to the narrative of tradition.
209
 While this is often taken to mean 
the eradication of physical desires, minimizing worldly interaction, renouncing 
pleasures and developing the discipline of self-effacement and detachment, the 
Mīmāṃsā enjoined subject seeks to affirm desire by acknowledging and submitting to 
it, while still yet going beyond it. Therefore, it is a going beyond through appropriation 
and not through negation. Through acts of the will (desire) and bodily disciplines, the 
enjoined subject takes on the form prescribed for it by tradition and cultivates long-term 
patterns of behaviour. The subject, as a historically situated being, inhabits a culture, 
appropriates the relevant elements that makes up the rationality of the tradition, whose 
remembrance and affirmation of that rationality are enacted through the body in 
practice. In the public domain, this enactment is carried out within the institution (of 
sacrifice) validated by the community.  In this subjective appropriation of traditions and 
in the enactment or re-enactment of its rationality one finds the relationship between 
ritual and dharma in Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras.  
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SUMMARY 
In this chapter, in light of the question of ritual and praxis, I discussed the nature of 
Vedic practice by looking at the event of sacrifice through the lens of ‘textuality’ and 
‘answerability’ as its constituting factors. I argued that Jaimini’s notion of [yajña]karma 
as explicated in his Mīmāṃsāsūtras provides an example of a traditionary practice that 
goes beyond the general bifurcation of action and knowledge that was prevalent both in 
the Pūrva-Uttarā Mīmāṃsā debate as well as in the Western intellectual tradition. I 
argued that while the enactment of Vedic sacrifice is often understood to be built on a 
structure that necessitates predictability and formality, Jaimini’s introduction of the idea 
of sacrifice as an event that is unrepeatable, in the sense that every enactment is 
understood to be ever new (apūrva), is premised upon the answerability of the 
practising agent and his negotiation and construction of meaning and purpose together 
with others through enactment. It is in this sense that the agent can be taken to embody 
the traditionary telos of dharma whose characteristic is that of a codanā.  
This allows me to claim that the Vedic tradition, far from being a determined and closed 
narrative, is a historically constituted and ongoing narrative, which not only 
appropriates the past but also possesses a telos that is continuously pursued and 
negotiated through the desirous and responsible agent in enactment. Thus, the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras are taken, in this thesis, as a philosophy of Vedic practice. In light of 
this historicality or historical situatedness, the shared cultivation and construction of the 
unbrokenness of tradition is brought about and maintained. This enactment, understood 
as the enactment of the rationality of a tradition by a desirous and answerable agent, 
fully constitutes the enjoined subject and ensures the realization of dharma in the event 
of Vedic sacrifice. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
A FINAL SUMMATION 
INTRODUCTION 
As noted in the introductory chapter, there is a general paucity of scholarship on 
Jaimini’s text, particularly as it relates to ritual, subjectivity and tradition. The attempt 
here at a hermeneutical re-reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras with the aim of seeking to 
establish its contemporary relevance, by excavating the insights that it can offer to the 
study of ritual, is but one reading amongst others. There are other readings of the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras, including one that sought to apply the ‘principles’ of the Sūtras in the 
contemporary field of Hindu legal law.
1
 For example, Kane, a distinguished lawyer of 
contemporary India claims that the Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation still possess 
practical importance for the interpretation of Hindu law and argues that they ought to be 
recognized by Indian courts. Kane states that although the commentaries of Śabara and 
Kumārila on Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras are primarily meant for expounding Vedic texts 
and interpreting sacrificial matters, yet, whatever fresh light they throw in the domains 
of jurisprudence, linguistics, geography and medicines is important even from the point 
of view of modern scholars.
2
 While this example serves to suggest that the 
‘contemporary relevance’ of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras can be proposed in a number of ways, 
this thesis has sought to do that specifically through an enquiry grounded in Jaimini’s 
primary concern for dharma and the traditionary practice of sacrifice.  
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The central argument put forward in this thesis can be more simply stated as a claim 
that Jaimini’s unique conception of dharma in his Mīmāṃsāsūtras, when read as a 
philosophy of Vedic practice possessing the structure of a hermeneutic tradition, can 
offer substantive and methodological insights to the contemporary scholarship on ritual. 
This claim presupposes the following questions: What is the significance of Jaimini’s 
enquiry? In what way does this have any bearing on the contemporary scholarship on 
ritual? These two main questions were used as the guiding framework to discuss the two 
interrelated themes of (a) the nature of Jaiminian enquiry and (b) its contemporary 
relevance.  
In this final conclusion, I will present a brief review of the contributions of the thesis in 
light of the two aims presented in the introductory chapter: (a) significance of Jaiminian 
enquiry and (b) its contemporary relevance for the study of ritual. I will end this 
concluding chapter by highlighting potential areas for further research as it relates both 
to Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā and to the study of ritual. 
JAIMINIAN ENQUIRY AND RITUAL STUDIES 
The first aim of this thesis was to demonstrate that the significance of Jaimini’s vision 
and approach in his Mīmāṃsāsūtras lies in his unique conception of dharma. This 
conception is a reading of dharma as a philosophy of Vedic practice that possesses the 
structure of a hermeneutic tradition. I pursued this argument in stages throughout the 
three core chapters. In these chapters, I discussed the conditions that gave rise to the 
emergence and transformation of the enjoined subject that entailed the three modes of 
(a) desiring the telos of dharma, (b) appropriating the internal rationality of the Veda, 
and (c) enacting the practice of sacrifice within the institution validated by the 
community of practitioners.  
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I showed that Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras could be taken as a form of enquiry that is 
inherently dialogical in its approach. Therefore, they already possess, even if implicitly, 
the structure of a hermeneutic tradition whose excavation has been the preliminary task 
developed in this thesis. This inherent dialogism of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras derive also from 
(a) its location between the sacrificial Śrauta-sūtras (ritual-manuals) and the 
philosophical Darśana-sūtras and (b) its close interrogation and engagement within its 
own tradition and with other traditions of enquiry. Although this study of Jaimini’s 
enquiry as a philosophy of Vedic practice that possesses the structures of a hermeneutic 
tradition has not been previously acknowledged, this is not entirely surprising, as its 
‘excavation’ was made possible only through the questions that were brought to the 
text. These questions arise primarily out of contentions that are specific to contemporary 
discourses and are located within the human sciences, particularly the interrelated study 
of ritual and religion. 
The second aim of this thesis was to get ‘insights’ from the discussions on Jaimini’s 
conception of dharma for the ‘questions’ raised by contemporary debates in the study of 
ritual. In my efforts to maintain the claim that the Mīmāṃsāsūtras are contemporarily 
relevant, the questions that were brought to the text from the contentions in the 
scholarship on ritual necessitated a hermeneutical re-reading that altered the way the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtras were approached and read. This hermeneutical re-reading, while it 
sought to maintain the internal concerns and boundaries of the tradition by engaging 
Jaimini’s primary concern of dharma and the intelligibility of Vedic practice, was 
nonetheless re-constructed in light of the questions raised from outside the Mīmāṃsā 
tradition. Therefore, there was an attempt at a ‘renewal’ of ‘past meanings’ in a 
subsequent dialogue. 
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In this dialogical engagement between the study of ritual and the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, I 
have highlighted that the main theme of the enjoinment of the subject i.e. the subject of 
ritual injunction introduced the possibility of critically discussing the notion of a ritual 
subjectivity. It is this subjectivity formed within a particular tradition that I emphasized 
in light of the problematic of ritual and the growing assertion for the development of 
ritual studies as a distinct discipline in itself.  
As I have elaborated in the conceptual chapter, while there is a multiplicity of 
interdisciplinary theories and perspectives that have been adopted in the study and 
interpretation of rituals, the contemporary debate within the scholarship on ritual can be 
identified by two main fundamental attitudes adopted with regard to ritual. These two 
attitudes may be summed up by the two phrases ‘ritual as representation of’ and ‘ritual 
as abstracted phenomenon’, adopted by two theoretical models that may be categorized 
as the semiotic-symbolists and the formalist-structuralists. These two prevalent attitudes 
in contemporary debates were influenced by the unchallenged dichotomy between myth 
and ritual in classical scholarship. This dichotomy was founded upon a particular notion 
of ‘myth as beliefs’ and ‘ritual as action’, where beliefs and ritual were understood to 
correspond to activities of the mind (thought-centred) and the body (behaviour-centred) 
respectively.
3
 The notion of ritual-as-action, and thereby, empty action was not 
problematized by contemporary debates on ritual. Therefore, they reduced ritual to 
either a secondary re-presentation of larger religious, social or cultural entities or to an 
event that is abstracted from its concrete enactment in material reality. This ‘symbolic’ 
representation of ritual as an epiphenomenon and the ‘formalist’ abstraction of ritual in 
terms of its forms and structure outside of its context only seek to strengthen the 
supposition that ritual is an unreflective and thoughtless action.
 
In an age of continuous 
                                                 
3
 See C Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992; RL Grimes, 
Ritual Criticism: Case Studies in its Practice, Essays on its Theory, University of South Carolina Press, 
Columbia, 1990, p. 1.  
 277 
 
reflection, ritual practices are carelessly taken to be increasingly redundant and ritual-
centred traditions are largely taken to be unthinking traditions that are no longer 
relevant and are therefore, ‘dead’.  
I have also highlighted that the Enlightenment-influenced study of ritual was guided 
predominantly by the adoption of a ‘universal rationality’ whose approach involved a 
‘neutral’ observer who brackets his own bias and does not allow the space to 
acknowledge his own prejudice. In the process, he tends to overlook the cultural and 
historical particularity in his quest for universal and accurate representation of data. The 
growing scholarship on ritual in the early twentieth century saw a ‘reaction’ to this 
position in the works of post-critical scholars who argued for the importance of 
identifying the uniqueness of ritual as an act in itself. Nonetheless, they sought to locate 
universal features or ‘grammars’ of ritual. Both of these accounts, while they seem to be 
in contention, were implicitly based on the presupposition that the scholars, as 
observers, were distinct from the object of enquiry they wished to represent and 
describe. Between the modern objective analysis of ritual as ‘data’ that is seen as a 
window to understanding larger social phenomena and the post-modern critical analysis 
of ritual as an ahistorical rule-governed meaningless activity, an imbalance was created 
in the scholarship on ritual. These two accounts tended to present reductionist 
explanations of ritual that can be categorized as cultural reductionism on the one hand 
and structural reductionism on the other. Both these forms of reductionism offered 
explanations and critiques that are predominantly externalist in their respective 
accounts. In their hesistancy to account for the validity of traditionary truth claims as 
located within particular traditions, these theories were both unable to provide a 
conceptual space to account for the vitality of subjectivity and interiority formed by 
traditions that necessarily entail narratively-structured traditionary practices. As a 
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consequence, as Flood pointed out, such ‘externalist accounts’ tend to ‘bypass tradition-
internal concerns and forms of reasoning’ that are intelligible and can ‘make claims 
upon the world and human experience’.4 One of the main endeavours of this thesis has 
been to highlight that the study of ritual needs to take these forms of tradition-internal 
rationalities and ways of forming tradition-specific subjectivities more seriously.  
Unlike the reductionist accounts whose explanation of the phenomenon of ritual are 
usually ‘antithetical to the internal claims of the traditions’ within which those practices 
are rendered meaningful, a dialogical study of ritual, such as the one developed in this 
thesis, is introduced as an exposition of traditionary-rationalities where the task is ‘to 
demonstrate or translate a tradition’s semantic density into a language which is 
implicitly comparative’ and therefore dialogical.5 This kind of account, similar to what 
Flood proposed and developed for the academic study of religious traditions in his 
major works, is ‘descriptive’ and phenomenological in that it wishes to offer a ‘thick 
description’ in the anthropological sense. However, and more importantly, it is also 
‘interpretative’ and hermeneutical in that it wishes to enquire beyond description to 
interrogating the internal concerns of the tradition in the philosophical sense. This 
framework of investigation entails the acceptance of the validity and ‘legitimacy of 
tradition and tradition-internal concerns’, which is then argued to provide a way forward 
from the problematic of having to choose between the inadequate universalism and 
area-specific relativism.
6
 
In this thesis, I presented an example of the intelligibility of traditionary practice to 
argue that ritual studies can be taken not just as ‘the social scientific study’ of ritual but 
also as an enquiry that can give validity and legitimacy to traditions’ self-enquiry. I also 
                                                 
4
 Flood, ‘Reflections on Tradition and Inquiry in the Study of Religions’, pp. 49-50. 
5
 Ibid., p. 50.  
6
 For a detailed discussion of Flood’s argument for the importance of allowing the study of religion to 
become an ‘arena that gives hospitality to traditions’ self-inquiry within a framework of rational 
discourse’, refer Flood, ‘Reflections on Tradition and Inquiry in the Study of Religions’, pp. 49-51. 
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highlighted the need to promote the study of ritual as a field of enquiry that ‘gives 
hospitality to traditions and their self-representations’ and claimed that such a study is 
inherently dialogical whereby the concern is to engage and explore the rationalities that 
can be gauged from the textuality of the narratives of traditions. To claim the legitimacy 
of traditions’ accounts of themselves is not to establish a ‘reification’ of ritual but to 
establish a ‘pluralistic field of inquiry’ within which ‘the theological expression’ of 
particular ‘traditions are accorded a space alongside the social scientific study’ of 
rituals.
7
   
Drawing from the post-Heideggerian hermeneutical tradition and borrowing insights 
primarily from the works of Gadamer, Ricoeur and MacIntyre, I proposed in Chapter 
Two that if the hermeneutical tradition can be taken to possesses a structure of 
traditionary enquiry, it would be constituted by three conditions of understanding, 
which were identified as (a) a sense of shared telos, (b) the authority of an internal 
rationality, and (c) the institution of the practising community. Each of these conditions 
advanced the tradition in temporality through enquiry. In light of this structure, the 
question raised was - In what sense could Jaimini’s enquiry be termed as truly 
possessing the structure of a hermeneutic tradition?  
I have argued that it is ritual subjectivity in Jaimini’s enquiry, which, through the 
pursuit of the telos of dharma and the appropriation and enactment of the rationality of 
tradition, disclosed a structure of transformation and enjoinment that can be taken to be 
akin to the structures of the hermeneutical tradition. This conception of the ritual subject 
was then identified as the contribution that could take the discussion on the scholarship 
of ritual forward. 
                                                 
7
 Ibid., p. 54. 
 280 
In Chapter Three, in light of the problem of meaning in the study of ritual, I argued that 
Jaimini’s proposal of sacrifice as an intrinsically meaningful-practice is a way forward 
from the bifurcation asserting that ritual is either a meaningless activity or an activity 
that is meaningful only as an epiphenomenon. Towards developing this argument, I 
provided a brief historical overview of the world of Vedic sacrifice within which the 
Mīmāṃsā as a school was first begun, to help me investigate Jaimini’s rationale for his 
concern and unique conception of dharma as the central theme of his enquiry. I 
specifically discussed Jaimini’s rejection of devatās as a viable rationale for claiming 
the intelligibility and significance of Vedic sacrifice as a meaningful-practice and 
argued that Jaimini’s insistence on the pursuit of the invisible dharma even in the midst 
of a foundationless Vedic world point towards his concern for the continuance of the 
practice of sacrifice as an unbroken tradition. The quest to understand the nature of this 
tradition, then allowed me to introduce the Mīmāṃsā subject, who, in the first instance 
is a subject constituted by desire and willingly submits himself to the practice of 
sacrifice in his pursuit of prītiḥ (happiness, heaven). This desirous subject is then taken 
as the mode through which the invisible telos of the Mīmāṃsā tradition is ultimately 
revealed. This mode of desire, guided by a concern for the intelligibility and 
meaningfulness of traditionary practice, then allowed me to discuss the first stage of 
enjoinment - a stage in which the subject responds to the call of tradition, a call that 
emanates from a remembrance of the memory of the past.  
In Chapter Four, in light of the question of ritual and rationality, I argued that although 
Jaimini does not explicitly articulate a concept of the rationality of traditions, his 
understanding and demonstration of the authority of the Veda as an infallible revelation 
presupposed a ‘tradition-internal reasoning’ or a rationality of tradition. Jaimini’s 
discussion of the originary and authorless nature of the Veda not only supported his 
claim that the Veda is the only means of knowing and accessing the invisible dharma 
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but also discloses a revelation-appropriation mechanism that constitutes the Veda as a 
sacred living text. This mechanism then presupposes the vitality of the enjoinment of 
the ritual subject. This chapter discloses that it is the internal rationality of a tradition 
that enjoins and constitutes the ritual subject and which the ritual subject of injunction 
ultimately embodies and enacts.  
In Chapter Five, in light of the problem of the articulation of ritual, I discussed the 
nature of Vedic practice by looking at the event of sacrifice through the lens of 
‘enjoinment’ and ‘answerability’ as important constitutive factors. I argued that 
Jaimini’s notion of yajñakarma in his Mīmāṃsāsūtras provides a way beyond the 
general bifurcation of action and knowledge that is prevalent both in the Mīmāṃsā as 
well as in the Western intellectual tradition that informs the study of ritual. I elaborated 
that while ritual activity is generally understood to be built on a structure that 
necessitates predictability and formality, Jaimini’s introduction of the idea of sacrifice 
as an event that is unrepeatable, in the sense that it is ever new (apūrva), is premised 
upon the answerability of the practising agent and his negotiation and construction of 
meaning together with others through enactment. In this sense, the agent is taken to be 
closely interrelated with dharma - the dharma whose primary characteristic is similar to 
that of a codanā. This allowed me to present the claim that the Vedic tradition, far from 
being a determined and closed narrative, is a historically-constituted and ongoing 
narrative. Not only does it appropriate the past but it also possesses a telos that is 
continuously pursued and negotiated through the desirous responsible agent in 
enactment. In this sense, the Mīmāṃsāsūtras are taken as a philosophy of Vedic practice 
that is hermeneutic in orientation and it is in light of this historicality or historical 
situatedness that the shared cultivation and construction of the unbroken character of 
tradition is brought about and maintained. This enactment in the event of sacrifice is 
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understood as the enactment of the rationality of a tradition by a desirous and 
answerable agent that fully constitutes the enjoined subject, ensures the realization of 
dharma and also affirms the continuation of tradition. 
Therefore, Jaimini, in his ritualistic conception of dharma in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras 
centuries before the formal academic study of ritual is developed, provides an account 
of the intelligibility and vitality of traditionary practice that enables one to excavate the 
hermeneutical structure constituting what is discussed in contemporary scholarship as 
‘ritual’. Jaimini’s notion of a traditionary practice is neither a given phenomenon nor an 
object that is dead but a continuity that is pursued and constructed through dedicated 
practice within a specific tradition in the matrix of the relationship between the living 
text (memory) of the particular tradition and the responsible subject that seeks to 
appropriate its rationality. Ritual, taken as a traditionary practice, is the event through 
which the meaningful pursuit and the enjoinment and embodiment of the practical 
rationality of a tradition is realized in enactment. This form of traditionary practice 
occurs in traditions that find their significance in continuity with the past and in cultures 
that are not yet de-cosmologized. A culture that consciously obliterates its past is unable 
to produce responsible practices that are identified here as rituals.   
In my re-reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, I pointed out that the implicit mechanisms and 
conceptual schemas that can be excavated reflect an enquiry that is hermeneutical in 
orientation and can also be read as a philosophy of Vedic practice. Taking the theme of 
ritual subjectivity and tradition from the main chapters together, I claimed that Jaimini’s 
enquiry is significant not only in that it possesses the structure of a hermeneutic 
tradition but more importantly because those structures are disclosed through our 
excavation and explication of the enjoined subject - the subject who embodies the 
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practical rationality of the Mīmāṃsā tradition and ensures its continuation by presenting 
itself as a carrier and validator of tradition. 
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Regarding the question of areas for further research, I discuss this in line with the two 
strands of enquiry that I have followed in this thesis. Within the scholarship on 
Mīmāṃsā, the excavation and recovering of the earliest Mīmāṃsā system as available 
through Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtras remains to be explored seriously. There is a lack of 
critical analysis on the texts of both Jaimini and Śabara and also a need to dispel the 
generalized presumption that the ritual concerns of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras are irrelevant to 
contemporary discourses. The translations of the Sūtras themselves are still limited to 
only a handful. There have been very few attempts to clarify the true import and 
significance of the text as a whole, particularly in a way that assists and allows readers 
to reimagine ways in which the insights may be of contemporary relevance. Besides the 
paucity of textual studies on the Mīmāṃsā tradition, there is also a dearth of empirical 
researches on the Mīmāṃsā tradition as practiced today, as can still be found in certain 
parts of Kerala as well as the influence of the tradition on Indian culture and ways of 
living through the years. Investigating these areas will undoubtedly provide significant 
insights on the historical embodiment of the ideas of the Sūtras within living 
communities today.  
Within the study of ritual, there is both a need to clarify the distinctiveness of ritual 
studies as a discipline and also imagine new ways to give legitimacy and respectfully 
account the self-understandings and self-articulations of traditions, even if they are 
introduced to critically engage with the social scientific study of ritual. The claim of the 
multi-disciplinary nature of the enquiries conducted by ritual studies remains to be truly 
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multi-disciplinary in that it has not sought to negotiate pluralities in their distinctive 
differences. A genuinely hospitable and multi-voiced discursive practice has yet to be 
initiated. 
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APPENDIX 
SANSKRIT SŪTRAS CITED IN THE TEXT 
All individual references to those sūtras which are fully translated anywhere in the texts 
are listed below: 
MS 1.1.1: Athāto dharmajijñāsā.  
MS 1.1.2: Codanālakṣaṇo’rtho dharmaḥ 
MS 1.1.4: Satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṁ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣaṃ animittaṁ 
vidyamānopalambhanatvāt  
MS 1.1.5: Autpattikastu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ, tasya jñānam upadeśo’vyatirekaś 
cārthe’nupalabdhe tat pramāṇaṁ bādarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt  
MS 1.1.6: Karmaike tatra darśanāt  
MS 1.1.7: Asthānāt  
MS 1.1.8: Karotiśabdāt  
MS 1.1.9: Sattvāntare ca yaugapadyāt 
 MS 1.1.10: Prakṛtivikṛtyośca  
MS 1.1.11: Vṛddhiśca kartṛbhūmnāsya 
MS 1.1.13: Sataḥ paramadarśanaṃ viṣayānāgamāt 
MS 1.1.14: Prayogasya paraṃ 
MS 1.1.16: Varṇāntaram avikāraḥ 
MS 1.1.18: Nityastu syād darśanasya parārthatvāt 
MS 1.1.24: Utpattau va’vacanāḥ syur arthasyāt annimittattvāt 
MS 1.1.26: Loke sanniyamanāt prayogasannikarṣaḥ syāt 
MS 1.1.27: Vedāṁś caike sannikarṣaṁ puruṣākhyāḥ 
MS 1.1.29: Uktantu śabdapūrvatvaṃ  
MS 1.1.30: Ākhyāḥ pravacanāt  
MS 1.1.31: Parantu śrutisāmānyamātraṃ  
 
MS 1.2.1: Āmnāyasya kriyārthatvādānārthakyamatadarthānāṁ tasmādanityamucyate 
MS 1.2.7: Vidhinā tv ekavākyatvāt stuty arthena vidhīnā syuḥ 
MS 1.2.17: Phalasya karmaniṣpattes teṣāṁ lokavat parimāṇataḥ phalaviśeṣaḥ syāt 
MS 1.2.19: Vidhirvā syād apūrvatvād vādamātraṁ hy anarthakaṃ 
MS 1.2.23: Vidhiścānarthakaḥ kvacit tasmātstutiḥ pratīyet tatsāmānyāditareṣu 
tathātvaṃ 
MS 1.2.24: Prakaraṇe sambhavan apakarṣo na kalpyeta vidhyānarthakyaṁ hi taṁ prati 
MS 1.2.25: Vidyau ca vākyabhedaḥ syāt 
MS 1.2.26: Heturvā syādarthavattvopapattibhyāṃ 
MS 1.2.27: Stutistu śabdapūrvatvāt acodanā ca tasya 
MS 1.2.28: Arthe stutiranyāyyeti cet 
MS 1.2.29: Arthastu vidhiśeṣatvāt yathā loke 
MS 1.2.31: Tadarthaśāstrāt 
MS 1.2.32: Vākyaniyamāt 
MS 1.2.33: Bhuddhaśāstrāt 
MS 1.2.34: Avidyamānavacanāt 
MS 1.2.35: Acetane’rthabandhanāt 
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MS 1.2.36: Arthavipratiśedhāt 
MS 1.2.37: Svādhyāyavad vacanāt 
MS 1.2.38: Avijñeyāt 
MS 1.2.39: Anityasaṁyogānmantrānarthakyaṃ 
MS 1.2.40: Avijñiṣṭastu vākyārthaḥ 
MS 1.2.41: Guṇārthena punaḥ śrutiḥ 
MS 1.2.42: Parisaṁkhyā 
MS 1.2.43: Arthavādo vā 
MS 1.2.44: Aviruddhaṁ paraṃ 
MS 1.2.45: Sampraiṣe karmagarhānupalambhaḥ saṁskāratvāt 
MS 1.2.46: Abhidhāne’rthavādaḥ 
MS 1.2.47: Guṇādapratiṣedhaḥ syāt 
MS 1.2.48: Vidyāvacanamasaṁyogāt 
MS 1.2.49: Sataḥ paramavijñānaṃ 
MS 1.2.50: Uktaścānityasaṁyogaḥ 
MS 1.2.51: Liṅgopadeśaśca tadarthatvāt 
MS 1.2.52: Ūhaḥ 
MS 1.2.53: Vidhiśabdāśca 
 
MS 1.3.1: Dharmasya śabdamūlatvāt aśabdamanapekṣyaṁ syāt 
MS 1.3.2: Api vā kartṛsāmānyāt pramāṇamanumānaṁ syāt 
MS 1.3.3: Virodhe tvanapekṣyaṁ syāt asati hyanumānaṃ 
MS 1.3.4: Hetudarśanācca 
MS 1.3.5: Śiṣṭākope viruddhamiti cet 
MS 1.3.6: Na śāstraparimāṇatvāt 
MS 1.3.7: Api vā karaṇāgrahaṇe prayuktānipratīyeran 
MS 1.3.23: Tulyaṁ tu kartṛdharmeṇa 
MS 1.3.33: Akṛtistu kriyārthatvāt 
 
MS 1.4.1: Uktaṁ sāmāmnāyaidamarthya tasmāt sarvaṁ tadarthaṁ syāt 
MS 1.4.2: Api vā nāmadheyaṁ syāt yadutpattāv apūrvam avidhāyakatvāt 
MS 1.4.6: Nāmadheye guṇakṣuteḥ syād vidhānamiti cet 
 
MS 2.1.1: Bhāvārthāh karmaśabdāḥ tebhyaḥ kriyā pratīyetaiṣahyartho vidhīyate 
MS 2.1.2: Sarveṣāṁ bhāvo’rtha iti cet 
MS 2.1.3: Yeṣāmutpattau sve prayoge rūpopalabdhistāni nāmāni tasmāt tebhyaḥ 
parākāṅkṣā bhūtatvāt sve prayoge 
MS 2.1.4: Yeṣāṁ tūtpattāvarthe sve prayogo na vidyate tānyākhyātāni tasmāt tebhyaḥ 
pratīyet āśritatvāt prayogasya 
MS 2.1.5: Codanā punarārambhaḥ 
MS 2.1.6: Tāni dvaidhaṁ guṇapradhānabhūtāni 
MS 2.1.7: Yairdravyaṁ na cikīrṣyate tāni pradhānabhūtāni dravyasya guṇabhūtatvāt 
MS 2.1.8: Yaistu dravyaṁ cikīrṣyate gūṇastatra pratīyeta tasya dravyapradhānatvāt 
MS 2.1.9: Dharmamātre tu karma syādanirvṛtteḥ prayājavat 
MS 2.1.10: Tulyaśrutitvādvā itaraiḥ sadharmaḥ syāt 
MS 2.1.11: Dravyopadeśa iti cet 
MS 2.1.12: Na tadarthatvāt lokavat, tasya ca śeṣabhūtatvāt 
MS 2.1.30: Vidhimantrayor aikārthyam aikaśabdyāt 
MS 2.1.31: Api vā prayogasāmarthyāt mantro’bhidhānavācī syāt 
MS 2.1.32: Taccodakeṣu mantrākhyā 
MS 2.1.33: Śeṣe brāhmaṇaśabdaḥ 
MS 2.1.34: Anāmnāteṣvamantratvamāmnāteṣu hi vibhāgaḥ syāt 
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MS 2.1.35: Teṣāmṛg yatrārthavaśena pādavyavasthā 
MS 2.1.36: Gītiṣu sāmākhyā 
MS 2.1.37: Śeṣe yajuḥśabdaḥ 
MS 2.1.41: Vacanāddharmaviśeṣah 
 
MS 2.3.23: Tatsaṁyogāt kratustadākhyaḥ syāt tena dharmavidhānāni 
 
MS 2.4.2: Kraturvā śrutisaṁyogāt 
MS 2.4.3: Liṅgadarśanācca karmadharme hi prakrameṇa niyamyeta 
tatrānarthakamanyat syāt 
MS 2.4.4: Vyapavargaṁ ca darśayati kālaścet karmabhedaḥ syāt 
MS 2.4.5: Anityatvāt tu naivaṁ syāt 
MS 2.4.6: Virodhaścāpi pūrvavat 
MS 2.4.7: Kartustu dharmaniyamāt kālaśāstraṁ nimittaṁ syāt 
MS 2.4.8: Nāmarūpadharma 
viśeṣapunaruktinindā’saktisamāptivacanaprāyaścittānyārthadarśanāt śākhāntareṣu 
karmabhedaḥ syāt 
MS 2.4.9: Ekaṁ vā saṁyogarūpacodanākhyāviśeṣāt 
 
MS 3.1.2: Śeṣaḥ parārthatvāt 
MS 3.1.3: Dravyaguṇasaṁskāreṣu bādariḥ 
MS 3.1.4: Karmāṇyapi jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt 
MS 3.1.5: Phalaṁ ca puruṣārthatvāt 
MS 3.1.6: Puruṣaśca karmāthatvāt 
MS 3.1.7: Teṣāmarthena sambandhaḥ 
MS 3.1.9: Arthalopādakarma syāt 
 
MS 3.2.22: Anarthakaścopadeśaḥ syādasambandhāt phalavatā na hyupasthānaṁ 
phalavat  
MS 3.2.23: Sarveṣāṁ copadiṣṭatvāt  
 
MS 3.3.35 Tatsarvārthamaviśeṣāt 
MS 3.3.36 Carau vā, arthoktaṁ puroḍāśe’rthavipratiṣedhātpaśau syāt 
MS 3.3.40: Dharmavipratiṣedhācca 
 
MS 3.4.1: Nivītamiti manuṣyadharmaḥ śabdasya tatpradhānatvāt 
MS 3.4.3: Vidhis tv apūrvatvāt syāt 
MS 3.4.20: Aprakaraṇe tu taddharmas tato viśeṣāt 
 
MS 3.5.21: Vacanāni tv apūrvatvāt tasmād yathopadeśaṁ syuḥ 
 
MS 3.7.6: Phalasaṁyogāt tu svāmiyuktaṁ pradhānasya 
MS 3.7.18: Śāstraphalaṁ prayoktari tallakṣaṇatvāt tasmāt svayaṁ prayoge syāt 
MS 3.7.19: Utsarge tu pradhānatvāccheṣakārī pradhānasya, tasmādanyaḥ svayaṁ vā 
syāt 
MS 3.7.20: Pradhānatvāt śeṣakārī pradhānasya, tasmād anyaḥ svayaṁ vā syāt 
MS 3.7.36: Niyamastu dakṣiṇābhiḥ śrutisaṁyogāt 
MS 3.7.38: Svāmisaptadaśāḥ karmasāmānyāt 
MS 3.7.51: Tadguṇādvā svadharmaḥ syād adhikārasāmarthyāt sahāṅgairavyaktaḥ śeṣe 
 
MS 4.1.1: Athātaḥ kratvarthapuruṣārthayorjijñāsā  
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MS 4.1.2: Yasmin prītiḥ puruṣasya tasya lipsā’rthalakṣaṇāvibhaktatvāt 
MS 4.1.3: Tadutsarge karmāṇi puruṣārthāya śāstrasyānatiśaṅkyatvānna ca drayaṁ 
cikīrṣyate tenārthenābhisambandhāt kriyāyāṃ puruṣaśrutiḥ 
MS 4.1.5: Api vā kāraṇā’grahaṇe tadarthamarthasyā’nabhisambandhāt 
MS 4.1.6: Tathā ca lokabhūteṣu 
MS 4.1.22: Ekaniṣpatteḥ sarvaṁ samaṁ syāt 
MS 4.1.23: Saṁsargarasaniṣpatterāmikṣā vā pradhānaṁ syāt 
MS 4.1.24: Mukhyaśabdābhisaṁstavācca 
 
MS 4.2.11: Pratipattirvā śabdaśya tatpradhānatvāt 
MS 4.2.23: Kartṛdeśakālānāmacodanaṁ prayoge nityasamavāyāt 
MS 4.2.27: Yajaticodanā dravyadevatākriyaṁ samudāye kṛtārthatvāt 
 
MS 4.3.1: Dravyasaṁskārakarmasu parārthatvāt phalaśrutirarthavādaḥ syāt 
MS 4.3.4: Naimittike vikāratvāt kratupradhānamanyat syāt 
MS 4.3.5: Ekasya tūbhayatve saṁyogapṛthaktvaṃ 
MS 4.3.7: Nārthapṛthaktvāt 
MS 4.3.10: Codanāyāṁ phalāśruteḥ karmamātraṁ vidhīyate na hyaśabdaṁ pratīyate 
MS 4.3.11: Api vā’mnānasāmarthyāc codanārthena gamyate arthānāṁ hyarthavattvena 
vacanāni pratīyante arthato hyasamarthānāmānantaryye’pyasambandhaḥ 
tasmācśrutyekadeśaḥ  
MS 4.3.14: Ekaṁ vā codanaikatvāt 
MS 4.3.15: Sa svargaḥ syāt, sarvān pratyaviśiṣṭatvāt 
MS 4.3.16: Pratyayācca 
 
MS 5.1.16: Mantratastu virodhe syāt prayogarūpasāmarthyāt tasmādutpattideśaḥ saḥ 
MS 5.1.29: Tathā’pūrvaṃ 
 
MS 6.1.3: Pratyarthaṁ cā’bhisaṁyogāt karmato hy abhisambandhaḥ tasmāt 
karmopadeśaḥ syāt 
MS 6.1.4: Phalārthatvāt karmaṇaḥ śāstraṁ sarvādhikāraṁ syāt 
MS 6.1.5: Karturvā śrutisaṁyogād vidhiḥ kārtsnyena gamyate 
MS 6.1.6: Liṅgaviśeṣanirdeśāttu puṁyukttamaitiśāyanaḥ 
MS 6.1.7: Tadukttitvācca doṣaśrutiravijñāte 
MS 6.1.8: Jātiṁ tu bādarāyaṇo’viśeṣāt tasmāt strayapi pratīyeta jātyarthasyāviśiṣṭatvāt 
MS 6.1.10: Dravyavattvāttu puṁsāṁ syāt dravyasaṁyuktaṁ krayavikrayābhyām 
adravyatvaṁ strīṇām dravyaiḥ samānayogitvāt 
MS 6.1.12: Tādarthyāt karmatādarthyaṃ 
MS 6.1.13: Phalotsāhā’viśeṣāttu 
MS 6.1.14: Arthena ca samavetatvāt 
MS 6.1.15: Krayasya dharmamātratvaṃ 
MS 6.1.16: Svavattāmapi darśayati 
MS 6.1.17: Svavatostu vacanādaikakarmyaṁ syāt 
MS 6.1.20: Phalārthitvāttu svāmitvenā’bhisambandhaḥ 
MS 6.1.24: Tasyā yāvaduktamāśīrbrahmacaryyamatulyatvāt 
MS 6.1.25: Cāturvarṇyam aviśeṣāt 
MS 6.1.26: Nirdeśādvā trayāṇāṁ syādagnyādheye hyasambandhaḥ kratuṣu 
brāhmaṇaśrutirityātreyaḥ 
MS 6.1.27: Nimittārthena bādariḥ tasmāt sarvādhikāraḥ syāt 
MS 6.1.28: Api vā’nyārthadarśanāt yathāśruti pratīyet 
MS 6.1.35: Saṁskārasya tadarthatvāt vidyāyāṁ puruṣaśrutiḥ 
MS 6.1.37: Avaidyatvādabhāvaḥ karmaṇi syāt 
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MS 6.1.39: Trayāṇāṁ dravyasampannaḥ karmaṇo dravyasiddhitvāt 
MS 6.1.40: Anityatvāttu naivaṁ syādarthāddhi dravyasaṁyogaḥ 
MS 6.1.41: Aṅgahīnaśca taddharmā 
MS 6.1.42: Utpattau nityasaṁyogāt 
MS 6.1.44: Vacanād rathakārasyādhāne’sya sarvaśeṣatvāt  
MS 6.1.51: Sthapatirniṣādaḥ syāt śabdasāmarthyāt 
 
MS 6.2.1: Puruṣārthaikasiddhitvāt tasya tasyādhikāraḥ syāt 
MS 6.2.2: Api cotpattisaṁyogo yathā syāt sattvadarśanaṃ, tathā bhāvo vibhāge syāt 
MS 6.2.6: Api vā kāmasaṁyoge sambandhāt prayogāyopadiśyeta pratyartha hi 
vidhiśruti viṣāṇāvat 
MS 6.2.9: Phalakāmo nimittamiti cet 
MS 6.2.13: Prakramāt tu niyamyetāsambhavasya kriyānimittatvāt 
MS 6.2.14: Phalārthitvādvā’niyamo yathānupakrānte 
MS 6.2.15: Niyamo vā tannimittatvāt kartustatkāraṇaṁ syāt 
MS 6.2.16: Loke karmāṇi vedavattato’dhipuruṣajñānaṃ 
MS 6.2.17: Aparādhe’pi ca taih sāstraṃ 
MS 6.3.18: Na devatāgniśabdakriyamanyārthasaṁyogāt 
MS 6.3.21: Tathā svāminaḥ phalasamavāyāt phalasya karmayogitvāt 
 
MS 6.5.5: Apūrvatvādvidhānaṁ syāt 
 
MS 6.7.14: Ahargaṇe ca taddharmā syāt sarvesāmaviśeṣāt 
 
MS 7.1.1: Srutipramāṇatvāccheṣāṇāṁ mukhyabhede yathādhikāraṁ bhāvaḥ syāt 
MS 7.1.2: Utpattyarthāvibhāgādvā sattvavadaikadharmyaṁ syāt 
MS 7.1.3: Codanāśeṣabhāvādvā tadbhedādvyavatiṣṭheran utpatterguṇabhūtatvāt 
MS 7.1.4: Sattve lakṣaṇasaṁyogāt sārvatrikaṁ pratīyeta 
MS 7.1.5: Avibhāgāttu naivaṁ syāt 
MS 7.1.6: Dvyarthatvaṁ ca vipratiṣiddhaṃ 
MS 7.1.7: Utpattau vidhyabhāvādvā codanāyāṁ pravṛttiḥ syāt, tataśca karmabhedaḥ 
syāt 
MS 7.1.8: Yadi vā’pyabhidhānavat sāmānyāt sarvadharmaḥ syāt 
MS 7.1.9: Arthasya tvavibhaktatvāttathā syādabhidhāneṣu pūrvavatvāt prayogasya, 
karmaṇaḥ śabdabhāvayatvādvibhāgāccheṣāṇāmapravṛttiḥ syāt 
MS 7.1.10: Smṛtiriti cet 
MS 7.1.11: Na pūrvavattvat 
MS 7.1.12: Arthasya śabdabhāvyatvāt prakaraṇanibandhanācchabdādevānyatra 
bhāva’syāt 
 
MS 7.4.10: Vidhyanto vā prakṛtivaccodanāyāṁ pravarteta tathā hi liṅgadarśanaṃ 
 
MS 8.1.1: Atha viśeṣalakṣaṇaṃ 
MS 8.1.5: Kṛtsnavidhānādvā’pūrvatvaṃ 
MS 8.1.34 Guṇatvena devatāśrutiḥ 
MS 8.1.35: Hiraṇyamājyadharma, tejastvāt 
MS 8.1.36: Dharmānugrahācca 
MS 8.1.37: Auṣadhaṁ vā viśadatvāt 
 
MS 8.3.32: Dṛṣṭaḥ prayoga iti cet 
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MS 9.1.1: Yajñakarma pradhānaṁ taddhi codanābhūtaṁ tasya dravyeṣu 
saṁskārastatprayuktastadarthatvāt 
MS 9.1.2: Saṁskāre yujyamānānāṁ tādarthyāttatprayuktaṁ syāt 
MS 9.1.3: Tena tvarthena yajñasya saṁyogād 
dharmasambandhastasmādyajñaprayuktaṁ syāt saṁkārasya tadarthatvāt 
MS 9.1.4: Phaladevatayośca 
MS 9.1.5: Na codanāto hi tādguṇyaṃ 
MS 9.1.6: Devatā vā prayojayedatithivad bhojanasya tadarthatvāt 
MS  9.1.7: Ārthapatyācca 
MS 9.1.8: Tataśca tena sambandhaḥ 
MS 9.1.9: Api vā śabdapūrvatvādyajñakarma pradhānaṁ syād guṇatve devatāśrutiḥ 
MS 9.1.10: Atithau tatpradhānatvam abhāvaḥ karmaṇi syāttasya prītipradhānatvāt 
MS 9.1.13: Artho vā syāt prayojanamitareṣāmacodanāt tasya ca guṇabhūtatvāt 
MS 9.1.26: Agnidharmaḥ pratīṣṭakaṁ saṅghātātpaurṇamāsīvat 
MS 9.1.27: Agnervā syād dravyaikatvāditarāsāṁ tadarthatvāt 
 
MS 9.2.43: Ākhyā caivaṁ tadāveśād vikṛtau syād pūrvatvāt 
 
MS 9.3.20: Apūrve tvavikāro’pradeśāt pratīyeta 
 
MS 9.4.1: Ṣaḍviṁśatirabhyāsena paśugaṇe tatprakṛtitvād gunasya 
pravibhaktatvādavikāro hi tāsāmakātrsnyenābhisambandho vikārānna samāsaḥ 
syādasaṁyogācca sarvābhiḥ 
MS 9.4.39: Vratadharmāc ca lepavat 
MS 9.4.41: Abhyudaye dohāpanayaḥ sadharmā syāt pravṛttatvāt 
 
MS 10.2.22: Ṛtvigdānaṁ dharmamātrārthaṁ syāddadātisāmarthyāt 
MS 10.2.23: Parikrayārthaṁ vā karmasaṁyogāllokavat 
MS 10.2.37: Syādvā prāsārpikasya dharmamātratvāt 
MS 10.2.38: Na dakṣiṇāśabdāt tasmānnityānuvādaḥ syāt 
MS 10.2.39: Udavasānīyaḥ satradharmā syāt tadaṅgatvāttatra dānaṁ dharmamātraṁ 
syāt 
MS 10.2.40: Na tvetatprakṛtitvādvibhaktacoditatvācca 
MS 10.2.69: Naimittike tu kāryatvāt prakṛteḥ syāt tadāpatteḥ 
 
MS 10.4.23: Vidhiśabdasya mantratve bhāvaḥ syāt tena codanā  
 
MS 10.5.11: Ekasyāṁ vā stomasyāvṛttidharmatvāt 
MS 10.5. 24: Dhuryeṣvapīti cet 
 
MS 10.6.45: Satramekaḥ prakṛtivat 
MS 10.6.46: Vacanāt tu bahūnāṁ syāt 
MS 10.6.47: Apadeśaḥ syāditi cet 
MS 10.6.48: Na ekavyapadeśāt 
MS 10.6.49: Sannivāpañca darśayati 
MS 10.6.50: Bahūnāmiti caikasmin viśeṣavacanaṁ vyarthaṃ 
MS 10.6.59: Dvādaśāhasyas atratvam āsanopāyicodanena yajamānabahutvena ca 
satraśabdābhisaṁyogāt 
MS 10.6.60: Yajaticodanādahīnatvaṁ svāmināṁ cā’sthitaparimāṇatvāt 
 
MS 11.1.1: Prayojanābhisambandhāt pṛthak satāṁ tataḥ 
syādaikakarmyamekaśabdābhisaṁyogāt 
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MS 11.1.6: Arthabhedastu tatrārthehaikārthyādaikakarmyaṃ 
MS 11.1.20: Karmanyārambhabhāvyatvāt kṛṣivat pratyārambhaṁ phalānī syuḥ 
MS 11.1.21: Adhikāraś ca sarveṣāṁ kāryyatvād upapadyate viśeṣaḥ 
MS 11.1.22: Sakṛttu syāt kṛtārthatvādaṅgavat 
MS 11.1.23: Śabdārthaśca tathā loke 
MS 11.1.24: Api vā samprayoge yathākāmī sampratīyetāśrutitvādvidhiṣu vacanāni syuḥ 
MS 11.1.25: Aikaśabdyāt tathāṅgeṣu 
MS 11.1.26: Loke karmā’rthalakṣaṇaṃ 
MS 11.1.27: Kriyāṇāmarthaśeṣatvāt pratyakṣo’tastannirvṛttyā’pavargaḥ syāt 
MS 11.1.28: Dharmamātre tvadarśanāc chabdārthenāpavargaḥ syāt 
MS 11.1.39: Dṛṣṭaḥ prayoga iti cet 
 
MS 11.3.6: Tatkālastu yūpakarmatvāttasya dharmavidhānāt sarvārthānāṁ ca 
vacanādanyakālatvaṃ
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